ROMANIAN ACADEMY
INSTITUTE OF ARCHAEOLOGY OF IAŞI

CHARLES J. HALPERIN

Russia and the Mongols

Slavs and the Steppe in Medieval and Early Modern Russia

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Edidit

VICTOR SPINEI

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Edited by

Victor Spinei and George Bilavschi

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Address: THE PUBLISHING HOUSE OF THE ROMANIAN ACADEMY
Calea 13 Septembrie nr. 13, Sector 5
050711 Bucureşti, România
Tel. (+40-21)3188146; (+4021)3188106
Fax. (+40-21)3182444
E-mail: edacad@ear.ro
www.ear.ro

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INTRODUCTION

As it is well known now, the installation of the Communist regime in Romania after World War II had very negative effects not only on the economy and society, but also on academic life. Censorship, obedience to Marxian doctrines, concessions to extreme nationalist attitudes, the precariousness of material resources, the drastic decrease in contacts with Western scholarly life, and other such ills caused stagnation in certain branches of historical science and depreciation of the international prestige of Romanian historiography. Recovering from those ills is not easy at all and may take some time, since certain out-dated ways of thinking have proven persistent, openness to the world's innovating trends and tendencies remains at a rather low level, and available material means necessary for research are still limited.

Nevertheless, many representatives of Romanian historiography, belonging to all generations, steadily promote reform and updating of research, and they are convinced of the necessity of more dynamism and more diversification in scientific undertakings. The leadership of the Institute of Archaeology of Iaşi fully share that attitude, since they are aware of the fact that exchanges of ideas and publications with colleagues and similar institutions of other countries, constructive professional debates, continuous collaboration, as well as common projects of general interest are of utmost importance.

In the spirit of such ideas, we think it worthwhile to include the achievements of Romanian researchers in volumes and journals published in other countries, as well as to include foreign historians' works in Romanian publications. At the same time, we consider it quite useful to gather, in distinct volumes, one and the same author's studies dedicated to a direction that is unitary in both theme and cultural horizon. Such anthologies spare the reader the trouble of looking for studies, on one or another specific matter, scattered in volumes and periodicals published in different places at different times. Nowadays the handiness of that kind of anthology is much appreciated everywhere, and such volumes of personal studies are frequently published in many countries.

By setting up the series Florilegium magistrorum historiae archaeologiaeque Antiquitatis et Medii Aevi, *with the full assent of the Publishing House of the Romanian Academy, the leadership of the Institute of Archaeology in Iaşi wish to make more available the scholarly contributions of some of the world's most prestigious specialists in the domains of Antiquity and the Middle Ages. As a rule, the volumes are to include studies that represent approaches to historical topics of general interest, as well as to modern methodological aspects that stimulated debates and controversies.*

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In order to institute the Florilegium *project, we approached several notable scholars in Europe and America, and we were glad to find out that our initiative was welcomed. In the special case this introduction refers to, the promptitude of his response to the dialogue we initiated in order to carry out the anthology project, and moreover, the value and diversity of the studies he offered account for the fact that the personality chosen to open the series was the eminent American mediaevalist Charles J. Halperin. He is known in the world of specialists mainly for his substantial investigations of the impact the great Mongol invasion had on Eastern Europe.*

The American colleague was not as ready to co-operate when he was asked to reveal certain biographical details. He was not very forthcoming in that respect, so we cannot mention too many details in regard to his career. In exchange, the list of his publications is quite telling as to the large range of the topics he has dealt with over the years.

Charles J. Halperin was born on 21 July 1946 in New York City, and he studied history at the Brooklyn College, Brooklyn, N.Y., between 1963 and 1967. He continued his education in his native city, at the Columbia University, where he also completed his doctoral thesis on a subject of Russian history. As a graduate student, he benefited from a research stay in the Soviet Union in 1971-1972, by means of the scholarships he received from the International Research and Exchanges Board and the Fulbright Hays Fellowship. For him it was a good opportunity to get more familiar with the Russian language and with the writings of Russian scholars. In 1972 he became an assistant professor at the Department of History of the Indiana University at Bloomington, Indiana, where he taught Russian history until 1980. In 1980-1982 he was a senior fellow at the Russian Institute of the Columbia University. It was during that period, more exactly in the autumn of 1981, when he returned to the Soviet Union for research, within the framework of an agreement of scientific collaboration. As he was unable to get another position at a university, for several years he had to work as a computer instructor, computer programmer and system analyst, until 1996, when he returned to Bloomington, where he later received a Visiting Scholar's position at the Russian and East European Institute of Indiana University, where he still works at present. That position carries no responsibilities, but does offer him some library and computer conveniences. So, with a shade of self-irony, Charles J. Halperin still defines himself as an "independent scholar". It is regrettable that no university has found it a way of taking advantage of his remarkable scientific potential, to the benefit of the education process.

No matter what professional position he held, Charles J. Halperin remained true to what he was mainly preoccupied in his youth, namely with the relationship of the Mongols with the Russian principalities. On that problem - with vast implications, both synchronically and diachronically -, he wrote two

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fundamental books: Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History *(Bloomington, IN, 1985), and* The Tatar Yoke *(Columbus, OH, 1986). They remain reference books, and they still are helpful, although two decades have passed since their publication. Charles J. Halperin has also published a series of studies on the same subject. In them he shows solid documentation, keen interpretation, and minute analysis of complex and controversial problems, for which he found credible solutions. His studies are of real importance not only for the history of the Mongols and of Russia, but also for the history of the whole eastern half of Europe.*

The present volume provides a selection from the rich range of works by Charles J. Halperin. Unfortunately, we have not been able to include other valuable articles by the same author. Our hope is that the present anthology will be received with interest by specialists not only in Romania, but also in other countries where there is major interest in the history of the Golden Horde and of mediaeval Russia.

The editors of this anthology wish to address their cordial thanks to the American and European publishing houses which first published the articles of this volume, and which kindly agreed to allow republication by Publishing House of the Romanian Academy.

Victor SPINEI

(Translated by Adrian PORUCIUC)

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A CHINGISSID SAINT OF RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH: "THE LIFE OF PETER, *TSAREVICH* OF THE HORDE"

The "Life of Peter, *Tsarevich*[1] of the Horde," despite its brevity, has at one time or another attracted the interest of historians of Russo-Mongol relations, Russian intellectual history, the history of the Russian Orthodox Church, and specialists in Old-Russian literature. Indeed, the text does have information on a variety of aspects of Russian political and cultural history. Nor would it be facetious to claim that the process by which a reputed descendent of Chinghis Khan became a saint of the Russian Orthodox Church possesses a certain intrinsic interest in and of itself.

It is most convenient, I think, considering the length of the text, to present its contents in some detail before considering problems of genre, dating, and interpretation. The earliest manuscripts of the *Life* date from the sixteenth century, and seem to differ but little amongst themselves.[2] All quotations will be from the most readily available text, as published in a collection of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Russian tales.

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[1] *Tsarevich* is usually translated as "prince," which does not convey the idea of membership in the Imperial (*tsarskii*) clan of the Chingissids; in terms of the Mongols, Russian sources use the word "prince" (*kniaz'*) to refer to non-Chingissid, tribal/clan royalty, e.g. "prince" Mamai or "prince" Edigei, where "prince" translates "emir" or "beg."

[2] *GPB*, Sof. 1364, 11, 333-343 verso, beginning of the sixteenth century, published in *Russkie povesti XV-XVI vekov*, comp. M. O. Skripil' (Moscow-Leningrad, 1958), pp. 98-105. This volume also contains a modern Russian translation of the text (pp. 266-27) and Notes and Commentary (pp. 430-440). All page references will be to the publication of the text in this volume, hereafter referred to as *RP*.

Only a slightly different manuscript, judging by discussions based on it, was published in "Skazanie o blazhennom Petre tsareviche Ordynskom," *Pravoslavnyi sobesednik*, no. 1 (March, 1859, pp. 356-376), inaccessible to me. Where possible, variants from this manuscript will be indicated.

Other sixteenth- or seventeenth-century manuscripts are referred to in F. Buslaev, "Smolenskaia legenda o sv. Merkurii i rostovskaia o Petre, tsareviche ordynskom," in his *Istoricheskie ocherki russkoi narodnoi slovesnosti i iskusstva* (St. Petersburg, 1861), p. 159; Ia. S. Lur'e, ed., *Istoki russkoi belletristiki* (Leningrad, 1970), p. 422, n. 130. [Hereafter referred to as *IRB*]; and *Opisanie ruk. otdela BAN*, 4 vols. (Moscow-Leningrad, 1951-1971), III, vyp. 2: *Istoricheskie sborniki XV-XVII vv.*, 226. These include manuscripts of the separate redaction of the *Life* included in Makarii's Great Menology, discussed below.

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The *Life* begins by recounting how bishop Cyril of Rostov travelled to the Horde for the sake of his eparchy. While there he cured the son of tsar Berke, for which he was greatly honored, receiving the right to collect annual donations (*obroki*) during his lifetime from the Iaroslavl' princes in honor of the sainted baptizer of Rostov, bishop Leontii. (p. 98) While at the Horde, Cyril's preaching stirs the soul of the young nephew of the tsar, who comes to question his own animistic beliefs. The author of the *Life* emphasizes that through the will of God good can come even from those of "evil origin" (lit. "evil roots"). (pp. 98-99) The *tsarevich* flees to Rostov, where he is impressed by the beauty of the liturgy in the *Uspenskii* cathedral, sung simultaneously in Greek and Russian. The *tsarevich* informs bishop Cyril of his desire to be baptized, but Cyril counsels caution, advising the neophyte to wait a while lest people come from the Horde to search for him. Soon Berke dies, and the bishop feels secure enough during the resulting confusion in the Horde to baptize the *tsarevich,* giving him the name Peter. The newly converted youth becomes a devout Christian, and resides with bishop Cyril until the latter's death. Bishop Ignatii, Cyril's successor, engaged in beautifying the *Uspenskii* cathedral, travels to the Horde seeking assistance as his predecessor did. (p. 99)

Peter, though an observant Christian, nevertheless had not forgotten his "Imperial...amusements" (*tsarskie...utekhi*), (p. 99) especially hunting. One day Peter falls asleep, while hunting, and the Apostles Peter and Paul appear to him in a dream, informing him that he is to build a church on that very spot, near lake Nero, where he is sleeping. The apostles announce their intention to "strengthen" (*ukrepiti*) Peter's clan (*rod*) and tribe (*plemia*). Peter does not understand this, thinking they mean to enhance his relatives among the Tatars. Peter and Paul give the *tsarevich* two purses, one of silver and one of gold, and instruct him to purchase three icons from the market in Rostov, and to bring them to the bishop of Rostov when he conveys their message to him.

In the meantime, the Apostles have also appeared in a dream to the bishop, threatening him with death unless he uses his treasury to build a church in then-honor. (p. 100) Bishop Ignatii does not understand their instructions, as the location of the future church is unspecified. In terror, Ignatii informs the prince, Boris Vasil'kovich (who is not named in this manuscript) of his dream. Precisely at that moment Peter approaches them with his three, recently-purchased icons, which reveal their supernatural origins by glowing brightly. The bishop and the prince are puzzled, since there are no icon-painters in Rostov, and Peter, being too young and "from the Tatars" (var. "from unbelievers" [*inovernykh*][3]), could not have painted the icons himself. Obviously the Apostles, as bishop Ignatii now appreciates from Peter's dream, have foreordained the construction of a church in their honor. (p. 101)

[3] Buslaev, p. 160.

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A liturgical procession proceeds to the designated spot, but the prince "playfully" refuses to donate the land to its divine purpose. Peter, obeying his instructions from the Apostles, promises to pay whatever price the prince demands for the land from the miraculous purses he has been given. The prince jocularly asks for nine *grivna* of silver and a tenth of gold, enough to mark the boundaries of the land laid out with a string.[4] Peter suggests only that the boundary be marked by a ditch, as in the Horde, which is immediately done. (p. 101) Peter, after some urging by the bishop, pays the agreed-upon sum, unaware that this is ten times the land's worth. His purses remain full, although the prince's carts can barely move from the weight of the gold and silver. The prince realizes the miraculous intervention of the Apostles. (p. 102)

Peter continues to live an exemplary life, but soon grows pensive. The prince and bishop reason: "If this man, of the Imperial tribe (*tsarevo plemia*), goes to the Horde, there will be great harm to our city." To tie him further to Rostov they arrange his marriage to the daughter of a Tatar magnate (*vel'mozha*) resident in Rostov. In addition, the prince frequently takes Peter hunting and invites him to the princely table, lest Peter abandon the Christian faith. (p. 102)

The prince gives Peter part of his own patrimony (*votchina*) near the Church of the Holy Apostles on the lake, and offers Peter a charter (*gramota*). Peter responds: "I, prince, from my father and my mother do not know how to own land, and what purpose would a charter serve?" The prince explains that a charter would inhibit his, the prince's, sons and grandsons from taking the land away from Peter's heirs. A charter is written in the presence of the bishop giving Peter the land, water and forests. Affairs in the Horde were quiet then. (p. 102) The prince grows increasingly fond of Peter. The prince's children call Peter "uncle," and Peter is always with the prince. In a formal church ceremony the prince and Peter become brothers. Peter dies, a respected old man, having taken the monastic cowl. At Peter's death the Peter-and-Paul Church is converted into a monastery, and Peter is buried on the spot where he first saw the Apostles in a dream. (pp. 102-103)

> The grandsons of the old prince forgot Peter and his goodness, and began to take away meadows and began to infringe on the boundaries of the possessions of Peter's children (lit. take from them frontier lands, *ukrainye zemli*). Peter's son [Lazar, not named in this manuscript] went to the Horde, announcing himself the grandson of the brother of the tsar. His uncles rejoiced and honored him and gave him many gifts and asked for an emissary (*posol*) of the tsar. The emissary of the tsar came to

[4] *Verv'* in the Old-Russian, interpreted as *verevka;* alternatively as the *verv'* of the Kievan Law Code *Pravda russkaia,* whose meaning in this context remains obscure to me. See Buslaev, p. 168; *Istoriia russkoi literatury,* 10 vols. (Moscow-Leningrad, 1941-1954), II, ch. i: *Literatura 1220-kh – 1550-kh gg.* (1946), 352. [Hereafter *IRL*-1946]

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> Rostov, and, having looked at Peter's charter from the old prince, gave judgment. And he set the boundaries of the land according to the charter of the old prince, and awarded the case to Peter's son and gave him a charter with a gold seal against the claims of the young princes and the grandsons of the old prince, according to the word of the tsar. And he went away. (p. 103)

The young princes say that they had heard their parents call Peter "uncle," but they do not have any sympathy for him or his heirs. Peter was "of the Tatar race" (*Tatarskii rod*), "not of our clan" (lit. bone, *kost'*). "What is his tribe to us?" they inquire. The Rostov princes resent the fact that Peter's heirs received more honor in the Horde than they. (p. 103)

Peter's grandson Iurii is a generous benefactor to the *Uspenskii* cathedral and the Petrov monastery, sponsoring liturgies in honor of Peter. Iurii's fishermen are more successful than those of Rostov, and upon the farmers' complaint the Rostov princes forbid Iurii's men to fish in lake Nero.

> Having heard this, Iurii, the grandson of Peter, went to the Horde, announcing himself the great-grandson of the brother of the tsar. His uncles honored him with great honors, and gave him many gifts and sent an envoy of the tsar to give him justice. The envoy came to Rostov and sat on the lake at the Church of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul, and the princes were afraid of the tsar's envoy, and he judged them against Peter's grandson.

After examining the charter, the envoy rejects the princes' claim that although the land belongs to Peter's heir the water is their patrimony, and decides the case in Iurii's favor, again giving him a charter with a gold seal. (pp. 103-104)

Under the great-grandson of Peter, Ignat, Akhmyl comes to the Russian Land, burning Iaroslavl' and advancing on Rostov. The princes flee. Ignat threatens the bishop Prokhor with his sword to coerce him not to flee as well, but to join Ignat in meeting Akhmyl peaceably. Ignat insists: "he is of our tribe and a blood-relative" (*Nashe est' plemia i srodichi*). The bishop and his congregation meet Akhmyl:

> And Ignat went in front of the crosses and the citizens, and taking the accoutrements of Imperial amusement (*tsarskie utekhi*), hunting gerfalcons, a fur coat, and drink, he stook on his knees at the edge of the field and lake in front of Akhmyl, and announced himself a brother from olden times (lit. ancient brother, *drevnii brat*) of the Imperial tribe (*tsareva plemeni*). "And this village belongs to the tsar and to you, lord. Our ancestor, who wrought miracles, bought it, lord."

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Asked to identify the people with him, Ignat explains to Akhmyl: "They are those who pray for the tsar and for you (*bogomol'tsi tsarevy i tvoi sut'*), who bless you and carry on prayer (*noshakhu bozhnitsu/*), according to our law." Now Prokhor heals by prayer and holy water the son of Akhmyl, who concludes:

> Blessed is the High God (*vysshii bog*) who put it in our hearts to come here. You are correct, lord bishop Prokhor, that your prayer would cure my son. Blessed are you, Ignat, who saved your people and protected this city. You are of the Imperial clan (*tsareva kost'*) and our tribe, and if harm should come to you here, do not hesitate to come to us.

Ignat leads Akhmyl away, and receives the blessing of Prokhor. The *Life* now itself comes to a close with a prayer that the descendents of Peter multiply and be blessed. (pp. 104-105)

* * *

In terms of genre Kliuchevskii first pointed out that the "Life of Peter, *Tsarevich* of the Horde" does not adhere to the mandatory literary canons for a saint's vita, despite the fact that it calls Peter "blessed" (*blazhennyi*),[5] Indeed, most manuscripts call the text a "tale" (*povest'*) rather than a vita (*zhitie*).[6] As Dmitriev has recently phrased it, the text is a combination vita and tale, the second half of which forms a sort of family chronicle of the Petrovichi.[7] In the sixteenth century *tsarevich* Peter was officially canonized at the councils of Metropolitan Makarii,[8] and the text was now altered to conform more closely to the literary etiquette of vitae before inclusion in Makarii's Great Menology. The entire second half of the *Life*, everything not about Peter himself, was removed, and in the first part details were adjusted to make the work more simplistic and didactic. Prince Boris no longer expresses any desire to fleece Peter over the purchase price of the land, although he still accepts the excessive payment.

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[5] V. O. Kliuchevskii, *Drevnerusskiia zhitiia sviatykh kak istoricheskii isto*chnik (Moscow, 1871), pp. 42-43.

[6] *IRL*-1946, p. 351.

[7] *IRB*, pp. 244-245. Also *IRL*-1946, p. 352.

[8] On Peter's canonization in the sixteenth century, see Kliuchevskii, p. 40, n. 1; E. Golubinskii, *Istoriia kanonizatsii sviatykh v russkoi tserkvi*. 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1903), pp. 110-111, 425, 548. Peter is mentioned among a list of "Rostov wonder-workers" in a speech by Ivan IV on the capture of Polotsk, *Akty istoricheskie*, 5 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1841-1872), I, 320, but not identified as a *tsarevich*.

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Only concern for Peter's salvation now motivates his marriage, not the security of Rostov. The redactors added the not unreasonable interpolation that the Tatar magnate who gave his daughter in marriage to Peter was already a Christian.[9] Everything that would violate hagiographic style was deleted, suggesting that Chizhevskii errs in ascribing inclusion of the *Life* in the Great Menology to a "typical misunderstanding" of sixteenth-century Muscovite scribes.[10] Dmitriev has praised the success of the unknown author of the primary redaction of the *Life* in fusing its disparate elements into a unified, rather homogeneous whole, not so much to violate hagiographic canons but consciously to attempt to create an integral narrative which Dmitriev calls "belles-lettristic." Certainly the cohesiveness of the *Life* cannot be denied.[11] Dmitriev's literary analysis shows the substantive unity of the *Life*, the inter-relatedness of each of its motifs and elements.[12]

Dating the text has proven somewhat more problematical; the issue, as we shall see, has some importance for the interpretation of the *Life*. Kliuchevskii noted its various anachronisms. Bishop Cyril is said to have baptized Peter after Berke's death, although Cyril predeceased Berke by four years. Moreover, Berke had already converted to Islam but Peter renounces pagan animism.[13] One could add the observation that the Rostov Monastery of the Holy Apostles itself predated *tsarevich* Peter's conversion by about seventy years; Peter was most certainly not its founder.[14] The raid of Akhmyl was actually a punitive expedition sent by Tsar Uzbek in 1322, so the *Life* could not have been written, or completed, less than a century or so after Peter's death, counting four generations to his great-grandsons. But Kliuchevskii claimed that the *Life* evinces a fresh impression of the incursions of the Rostov princes and Mongols on the lands of the Petrovichi and the Petrov monastery. The lucid narrative has not had much time to be obscured by gradual literary embellishment. The implicit denigration of the Rostov princes, to which I will return, would make sense in the early fourteenth century, Kliuchevskii believed, when the growing power of Moscow had already reduced Rostov's independence, as the famous description of the arrival of the Muscovite governors (*namestniki*) in the "Life of St. Sergius" vividly attests. At the latest, Kliuchevskii decided, the *Life* could not have been written after the middle of the fourteenth century.[15]

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[9] *IRB*, p. 422.

[10] Dmitrij Čiževskij, *History of Russian Literature from the Eleventh Century to the end of the Baroque* (s'Gravenhage, 1960), p. 200.

[11] *IRB*, pp. 245, 250-251.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 245-250. For a less convincing literary analysis, by Putilov, see *Istoriia russkoi literatury*, 3 vols. (Moscow-Leningrad, 1958-1964), I, 706-707. [Hereafter *IRL*-1958].

[13] Kliuchevskii, pp. 38-40.

[14] *RP*, pp. 439-440.

[15] Kliuchevskii, pp. 40-42; accepted by A. N. Pypin, *Istoriia russkoi literatury*, 3 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1898-1899), I, 329 (*Drevniaia pis'mennost'*); and by A. N. Nasonov, *Mongoly i Rus'*

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The Soviet specialist on Old-Russian literature Skripil' rejected Kliuchevskii's dating. Skripil' related the genre of "Life of Peter" to what he called the motif of the Horde emigrant who-founds-a-church. The two analogues Skripil' invoked were the Godunov clan geneology tracing their lineage to a Tatar prince Chet, who in 1330 left the Horde, converted to Orthodoxy after a miraculous dream and founded the Ipat'ev monastery, and the similar tale of the Tatar post-official (*iamshchik*) Buga, who, rather than face execution on the orders of Alexander Nevskii, became baptized, and after a providential dream founded the Ustiug Monastery of the Birth of John the Baptist.[16] The earliest time at which the Petrov monastery would have invoked the memory of a converted Tatar-founder, Skripil' insisted, would have been after numerous *tsarevichi* entered Muscovite service in the mid-fifteenth century. Skripil' felt that the vulnerability of the Rostov princes to criticism would then most likely be a function of Ivan III's purchase of half of Rostov in 1474, which created sufficient fears in the minds of the Petrov monks for their land to inspire the writing of a *Life* sanctifying the monastery's landowning rights. Even though it may have been based on earlier written notes (*zapisi*), Skripil' therefore dated the *Life*, implicitly at the same epoch as the two other representatives of its genre, no earlier than the end of the fifteenth century.[17]

Obviously the *Life* is based on legendary material; even the existence of the *tsarevich* Peter and his victimized descendents cannot be verified outside the *Life* itself.[18] Dmitriev, while postulating the existence of the legend of Peter by the mid-fourteenth century, agrees with Skripil's dating of the *Life* in its final literary form, although Dmitriev adds the eternal caveat that no dating can ever be definitive in a manuscript tradition such as this one.[19]

Budovnits, on the other hand, sought to discredit Skripil's argumentation and to rehabilitate Kliuchevskii's dating. Budovnits pointed out the dissimilarity between the phenomena of the mid-fifteenth-century serving Tatar princes and the converted youth of the *Life*. Relying upon Nasonov's analysis, Budovnits emphasized the congruence between the *Life* and the actual history of Rostovian-Mongol relations in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Nasonov had shown that in this period the Mongols made the Rostov princes the objects of their particular attention, as a counterweight to the

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(Moscow-Leningrad, 1940), pp. 40-41, 107-108, who considers the description of the 1322 raid that of an eyewitness.

[16] *RP*, pp. 430-433, repeated from *IRL*-1946, p. 354. The Commentary on the *Life* in *RP* is almost a verbatim reproduction of the sub-chapter by Skripil' in the 1946 volume on it. I have not seen M. O. Skripil', "Legendarno-politicheskie skazaniia drevnei Rusi," *Doklady I soobshcheniia Fil. fak. LGU*, vyp. 2 (1950), which refers to the *Life* on pp. 57-59.

[17] *RP* pp. 434-435; *IRL*-1946, pp. 354-356. Cf. Putilov's dating, *IRL*-1958, p. 203 on different grounds of genre.

[18] Putilov alone concludes Peter is a fictitious personage (*IRL*-1958, p. 207).

[19] *IRB*, p. 244; identical view in N. K. Gudzii, *Istoriia drevnei russkoi literatury*, 7th ed. (Moscow, 1966), p. 280.

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anti-Tatar uprisings (*veche*) of the northeastern cities, including Rostov. The princes of Rostov often visited the Horde and served in its campaigns. The bishops of Rostov continued to maintain a close relationship with the Mongols after having served as intermediaries between the khans and the Orthodox church until the appointment of a new metropolitan after the Mongol conquest. Their frequent trips to the Horde are, for example, well documented in the chronicles. As the "Life of Peter" demonstrated, in Nasonov's view, Tatar nobles resided in Rostov. Finally, Nasonov argued that toponymics suggest a large concentration of ***baskak*** regiments in the Rostov region.[20] Budovnits thought that interest in Tatar converts in early fourteenth-century Rostov was perfectly logical. Furthermore, the Rostov monks had no cause for fear in the late fifteenth century from Moscow, since the confiscations of archiepiscopal lands in Novgorod were the result of special considerations there; tensions over monastic land were so endemic in medieval Russia that the *Life* need not be ascribed to a later period on this score. Budovnits also found the "servility" of the *Life* towards the Mongols, to which I will return at length, more consistent with fourteenth-century attitudes than, after the fragmentation of the Horde, let alone after 1480, with late fifteenth-century ones. The "Life of Peter," Budovnits wrote, was "undoubtedly" written in the early fourteenth century, as Kliuchevskii first proposed.[21]

While no dating of the text will ever be anything more than probable, I do think the preponderence of truth lies in the earlier dating. How long it would have taken for the legendary details of Peter's life to have coalesced into the *vita* in its current form is a moot point, but mid-fourteenth-century seems at least as likely as mid-fifteenth. Kargalov's revision of our conception of the ***baskak*** system does not diminish the contemporaneousness of the *Life*. Kargalov proposes that the Tatar nobles resident in Rostov were ***baskaki***, which should only have made Rostov more sensitive to Tatar policy in this period.[22]

There is little question that there are some literary – in origin perhaps rhetorical, perhaps folkloric – similarities among the three works cited by Skripil'. I would stress, on the contrary, their diversity on one crucial point, the status of the Mongol involved: Chet is said to be a prince, Buga only an official, but Peter is of the Chingissid clan. Moreover, at least in the case of the Chet legend we cannot invoke anything resembling comparable dates of

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[20] Nasonov, ch. ii, pp. 50-68, *passim*.

[21] I. U. Budovnits, *Obshchestvenno-politicheskaia mysl' drevnei Rusi* (Moscow, 1960), pp. 342-344. Likhachev sees evidence that the author of the *Life* also wrote the "Life of bishop Ignatii," also in the fourteenth century, but this sentence seems absent from the *RP* manuscript. See D. S. Likhachev, *Tekstologiia* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1962), p. 305.

The positive attitude of the *Life* towards the Byzantines - Leontii is said to have been blessed by the Emperor and the Patriarch – would also seem rather to suggest the fourteenth century.

[22] V. V. Kargalov, *Vneshnepoliticheskie faktory razvitiia feodal'noi Rusi. Feodal'naia Rus' i kochevniki* (Moscow, 1967), pp. 156-157.

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composition. Veselovskii has shown that the earliest evidence for the existence of the Chet legend in any form is the end of the sixteenth century, a full century after even Skripil's preferred dating of Peter's *Life.*[23] I would add that it seems evident that the Chet legend was invented less to enhance the prestige of the Ipat'ev monastery than that of one of Chet's ostenible descendents, perhaps already contemplating elevation to the highest power, whereas the "Life of Peter," although it must have been written when members of the Petrovichi family were still alive, was much more dedicated to protecting the Petrov monastery's property.

* * *

The text of the *Life* has always precluded any disagreement, to turn to the interpretation of the work, over the somewhat crass materialistic purpose of the *Life, viz.* to establish both moral and legal claims by which to defend the inviolability of the lands of the Petrovichi family and the Monastery of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul, one of whose monks was, we can assume, the author of the *Life.* The moral security of the property is established by the supernatural manner of the establishment of the church to the Apostles and the holiness of its reputed founder, the legal security by the land grant of Boris Vasil'kovich and the subsequent Mongol judgment charters.[24] The apparition of the Apostles, the miraculous purses of gold and silver (which may have been copied from an oriental motif[25]), the continued defense of the monastery against its enemies – all are further signs of divine protection.

Those enemies are not, I would feel, the Rostov princes per se. The "old prince," Boris, does begin by opposing, however facetiously, the projected church; he does extract an exhorbitant payment for the land on which the church will be built. But these actions by the prince were essential to provide an opportunity for the wonder-working purses of gold and silver to "do their stuff," and the prince's attitude towards Peter thereafter is more indicative of the portrayal of Boris which the author of the *Life* favors. Here the prince attempts to make Peter content and happy in his new life, by securing him a wife[26], and by taking him hunting and to dinner. The *Life* eloquently describes how the prince became genuinely fond of Peter, outgrowing his earlier ambivalences; the prince gives Peter a spacious estate with a charter

[23] S. V. Veselovskii, *Issledovaniia po istorii klassa sluzhilykh zemlevladel'tsev* (Moscow, 1969), p. 162-164.

[24] Kliuchevskii, pp. 40-41, repeated by virtually every student of the *vita* since, the present writer included. Only Putilov sees its goal as praising Rostov (*IRL*-1958, p. 207).

[25] See *RP*, pp. 435-436; *IRB*, p. 247; M. Speranskii, *Istoriia drevnei russkoi literatury.* 2 ed. (Moscow, 1914), p. 256.

[26] Dmitriev alludes to the marriage of the son of Igor' at the behest of Konchak in the *Slovo o polku Igoreve* (*IRB*, p. 248).

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(prophetically, as Dmitriev reminds us) to ensure its permanence and protect Peter's descendents from harm. The prince makes Peter a member of his family, both literally in the church ceremony of "brotherhood," and figuratively, emotionally, in the love with which Boris's children call Peter "uncle." This relationship between prince Boris and Peter is then held up as a standard by which later Rostov princes can be judged. Their greed and envy reflect only the transience of true brotherhood and devotion. That these princes fail to imitate the example of prince Boris constitutes a personal failing, not a general characteristic of the office of Rostov prince.[27]

The 1322 campaign (*rat'*) of Akhmyl was, in fact, led by Ivan Danilovich Kalita of Moscow, and it was intended to punish the opponents of the Horde, including Tver' and the Rostov *veche* uprising of 1320. But Kalita is not even mentioned in the *Life*,[28] which lessens the likelihood that it was written in the late fifteenth century with Muscovite pretensions in mind. The utility of a concrete instance of the monastery's divine immunity against Moscow, were the threat great enough, would have outweighed any considerations of delicacy towards Moscow.

The actions of the bishops of Rostov are also not without some nuances. The cult of the bishop-saint of Rostov, Leontii, figures prominently in the beginning of the *Life*, and the missionary work of bishop Cyril is crucial to the whole text, for it is he who inspires Peter to convert to Christianity. The trips of Cyril and Ignatii to the Horde have been variously interpreted. Budovnits suggests they were designed to secure Horde protection against the Rostov princes, a speculative inference even though the Iaroslavl' princes do seem compelled by the khans to contribute to the *Uspenskii* cathedral.[29] Golubinskii thought it not impossible that each bishopric may have requited its own Mongol *iarlyk*, necessitating the travels of the bishops to Sarai, but his alternative explanation, that the trips merely represent the intimate relations between Rostov and the Horde, seems in itself adequate.[30] Bishop Ignatii is given a threatening dream to persuade him to build the Petrov church, and bishop Prokhor had to stare into Ignat's bared sword to be convinced to meet Akhmyl peaceably. In the last episode, however, Prokhor fares better than the Rostov princes, who do flee, and Prokhor's healing of Akhmyl's son imitates Cyril's healing of Berke's son. Overall the Rostov bishops are presented favorably. Conspicuously absent is any hint of conflict between the bishops and the monastery; Peter's descendents continue their contributions to the episcopal church as well as to their own monastery.

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[27] For the starting point of this line of analysis, which I have considerably developed, see *RP*, p. 437; Buslaev, p. 168.

[28] Nasonov, pp. 107-108.

[29] Budovnits, pp. 331-332. Budovnits exaggerates the disagreements between prince Boris and bishop Ignatii in the founding of the Church of the Apostles (*ibid.*, p. 340).

[30] E. Golubinskii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2 vols. in 4 (Moscow, 1900-1910), II, 1-ia polovina, 38-39.

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It is the instruments by which the monastery is usually saved from harm that have drawn the most comment, and legitimately so, because the attitude of the *Life* toward the Mongols is pivotal. From the very beginning of the *Life* the honor, largesse, and concern of the khans for the Rostov church is manifested and highlighted. Cyril is much praised in the Horde, Ignatii receives contributions from the khan. Tatar envoys righteously judge in favor of the Petrov monastery against the Christian Rostov princes![31] Mongol charters assure the monastery's continuing security, enhancing its original Russian charter. At the end of the Akhmyl episode Ignat is told to go to the Horde, as Lazar and Iurii had, to seek redress of grievances should anyone threaten the lands of the monastery or its patron family in the future. The relevance of events in the Horde for the fate of Rostov and Peter's kin never escapes the attention of the author of the *Life*.

Several minor exegetical points that bear on the attitude of the *Life* toward the Mongols might be raised at this juncture. Skripil' interprets Peter's protestations of ignorance of land-ownership and charters as an underhanded allusion to the superiority of Russian political concepts (*gosudarstvennost'*) to Mongol ones.[32] The *Life's* appreciation of the absence of sedentary concepts of property-owning among the Mongols is profound, and would reinforce Kargalov's view that Tatar officials received Russian-style land-grants in the Rostov area, but this is not said with any malice or condescension. The Horde method of measuring boundaries is, after all, utilized. Peter's ignorance of charters, especially in view of the later role of Mongol judgment charters in the text, would seem to be a result of Peter's youth more than anything else.

Peter's response to the prophesy of the Apostles that his clan will prosper is to think that the family fortunes among the Tatars are involved. *Pace* Dmitriev, what is at stake is not so much Peter's ability to comprehend that his own future family in Russia will be blessed than that he could not as yet foresee, again because of his immaturity, the particular form of that future, that the members of the Petrov clan would be patrons of a monastery in honor of the Apostles.[33]

Finally, the element of divine providence in the founding of the Church of the Holy Apostles is not meant to compensate, as Skripil' would have it, for the non-Christian origin of its founder.[34] Divine providence is its own justification, not as compensation for anything. The obvious sincerity of Peter's devotion far outweighs his family background; Peter's origin in "evil roots" only serves as contrast to his later good deeds. That Peter could not have painted the icons because of his Tatar origins is a statement of fact: a recent convert, let alone one so young, could not have mastered the complex art of icon-painting that rapidly.

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[31] Buslaev, p. 168, and other authors.
[32] *RP*, p. 437.
[33] *IRB*, p. 246.
[34] *RP*, pp. 430-431.

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The overwhelmingly positive role of the Mongols in the "Life of Peter" should not be understood as "obsequiousness" or "groveling" in Budovnits's colorful language. The "selfishness" of the Church in protecting its own material goods is not all that reprehensible. It is fatuous to claim, as Budovnits does, that Ignat's encounter with Akhmyl is a rejection of even the most passive form of opposition to the Mongols, i.e., flight; Ignat does, after all, save not only the Petrov monastery but also the city of Rostov from harm. His actions reflect his conviction of divine protection and, as we shall see, the strength of the Chingissid principle.[35] Nor should the presentation of the Tatars as the protectors of the Church be seen as an "example of a curious situation," in Fedotov's words, and interpreted as representing the views of some hypothetical pro-Mongol faction in the Orthodox Church.[36] What neither Budovnits nor Fedotov realized is that the entire Russian Church, indeed the entire elite of medieval Russian society, saw the Mongols as legitimate rulers, their khans as the heirs of the Orthodox Byzantine *basilei.*[37] The obligation of the Russian Church, in return for fiscal and judicial immunity, was to pray for the health of the khans, to which Ignat alludes in his dialogue with Akhmyl. The "Life of Peter" testifies only to the fact that this recognition of the legitimacy and justice of Mongol sovereignty, of the patronage by the Mongol khans of the Russian Church, extended to a particular monastery in Rostov, which should hardly occasion any profound surprise.

What is remarkable in the *Life* is the precision of its appreciation of the immutability and ultimate decisiveness of the Chingissid clan principle. Vernadsky remarks that Peter and his descendents did not lose their rights as Mongol princes when they converted to Orthodoxy.[38] Peter's descendents were still Mongol, and could demand judgment in a Mongol court, despite four generations of Christianity.[39] When Peter's son and grandson go to the Horde they proclaim their membership in the Imperial clan; their relatives, the Sarai Chingissids, immediately honor and succor them. Ignat greets Akhmyl in the same way, invoking his membership in the Imperial blood, playing upon the Chingissid patronage of the Petrov monastery.[40] The symbol of the hunting accoutrements functions to emphasize the link of the *tsarevich* Peter to Akhmyl: Peter has his

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[35] Budovnits, pp. 331-332, 354.

[36] George Fedotov, *The Russian Religious Mind,* Vol. II: *The Middle Ages, Thirteenth-Fifteenth centuries,* ed. John Meyendorff (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), 10, 185.

[37] Michael Cherniavsky, "Khan or Basileus: An Aspect of Russian Medieval Political Theory," *Journal of the History of Ideas,* XX (October-December 1959), 459-476.

[38] George Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia.* Vol. III of *A History of Russia* (New Haven, 1953), p. 169.

[39] *Ibid.,* p. 355.

[40] Ignat implies Akhmyl is also a member of the Chingissid clan when he calls him a blood-relative; although the chronicles do not call Akhmyl anything other than an envoy (*posol*) of Uzbek, he still could have been of the Imperial blood.

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vision of the Apostles while hunting, Ignat greets Akhmyl with gerfalcons and furs. The "Imperial amusements" unite all members of the Chingissid blood, as if hunting were a leitmotif of the clan or an Imperial prerogative. The consistency with which family relationships within the Petrovichi are rationalized might reflect this pervasive feeling of "clanship" in the *Life*.

The Rostov princes who resent the greater honor of Peter's heirs at the Horde fully comprehended the efficacy of the principle of the sacredness of the Chingissid blood. No Russian prince could ever hope to achieve the status of a member of the blood royal. What has, to my knowledge, never been appreciated before is the significance of the word which the text used to describe the clan. The Rostov princes say that the Petrovichi are "not of our bone" (*kost'*); Akhmyl later hails Ignat as a member of his "bone." This use of the word seems unique,[41] but there is no doubt that "bone" here is a simple translation of the Mongol word *yasun,* meaning clan.[42] What we have in this text is a stunning example of the assimilation of Mongol clan concepts by the Russians, since the use of exactly the same word in this context can only imply translation, not coincidence. Obviously, too, the Russians learned the term from the Mongols as first applied to the quintessential, Imperial clan, the Chingissids.

We have seen, in conclusion, that the "Life of Peter, *Tsarevich* of the Horde" is yet further testimony, if more were needed, of the legitimacy of Mongol rule in Russian eyes and the predominance of the Chingissid clan in the Russian perception of Mongol political society. If we recall, however, the undeniable monastic authorship of the *Life,* then this testimony takes on new meaning, because it was precisely the unknown monastic author of the *Life* who understood that a Chingissid is a Chingissid, to employ an inelegant parallel; that after four generations of Orthodoxy, sedentary life and implicit Russification, a Chingissid would still be recognized and respected as such by a still nomadic, presumably Moslem, Mongol official or Sarai Chingissid. At least this concept of the Turco-Tatar steppe culture, if no other, penetrated that deeply into the consciousness of the Church and its ideologues. The "Life of Peter" is the most convincing evidence I know of that documents monastic participation in at least this fundamental element of the Turco-Tatar steppe culture.[43]

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[41] I. I. Sreznevskii, *Materialy dlia slovaria drevne-russkogo iazyka,* 3 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1893-1912), I, col. 1297, cites only this text to document the meaning of *kost'* as "race" (*poroda*) or "tribe" (*plemia*), which is not quite accurate enough.

[42] I owe this knowledge to consultations with Professor Larry W. Moses and Mr. Samuel Grupper of the Department of Uralic and Altaic Studies of Indiana University, who have frequently tolerated my uninformed and insistent questions.

[43] For an opposite view, cf. Edward L. Keenan, *The Kurbskii-Groznyi Apocrypha* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), pp. 53-54; and especially the "Conclusion" of his unpublished doctoral dissertation, "Muscovy and Kazan: 1445-1552.– A Study in Steppe Politics," Harvard University, 1965.

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GEORGE VERNADSKY, EURASIANISM, THE MONGOLS, AND RUSSIA

Eurasianism, the theory that Russia was neither Europe nor Asia but a world unto itself, Eurasia, runs through much, if not all, of George Vernadsky's enormous scholarly output.[1] Eurasianism was the fuel of his impressive productivity, the central, unifying theme of his varied investigations of Russian, Byzantine, and Inner Asian history.[2] Despite the high esteem in which Vernadsky came to be held, there have been few examinations of his contributions to historical knowledge.[3] Yet Vernadsky's career and his scholarship have much to tell us of the fate of the Imperial Russian historiographic tradition in the twentieth century.

Vernadsky is most often associated with the theme of the significance of the Mongols in Russian history. Vernadsky's observations on this topic over the course of his nearly sixty-year career provide an excellent medium for understanding the ambiguities of his adherence to Eurasianism and for tracing the evolution of his Eurasianism in response to the different political and cultural environments in which he worked. As we shall see, the assumption of his eulogists that Vernadsky's Eurasianism was static is too simplistic, while the equally facile conclusion that Vernadsky gradually tempered the extremist

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[1] See the obituaries by Alan D. Ferguson in *Russian Review*, 32 (1973): 456-58, S. Pushkarev in *Novyi zhurnal*, 113 (1973): 266-70, Ralph T. Fisher Jr. in *Slavic Review*, 33, no. 1 (1974): 206-208, and Alfred Levin in *American Historical Review*, 79 (1974): 267-68.

[2] The following bibliographies of Vernadsky's works are in print, although none is complete or free of inaccuracies: Alan D. Ferguson, "A Bibliography of the Works of George Vernadsky," *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, 5 (1954): 32-40; idem, "Bibliography of the Works of George Vernadsky," in Alan D. Ferguson and Alfred Levin, eds., *Essays in Russian History: A Collection Dedicated to George Vernadsky* (Hamden, Conn., 1964), pp. xi-xv; and Nikolay Andreyev, "Spisok trudov G. V. Vernadskogo," *Zapiski russkoi akademicheskoi gruppy v SShA*, 9 (1975): 168-81, translated and reprinted in George Vernadsky, *Russian Historiography: A History*, trans. N. Lupinin (Belmont, Mass., 1978), pp. 527-37. By my estimate Vernadsky published approximately 8,800 pages.

[3] Treatments of the subject by Dimitri Obolensky and Nikolay Andreyev are too brief to be more than superficial (see Dimitri Obolensky, "Professor Vernadsky's History of Ancient and Medieval Russia," *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, 5 [1954]: 20-31, revised and expanded as "George Vernadsky as a Historian of Ancient and Medieval Russia," in Ferguson and Levin, eds., *Essays in Russian History*, pp. 1-17 and Nikolay Andreyev, "G. V. Vernadskii [20 avgusta 1887 g. – 12 iunia 1973 g.]," *Zapiski russkoi akademicheskoi gruppy v SShA*, 9 [1975], pp. 182-93, translated and reprinted in Vernadsky, *Russian Historiography*, pp. 512-26).

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elements of Eurasianism is too imprecise to be satisfactory.[4] Indeed, the development of Vernadsky's historical concepts is far more complex than has hitherto been appreciated.

Vernadsky's career can best be divided into three phases – from 1910 to his emigration in 1920, from 1920 to 1927 in Europe, and from 1927 in the United States at Yale University – and each period must be taken into account to comprehend the totality of his historical thinking.

After his graduation from Moscow University in 1910, Vernadsky began dissertation research on Russian expansion into Siberia. He explained this choice of topic by referring to the rich, untapped archival holdings in Moscow from the government departments (*prikazy*) of the Muscovite state. The decision was consistent with major trends in Russian life and scholarship, since scholarly interest in Asia had increased significantly in the nineteenth century in both Russia and Europe,[5] and Siberia had just been the object of massive colonization.[6] The historical roots of that migration and the consequences of expansion into Asia for Russian history were therefore themes of topical interest. Vernadsky did not pursue this research to its conclusion, however. He was prevented in part by the lack of a sponsor at Moscow University: V. O. Kliuchevskii no longer gave seminars, and M. K. Liubavskii's research focused on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. But the decisive factor in his abandonment of the topic seems to have been the relocation of his father to St. Petersburg. Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadskii had resigned from Moscow University to protest the actions of Minister of Education Kasso and had accepted a standing invitation to join the Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg. George moved with his parents. Commuting to Moscow was impractical, so he discontinued his research on Siberia.

By that time, he had gathered sufficient information to produce three articles,[7] the conclusions of which are enlightening in view of his later research. The premise of these early articles is that a nation's character is best demonstrated by the process of colonization. Russian settlement of Siberia was therefore illustrative of the abiding features of the Russian people. Vernadsky argued simultaneously that the Russian national character perforce changed as

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[4] See the obituaries cited in note 1, especially those by Ferguson and Levin. See also note 31 below.

[5] V. V. Bartol'd, "Obzor deiatel'nosti fakul'teta vostochnykh iazykov" (of St. Petersburg University) and "Istoriia izucheniia Vostoka v Evrope i Rossii" in V. V. Bartol'd, *Sochineniia*, vol. 10: *Raboty po istorii vostokovedeniia* (Moscow, 1977), pp. 21-196, 197-482.

[6] Donald Treadgold, *The Great Siberian Migration. Government and Peasant in Resettlement from the Emancipation to the First World War* (Princeton, 1957).

[7] G. V. Vernadskii, "O dvizhenii russkikh na vostok," *Nauchnyi istoricheskii zhurnal*, 1, no. 2 (1913): 52-61; idem, "Protiv solntsa. Rasprostranenie russkogo gosudarstva k vostoku," *Russkaia mysl'*, 35, no. 1 (1914): 56-79; and idem. "Gosudarevye sluzhilye i promyshlennye liudi v Vostochnoi Sibiri XVII v.," Ministerstvo Narodnago Prosveshcheniia, *Zhurnal*, 55, no. 4 (April 1915): 332-54.

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the Russians moved eastward, "against the sun." Experience with varying geographic and climatic zones and intermarriage with native Siberian peoples altered the Russian personality of necessity, diminishing some elements and bringing others into prominence. In this, Vernadsky's exposition echoes several of the fundamental concepts of the work of his undergraduate instructor in Russian history at Moscow University, Kliuchevskii.

The central article of the trio, on the movement of the Russians to the east, was taken from his inaugural lecture as an assistant professor (*privat dotsent*) at St. Petersburg University. The vision of Russian expansion and its consequences outlined in this article owes much of its excitement to Vernadsky's bold and elegant prose, perhaps the finest he ever wrote in Russian or any other language. Substantively his argument is not entirely novel, since several of the generalizations upon which it is built can be traced to previous historians. Vernadsky's conception of the role of the Mongols in the rise of Moscow, for example, is derived from Karamzin, although it had been rejected by Solov'ev and Kliuchevskii. But the interpretation as a whole is original, and no one would deny that it is ambitious and stimulating. Unfortunately, it is not entirely integrated and often resembles more a series of flashing scenes from history than a coherent sequence. Missing links and somewhat irrelevant contrasts abound. It is clear, nevertheless, that Vernadsky did more than repeat Kliuchevskii's views on Russian history. Vernadsky attributed a far greater role to Asia and Asians in Russian history than had Kliuchevskii.

Vernadsky presents the Mongol conquest of Russia as the pivotal development in the course of Russian history. He did not wish to disagree with the usual view that the Mongols had isolated Russia and that the Mongol conquest had been a catastrophe. He insisted, however, that the Mongol role in Russian history could also be seen in another perspective. The Mongols had profoundly transformed Russia's relationship with the steppe, and in so doing, they decisively shaped further Russian migration.

The Mongols solved what had been the problem of Russia's eastward expansion during the Kievan period. Vernadsky compared the eastward expansion of the East Slavs to the westward expansion of the Germanic peoples. He implied that no obstacle had impeded Germanic expansion westward. But Russia, European in culture and race, was geographically located in Asia, and thus East Slavic expansion during the Kievan period was stymied by the pastoral nomads of the steppe. Vernadsky interjects an imperfect analogy: both the Dutch and the East Slavs needed more land, but while the Dutch could build dikes to stem the sea and thus acquire more land, the East Slavs could not move into the steppe because they could not stem the tide of steppe intruders. The "disorganized" steppe nomads were not subject to a central authority which could control them; therefore, "organized" Kievan Rus' could not hold the line against its nomadic neighbors. The Mongols organized the disorganized steppe, which in the long run facilitated Russian expansion eastward.

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The Mongols were responsible for the ability of the East Slavs to resume their expansion eastward. Such movement required a stronger centralized government, which arose under Muscovite leadership because the Mongols had weakened the petty Russian principalities and the power of the aristocracy (*boiarstvo*). The lower classes were thus unimpeded in supporting the creation of a powerful unified state which could protect Russia from the steppe. That state also benefited from the advanced Chinese technology which the Mongols must have brought with them to Russia, although Vernadsky provides no examples. It was, he seemed to be arguing, unfair or at least imprecise to dismiss the Mongols as wild nomads, given their organizational achievements and exposure to higher civilizations. The Mongols played a positive role in the evolution of the Russian state.

The Mongols had turned Russia to the south and east, and the Russian people resumed their previously halted migration eastward in the post-Mongol period. During the centuries of Mongol rule Russians had traveled to Karakorum and become familiar with the lands of the Near East and Central Asia later conquered by Timur (Tamerlane). The Muscovites learned how to expand into the steppe by conquering Kazan' in the sixteenth century, and they learned their lessons well. The annexation of Siberia was the product of both mass migration and the exertions of entrepreneurs in the extractive industries. These entrepreneurs carried on the tradition of the Novgorodian adventurers who had pressed into the Urals during the Kievan and early Mongol periods in search of furs. Once set in motion, Russian expansion eastward did not cease until the Russians crossed into North America in the nineteenth century. In Alaska and California the Russians linked up with the movement westward in the United States. Thus the two branches of the Indo-European race (Slavic and Anglo-Germanic) met after moving around the planet. The catalyst of Russian participation in this epochal phenomenon, the apotheosis of the parallel migrations of the Germanic peoples westward and the Slavic peoples eastward with which Vernadsky had begun his discussion, was precisely the expansion of Russian geographic horizons brought about by the inclusion of Russia in the Mongol Empire.

Whatever its originality or cogency, Vernadsky's theory in several essential ways was Eurasianist *avant le mot*. He had anticipated a number of basic Eurasian axioms: that Russia was geographically as much Asian as European, that the Mongol conquest was the central event of Russian history, that the Mongol influence upon Russia was not entirely negative, and that Russian expansion eastward was one of the most important features of Russian history. To the extent that Vernadsky had anticipated Eurasianism he had already broken with Kliuchevskii on more than the issue of the Mongols. Why he did so cannot be determined on the basis of available evidence since he sheds no light on the question in his memoir.[8] Certainly, Russia's role in Asia was a vital issue in

[8] G. V. Vernadskii, "Iz vospominanii. Gody ucheniia. S. F. Platonov," *Novyi zhurnal*, 100 (1970): 196-221.

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nineteenth-century Russian thought,[9] and the Russo-Japanese War brought the issue dramatically to the fore. Vernadsky's analysis was hardly shocking, but it is not possible to explain his foreshadowing of Eurasianism and his departure from Kliuchevskii and the Imperial Russian historiographic tradition on the basis of available personal or intellectual information about Vernadsky.

In one crucial respect Vernadsky had not anticipated the Eurasian conception. As yet he saw no antagonism between Russia and Europe. The Russians were, he stated as a commonplace, European in race and culture, and the culmination of Russian expansion eastward was formulated in terms of the fate of the Indo-European race. In this regard Vernadsky was not Eurasian, since the inherent hostility between Europe and Russia was a militant tenet of Eurasian theory.[10] Until his emigration Vernadsky gave no hint in his writings of anti-Western animus. Indeed, the very opposite would be true.

The evidence is Vernadsky's second choice of a dissertation topic. He had been accepted as a graduate student at St. Petersburg University by S. F. Platonov. Although Platonov wanted him to do a dissertation on an eighteenth-century public figure, Vernadsky turned instead to Russian Freemasonry. Once again he justified his selection on the basis of professional criteria: St. Petersburg had immense unused archival materials on the theme. Besides, he admitted, he was attracted to the broad European context of Russian Freemasonry. This dissertation was completed and published in 1917.[11] Vernadsky took a positive view of the impact of European culture upon Russian historical development and presented the philanthropic and pedagogic activities of the Russian Freemasons and Novikov[12] in a favorable light as the products of European enlightenment and philosophy.

At the time of the October Revolution Vernadsky was teaching at Perm' University. He stayed out of Bolshevik hands by quitting Perm' for Simferopol' in the Crimea, where he joined the faculty of Taurida University. With the collapse of Wrangel's forces, he joined the evacuation to Constantinople in 1920. After a brief stay in that city, he made his way to Athens.[13] In 1922 Vernadsky moved to Prague, where he remained for five years. Prague was his last stop in Europe before crossing the Atlantic to New Haven in 1927, where he stayed for the rest of his life.

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[9] Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, "Russia and Asia: Two Nineteenth-Century Russian Views," *California Slavic Studies,* 1 (1960): 170-81.

[10] Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, "Prince N. S. Trubetskoy's 'Europe and Mankind,'" *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas,* 13 (1964): 207-20.

[11] G. V. Vernadskii, *Russkoe masonstvo v tsarstvovanii Ekateriny II.* Istoriko-filologicheskii fakul'tet Sankt Peterburgskago universiteta, *Zapiski,* 137 (1917).

[12] G. V. Vernadskii, *Nikolai Ivanovich Novikov* (Petrograd, 1918).

[13] G. V. Vernadskii, "Perm'-Moskva-Kiev. Vospominaniia," *Novyi zhurnal,* 104 (1971): 177-88; idem, "Krym. Vospominaniia," *Novyi zhurnal,* 105 (1971): 203-24; idem, "Konstantinopol', 1920-1921. Vospominaniia, chast' III," *Novyi zhurnal,* 108 (1972): 202-17.

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It was in Prague that Vernadsky became associated with the Eurasian school founded by N. S. Trubetskoi and P. N. Savitskii. The affiliation was the crucial step in his historiographic development, but he never explored his motives, at least not in writing. Vernadsky invariably observed that he had joined the Eurasianists because he found some of their historical and philosophical views compatible with his own, but he claimed never to have participated in their political shenanigans.[14] Vernadsky did not identify which Eurasian ideas he found acceptable and which unconvincing; he was not a self-revealing man and did not dwell in his memoirs upon this momentous intellectual event. Its ramifications require comment.

According to the Eurasianists, Eurasia was a self-contained geographical entity whose boundaries coincided roughly with those of the Russian Empire in 1914. Russia-Eurasia was neither European nor Asiatic and should be involved with neither Europe nor Asia. Its geopolitical destiny was to unite all of Eurasia under its authority, to recreate the empire of Genghis Khan. The Russians had more in common with their fellow Eurasian, Inner Asian peoples, such as the Uzbeks, than with the Catholic West Slavs or any Europeans. The relationship between Orthodox and Western Christianity (both Catholic and Protestant) was one of unbridled hostility. Western political and cultural forms had no place in Russia. The Eurasian peoples instinctively obeyed a centralized autocratic authority. The Bolshevik revolution was doomed, since Marxism was but another excrescence of a decadent European civilization of which Russia should have no part. When the Bolsheviks were overthrown, the new leadership of Russia would rightly come from those who understood the country's Eurasian destiny and thus could restore its religious unity and political greatness.[15]

The roots of Eurasianism lie in Imperial Russian and European intellectual and cultural history: in the ideas of the Slavophiles, N. Ia. Danilevskii and Vladimir Solov'ev; in the German theories of geopolitics; in the developing scholarly studies of the history, languages, and societies of Inner Asia; and in the images and symbols projected onto Asians and the steppe by new literary movements such as the Scythians."[16] Eurasianism was created in the crucible of the

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[14] George and Nina Vernadsky Papers, Bakhmeteff Archive, Butler Library, Columbia University (hereafter cited by series and box number), Non-Correspondence Series, Box 31.8.3.2, "Avtobiograficheskie zametki."

[15] For two statements of the Eurasian view of Russian history see I. R. [Prince N. S. Trubetskoi], *Nasledie Chingis khana. Vzgliad na russkuiu istoriiu ne s Zapada, a s Vostoka* (Berlin, 1925) and P. N. Savitskii, "Geopoliticheskie zametki po russkoi istorii," in G. V. Vernadskii, *Nachertanie russkoi istorii*, vol. 1 (Prague, 1927), pp. 234-60. On Eurasianism consult Otto Boss, *Die Lehre der Eurasier: Ein Beitrag zur russischen Ideengeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Wiesbaden, 1961) and G. E. Orchard, "The Eurasian School of Russian Historiography," *Laurentian University Review*, 10, no. 1 (November 1977): 97-206.

[16] Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, "The Emergence of Eurasianism," *California Slavic Studies*, 4 (1967): 39-72 and idem, "Asia Through Russian Eyes," in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., *Russia and Asia* (Stanford, 1972), pp. 19-29.

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Russian Revolution, the Bolshevik seizure of power, and the emigration. It was the ideology of a handful of original and cultured Russian intellectuals who sought to convince themselves that the Russia they ought rightfully to rule would return when the madness of Bolshevism was played out.

Eurasianism rejected Western parliamentary and democratic political forms and preferred a system of centralized economic control in Russia rather than one of free enterprise. Advocates of Eurasianism despised and scorned Russia's contacts with Europe and blamed Russia's tragedy upon those, beginning with Peter the Great, who had diverted the country from its true path. Eurasianism was a highly political movement which repudiated Russia's "Western and European" tradition since Peter the Great.

Nothing seems more anomalous than Vernadsky's affiliation with the Eurasianists since he was the product of precisely that Westernizing tradition. The milieu in which Vernadsky was reared was that of the Europocentric intelligentsia. His grandfather had been a professor of political economy and his father was a world-renowned natural scientist, the founder of a circle (*krug*) which sent many of its members into the Kadet Party, the embodiment of Russian Westernism.[17] Indeed, Vladimir Vernadskii was a member of the Central Committee of the Kadet Party, a representative to the State Council of the Academy of Sciences and other higher educational institutions, and Deputy Minister of Education in the Provisional Government. George Vernadsky was not as politically active as his father, but his affiliations were Kadet, officially or in tone. He had some ties to the student section of the Kadet Party at Moscow University. While living in St. Petersburg he seems to have served in the Morshansk district (*uezd*) zemstvo assembly in Tambov guberniia, and during World War I he spent one year in the Department of Relief for War Refugees of the Petrograd Committee of the Union of Towns, public activities much in keeping with the Kadet ethos of progressive political participation. In 1917 he became assistant to A. A. Kornilov, secretary of the Central Committee of the Kadet Party. Perhaps in this capacity he authored a campaign biography of the Kadet leader Pavel Miliukov[18] and another denouncing the slogan of the Left "no annexations, no indemnities." It is no surprise, therefore, that the Cheka came looking for him in Perm' after the Bolshevik seizure of power. Although he had given up politics during the summer of 1917, he was still a visible Kadet as far as the new regime was concerned. In the Crimea Vernadsky briefly reentered politics as chief of communications for public information (Vernadsky's translation of

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[17] George Vernadsky devoted a series of articles to this group as one of his last research projects. See George Vernadsky, "The Prijutino Brotherhood (Preliminary communication)," in *Orbis scriptus. Dm. Tschiževskij zum 70 Geburtstag* (Munich, 1966), pp. 857-63, and G. V. Vernadskii, "Bratstvo 'Priiutino,' " *Novyi zhurnal*, 93 (1968): 147-71; 95 (1969): 202-15; 96 (1969): 153-71; 97 (1969): 218-37.

[18] G. Vernadskii, *Pavel Nikolaevich Miliukov* (Petrograd, 1917). The work is not listed in Andreyev, "Spisok trudov."

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nachal'nik otdel pechati or chief of press section) for Wrangel. Thus he had no alternative but to emigrate when Simferopol' was overrun by the triumphant Soviets.

This background might make Vernadsky's adherence to Eurasianism upon his arrival in Prague more plausible. After all, the wrenching experiences of revolution and emigration might have made him reject his intellectual and political inheritance by turning to a theory rooted in the anti-European elements of Imperial Russian culture. This line of reasoning is unconvincing, however. Vernadsky's description of his affiliation with Eurasianism does not betray the intellectual or emotional anguish such a repudiation would have entailed. He did not join the Eurasianists to renounce his father since he remained intimate with Vladimir Vernadskii, who spent much of the 1920s in Europe, mostly in Paris. Not even his father's return to the Soviet Union interrupted their relationship. Nor did Vernadsky seek social or political refuge in Eurasianism. In Prague his social life revolved not around the Eurasianists but around the Kondakov Institute and the juridical faculty of the Russian émigré university in which he taught. His now consistent apoliticism removed him from the worst excesses of Eurasianism but also distinguished his participation in the movement from that of its activists. Most importantly, Vernadsky's intellectual affiliation with Eurasianism seems to have been only partial, since, as we shall see, he retained some elements of his pre-Eurasianist Westernism even during his most Eurasianist years.

In general terms the genesis of Eurasianism is already well understood. The elements of Imperial Russian culture from which it derived and the process by which revolution and emigration inspired a handful of intellectuals to reject the Western European model for Russia's past, present, and future have been identified. But therein lies the limitation of our knowledge: only a small minority of Russia's intelligentsia joined Eurasianism. The vast majority of the emigration rejected it. Not surprisingly, it was denounced with a vengeance by émigré Kadet historians such as A. A. Kizevetter and Miliukov, the erstwhile subject of Vernadsky's political propaganda.[19] Only detailed biographical information about individual Eurasianists can illuminate the distinct characteristics of those original minds which led them to nonnormative beliefs. For Vernadsky, and perhaps for all the Eurasian epigones, such information is lacking. If he ever thought it necessary or appropriate to analyze his split with his academic and political mentors, his conclusions have not survived. I suspect Vernadsky did not seek such a self-awareness of his intellectual biography.

Investigation of Vernadsky's publications, therefore, constitutes the only access to his changing historical orientation. His Eurasian works of the 1920s and 1930s give no hint of disagreement with the dogmas of Eurasianism. He shifted his

[19] A. A. Kizevetter, "Evraziistvo i nauka," *Slavia*, 7 (1928-29): 426-30; Paul Miliukov, "Eurasianism and Europeanism in Russian History," in *Festschrift Th. G. Masaryk zum 80. Geburtstag*, vol. 1: *Der russische Gedanke* (Bonn, 1930), pp. 225-36.

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research from modern Russian history, his specialty in Perm' and Taurida universities, to early Russian history. For his first Eurasian statement he turned his attention to ecclesiastical relations between Catholicism and Orthodoxy. Such a choice was not accidental. During the Civil War, as he put it, he had returned to the Russian Orthodox Church. While in White territory, in Constantinople, and in Athens he enjoyed extensive contacts with Russian prelates. Devotion to Orthodoxy was an abiding feature of Eurasianism, and Vernadsky shared it.

In the 1923 Eurasian collection *Rossiia i Latinstvo,* Vernadsky contributed an article on the union of churches.[20] He attacked all historical attempts at ecclesiastical union between the Orthodox Byzantine and Roman Catholic churches. Byzantine willingness to join the Catholic Church was feigned. The church union was an insincere, opportunistic ploy to secure papal military assistance to save Constantinople from the Ottomans. The papacy was cynically trying to exploit Byzantine weakness to subordinate the Orthodox Church. The Palaeologi emperors succeeded only in driving a wedge between rulers and people when unity could have saved the empire. (In a similar vein Vernadsky argued elsewhere that Peter the Great caused the Russian Revolution by his transformation of the Russian Orthodox Church into an extension of the bureaucracy, which created a religious chasm between the autocracy and its subjects.)[21] The Union of Brest was a catastrophe to "us Russians" (*russkie nashi*).[22] Weak and unprincipled episcopal leadership was seduced by unscrupulous Catholics to recognize the papacy, and true Russian Orthodoxy suffered. The Union of Brest was the first in a series of continuing acts of Catholic oppression of the Orthodox, repeated in Hungary against Transcarpathian Ruthenians (*Ugorskaia Rus'*), against the Serbs in Transylvania/Romania, and against "Western Rus'" (Ukrainians and Belorussians) in Poland in the 1920s. Vernadsky's historical analysis was not without its merits, but the article as a whole betrayed a rabid religious partisanship. In this shrill diatribe he echoed the polemical Eurasian chorus denouncing Europe and Catholicism. For him this was a new note, without precedent in his preemigration works.

In 1925 Vernadsky applied the Eurasian notion of Catholic-Orthodox hatred to Russian history in his famous article on Aleksandr Nevskii.[23] Russia faced massive destruction from two directions in the thirteenth century. The Mongols from the east threatened only the Russian body, since they practiced religious toleration, but the Teutonic and Livonian knights from the West, who imposed conversion to Catholicism upon the Orthodox Russians, also threatened

[20] G. V. Vernadskii, " 'Soedinenie tserkvei' v istoricheskoi deistvitel'nosti," in *Rossiia i Latinstvo* (Berlin, 1923), pp. 80-120.

[21] See the text of a lecture, "Desnitsa i shuitsa Imperatorskogo perioda," delivered in Prague in 1922, in Vernadsky Papers, Non-Correspondence Series, Box 32.1.9.2.

[22] Vernadskii, " 'Soedinenie tserkvei,' " p. 81.

[23] G. V. Vernadskii, "Dva podviga sv. Aleksandra Nevskogo," *Evraziiskii Vremennik,* 4 (1925): 318-37.

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the Russian soul. Grand Prince Daniil of Galicia-Volhynia opportunistically sacrificed Orthodoxy by seeking a church union to save his throne. The result of his policy of a papal alliance and opposition to the Tatars was the "slavery to Latinity" (*Latinskoe rabstvo*) of Southwest Rus', which continued even to the present.[24] Nevskii's two feats were fighting off the Latin enemies and submitting in all humility to the Mongols, thus saving Russian national consciousness and Orthodoxy. The Mongols saved Russia from the Catholics by defeating Grand Prince Vitovt of Lithuania at the battle on the river Vorskla in 1399. By then, however, Russian liberation from the Tatars had already been launched by Dmitrii Donskoi, who took advantage of the weakness of the Golden Horde to win the battle of Kulikovo Field in 1380.

The vehemence of Vernadsky's denunciation of Daniil of Galicia-Volhynia undoubtedly derived some of its fervor from his vociferous rejection of anything which separated the Ukraine from Russia. Like both the Kadets and the Eurasianists, Vernadsky opposed the political fragmentation of the Russian Empire. In 1923, for example, he objected to the orthographic reform in the Soviet Union not only because it meant linguistic distortion and broke with the great Imperial Russian cultural tradition, but also because it applied only to Russian, not Ukrainian. The reform would supply additional ammunition to those Ukrainian separatists who wanted to divorce the Ukraine from Russia.[25] In 1926 Vernadsky insisted on the "unity of the Russian Church" and dismissed the "pseudonational" Ukrainian program for a separate Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The Russian church had been united from the time of Vladimir's baptism until the eighteenth century. The liturgical language was neither Russian nor Ukrainian but Church Slavonic. In the seventeenth century the Russian church schism (*raskol*) was a product of Ukrainian influence in the Muscovite church. Now was the time to heal all divisions within the Russian church, between Orthodox and Old Believers, as well as Russians and Ukrainians.[26] Vernadsky's attitude toward the Ukraine did not then or later preclude respect for Ukrainian culture, but his intransigence on the issue of political division lent a partisan and acrimonious edge to his putatively objective, historical evaluation of Daniil's relationship with the papacy and the Tatars.[27]

Vernadsky's first general article on the significance of the Tatar yoke in Russian history, published in 1927, is a disappointing, erratic, and disjointed essay whose separate sections contain acute observations but do not hang

[24] Ibid., p. 324.

[25] Georgii Vernadskii, "O russkom pravopisanii, I," *Russkaia mysl'*, 6-8 (1923): 332-34. This article is not included in Andreyev, "Spisok trudov."

[26] G. V. Vernadskii, "O istorijskom jedinstvu ruske crkve," *Hrišćanski život*, 5, no. 7-9 (1926): 281-89. This is not included in Andreyev, "Spisok trudov."

[27] Vernadsky asserted that both Trubetskoi and his father held similarly balanced views of the Ukraine. See his unpublished article, "Kniaz' Trubetskoi i ukrainskii vopros," circa 1938, Vernadsky Papers, Noncorrespondence Series, Box 32.1.9.1, and a letter to the editor of the Toronto Ukrainian pedagogical journal *Zhyttia i shkola*, March 22, 1961, ibid., Box 30.4.2.2.

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together in a coherent fashion.[28] Previously, the Roman and Byzantine empires had served as intermediaries between the steppe and the Mediterranean.[29] Because of the Mongol conquest, Russia acquired that role as part of its Eurasian destiny. If the khans of the Golden Horde had converted to Orthodox Christianity rather than Islam, then the horde, not Muscovy, would have unified Russia, and the bishop of Sarai, rather than the metropolitan in Moscow, would have become its ecclesiastical leader. This theorizing leads nowhere, although perhaps it was intended to bring out the unfulfilled potential inherent in the Mongol conquest.

Vernadsky published three books with the Eurasian press. The first must have been written before he left Prague for New Haven; the other two were composed in the United States. They are not scholarly works, and they lack critical apparatus and bibliographic footnotes. They seem to be hastily written exercises in journalism or publicistics rather than the profound historical synthesis they purport to be. None of the three was devoted primarily to the problem of the Mongol influence on Russia, but all contain remarks on that theme. Vernadsky's relocation did not immediately influence his interpretation. In these works he expanded the factual base mobilized to support the Eurasian view of Russian history without altering that view itself.

Nachertanie russkoi istorii appeared in 1927.[30] It is framed by an introduction and conclusion expressing Eurasianist ideology. Russia, Vernadsky wrote, is neither Europe nor Asia but Eurasia. The moving force in Eurasia is the *russkii narod,* the single "Russian" nation of the three East Slavic peoples. Russian eastward expansion was not imperialistic because of the friendly and easy assimilation of non-Russian peoples by their fellow-Eurasianist Russians.[31] The Russian people instinctively sought their Eurasian geopolitical destiny.[32] The overarching conceptual framework of the *Nachertanie russkoi istorii* was supplied by Eurasian metaphysics in its most messianic, determinist, teleological, and Great Russian chauvinist guise.

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[28] G. V. Vernadskii, "Mongol'skoe igo v russkoi istorii," *Evraziiskii Vremennik,* 5 (1927): 153-64.

[29] This interpretation reflects the influence of Vernadsky's St. Petersburg teacher and later colleague at Yale, Michael Rostovtseff, presented in his *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia* (Oxford, 1922), and N. P. Kondakov on the relations of Classical, Scythian, Byzantine, and Old Russian art. Vernadsky was associated with Kondakov and his students in Prague (see G. V. Vernadskii, *O znachenii nauchnoi deiatel'nosti N. P. Kondakova. K vos'midesiatiletiiu so dnia rozhdeniia, 1944 – I.XI – 1924* [*Rech', proiznesennaia na III s"ezde russkikh uchenykh* v *Prage 25 sentiabria 1924 g.*] [Prague, 1924]).

[30] Volume 1 of *Nachertanie russkoi istorii* was devoted to "external" history. Volume 2 on "internal" history never appeared.

[31] Vernadsky long remained committed to this whitewash of Russian relations with the nationalities of the Russian Empire. On the current Soviet version of a similar theory, see Lowell Tillett, *The Great Friendship. Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1969).

[32] Vernadskii, *Nachertanie russkoi istorii,* pp. 5-23, 229-31.

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There are no surprises in its section on the Mongol period. Vernadsky emphasizes Mongol toleration of Orthodox Christianity, Mongol campaigns against Catholic powers in Eastern and Central Europe, and Vitovt's defeat in 1399. He suggests that some Muscovite governmental forms were borrowed from the Mongols. He denigrates the tradition of the Kievan democratic town meeting (*veche*) and Cossack self-rule as exceptions to the Eurasian pattern of strong central power rather than antecedents of modern Russian political structures. Vernadsky dated the end of the Mongol yoke not to 1480, the date of Ivan III's stand on the Ugra river, but to 1452. In that year the khanate of Kasimov was established, a vassal Tatar border dependency which owed obedience to Vasilii II and protected the Russian forest zone from the steppe. Vernadsky retained this chronology in all his later works.[33]

In 1934, seven years after his arrival in the United States, Vernadsky attempted to integrate the histories of all the peoples of Eurasia to demonstrate that they shared a common experience. The *Opyt istorii Evrazii* is an ambitious work. Unifying the seemingly diverse pasts of the divergent peoples of Eurasia would obviously buttress the Eurasian theory, and Vernadsky's method was to identify factual parallels between Russian and Inner Asian history. Unfortunately such parallels prove neither influence nor historical symbiosis, and most of the events in Russian history he employs could quite easily be compared to "non-Eurasian," Catholic West Slavic or European history. The conclusions about Russo-Tatar relations scattered through the book merely rehearse his previous views. According to Vernadsky, the "anarchic tradition" (*buntarstvo*) of the Russian people is just "the other side of the coin" of the congenital Russian/Eurasian demand for subordination to higher central authority. Despite fits of rebellion, the argument goes, Russians need and prefer authoritarian government. Russia is the geopolitical heir of the Chingissid Empire. Russian annexation of Kazan' and Astrakhan' under Ivan IV launched Russia upon its Eurasian mission, a destiny facilitated by the "congeniality" of the Russian people toward other Eurasian peoples.[34]

Nor had Vernadsky modified his observations or approach by 1938, over a decade after his arrival at Yale, when *Zven'ia russkoi kul'tury* appeared.[35] He repeats his usual arguments in this book in no coherent order or sequence. Muscovite institutional borrowing from the Mongols is an "indisputable fact." The Mongol khans fostered Russian unity by ending the independence of rival

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[33] Ibid., pp. 67-111.

[34] G. V. Vernadskii, *Opyt istorii Evrazii s poloviny VI veka do nastoiashchego vremeni* (Berlin, 1934), pp. 11-13, 108, 131-32.

[35] G. V. Vernadskii, *Zven'ia russkoi kul'tury*, vol. 1, part 1: *Drevniaia Rus' (do poloviny XV v.)* (Brussels, 1938), treats the economy, society, government and administration, law and the judiciary. Part 2 was to cover church and religion, science and technology, literature, art, education and ideas; it never appeared. Apparently two-volume sets were also planned for the rest of Muscovite and for Imperial Russian history, which would have produced a six-volume work.

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principalities. Nevskii's political wisdom was neither appreciated nor understood by the hotheads of his time, and so on.[36]

When Vernadsky began work on the major project which dominated his research for the next thirty years, his five-volume history of Russia to 1682, it might have appeared from his publications that he was still committed, for all his apoliticism, to the antidemocratic, chauvinist, and religiously bigoted values of Eurasian dogma. Readers familiar with the series of scholarly studies Vernadsky published at the height of his most strident Eurasianism, in which he took a favorable view of Russian constitutional and political reforms imitative of Western European models,[37] might have realized that such was not the case. How Vernadsky managed to hold mutually exclusive views of Russia's relationship with the West simultaneously remains a mystery, but these monographs and articles demonstrate that he had not abandoned his liberal, democratic principles entirely. What brought the Kliuchevskii-Kadet tradition back into the mainstream of Vernadsky's analysis of Russia and the Mongols was, as he seems never to have realized or acknowledged, his continuing exposure to the American social and political milieu, a development obscured by its time-lag, its expression in the form of a return to earlier historiographic modes, and its failure to displace Eurasianism *in toto.*

Kievan Russia, published in 1948, is in many respects very much a Eurasianist work. It begins with a laudatory invocation of the "brilliant" contrast of the Latino-Germanic and Russian worlds by Trubetskoi, which is the classic Eurasianist statement. Vernadsky's interpretation of Kievan Rus' steppe relations is balanced and imaginative. In discussing Kievan economic and political history, however, he follows the argument of his professor Kliuchevskii: Kievan Rus' is a capitalist economy rooted in commerce, and the democratic political values of the Kievan town meeting showed the way for future Russian history.[38] Under the

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[36] Ibid., pp. 21, 126-29, 141-42, 170-71, 173-74, 208, and *passim.*

[37] On the Russian Freemasons see G. Vernadskij, "Le césarévitch Paul et les francsmaçons de Moscou," *Revue des Études Slaves,* 3 (1923): 268-85; G. V. Vernadskii, "Zametki o literaturno-izdatel'skoi deiatel'nosti N. I. Novikova," in *Istoriko-literaturnyi sbornik posv. V. I. Sreznevskomu* (Leningrad, 1924) [typeset 1916], pp. 85-91; and G. Vernadskij, "Beiträge zur Geschichte der Freimaurerei und des Mystizismus in Russland," *Zeitschrift für Slavische Philologie* IV (1927), pp. 162-78. In addition, see G. V. Vernadskii, *Gosudarstvennaia ustavnaia gramota Rossiiskoi imperii 1820 goda. Istoriko-iuridicheskii ocherk* (Prague, 1925). This work was translated by Serge Oldenbourg as G. Vernadsky, *La Charte constitutionelle de l'Empire Russe de l'An 1820* (Paris, 1933). See also J. V. Vernadskij, "Risšká ustavni listina ruského cisarstvi," *Sbornik vìd pravnich a statnich,* 25 (1925): 394-425; George Vernadsky, "Un projet de déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen en Russie en 1801," *Revue historique de droit français et étranger,* 4th ser., 4 (1925): 436-45; G. Vernadskij, "Alexander Ier et le problème slave pendant la première moitié de son regne," *Revue des Études Slaves,* 7 (1927): 93-111; and Georg Vernadsky, "Zur Geschichte des Entwurfs einer Konstitution für Russland v. Jahre 1819," *Historische Zeitschrift,* 135 (1927): 423-27.

[38] George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia,* vol. 2: *Kievan Russia* (New Haven, 1948), pp. 1-18, 163-72, 209-13.

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influence of American free enterprise and democracy, Vernadsky seems to have returned to the more "progressive" interpretation of Kievan history of his university mentor, which was far more consistent with his family background. The Eurasianists were suspicious of the history of Kievan Rus', since they saw its involvement in Balkan politics as the precedent for Russian meddling in "non-Eurasian" European history which had led to Russia's catastrophic participation in World War I and the Bolshevik revolution.[39] But Vernadsky incorporated both Eurasianism and Europeanism into his historical conception, without resolving the inconsistencies or contradictions thus generated. *Kievan Russia* was a harbinger of Vernadsky's altered judgments on the Mongol impact on Russian history.

What should have been the crown of Vernadsky's long research, *The Mongols and Russia,* was published in 1953. In organizing the volume he omitted internal Russian economic, social, and cultural history, promising to devote a companion volume to these themes. This supplement was never written; the subsequent volume of the series merely picked up the historical narrative in 1462.[40]

In his review of *The Mongols and Russia,* Nikolay Andreyev observed that Vernadsky had dropped the "fighting spirit" of early Eurasianism, which distorted Russian history, and had "soft-pedalled" his Eurasianism. The result, Andreyev implied, was more accurate history.[41] Only a detailed analysis of the book can reveal in which ways it is Eurasianist and in which ways it is a continuation of the deviation from the Eurasian values of the book *Kievan Russia.*

In his opening sentence Vernadsky states a premise he had held for close to forty years: "The Mongol period is one of the most significant in the whole course of Russian history." The Mongols had had a profound effect on Russian social and political institutions. They did not impose their religion on the Russians as the Germans tried to do in the thirteenth century. The "ruthless efficiency" of Mongol rule, however, necessitated a "long and tortuous" road to emancipation. "Inevitably," the Russians absorbed many features of Mongol government. These "scars" remained visible long after the overthrow of Mongol suzerainty. Only by paying close attention to the history of the Mongol Empire could historians understand its impact on Russian history.[42]

The structure of *The Mongols and Russia* is unquestionably Eurasian; the structure is also a failure. To place the impact of the Mongols on Russia in

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[39] I. R., *Nasledie Chingis khana,* pp. 3-4, divorces Kievan Rus' from "Russian history" because of its north-south, rather than east-west, axis.

[40] Vernadsky, *A History of Russia,* vol. 3: *The Mongols and Russia* (New Haven, 1953). See the review by Marc Szeftel, *Russian Review,* 14 (1955): 65-67. Cf. Vernadsky, *A History of Russia,* vol. 4: *Russia at the Dawn of the Modern Age* (New Haven, 1959).

[41] See the review by Nikolay Andreyev published in English in *Slavonic and East European Review,* 32, no. 109 (June 1954): 534-37 and in Russian in *Novyi zhurnal,* 36 (1954): 304-307.

[42] Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia,* pp. v-vii.

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proper perspective, Vernadsky begins his text with a long discussion of the creation of the Mongol Empire.[43] This is the book's least original and valuable section. Vernadsky then presents a narrative history of the Mongol successor state which ruled Russia, the Golden Horde. Following the narrative come thematic sections on the social, economic, and cultural history of the Golden Horde. After laying the Mongol background, Vernadsky finally arrives at a narrative of Russian history during the Mongol period and an exposition of Russo-Tatar relations. The final section of the book is a synthesis of the Mongol impact on Russian history. This structure did not work because it left no room for most domestic Russian history during the Mongol period, and Vernadsky did not succeed in integrating the histories of the Golden Horde and the Russian principalities. Nor did his organization permit him even to bring together in a single space all of the evidence and conclusions concerning the Mongol rqle in Russian history. Some of this material was presented in the chapters on the Golden Horde, while the rest of it appears in the conclusion about the Mongol influence on Russian history. It might have been Vernadsky's execution of that structure, rather than the Eurasian theory itself, that explains his failure to present his material coherently.

Nevertheless, the overall picture which Vernadsky paints is clear enough, and it is in the main Eurasian. The Mongol destruction of Russia was a catastrophe, but even catastrophes must be studied. A balanced appraisal of the Mongol role in Russian history is obligatory. Russian subjection to the Mongols was a "grim necessity" until Mongol weakness made military opposition feasible rather than suicidal. The economic losses occasioned by the Mongol conquest were partially offset by the positive contribution of the Mongols to international commerce. The Muscovites borrowed extensively from Mongol fiscal, military, diplomatic, and administrative institutions. The assimilated descendants of the Mongols who entered the Muscovite aristocracy made significant contributions to Russian history. These observations come from the stock in trade of Vernadsky's most Eurasianist Russian-language publications of the interwar period.[44]

Vernadsky still blamed the Mongols for not protecting "Western Russia" (Belorussia and the Ukraine) from Catholicism (Lithuanians and Poles),[45] but his evaluation of Grand Prince Daniil of Galicia-Volhynia was tangibly different from what it had been. He did not discard the contrast between Daniil and Nevskii, but now he explained their differing political programs by geographic and political context rather than by Daniil's weakness of character. Daniil was farther from Mongol power than Nevskii, and his Catholic neighbors, Slavic Poland and

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[43] See the reviews by the orientalists Denis Sinor in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1957, pp. 101-102 and Berthold Spuler in *American Historical Review*, 59 (1953-54): 617-19 in English and *Oriens*, 7 (1957): 117-18 in German.

[44] Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia*, pp. 1-5, 244, 330-32, 333-35, 338-44, 344-66, 214-32, 366-67.

[45] Ibid., pp. 233-34.

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"semi-Slavic" Hungary, were not as hostile as the crusading German knights.[46] Absent is any accusation of treason or apostasy by Daniil. Eurasian religious bigotry has been replaced by a carefully constructed, convincing (if not terribly original), and far calmer historical analysis.[47]

This shift in Vernadsky's interpretation is not easily explained. His greater age is not a sufficient argument since advancing age sometimes brings increased tolerance, but it can also foster heightened religious devotion and intolerance. A less biological analysis of the change seems more promising. Before his arrival in the United States Vernadsky had lived almost entirely in a Russian Orthodox, Russian-speaking world. In Constantinople and Greece, for example, he met many Greek Orthodox Christians, but his major involvements were with fellow émigrés, and Vernadsky's Prague was an emotion-charged, Russian émigré hothouse. But while Vernadsky did not isolate himself from the Russian community in New Haven, his social contacts were infinitely more cosmopolitan than they had ever been. The American ethos of religious toleration would in several decades have melted Vernadsky's attachment to divisive religious attitudes. Finally, he had given vent to Eurasian spleen in publicistic works only. Such partisanship had never found an outlet in his genuinely scholarly studies and would have been out of place in *The Mongols and Russia.*

Vernadsky's approach to the problem of Mongol influence on Russian history was now defensive, rather than aggressive and militant as it had been in his earlier Eurasian works. To establish the Mongol impact upon Russian history, he proposed to compare pre-Mongol Russia (Kievan Rus') with post-Mongol Russia (sixteenth-century Muscovy). He begins his synthesis as follows: "It is logically possible to deny any positive influence of Mongol institutions on Russian ones and yet to recognize the importance of the Mongol impact on Russian development, even if it were merely negative."[48] Vernadsky may have anticipated objections to the notion that the Mongols exercised any influence on Russian history and sought to preempt accusations that he "approved" of the Mongol role because he was studying it. Vernadsky himself may have once believed that Muscovite institutional borrowing from the Mongols constituted positive Mongol influence but he appears to have reconsidered the matter. That reconsideration animates his defensive posture.

In evaluating the cumulative Mongol impact on Russia, Vernadsky contrasted the "freedom" of Kievan Rus' with the universal obligations of Muscovy. He closed his discussion, as well as *The Mongols and Russia,* with its most quoted sentence: "Autocracy and serfdom were the price the Russian people had to pay for national survival."[49] To overthrow the Mongols, the Russian people knew they had to accept social regimentation and political authoritarianism.

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[46] Ibid., pp. 143-44, 148-49.

[47] Vernadsky softened his interpretation of the Union of Brest in *Russia at the Dawn of the Modern Age,* pp. 289-92.

[48] Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia,* p. 333.

[49] Ibid., pp. 335-38, 385-90.

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Vernadsky's conclusion does not inspire assent. Both serfdom and autocracy developed in Russia after the termination of Mongol rule. Indeed, they had barely begun to appear in the middle of the fifteenth century (when Vernadsky dated the liquidation of the Tatar yoke with the establishment of the Kasimov khanate) and would take decades or centuries to develop fully. Moreover, Vernadsky did not present an internal history of Russia during the Mongol period which would demonstrate exactly how the Mongols caused the emergence of serfdom and autocracy. His disclaimers notwithstanding, in formulating this generalization Vernadsky committed the *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* fallacy and attributed to Mongol influence changes in Russian life not of their making.

But let us leave aside the historical veracity of this argument and explore its logic. Vernadsky was not claiming that the Muscovite autocracy imitated Mongol autocracy. He traced the forms and ideology of Muscovite autocracy to Byzantium, not Karakorum. Nor did he believe now that Russia was fated to suffer forever under authoritarian government. In fact he praised the democratic political institutions of Kievan Rus' and took a positive view of the institutions of self-government in Russia created by both the Great Reforms (particularly the zemstvo) and the revolution of 1905. He would not have accepted Wittfogel's assertion that the Mongols unalterably infected Russia with oriental despotism.[50] Rather, autocracy and serfdom – two institutions of which Vernadsky, like everyone from his prerevolutionary social and intellectual milieu, disapproved – were the "scars" which the Mongols left on Russia even after the liquidation of the Tatar yoke. The "catastrophe" of the Mongol conquest was the price Russia had to pay for liberation from Mongol rule, namely, autocracy and serfdom. Vernadsky's conclusion is manifestly not an underestimation of the negative effects of the Mongol conquest upon Russia.[51] Perhaps his conclusion is so obviously negative no commentator has felt the need to call attention to that fact.

Vernadsky's judgment remains geopolitical and determinist, like Eurasianism: Russia, because of its location in Eurasia, could not avoid Mongol conquest, and it had to resort to autocracy and serfdom to reassert its national independence. Vernadsky's interpretation also retains the Russian patriotism of Eurasianism and Imperial Russian historiography before it: the reified "Russian people" emerged from the fire of Mongol rule stronger, their will tempered into hard steel by its flames, and consciously and collectively acceeded to the national program to expel the oppressors.

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[50] Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism. A Comparative Study of Total Power* (New Haven, 1957), pp. 201-203, 219-25 and idem, "Russia and the East: A Comparison and Contrast" and "Reply," *Slavic Review*, 22, no. 4 (December 1963): 627-43, 656-62. It might be interesting to compare the roots of Eurasianism and the theory of Russia as an oriental despotism.

[51] The critical review of *The Mongols and Russia* by N. Ia. Merpert and V. T. Pashuto in *Voprosy istorii*, 1955, no. 8, pp. 180-86 is interesting in this respect, although other corrections have more validity. Soviet historians also attribute the overthrow of Mongol rule to the efforts of the patriotic Russian people *(narod)*.

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But Vernadsky's interpretation of the cost to Russia of national liberation is not Eurasianist. Eurasianist theorizing stated that Russians-Eurasians naturally preferred authoritarian rule, an assumption designed to enable the new ideocrats to return to Russia as the post-Bolshevik organic leadership. The Eurasianists were not interested in establishing Western political institutions in Russia, whose social and cultural ethos was alien to parliamentarism. Vernadsky had never been a party to the Eurasianists' political fantasies, but in his publicistic, Russian-language Eurasian works, he had accepted the rhetoric of Eurasianism in minimizing the significance of democratic Russian political institutions such as the *veche* and the Cossack circle (*krug*). He had presented Muscovite borrowing of Mongol institutions as a favorable development. Now, writing in English for an American audience, he returned to Kliuchevskii's positive interpretation of Russia's democratic history, a perspective which enhanced the value of Russian history in the American democratic, antiauthoritarian political environment. Muscovite borrowing of Mongol political institutions to strengthen centralized autocracy became a negative feature of the Mongol impact on Russian history. The new formulation repudiated the political culture of Eurasianism.

To the Eurasianists the Mongol conquest was important as a step in the process by which Russia would come to fulfill its Eurasian geopolitical destiny. The Eurasianists never described Mongol rule as an unmitigated disaster, as Vernadsky now did, but they were far more enthusiastic about Russia's Eurasian identity when it was Russia expanding eastward to unite Eurasia rather than the Mongols expanding westward to do so. Vernadsky continued to take a Eurasian view of the Muscovite annexation of Kazan' and Astrakhan' in the sixteenth century. His Eurasianism came home to roost in this glorious depiction of "the foundation of Russia's Eurasian empire."[52] The contrast between this interpretation and that of S. M. Solov'ev, who saw conquest of Kazan' as a crusading triumph of Christianity over Islam, could not be greater.

Vernadsky, therefore, had not abandoned Eurasianism in *The Mongols and Russia,* but neither had he preserved it intact. What he had "soft-pedalled" were those elements of Eurasianism most offensive to Russian patriotic and nationalist sensibilities and those values in Eurasianism most antithetical to the American way of life. Historiographically he accomplished this feat by incorporating judgments from the liberal, progressive Russian historical tradition into his Eurasian framework. *The Mongols and Russia* is an eclectic monograph, but it is not randomly eclectic. Eurasian in structure and Eurasian in vocabulary, occasionally Eurasian in premise and conclusion, the book is non-Eurasian, even anti-Eurasian, in its religious, social, and political values and its projection of those values onto Russian history. Its ultimate conclusion is decidedly incompatible with much Eurasian theory.

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[52] George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, vol. 5: *The Tsardom of Muscovy, 1547-1682,* 2 parts (New Haven, 1969), pp. 1-222, especially pp. 1-8, which continue to laud Trubetskoi and Savitskii.

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Vernadsky apparently never articulated consciousness of the evolution in his historical writings or the contradictions in his conceptualization of the Mongol period of Russian history. In 1959 he summarized the "main theme" of *The Mongols and Russia* as the "historical catastrophe" of the destruction and devastation wrought upon Russia by the Mongols.[53] This is a very un-Eurasian summary of a book replete with Eurasianism.

Personally and professionally George Vernadsky was a product of the great liberal Russian intelligentsia tradition. His prerevolutionary research on Russian expansion into Siberia led him to some original insights which questioned the usual interpretation of the Mongol impact on Russian history without imperiling his commitment to that tradition. In joining the minority movement of Eurasianism in the Russian emigration, he repudiated several of the fundamental principles of his political and historiographic background, but this repudiation was more complicated, ambiguous, and contradictory than has been realized. Despite his adherence to Eurasianism for the rest of his long and productive life, under the influence of the cultural environment of his adopted homeland Vernadsky in several ways returned to the democratic religious and political values and historiographic premises of his upbringing and education. His changing interpretations of the role of the Mongols in Russian history embody this evolution particularly well. The viability and relevance of the Imperial Russian historiographic tradition, manifested in its hold upon Vernadsky, suggests a partial explanation of its continuing influence on studies of Russian history.

[53] George Vernadsky, "Teaching and Writing Russian History in America: A General Chronological Outline," *Russian Orthodox Journal*, 33, no. 4 (August 1959): 26.

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"KNOW THY ENEMY": MEDIEVAL RUSSIAN FAMILIARITY WITH THE MONGOLS OF THE GOLDEN HORDE

The question of the role of the Mongols in Russian history has always been a controversial one. Patriotic national Russian historiography, both Imperial and Soviet, has always been reluctant to admit that foreign conquest by Inner Asian pastoral nomads could have brought any positive benefits to Russia. Indeed, much of the time in Imperial Russian historiography the issue of possible Mongol influence was ignored altogether. Thus the great multi-volume histories of S. M. Solovev and V. O. Ključevskij do not contain a "Mongol period" at all. Otherwise historians have mostly emphasized the negative consequences of the Mongols on Russian history: economic losses in raids and exploitation via taxes, Mongol political interference in the affairs of the Russian principalities, cultural isolation, and even moral regression.[1] This negative interpretation of Mongol influence takes two forms: either it is argued that the Mongols had no effect upon Russian history, since the political infrastructure, social structure, and Church were left alone, or that the Mongol role was a catastrophic one for those areas of Russian life which the Tatars did touch. Soviet scholarship[2] and much historiography in the West[3] adheres to this consensus. Even in the best of recent Soviet monographs

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[1] For surveys of the historiography consult B. D. Grekov, A. Ju. Jakubovskij, *Zolotaja orda i ee padenie*. Moskva, Leningrad 1950, pp. 247-251; Michael Cherniavsky, Khan or Basileus: An Aspect of Russian Medieval Political Theory, in: Journal of the History of Ideas 20 (1959) pp. 459-476 (the most perceptive analysis, albeit the briefest), here p. 459; Boris Ischboldin, *Essays on Tatar History*. New Delhi 1963, pp. 17-23; V. V. Kargalov, *Vnešnepolitičeskie factory razvitija feodal'noj Rusi. Feodal'naja Rus' i kočevniki*. Moskva 1967, pp. 219-255 (the most extensive discussion); N. S. Borisov, Otečestvennaja istoriografija o vlijanii tataro-mongol'skogo našestvija na russkuju kul'turu, in: Problemy istorii SSSR 5 (1976) pp. 129-148 (the most recent survey).

[2] A. Sakharov, Les Mongoles et la civilization russe. Contributions a l'histoire russe, in: Cahiers d' histoire mondiale (Neuchatel 1958) pp. 77-87, retains its validity as a summary of Soviet views; cf. L. V. Čerepnin, Mongolo-Tatary na Rusi (XIII v.), in: S. L. Tichvinskij (ed.), *Tataro-Mongoly v Azii i Evrope*. Moskva 1970, pp. 179-203.

[3] The most elaborate theory that the Mongols "ruined" Russian history is that of Karl A. Wittfogel, who argues that the Mongols brought "oriental despotism" to Russia. See Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism. A Comparative Study of Total Power*. New Haven 1957, especially pp. 201-203, 219-225. For a discussion see: Slavic Review 22. 4 (Dec. 1963): Wittfogel, Russia and the East: A Comparison and Contrast, pp. 627-643; Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, "Oriental Despotism" and Russia, pp. 644-649; Berthold Spuler, Russia and Islam, pp. 650-655, and Wittfogel Reply, pp. 656-662. I do not find this analysis, of Wittfogel's interpretation of the role of the Mongols in

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on the Mongol empire it is presumed that military, economic and political harm exhaust the nature of Mongol influence upon any country or area conquered by the Mongols.[4]

Political narratives of thirteenth-fifteenth century Russian history differ in how much influence they assign to the Mongols in the evolution of the northeastern Russian principalities, and most importantly in the rise of Moscow. Yet all these studies share a perception of the Golden Horde as an external factor acting upon Russia, interfering or not interfering in Russian matters. Rarely is the internal history of the Horde taken into account in the formulation of Horde policy toward Russia. It is assumed the Mongols wanted to exploit Russia and pursued whatever political program served that purpose. It is not so much that this axiom is wrong but merely that it reduces Russo-Tatar relations to a series of political, and military, machinations by cynical Tatar "foreigners."[5] The Tatars perform in the role given them by the medieval Russian sources, in which the infidel, pagan, cruel and evil Tatars act at the inspiration of the Devil to destroy Russian orthodox Christians out of natural malice.[6] In the phrase of A. E. Presnjakov, Mongol authority was "alien and strange" in Russia.[7] Thus the medieval Russian perception of the Tatars is of a piece which, indeed, serves as the foundation stone for modern historiographic treatments of the Mongols as an external, alien and negative actor in medieval Russian history.

Some recent scholarship has parted company, in greater or lesser degree, with this dominant paradigm of Russo-Mongol relations, and sought to present a

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Russian history adequate, and shall try to present a full discussion elsewhere.

Although Wittfogel's theory of Oriental Despotism is not universally accepted, its images of the Mongol effect upon Russia are widely imitated; see e.g. B. Szczesniak, A Note on the Character of the Tartar Impact upon the Russian Church and State, in: Études Slaves et Est-Européens 17 (1972) pp. 92-98.

For an argument that the Mongols had no impact upon Russia other than destructive, see Valentin A. Riasanovsky, The Influence of Ancient Mongol Culture and Law on Russian Culture and Law, in: Chinese Social and Political Science Review 20, 4 (Jan. 1937) pp. 499-530.

[4] For example, Tichvinskij (ed.), *Tataro-Mongoly v Azii i Evrope*, or specifically on Russia, Kargalov, *Vnešnepolitičeskie factory razvitija feodal'noj Rusi*, and many other publications by Kargalov.

[5] Presnjakov restored an active Mongol role in Russian history after the neglect of Ključevskij, butas an external factor; subsequent narratives retain this approach to the problem. See A. E. Presnjakov, *Obrazovanie velikorusskago gosudarstva. Ocerki po istorii XIII-XV stoletija*. Petrograd 1918; A. N. Nasonov, *Mongoly i Rus'. Istorija tatarskoj politiki na Rusi*. Moskva, Leningrad 1940; L. V. Čerepnin, *Obrazovanie russkogo centralizovannogo gosudarstva v XIV-XV vv. Očerki social'no-ėkonomičeskoj i političeskoj istorii Rusi*. Moskva 1960; and John L. I. Fennell, *The Emergence of Moscow, 1304-1359*. Berkeley, Los Angeles 1968.

[6] For example, M. V. Šachmatov, Otnošenie drevne-russkich knižnikov k tataram, in: Trudy IV S-ezda russkich akademičeskich organizacij za granicej v Belgrade 16-23 Sentjabrja 1928. Čast' 1, Belgrad 1929, pp. 165-173; or Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, Asia through Russian Eyes, in: Waynes S. Vucinich (ed.), *Russia and Asia*. Stanford 1972, pp. 3-29.

[7] Presnjakov, *Obrazovanie velikorusskago gosudarstva*, pp. 48-50. I have not found a way to reproduce Presnjakov's alliteration, *čužaja i čuždaja vlast'*, in English.

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more balanced picture of the Mongol impact upon Russian history. It is possible that the Eurasian movement of the Russian emigration after the Russian Revolution of 1917 played a constructive role in this development, although their early publicistic works do not meet acceptable scholarly standards and the Eurasian theory was considered too marred by metaphysical geopolitical determinist dogma to be useful.[8] Nevertheless out of Eurasianism came George Vernadsky, who attempted to discuss the influence of the Mongols on Russian history in an objective fashion, and who made a serious case for Muscovite borrowing of Mongol political, fiscal, military, administrative, and diplomatic institutions.[9] It is very difficult to deny that the Muscovites adapted the Mongol postal system, the *jam*.[10] The Mongols have also been exonerated of some of the charges against them for ruining Russian history. Thomas S. Noonan has cleared them of responsibility for the fact that Russia "missed" the Renaissance.[11] Lawrence N. Langer has demonstrated that the Mongol campaigns of 1237-1238 or 1382 did not bring famine and plague to Russia; the Black Death, not the Mongols, was the major cause of the creation of *pustoši* (literally: wastes), i. e. abandoned villages no longer in cultivation.[12] Suzanne Mcnally has tried to make a case that the Mongols did not introduce the *terem* and the isolation of women into medieval Russia.[13] And Janet Martin has presented the Mongol role in the Russian fur trade in a clearer light: Mongol interference did re-route the fur trade, but this alteration benefitted some Russians while hurting others.[14]

Understanding of medieval Russian perceptions of the Tatars has also improved. Michael Cherniavskij brilliantly demonstrated that the Russians assimilated the most important political theory of the Mongol Empire, the legitimacy of the clan of Chinghis Khan, and presented the *khan* with the legitimate

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[8] On Eurasianism see Otto Böss, *Die Lehre der Eurasier. Ein Beitrag zur russischen Ideengeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts*. Wiesbaden 1961 = Veröffentlichungen des Osteuropa-Instituts München, Band 15; Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, The Emergence of Eurasianism, in: California Slavic Studies 4 (1967) pp. 39-72; and G. Edward Orchard, The Eurasian School of Russian Historiography, in: Laurentian University Review 10, 1 (Nov. 1977) pp. 97-106.

[9] George Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia*. New Haven 1953. Now see Charles J. Halperin, "George Vernadsky, Eurasianism, the Mongols, and Russia," in: *Slavic Review* 41:3 (1982), pp. 477-493 [#2]; idem, "Russia and the Steppe: George Vernadsky and Eurasianism," in: *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 36 (1985), pp. 55-194.

[10] Gustave Alef, The Origin and Early Development of the Muscovite Postal Service, in: Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas. N. S. 15 (1967) pp. 1-15.

[11] Thomas S. Noonan, Medieval Russia, the Mongols and the West: Novgorod's Relations with the Baltic, 1100-1350, in: Medieval Studies 37 (1975) pp. 316-339.

[12] Lawrence N. Langer, Plague and the Russian Countryside: Monastic Estates in the Late Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, in: Canadian-American Slavic Studies 10, 3 (Fall 1976) pp. 351-368.

[13] Suzanne Janosik McNally, *From Public Person to Private Prisoner: The Changing Place of Women in Medieval Russia*. Ph. D. diss., State University of New York at Binghamton, 1976, pp. 142-148, 253-256.

[14] Janet Martin, The land of darkness and the Golden Horde. The fur trade under the Mongols. XIII-XIV centuries, in: Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique 19 (1978) pp. 401-422.

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regalia and prerogatives of the Byzantine *basileus.*[15] I have tried to show that Russian manipulation of Chingissid ideology went beyond even Chemiavsky's estimate; Chingissid precepts penetrated wider[16] and were applied more flexibly to justify Muscovite policy vis-à-vis the Tatars.[17]

It is now known that Old Russian literature functioned within the confines of a "literary etiquette," a combination of aesthetic, literary and moral norms which shaped how a given topic could be described.[18] It would appear that the "literary etiquette" of Russo-Tatar relations precluded presenting the infidel Tatars in anything but a negative light. In effect a single enormous cliché or literary topos dominated all narrative prose about the Tatars, the imagery of the "scourge of God." In every Tatar raid the infidels spare neither young nor old, neither women nor children, neither monk nor nun, and so on. But more is involved in this one-sided and hence distorted attitude toward Russo-Tatar historical experience.

Everywhere on the medieval ethno-religious frontier there were societies which had no choice but to get along although they were engaged in frequent military hostilities and shared antagonistic, exclusivist religions. Thus in addition to warfare and mutual scorn, Spanish Catholics and Muslim Moors, Byzantine Christians and Arab or Turkic Muslims, French Crusaders in Jerusalem and Muslim subjects, East Slavs and their Turkic and later Mongol neighbors, and even Chinese and the "barbarians" beyond the Great Wall had no choice but to learn enough about each other to carry on more pragmatic relations as well. Bilingualism, trade, alliance, intermarriage, institutional borrowing, all took place. But such pragmatism could never be articulated without imperiling the self-image of one's society and polity as possessed of a monopoly upon righteousness and salvation. So no theory of cooperation akin to détente or peaceful coexistence was ever articulated to justify non-military interaction. An ideology of silence rationalized the contradiction between the desire for prejudice and the exigencies of pragmatism.[19] Thus buried in the medieval Russian

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[15] Chemiavsky, *Khan or Basileus*, pp. 459-476. This article is not cited by John L. I. Fennell, The Ideological Role of the Russian Church in the First Half of the Fourteenth Century, in: *Gorski Vijenac. A Garland of Essays Offerred to Professor Elizabeth Hill.* Cambridge 1970, pp. 105-111, who therefore expresses surprise at the gingerly treatment of the khans in some texts. Fennell does not distinguish between medieval Russian images of the Tatars and their more respectful attitude toward the khans.

[16] Charles J. Halperin, A Chingissid Saint of the Russian Orthodox Church: "The Life of Peter, *tsarevich* of the Horde", in: Canadian-American Slavic Studies 9, 3 (1975), pp. 324-335.

[17] Charles J. Halperin, The Russian Land and the Russian Tsar: The Emergence of Muscovite Ideology, 1380-1408, in: Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte 23 (1976), pp. 7-103.

[18] D. S. Lichačev, *Čelovek v literature drevnej Rusi.* Moskva 1958; 2nd ed. 1970; Lichačev, *Poėtika drevnerusskoj literatury.* Leningrad 1967; and Lichačev, *Razvitie russkoj literatury X–XVII vekov. Ėpochi i stili.* Leningrad 1973.

[19] Now see Charles J. Halperin, "The Ideology of Silence: Prejudice and Pragmatism on the Medieval Religious Frontier," in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 26:3 (1984), pp. 442-466 [#9]; idem, "Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian

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sources is the evidence to substantiate the contention that Russo-Tatar relations were more than martial. Only by asking what the sources tell us without wanting to tell us can we mine this data, since it would have been embarrassing for the medieval Russian intellectuals, the bookmen who wrote, copied, and preserved written manuscripts, to admit to expertise in Tatarica. The infidel Mongols were to be fought on the field of battle, not studied in the pursuit of objective knowledge.

The Soviet scholar M. D. Polubojarinova has concluded on the basis of the written and archeological evidence that the Russian physical presence in the Golden Horde was ubiquitous. Russian princes, nobles, warriors, merchants, clerics and slaves were frequent long- or short-term visitors on the territory of the Tatars. But Polubojarinova does not inquire whether prolonged and frequent sojourns in the Horde had any effect upon the medieval Russian perception of the Tatars.[20] It is difficult to imagine that the Russians could know the Tatars so well and still think of them as, in Presnjakov's words, alien and strange. The portrayal of the Tatars in the medieval Russian sources would then seem to be an ideological pose in order to buttress religious hostility and military preparedness, since conceiving of the Tatars as familiar but hostile apparently was not satisfactory. It is sad but true that it is always easier to think of one's enemies as sub-human or inhuman than as merely different human beings whose interests clash with one's own.

The Tatars were the enemies of the Russians; the Tatars had conquered Russia, their raids and campaigns continued to devastate her, and the decisions of the Mongol khan affected what happened in Russian politics. It was therefore imperative that the medieval Russians get to know their enemy; defensive prudence alone dictated such a policy. Religious prejudice and ideological pretension precluded talking about it, articulating it, or generalizing about the expertise one had acquired. In this article I want to present the data which supports the conclusion that the Russians became intimately acquainted with the geography, personnel and language of the Mongols of the Golden Horde.

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The Tatars did not move into the Russian forest zone; they stayed in the Pontic and Caspian steppe. The Russians had little choice in learning more about the steppe; they were compelled to visit the Horde in order to conduct

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History," (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985); idem, "The Tatar Yoke," (Columbus, OH: Slavica Press, 1986).

[20] M. D. Polubojarinova, *Russkie ljudi v Zolotoj Orde*. Moskva 1978; see my review in: Russian Review 39, 2 (April 1980) pp. 237-238. The omission of page references in this review, unbeknownst to me, renders one sentence confusing: Polubojarinova devotes twice as many pages to archeological as to written evidence, which reflects her expertise as an archeologist.

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their political affairs. Yet the great Russian orientalist V. V. Bartol'd lamented in his masterful survey of the study of the orient in Russia and Europe that the Russians had not taken full opportunity of this situation. There were no Russian equivalents of the informative travelogues of the Franciscan fathers of the thirteenth century. The Franciscans left us accounts of their journeys to Karakorum rich in knowledge of the geography and society of the Mongol empire. The Russians who visited Karakorum left no such written legacy to enrich the tradition of European scholarship about the Orient.[21]

The absence of Russian travel accounts comparable to Carpini or Rubruck can be extended to an even closer region too. There are no texts illustrative of Russian reactions to Karakorum and the points in-between Russia and Mongolia. The Russian conscripts who served in the Imperial Guard stationed outside Peking have also disappeared without leaving any traces in the medieval Russian sources. Russian knowledge of the geography of the Golden Horde was never codified in a single travel account, but it can be reconstructed from various medieval Russian texts.

In 1318-1319 prince Michail Aleksandrovič of Tveŕ was summoned to the Horde to answer a series of largely specious accusations inspired by his rival prince Ivan Kalita of Moscow. For several months, while being tortured and tried, Michail accompanied the Horde in its nomadizing. Because he was executed and canonized, he became the subject of a *vita*.[22] The author of this saint's life describes the Horde's itinerary with a sure hand: Michail reached the Horde on the river Donec, at the Surož Sea (Sea of Azov). He travelled to the Terek river in the Caucasus near the Jasskij and Čerkasskij hills (*gory* of the Jasy [Alans] and Čerkesy [Circassians], later corrupted to *gorody* = cities) at the city of Dedjakov [Tjutjakov],[23] on the river Sevenč. The Horde then crossed the river Adyž, which was appropriately named, since the word in Tatar means "sorrow." After his execution Michail's body was first buried in Možd'žčara near the Iron Gates in the eastern Caucasus (near Derbent). The body was later removed to Bezdež, at the confluence of the Volga and Don rivers,[24] before final relocation in Rus.[25]

[21] V. V. Bartol'd, *Raboty po istorii vostokovedenija*. Moskva 1977, pp. 363-364 (= *Sočinenija*, vol. 9).

[22] V. A. Kučkin, *Povesti o Michaile Tverskom. Istoriko-tekstologičeskoe issledovanie*. Moskva 1974, is a fairly comprehensive study of this text.

[23] On the location of this city consult M. G. Safargaliev, Gde nachodilsja zolotoordynskij gorod Dedjakovo? in: Učenye zapiski Mordovskogo pedagogičeskogo instituta imeni A. I. Poležaeva. Serija obščestvennych nauk. Vyp 4. Saransk 1956, pp. 128-137; V. A. Kučkin Gde iskat'jasskij gorod Tjutjakov?, in: Izvestija Severo-Osetinskogo naučnogo issledovatel'nogo instituta. Vol. 25. Ordžonikidze 1966, pp. 169-183; and E. I. Krupnov, Ešče raz o mestonachoždenii goroda Dedjakova, in: *Slaviane i Ruś*. Moskva 1968, pp. 291-297 (= Rybakov *Festschrift*).

[24] V. L. Egorov, Razvide centrobežnych ustremlenij v Zolotoj Orde, in: Voprosy istorii (1974) No. 8, pp. 36-50, here p. 49.

[25] *Polnoe sobranie russkich letopisej* [hereafter PSRL refers to this series]. Vol. 1. 2nd ed. Leningrad 1926; vol. 2. 2nd ed. S.-Peterburg 1908; vol. 4. S.-Peterburg 1848; vol. 5. S.-Peterburg

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Obviously this is a first-hand account by an eyewitness with a thorough familiarity with the heartland of the Golden Horde; the vita of Michail is the most extensive and precise extant source on the nomadic cycle of the Golden Horde. It was written, however, not to record the movements of the Horde *per se*, but to illustrate the duration and hardship of Michail's *via dolorosa* to martyrdom. Shorter passages in the Russian chronicles also manifest familiarity with the geography of the steppe. In 1346 a plague devastated not only the Horde (the *orda*, the nomadizing capital of the khan) but also Saraj, the permanent capital, Ornač (Urgenč, Chorezm in Central Asia), and Bezdež; it struck the following peoples: Muslims (*Besermeny* = Central Asian Muslims), Tatars, Armenians, Jews, Italians (*Frjazy*, primarily Genoese in the Crimea), and Circassians.[26] The Russians were particularly familiar with the Volga river to and beyond Saraj. One passage lists the cities along this waterway: Bolgar, Saraj, Bezdež, and Naručad.[27] Another annal recapitulates the destructive path of a band of Novgorodian freebooters (*uškujniki*), from the Zasuŕe, Markvaš and Vetluz to Bolgar, and down the Volga all the way to Astrachań.[28] The Russian chroniclers must have appreciated the importance of Tebriz in Azerbajdžan to the Golden Horde, since its capture from the Ilkhanids of Persia, the culmination of a century-long struggle, was recorded in 1357.[29] Russian knowledge extended eastward as well as southward. Sub anno 1406 it was written down that Tochtamyš, onetime khan of the Golden Horde and erstwhile servitor of grand prince Vitovt of Lithuania defeated at the battle on the river Vorskla, died in the Siberian tsarstvo (*zemlja*; khanate).[30]

In 1389 Ignatij of Smolensk accompanied metropolitan-designate Pimen down the Volga river, en route to Constantinople. Ignatij paints a vivid portrait of the terrain of the Červlenyj Jar (purple mountains) district with its river bends .and mountains of chalk. The ecclesiastical suite traversed the *ulusy* (districts) of Sary Hoza, Bek Bulat and Ak Buga.[31] In the fifteenth century the Tverian merchant Afanasij Nikitin eventually succeeded in reaching India, but sailing down the Volga he passed Kazań, the Horde, Uslan, Saraj and Berekezany. At the Buzan river Nikitin's party ran into hostile Tatars. At Astrachań Nikitin's boat failed to outrun Kaisym sultan and three thousand Tatars; the local horde

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1851; vol. 10. S.-Peterburg 1885; vol. 11. S.-Peterburg 1897; vol. 15. S.-Peterburg 1863; vol. 18. S.-Peterburg 1913: vol. 20. S.-Peterburg 1910; vol. 23. S.-Peterburg 1910; vol. 25. Moskva, Leningrad 1949; vol. 27. Moskva, Leningrad 1962; vol. 32. Moskva 1975; here vol. 5, pp. 207-215. Cf. the comments on the Horde and its movements in H. A. R. Gibb (tr.), *Ibn Batuta, Travels in Asia and Africa 1325-1354*. New York 1929, pp. 142-152.

[26] *Troickaja letopiś. Rekonstrukcija teksta*. Ed. M. D. Priselkov. Moskva, Leningrad 1950, p. 368 [hereafter TL refers to this chronicle].

[27] TL, p. 378.

[28] TL, p. 396. See Janet Martin, Les uškujniki de Novgorod: marchands ou pirates?, in: Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique 16 (1975) pp. 5-18.

[29] PSRL, vol. 4, p. 63.

[30] TL p. 465.

[31] PSRL, vol. 11, p. 96.

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chased them to Bogun. They were intercepted yet again near Tarchi, on the north shore of the Caspian Sea, *en route* to Derbent (the Iron Gates), by the Kaitaks. At Derbent the ambassador of the Shirvanshah from Azerbajdžan, Asanbeg, under whose protection Nikitin was travelling, secured the release of the men captured by the Kaitaks through the good offices of Bulat Beg. Derbent ruler Bulat Beg was the brother-in-law of lord Alil'beg of the Kaitak.[32]

Sometimes it is difficult to tell how much familiarity with the geography of the steppe is conveyed by a particular source. The Mongol khans issued *jarlyki* to the metropolitans of the Russian Orthodox Church guaranteeing the Church fiscal and judicial immunities. Mongol chancellery practice dictated that the scribe note the location of the khan at the time of issuance of the patent. A collection of *jarlyki* was translated into Russian and has survived. One suspects the Russians recognized the sites at which the *jarlyki* were written, most of which fell in Astrachań province (*gubernija*). The locations included Velikoluko, Želtoi, Trosti, Saraj, Kaonga, and Gulistan. One *jarlyk* was composed nomadizing on the Black Sea, and another just "in the steppe" (*na Taly*).[33]

In 1480-1481 khan Achmat of the Great Horde was killed by Nogai Tatars in the service of Muscovite grand prince Ivan III. The chronicles identify the very spot at which this event took place: at the Bela Veža between the Don and the Volga rivers, at the Malyj Donee river [*na Doncu na Malom*] near Azov. Presumably this information came from a report from the Nogais to Ivan III, and the region in which Achmat was killed was not unfamiliar to the Russians.[34]

The medieval Russian sources exhibit a knowledge of the geography of more than just the territory of the Golden Horde. The Russians were well-informed of the scope of the conquests of the great Timur (Temir-Aksak in the Russian texts, better known in the West as Tamerlane). They had to be: the Golden Horde was locked into a titanic struggle with the Timurid empire in which Russian contingents fought in the forces of the Horde. The chronicles list Timur's acquisitions in Central Asia and the Middle East, not without some Biblical adulterations.[35] This list also served as the basis for a sixteenth-century enumeration of the "Tatar lands" of Central Asia, the Caspian, the Caucasus and Transcaucasus, the northern Black Sea and the Volga river basin.[36] A recently discovered fifteenth-century text demonstrated an excellent knowledge of the cities, rulers, climate, geography and economy of the Iron Gates in the eastern

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[32] PSRL, vol. 20, pp. 303-304, and: *Choženie za tri morja Afanasija Nikkina 1466-1472 gg.* Moskva 1948; 2nd ed. 1958, pp. 10-11.

[33] M. D. Priselkov, *Chanskie jarlyki russkim mitropolitam.* Petrograd 1916, pp. 57, 59, 61. For identification of obscure locations see the Commentary in: Pamjatniki russkogo prava. Vol. 3, Moskva 1955, pp. 476, 477, 479, 480.

[34] *Ustjužskij letopisnyj svod (Archangelogorodskij letopisec).* Ed. N. K. Serbina. Moskva, Leningrad 1950, pp. 93-94.

[35] PSRL, vol. 15, col. 448-449.

[36] N. A. Kazakova, „Tatarskim zemljam imena", in: Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoj literatury [hereafter TODRL refers to this journal] 34 (1979) pp. 253-256.

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Caucasus, near Derbent. This region was long familiar to the Russians from the nomadic travels of the Golden Horde, and it was also useful as a pathway to Persia.[37]

The Russians knew more about the geography of the Golden Horde than modern scholars, who cannot always locate all of the sites to which the medieval Russian sources allude with such ease. Such modern ignorance does not undermine Vernadsky's conclusion about Russian expertise in steppe geography: "The Russian chronicles of this period display a good knowledge of the geography of the Golden Horde and on various occasions mention not only Saray, but other commercial centers like Urgenj and Astrakhan. [...] The Russians were also well acquainted with the...Azov region and the Crimea."[38]

The Russians knew their way around Saraj far better than around Constantinople; yet we have a rich Russian pilgrim literature with incomparable topographic and cultural information about Constantinople,[39] and no description of Saraj, let alone of Karakorum. This disparity in the transmission of geographic knowledge is not a function of ignorance, therefore, but of cultural and literary constraints which inhibited the presentation of medieval Russian expertise in written form. To the medieval Russians only a religious pilgrimage could be immortalized as a travelogue. The Franciscans, after all, were on a religious mission with a thoroughly defensible religious purpose, the conversion of the Mongols to Catholicism. Medieval Russia had no equivalent of the secular travel literature which produced the famous account of Marco Polo until Afanasij Nikitin. Nikitin was an exception, and obviously found the zone of the Golden Horde too familiar compared to the exotica of India to warrant full narration in his travels. The Russian princes and clerics who went to Saraj did so for an embarrassing reason: because Russia had been conquered by the Mongols. It would have been far too unseemly to preserve the geographic knowledge acquired in such trips in a public fashion, although there are minor exceptions in the course of narrating current events. In addition medieval Russia simply did not possess a tradition of composing the kind of work which would summarize new "social science" information in the manner of the western medieval universities. The relative silence about the geography of the Horde is a function of the general Russian intellectual response to the dilemma of infidel rule, which was silence. Nevertheless enough material has been retained to glimpse the remarkable expertise of the medieval Russians in the geography of the steppe.

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[37] V. A. Kučkin, „Skazanie o železnych vratach", in: Archeografičeskij ežegodnik za 1964 g. (1965) pp. 274-277, and Russkij putešestvennik v Azerbajdžane v pervoj polovine XV veka, in: Voprosy istorii (1965) No. 3, pp. 204-205; Ju. K. Begunov, Drevnerusskoe opisanie Derbenta i Širvana,in: TODRL 21 (1965) pp. 126-131.

[38] Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia*, p. 343.

[39] On the utility of the pilgrimages see George P. Majeska, "St. Sophia in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries: The Russian Travellers and the Relics," in: *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 27 (1973), pp. 69-87, and idem, "Russian Travelers to Constantinopole in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries," (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1984).

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The Tatars are most often referred to in the medieval Russian chronicles as just that, "the Tatars" (*Tatary*), usually preceded by some pejurative adjectives. But the Tatars were not an alien, strange people to the medieval Russians, and the anonymous collective generic by which they were commonly called should not be construed as telling the whole story of medieval Russian familiarity with the personnel of the Horde. Naturally the Russians had to know the identity of their rulers, the khans. This was not as easy as it might have been, since civil war and disorder were not unknown in the Horde and changes of ruler could be frequent. But the Russian sources know much more than that. The chronicles contain the names of at least two hundred Tatars embedded simply in the ongoing narrative of Russo-Tatar relations.[40] This data can best be appreciated when it is brought together in tabular form.[41]

Not only did the Russians record the names of khans (*cari*); they also sometimes mention imperial princes (*careviči*) and the wives/widows of khans, *caricy* (khanshas, khatuns). Non-Chingissid aristocrats are accorded the title "prince" (*knjaź*), which usually translated "emir" or "beg." Mongol officials are designated with their appropriate titles; the *baskaki* were governors who supervised the collection of tribute and conscription and maintained public order; the *darugi* had administrative functions in the Horde itself; the "envoys" (*posoly*, a literal translation of the Mongol *il'či*) carried messages and orders between the Horde and the Russian forest zone. Sometimes the Russian sources apply a Russian title to a Tatar notable, such as "commander" (*voevoda*) or "courtier" (*stol'nik*). Naturally, sometimes there is confusion among scholars as to the identity of a particular Tatar,[42] and even the Russian chronicles could not keep the musical chairs of the Saraj throne straight all the time during the enormous unrest of the 1360's and 1370's.[43] Nevertheless the Russian chronicles on the whole contain fuller and more accurate information about the

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[40] Different chronicles sometime mention different events under the same year, or the same event under different years, or different Tatar notables in connection with the same event. Given the vagaries of transliteration of oriental names into Russian, sometimes it is not obvious if two names refer to the same individual. I have not tried to rationalize all this data. Only one allusion to any individual is counted. It is very likely that my lists are incomplete, but the quantity of data should be sufficient to substantiate the conclusion presented in this article.

[41] See Appendix, pp. 173-175. NPL = *Novgorodskaja pervaja letopiś staršego i mladšego izvodov*. Ed. A. N. Nasonov. Moskva, Leningrad 1950.

[42] Nasonov, *Mongoly i Ruś*, p. 30, n. 3 thought Kutlubuga, s. a. 1262, referred to Kubilai Khan in China, although he is called a Muslim. Berthold Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde. Die Mongolen in Rußland*. 2nd ed. Wiesbaden 1965, p. 36, refutes Nasonov, but calls Qutluġ-Boġa a *baskak*, a title absent from the chronicle.

[43] Grekov, Jakubovskij, *Zolotaja Orda i ee padenie*, pp. 269-270 corrects some erroneous information about khans during the civil war.

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dynastic changes in the Golden Horde in the second half of the fourteenth century than the Arabo-Persian sources; the Russian Christians followed Horde politics closer than the fellow Muslim Mongols in Iran or the Mamelukes.[44] Indeed, the Russian chronicles of the later fourteenth and early fifteenth century contain more information about the Horde than about any of Russia's neighbors,[45] and with good reason: none of Russia's other neighbors posed as immediate and important a threat as the Horde. Even given the vagaries of Russian spelling, on the whole the Russian chronicles transcribe the names of Tatar *careviči*, such as those in the army of emir Edigej which besieged Moscow in 1409, with remarkable accuracy.[46] Russian expertise in the society and personnel of the Horde was immense.

The medieval Russian chronicles had a weakness for compiling lists, for example, of metropolitans of the Church or the bishops of a particular city, of grand princes of Vladimir or princes of a particular principality. It is hardly surprising that the chronicles also contain a list of *cari ordynskie* (khans of the Horde).[47] The names of the Tatar commanders of specific raids or campaigns into Russia were so well known that the most important raids were known by the name of their leaders; thus we have references to the "campaigns" (*rati*) of Nevrjui in 1251, Djudeń in 1293 and Achmyl' in 1322.[48] With equal consistency such raids were employed as chronological references; for example, such and such a piece of land was farmed by my ancestor forty years after the "Edigeeva rat' " (campaign of Edigej = 1408+ 40 = 1448).[49]

The scores of names of Tatar *cari, careviči, caricy*, princes, *baskaki, darugi,* envoys and commanders, and other Tatars without titles or ranks, recorded in the medieval Russian chronicles bespeak an intimate familiarity with the people of the Golden Horde. The Russians always knew who was, and who was not, a Chingissid. They frequently know of familial relationships such as marriage ties, in-laws, siblings, even cousins. The sheer effort that went into amassing this quantity and quality of social data is impressive. Given political necessity the Russians had little choice but to stay au courant of Horde affairs.

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44 Grekov, Jakubovskij, *Zolotaja Orda i ee padenie*, p. 272 calls the superior knowledge of Horde politics of the Russian chronicles "entirely characteristic."

45 L. V. Čerepnin Otraženie meždunarodnoj žizni XIV-načalo XV v. v moskovskom letopisanii, in: *Meždunarodnye svjazi Rossii do XVII v.*, Moskva 1961, pp. 225-256, especially pp. 227-231, 244-247.

46 A. Jakubovskij, Iz istorii padenija Zolotoj Ordy, in: Voprosy istorii (1947) No. 2, pp. 30-45, here p. 40, high praise from a reputable orientalist such as Jakubovskij!

47 M. E. Byčkova, *Rodoslovnye knigi XVI-XVII vv. kak istoričeskij istočnik*. Moskva 1975, pp. 147-150.

48 M. N. Tichomirov, Kulikovskaja bitva 1380 g., in: Tichomirov, V. F. Ržiga, L. A. Dmitriev (eds.), *Povesti o Kulikovskoj bitve*. Moskva 1959, pp. 335-376, here p. 336.

49 A. D. Gorskij, Otraženie tataro-mongol'skogo iga v russkich aktach XIV-XV vv., in: *Feodal'naja Rossija vo vsemirno-istoričeskom processe*. Moskva 1972, pp. 48-58 (= Čerepnin *Festschrift*).

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For a Russian prince reliable information about the political situation in the Horde could be crucial in an emergency, and unreliable information could prove fatal. Even normal political functioning required knowing whom it was worthwhile to bribe or petition. Much of the Russian familiarity with the political élite of the Horde was acquired by necessity, not choice.

Yet the implications of this Russian penetration of the society of the Horde go further than political exigency, because the information which the chronicles preserve goes beyond barebones politics. The names of the Tatar notables utilized in the medieval Russian chronicles must have been of interest to the intended audience of these texts, else the data would not have been included. The élite of medieval Russia – the princes, *bojare*, hierarchs of the Church, maybe merchants – knew the élite of the Golden Horde – rulers, officials – by name. The names must have conveyed identities to the Russians who heard them, or the nonchalance of the chronicles in dropping so many names makes no sense. To the Russian élite "the Tatars" were an anonymous mass, probably as undifferentiated as "the Russians" (*Ruś*) or the "lower classes" (*čerń*). But the Mongol élite was the exact opposite of a nameless, faceless, undifferentiated mass. The Mongol élite had names, and the identities which went with a name in medieval hierarchical societies. For the medieval Russian élite, the élite of the Golden Horde could not possibly have been alien or unknown. On the contrary, the élite of the Horde was familiar and known. It might still be dangerous to deal with the Tatars, but the danger was a predictable one, known and weighed in advance on the basis of knowledge of the people with whom one had to deal.

At no time does any medieval Russian source explain in so many words that the Russians knew the names and roles and identities of the members of the Tatar élite with whom they came into contact. Such a generalization would have raised too many questions about the nature of the situation which threw Orthodox Christian Russians and shamanist or Muslim Tatars into such social propinquity. Only by collating the social data half-hidden in the Russian chronicles can a striking feature of Russo-Tatar social relations be extracted for analysis, namely, the intimate social familiarity of the Russians with the Tatars of the Golden Horde. The consequences of this phenomenon for our understanding of the nature of Russo-Tatar relations are profound, and cast serious doubts upon the self-conscious pose of the medieval Russian sources and the premise of much modern historiography that the Mongols were an external factor in Russian history during the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries.

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There would have been no way for the Russians to communicate with the Tatars, to acquire the geographic and social expertise about the Golden Horde they possessed, unless, literally, the two groups spoke the same language. There

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has been surprising little discussion of this fundamental aspect of Russo-Tatar relations.[50] It would appear that the medieval Russian sources maintain a discrete silence even about how they broke the silence in order to converse with the Tatars.

In 1223 the chronicler claimed not to know who the Tatars were, where they came from, what their religion was, or what language they spoke. Yet there were negotiations between the East Slavic princes and the Tatars. The narration does not mention in what language, nor does it allude to translators. That the *lingua franca* employed in 1223 must have been some form of "Turkic" is a foregone conclusion. The Mongols did not speak Russian, nor did the Russians speak Mongol; neither had ever had any contact with the other. But the Mongol confederation already included large contingents of Turkic-speaking nomads, and the East Slavs had long enjoyed intense contact with the Turkic-speaking nomads of the Pontic steppe. Turkic-speakers must have been common in the Mongol army, and Turkic-speakers must have been readily available among the East Slavic political establishment. Thus in 1223 Turkic must have been the medium of communication.

The Mongols remained in the steppe when they conquered Russia; there they assimilated with the Turkic-speaking population, the Kipchaks (Polovcy in Russian). The Turkicization of the Mongols of the Golden Horde entailed no changes in Russo-Tatar communication. The "Tatar" language evolved into Chagatai Turkic by the fifteenth century. But the Mongols were the conquerors, who stayed in the steppe; mostly they would not have taken the trouble to learn to speak Russian. It is more likely that the Russian princely and ecclesiastical delegations included a Turkic-speaker who served as translator. Yet the chronicles almost never mention such bilingual speakers or translators.

The exceptions prove the rule. A Russian-speaking translator (*tolmač*) is mentioned as having participated in the siege of Cholm; obviously he was a Tatar.[51] Most references to translators are late, very literary, and perhaps not reliable. The "Skazanie o Mamaevom poboišče" (Narration of the Battle with Mamai) was written about the Russian victory in the battle of Kulikovo in 1380. According to this highly rhetorical work the Russian envoy Tjut'čov was sent to the Horde with two Polovtsian-speaking *tolmači*.[52] (It was a common "historicist" cliché of late fourteenth-early fifteenth century Russian literature to describe the Tatars as Polovcy, so the language the Russian translators spoke was Tatar.)

The first bilingual translators were sometimes Russian-speaking Polovcy. Carpini mentions two "knights" of grand prince Jaroslav, the Coman Temer and the Christian Coman Sangor (who should have had a Christian name).[53] Some of the

[50] The discussion in Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde*, pp. 285-293 seems inconclusive.

[51] PSRL, vol. 2, col. 851.

[52] Tichomirov, Ržiga, Dmitriev (eds.), *Povesti o Kulikovskoj bitve*, p. 49. On this text see Halperin, The Russian Land and the Russian Tsař, pp. 23-37.

[53] Christopher Dawson (ed.), *Mission to Asia. Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries*. New York 1955, pp. 66, 70.

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"Russian" princely envoys (*kiličei*) to the Horde may not have been ethnic Russians either. In 1360 prince Vasilij of Kašin sent Grigořčjuk Koreev to the Horde,[54] and in 1380 Dmitrij Donskoj dispatched Tolbuga and Mokšej to carry a message to khan Tochtamyš.[55] While names are not a flawless indicator of ethnic identity, certainly these non-Russian non-Christian names do suggest the possibility that bilingual nomads in Russian service were, naturally enough, employed as Russian envoys to the Horde.

Obviously some Tatars would have learned Russian, by preference or by necessity. A *baskak* permanently stationed in a Russian city might have found it convenient to speak the local language. The Tatar princesses who married Russian princes, such as Končaka, converted to Russian Orthodox Christianity. They would have had to learn Russian or Slavonic in order to practice their new religion. The suites and servants of such Tatar converts are also likely to have learned Russian since they were moving to Russia to live. Tatar nobles who entered Russian service and converted, such as the three named sub anno 1393 in the chronicles, undoubtedly assimilated. The greatest movement of Tatars into Russian service came only with the second half of the fifteenth century. Before then the number of Russians who learned "Tatar" must have been far greater than that of Tatars who learned Russian. The Russian princes, nobles, merchants or clerics who travelled to or lived in the Horde, or who received Tatar envoys and officials who came to the Russian forest zone, must have had ample incentive to acquire some facility in the Tatar language.

The *jarlyki* from the khans to the Russian Church were originally written in Turkic, even though they were addressed to a Russian-speaking audience. Presumably someone in the chancellery of the metropolitan had the ability to convey its message into Russian. The best educated guess is that the extant collection of *jarlyki* was translated into Russian by a clerk of the metropolitan's chancellery in the late fourteenth or early fifteenth centuries.[56]

The pervasive silence of the Russian chronicles about bilingualism and the extreme rarity of allusions to translators create a *prima facie* case that something is amiss. Conceivably bilingualism and translators were too

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[54] PSRL, vol. 15, col. 67.

[55] TL, p. 421. On kiličei see Polubojarinova, *Russkie ljudi v Zolotoj Orde*, pp. 18-19.

[56] A. A. Zimin, Kratkoe i jprostrannoe sobranija chanskich jarlykov, vydannych russkim mitropolitam, in: Archeografičeskij ežegodnik za 1961g. (1962), pp. 28-40. Soviet orientalists have begun addressing the problem of the original language of the Golden Horde *jarlyki.* See, for example, three of the articles by A. P. Grigorev, Ėvoljucija formy adresanta v zolotoordynskich jarlykach XII-XIV w., in: Učenye zapiski LGU, No. 389, Seriia vostokovedčeskich nauk (1977) vyp. 19. Vostokovedenie 3, pp. 132-156; Obraščenie v zolotoordynskich jarlykach XIII-XIV w., in: Učenye zapiski LGU, No. 403. Serija vostok. nauk (1980), vyp. 23. Vostokovedenie 7, pp. 155-180; and: K rekonstrukcii tekstov zolotoordynskich jarlykov XIII-XIV vv., in: Istoriografija i istočnikovedenija istorii stran Azii i Afriki 5 (1980) pp. 13-38; and M. A. Usmanov, *Žalovannye akty Džučieva ulusa XIV-XVI vekov.* Kazań 1979, especially pp. 94-115, pp. 192-193.

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common to require comment, except that sometimes they were mentioned explicitly. Rather it seems plausible that knowledge of "Tatar" was culturally embarrassing. It was the language of the infidel, and no one could earn any credits toward salvation by mastering it. During the Muscovite civil war Vasilij II was accused of loving the Tatar language more than his own, one of the accusations of pro-Tatar behavior which resulted in his overthrow and blinding.[57] Neither is the case of Afanasij Nikitin exemplary of the advantages of learning oriental languages. Nikitin spent seven years living among Muslims, and may even have apostacized. For commerce, religion and mere survival he had to become fluent in eastern languages. He seems to have mastered Persian, Arabic and Chagatai Turkic so well that he subconsciously slipped in and out of his oriental patois even when writing or dictating his travelogue.[58] Nikitin suffered acute anxiety over his "deracination" and perhaps apostasy. Excessive familiarity with the language, let alone the religion, of the infidel threatened doom for the Russian Orthodox Christian.

Medieval Russian familiarity with the Tatar language must have been far greater than the medieval Russian sources allow or admit. Yet like Russian expertise in the geography and society of the Horde, bilingualism was a product of necessity best left unarticulated in the works of the medieval Russian intellectuals.

* * *

A complete and comprehensive picture of the Mongol impact upon Russian history must take into account not only what the Mongols did to Russia but also how the Russians perceived the Tatars and how they dealt with them as people off the battlefield. Medieval Russian familiarity with the geography, society and language of the Golden Horde suggests that the Russians and Tatars did more than kill each other. But Russian knowledge about the Golden Horde did not lead to cultural understanding or tolerance; how could it, when the motive for acquiring this knowledge was the military and political hostility engendered by Mongol conquest? Moreover, the medieval Russian bookmen were loathe to acknowledge their expertise in the Golden Horde, since excessive familiarity with the infidel enemy was dangerous. As a result the expertise in Tatarica of the medieval Russian

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[57] PSRL, vol. 4, s.a. 1446, p. 125.

[58] *Choženie za tri morja Afanasija Nikitina 1466-1472, passim* and the recent revisionist studies by Gail Diane Lenhoff, Beyond Three Seas: Afanasij Nikitin's Journey from Orthodoxy to Apostasy, in: East European Quarterly 13, 4 (1979) pp. 431-447, and Chapter 6: Afanasij Nikitin's Journey Beyond Three Seas, in her doctoral dissertation: *The Making of the Medieval Russian Journey*. University of Michigan 1980, pp. 198-248 (on Nikitin's oriental patois, pp. 228-239). I am grateful to Professor Lenhoff for making a copy of this chapter of her dissertation available to me. Much more attention should be paid to JA. S. Luŕe. Podvig Afanasija Nikitina (k 500 – letiju načala ego putešestvija), in: Izvestija Vsesojuznogo Geografičeskogo obščestva 99 (1967) pp. 435-442.

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elite is almost masked in the sources. But it is still so massive and significant that by discounting the religious and literary limitations of the medieval Russian sources, it can still be resurrected and analyzed in order to shed further light upon Russo-Tatar relations.

Appendix

Tatar Notables Named in the Medieval Russian Chronicles

YEAR	TATARS	SOURCE
1223	Gemjabeg, C'gyrkan, Tešjukan	NPL, pp. 61-63, 264-266
1237-1238	Batyj	PSRL, vol. 1, col. 470
1240	Tovrul, Urdju, Baidar, Birjui, Kaidan, Bečak, Mengu, Kjujuk', *voevoda* Sebedjai, *voevoda* Burundai	SRL, vol. 2, cols. 784-785
1243	Manmana, Balaa	PSRL, vol. 2, col. 794
1245	*stol'nik* (courtier) Eldega	NPL, pp. 298-303
1247	Berdebek	PSRL vol. 10, pp. 134-135
1249	Sartak, son of Batyj	PSRL, vol. 1, col. 472
1251	Nevrjui	NPL, p. 304
1256	*car'* Ulavcij	TL, p. 325
1259-1260	Kuremsa, Burundai	PSRL, vol. 2, cols. 841-848
1261	Baimu, Kuičija, Asika, Boljuja	PSRL vol. 2, cols. 849-855
1262	*posol* Kutlubuga	TL, p. 327
	car' Berkaj	NPL, p. 312
1269	*velikij baskak* Amragan	NPL, pp. 319, 88
1274	Igurčina	PSRL vol. 2, cols. 871-874
1277	*car'* Nogai, *posoly*: Tegičag, Kutlubuga, Ešimut, Mam-šeja	PSRL, vol. 2, cols. 876-878
1280	Končak, Kozej, Kubatan	PSRL vol. 2, cols. 881-882
1282	Tura, Temer' Alyn	TL, p. 339
1283-1284	Kursk *baskak* Achmat	PSRL, vol.1, cols. 481-482; TL, pp. 340-342
1288	*knjaź ordynskij* Elortaj	PSRL, vol. 10, p. 167
1291	*car'* Telebuga, *car'* Alguj	NPL, p. 327
1293	*car'* Toktomer, Djuden'	PSRL, vol. 1, col. 483; TL, pp. 345-346
1294	*car'* Tochta	TL, p. 347
1297	Nevrjui	TL, pp. 347-348
1305	*baskak* Kutlubuga	PSRL, vol. 1, col. 528
1306	Tair	PSRL, vol. 25, p. 393; vol. 18, p. 86
1314	*posol* Aračij	TL, pp. 354-355
1315	Tjaitemer'	TL, p. 355

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1316	Kazanči, Sabanči	PSRL, vol. 1, col. 529
1317-1318	Končaka, Christian name Agafija, sister of *caŕ* Uzbek, wife of Jurij Danilovič of Moscow, *posol* Kavgadyj, Astrabal	TL, pp. 355-356; PSRL, vol. 4, pp. 48-49
1318	Telebuga, *posol* Konchia	NPL, pp. 95-96; TL p. 356
1322	*posol* Achmyl, *posol* Sevenč'buga	TL, p. 357
1323	*carica* Bojalyń, wife of Uzbek	TL, p. 357
1327	*posol* Ševkal, Fedorčjuk, Turalyk, Sjuga	TL, pp. 358-359
1329	Gajančar	PSRL, vol. 15, col. 41
1330	*velikij knjaź ordynskij* Asan	PSRL, vol. 10, p. 203
	cariki: Kotlubaj, Katibej, Beker	PSRL, vol. 32, p. 43
1332	Dmitrij Soltan	PSRL, vol. 32, p. 43
1333	Toidyj, Kal-ntaj, Čiriča	PSRL, vol. 15, col. 47
1338	Istorčej, Kindyk, Avdulja	PSRL vol. 15, cols. 48-49; TL, p. 362
1340	Tovlubij	TL, p. 363
1341	*caŕ* Uzbek, *caŕ* Čanibek, brothers of Čanibek: Chydyrbek, Tinibek	TL, p. 365; PSRL, vol. 15, col. 54
1342	Kindjak	TL, p. 365
1347	*posol* Koga	TL, p. 368
1349	*posol* Totuj	TL, p. 369
1352	Ourdak	PSRL, vol. 15, col. 61
1357	Košak, Itkara	PSRL, vol. 25, p. 180, vol. 18, p. 100
	carica Taidula, *caŕ* Berdibek	PSRL, vol.18, p. 100; TL, pp. 375-376
	posol Iryńčej	PSRL, vol. 15, col. 65
1358	*carev syn* Mamat Choža	TL, p. 376
1359	*caŕ* Kul'pa, *caŕ* Naurus, sons of Naurus: Michail and Ivan	TL, pp. 376-377
1360	*caŕ* Chidyr, *knjaź ordynskij* Mualbuzin	PSRL, vol. 15, col. 69
	posol Žukotnica	TL, p. 377
1361	Murat, brother of Chidyr; *knjaź* Mamai; *caŕ* Avdulja, puppet of Mamai; *caŕ* Temirchoža; Kil'debek and Bolaktenur, sons of Čanibek; *knjaź* Naručad; Ardemelik, Uruzbuga, Aratechozja, Sekiz, Achmat	TL, pp. 377-378; PSRL, vol. 15, cols. 71-72
1362	*posoly*: Urus, Kairbek, Altynčbej	PSRL, vol. 27, p. 242
1363	*caŕ* Amurat, *posol* Iljak	PSRL, vol. 11, p. 2
1364	*caŕ* Aziz, *posol* Urusmandy	PSRL, vol. 15, col. 77
1365	*knjaź* Tagaj	TL, p. 381
	posoly Baram Choza and Osan	PSRL, vol. 4, p. 65
1368	*posoly*: Karač, Oajdar, Tjutekaš	TL, p. 386; PSRL vol. 11, p. 10
1370	Mamant-Saltan, puppet *caŕ* of Mamai; *posol* Ačichoža, *knjaź* Osan of Bolgar,	TL, pp. 389-390
	Saltan Bakov *syn*; *posoly*: Kap'tagai, Tjuzjak, Sarychoža	PSRL vol. 15, cob. 92, 95

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1374	*posol* Sarajko	TL, p. 396
1375	Astrachań *knjaź* Salčej; *posol* Ažichožej	TL, p. 398; PSRL, vol. 15, col. 110
1377	*carevič* Arapša	TL, pp. 402-403
1378	Chazibej, Koverga, Karagaluk, Kostrok, Begička	TL, pp. 415-417
1381	*caŕ* Tochtamyš, *posol carevič* Ak-choža	TL, p. 421
1382	*posol, šurin* (brother-in-law) of Tochtamyš, Šichmat	TL, pp. 422-424
1383	*posol* Adaš	TL, p. 427
1386	*carica* Tovlunbeka, wife of *caŕ* Tochtamyš	TL, p. 430
1389	*posoly*: Šichmat, Ulan	TL, p. 435; PSRL, vol. 4, p. 97
1391	Bektut	TL, pp. 437-438
1393	Bachty chozja (Onanija after baptism), Chidyŕ chozja (Ozaŕja after baptism), Mamat' chozja (Misail after baptism)	TL, p. 443
1398	*caŕ* Temir-Kutluj, client of Temir-Aksak (Tamerlane)	TL, pp. 448-449
1399	*posoly*: Bekšik, Satkin; *knjaź* Edigej; *carevič* Entjak	TL, pp. 450-453
1400	*caŕ* Šadibek, *posol* Sofrja	TL, p. 454
1405	*posol kaznačej* (treasurer) Mirza	TL, p. 459
1407	*caŕ* Bulat Saltan	TL, p. 465
1408	*careviči*: Bučak, Tegri-Berdij, Altemir, Bulat; *knjazi*: Machmet son of Isup Sjulimen, Teginja son of Šich, Saraj son of Urusach, Obrjagim son of Temirja, Jakšibij, son of Edigej; Seitjalibij, Burnak, Erikliberdij *posol*	TL, pp. 468-471
	Mamait Derbyš	PSRL, vol. 15, col. 480
1412	*caŕ* Zeledi Saltan, son of Tochtamyš	PSRL, vol. 4, p. 113
1419	Barak	PSRL, vol. 5, p. 262
1424	*caŕ* Kudaidat, Kogčja *bogatyŕ*	PSRL, vol. 5, p. 262
1429	Alibaba	PSRL, vol. 18, p. 170
1431	*knjaź* Aidar, *caŕ* Ulumachmat	PSRL, vol. 18, pp. 170-171
1432	*ulus doroga* Min Bulat, *knjaź ordynskij*	PSRL, vol. 18, pp. 171-172
	Širin, Tjaginja, *stol'nik* Usein the cousin of Teginja	
1438	*posoly*: El'berdej, son-in-law of *caŕ*	PSRL, vol. 18, pp. 188-190
	Ulumachmet, *daraga knjaź* Usein Saraev, Usen'chozja, son of Ulumachmat Mamutek	
	Mustafa, murza Achmut, Aziberdej son of Mišerovanov	PSRL, vol. 18, p. 192
1445	Ačisan; Bigič, *posol* of Machmet;	PSRL, vol. 18, pp. 193-195

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	posoly: Seit Asan, Uteš Kuraiš, Dylchozja, Aidar; *careviči*: Kaisym, Jagub, Tregob, Berdodat	PSRL, vol. 18, p. 195 PSRL, vol. 20, p. 260; vol. 23, p. 153
1450	Malyberdej *ulan*	PSRL, vol. 18, p. 206
1451	Mazavša, son of Kičiachmat; Gediger	PSRL, vol. 5, p. 270
1460	*cař* Achmat; Teisufuj, Temir	PSRL, vol. 5, p. 272
1471	Rjazań *doroga* Temir̂	PSRL, vol. 18, p. 224
1476	Bočjuka, *posol* of *cař* Achmut of the *Bol'šaja orda*	PSRL, vol. 18, p. 252

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SOVIET HISTORIOGRAPHY ON RUSSIA AND THE MONGOLS*

Soviet historiography has always exercised a particular fascination for Western specialists in Russian history. In part this is because more is written on Russian history in the Soviet Union than anywhere else, but at least as important is interest in understanding the evolution of the Soviet Union itself: historiographic investigation provides illuminating insights into the interplay between scholarship and the Soviet political system. While earlier syntheses emphasized the distortion of history in the service of Stalinism, the cultural abominations of the *Zhdanovshchina*, and the animosities of the Cold War,[1] recent studies have found more diversity and autonomy in Soviet historiography, consequences of the process of de-Stalinization.[2] The political factor, to be sure, has never been overlooked, but its influence has been presented as less homogeneous and more ambiguous.[3]

Whatever importance Western historians have assigned to the Mongol period of Russian history has not carried over into historiographic studies; it is a striking feature of them that not a single one devotes a chapter or article to the problem of Russia and the Mongols.[4] This lacuna does not derive from the

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[1] For example, Cyril Black, ed., *Rewriting Russian History*, 2nd rev. ed. (New York, 1962), and Konstantin Shteppa, *Russian Historians and the Soviet State* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1962).

[2] For example, Nancy Whittier Heer, *Politics and History in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, MA, 1971) and "Political Leadership in Soviet Historiography: Cult or Collective?" in Paul Cocks, Robert V. Daniels, and Nancy Whittier Heer, eds., *The Dynamics of Soviet Politics* (Cambridge, MA, 1976), pp. 11-27, 335-57; and Samuel H. Baron and Nancy Whittier Heer, eds., *Windows on the Russian Past: Studies on Soviet Historiography Since Stalin* (Columbus, OH, 1977).

[3] For example, Lowell R. Tillett, "Shamil and Muridism in Recent Soviet Historiography," *American Slavic and East European Review* 20 (1961): 253-69, "Soviet Second Thoughts on Tsarist Colonialism," *Foreign Affairs* 42 (1963-64): 309-319, "Nationalism and History," *Problems of Communism* 16, no. 5 (September-October 1967): 36-45, and his *The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1969); and, in a different way, George M. Enteen, *The Soviet Scholar-Bureaucrat: M. N. Pokrovskii and the Society of Marxist Historians* (University Park, PA, 1978).

[4] That is, in Cyril Black, ed., *Rewriting Russian History*, or Anatole G. Mazour, *The Writing of History in the Soviet Union* (Stanford, CA, 1971), or Baron and Heer, eds., *Windows on the Russian Past*.

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condition of Soviet scholarship on this significant theme, which is active, lively, and fully deserving of Western historiographic attention. Rather, to judge from the original research on medieval Russian history published in the West, it is a function of the relative disinterest of Western specialists in the topic.

There are two major, closely-connected, difficulties in analyzing Soviet historiography on Russia and the Mongols. First, because of the importance of the relevance of the nearly two-and-a-half centuries of Mongol rule for Russian history is so pervasive that far more works touch on the issue than can be assimilated within the confines of a single article; the present discussion must therefore be highly selective. Secondly, any balanced appreciation of the Mongols' role in Russian history must of necessity be based upon the conclusions of several scholarly discipines, most notably oriental studies (*vostokovedenie*) in order to understand the development of the Golden Horde, and Old-Russian literature (*literaturovedenie*) in order to analyze critically the medieval Russian sources which supply the narrative raw material out of which most, if not all, histories of Russo-Tatar relations are fashioned. No Soviet historian of Russia and the Mongols has ever tried to integrate the methods of these separate specializations; in all fairness it must be added that neither has any non-Soviet historian.[5]

As one would expect, one basic contribution of Soviet scholars to the study of Russia and the Mongols has been in the publication of relevant medieval Russian sources. These include the grand-princely wills and treaties, chronicles and other literary works, and a new publication of the *iarlyki* granted to the metropolitans of the Russian Orthodox Church by the khans of the Golden Horde.[6] Without these publications no historian lacking access to Soviet archives could investigate Russo-Tatar relations. In addition, Soviet scholarship deserves high praise for publishing the second volume of Tizengauzen's compilation and translation of oriental sources for the history of the Golden Horde.[7]

Modern Soviet historiography about Russia and the Mongols begins with the rejection of the theories of Pokrovskii and the return to nationalist, patriotic historiography in the 1930s. However, the details of the case require some elucidation. Criticism of Pokrovskii's interpretation of the Mongol impact on Russian history was undertaken by A. N. Nasonov, who was essentially a

[5] This critique is not to be found in the brief appreciation of Soviet historiography on Russia and the Mongols in V. V. Kargalov, *Vneshnepoliticheskie faktory razvitiia feodal'noi Rusi: Feodal'naia Rus' i kochevniki* (Moscow, 1967), pp. 248-55 or in the more recent remarks by N. S. Borisov (see n. 32).

[6] It is neither necessary nor possible to cite all source publications here, but I should like to cite *Pamiatniki russkogo prava*, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1955): 463-92, which contains the *iarlyki* from the Mongol khans to the metropolitans, prepared by A. A. Zimin. See his "Kratkoe i prostrannoe sobraniia khanskikh iarlykov, vydannykh russkim mitropolitam," *Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 1961* (1962), pp. 28-40.

[7] V. G. Tizengauzen, *Sbornik materialov otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Zolotoi ordy*, vol. 2 (Moscow-Leningrad, 1941).

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specialist in medieval Russian chronicle-writing.[8] Nasonov agreed with several of Pokrovskii's tenets, for example, that the princes and *boiare* collaborated with the Mongols, that opposition to Mongol rule came from the Russian people (*narod*), and that during the fourteenth century Moscow benefitted from Mongol political and military support in its struggle with Tver'. Basically, Nasonov took Pokrovskii to task for not saying enough about the Tatars, which Nasonov explained by Pokrovskii's excessive reliance upon pre-revolutionary Russian historiography. Pokrovskii did not discuss the ruinous impact of the Mongols on die economy, the retardation of art and architecture, the separation of Galicia-Volhynia from Vladimir-Suzdalia and other manifestations of decentralization, the nature of Tatar policy toward Russia or the *baskak* system. Pokrovskii presented far too passive an image of Mongol intervention in Russian history, and thus did not appreciate the degree to which Moscow rose to its position as the unifying center of Russia by leading the opposition to the Mongols. Nasonov even had a few kind words to say about the positive role of the Russian Orthodox Church in assisting Moscow to stand up to the Tatars.

Nasonov's analysis of the weaknesses of Pokrovskii's presentation of the problem of the Mongols in Russian history is fairly accurate, but Nasonov's article must be read in conjunction with his own monograph on Russo-Tatar relations to be understood completely. In effect what Nasonov had done in his article was to adumbrate his own original conclusions and criticize Pokrovskii for not having anticipated them.[9] The major conclusion of Nasonov's monograph was that the Tatars played a consistently divisive and activist role in Russian politics from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, and that Moscow triumphed in the northeast not thanks to help from the khans, as Karamzin had written, but by mobilizing Russia against them. Nasonov advanced a host of specific conclusions about aspects of Russo-Tatar relations. For example, he related the structure of the *baskak* system to toponymic evidence, reevaluated Nevskii's role in and the nature of the 1262 *veche* uprisings, and identified a Tatar policy toward Rostov. While not all of Nasonov's observations have been accepted, there is no question but that this monograph, solidly based upon his erudition in the chronicles, remains an essential starting point for any historian of Russo-Tatar relations.

Nasonov's general interpretation of the negative and regressive impact of the Mongols on Russian history has remained canonical in Soviet scholarship; it was echoed my the early editions of the fundamental collaborative work of B. D. Grekov and A. Iu. Iakubovskii.[10] The more recent views advanced by Soviet

[8] A. N. Nasonov, "Tatarskoe igo na Rusi v osveshchenii M. N. Pokrovskogo," in *Protiv antimarksistkoi istoricheskoi kontseptsii M. N. Pokrovskogo*, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1940), pp. 59-90.

[9] A. N. Nasonov, *Mongoly i Rus' (Istoriia Tatarskoi politiki na Rusi)* (Moscow, 1940).

[10] B. D. Grekov and A. Iu. Iakubovskii, *Zolotaia Orda i ee padenie*, appeared in its earliest form in 1937 and was then reissued in 1941; the most accessible edition is Moscow, 1950. Grekov's section on the Horde and *Rus'* is compatible with Nasonov's superior monograph published a few years later.

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scholars have not violated the basic generalization that the Mongol conquest of Russia was a historical catastrophe which the great Russian people managed at enormous cost to overcome and overthrow. The possibility that Russia profited from the Mongol conquest by participating in international commerce across Eurasia under Mongol auspices or that Muscovy borrowed political, military, or fiscal institutions from the Mongols is not entertained within Soviet scholarship, and never has been.

Despite this one-sided interpretation of the effects of the Mongols on Russia, Soviet orientalists have made enormous contributions to the study of the Mongol Empire and the Golden Horde. Vladimirtsev's monograph on Mongol nomadic feudalism proved seminal.[11] Fiefs of people and herds, with their attendant grazing rights, replaced European fiefs in agricultural land as the basis of vassal relationships. Chinghis Khan was the instrument of the Mongol feudal elite, not of the Mongol people. Once his wars had accomplished their progressive function of unifying the Mongols, they became detrimental to the Mongol masses by wasting their demographic resources on the altar of the greed of the Mongol aristocracy. While Chinghis' leadership skills were not denied, his success was seen not as a function of personal charisma or of the racial qualities of the Mongol "barbarians," but rather, of the socio-economic structure of Mongol society, i.e. feudalism. This imaginative conception of the Mongol social and political hierarchy appeared more or less simultaneously with the rejection of Pokrovskii and is fundamental to current Soviet studies of Russia and the Mongols.

Vladimirtsev was criticized for projecting French feudal terminology onto the Mongols, for exaggerating the degree of feudalization of early Mongol society, for giving slight attention to the social structure of the Mongol Empire itself as compared to the Mongols in Mongolia before and after the great Chingissid epoch, and in essence for overstepping his expertise: Vladimirtsev was a linguist, not a historian.[12] But the notion that the Mongol Empire could be subsumed under the Marxist conception of feudalism was accepted and survived a lively discussion which crowded the pages of *Voprosy istorii* in the 1950s.[13]

The survey by A. Sakharov, "Les Mongoles et la civilization russe," *Contributions à l'histoire russe*, Cahiers d'histoire mondiales (Neuchâtel, 1958), pp. 77-97, is a bibliographically out-of-date but historiographically still valid summary in a Western language.

[11] B. Ia. Vladimirtsev, *Obshchestvennyi stroi Mongolov: Mongol'skii kochevoi feodalizm* (Leningrad, 1934).

[12] A. Iu. Iakubovskii, "Kniga B. Ia. Vladimirtseva 'Obshchestvennyi stroi mongolov' i perspektivy dal'neishego izucheniia Zolotoi Ordy," *Istoricheskii sbornik* (Institut istorii AN SSSR), vol. 5 (Moscow, 1936), pp. 293-313 and "Iz istorii izucheniia mongolov perioda XI-XIII vv.," *Ocherki po istorii russkogo vostokovedeniia* [sb. I] (Moscow, 1953), pp. 82-88.

Iakubovskii, "Iz istorii izucheniia mongolov perioda XI-XIII vv.," pp. 64-78 discusses the work of the great orientalist V. V. Bartol'd in Soviet scholarship. Cf. Yurii Bregel, "The Works of V. V. Barthold and the Soviet Censorship," *Survey* 24, no. 3 (September 1979): 91-107.

[13] A specialist in nineteenth-century Kazakh history, S. E. Tolybekov, denied that pastoral nomads possessed concepts of ownership of land, rather than herds, and therefore rejected Vladimirtsev's contention that the pastoral nomadic Mongols could have developed a higher,

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Non-Marxist explanations for the rise of the Mongol Empire, which invoke the nature of the Mongol people, or the idea of universal empire, or geography, or the genius of Chinghis, are attributed by Soviet historians to racism, imperialism, and colonialism.[14] In fact the Mongol Empire worked to the detriment of the Mongol people. The Mongol conquest dynasties were parasitical, and Mongol exploitation had a regressive effect on the socio-economic development of all sedentary peoples incorporated within the Mongol Empire.[15] Any suggestion to the contrary is met with massive retaliation.[16] Soviet scholars have published significant research on the Mongols in China and East Asia, the Caucasus, and Iran.[17]

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feudal social formation. After much debate by specialists in a variety of fields of Inner Asian history, the editors of *Voprosy istorii* declared authoritatively that Vladimirtsev was wrong only in qualifying Mongol feudalism as "nomadic" rather than simply calling it feudalism, and that pastoral nomadism, while it did slow the tempo of socio-economic development compared to agriculture, was not static.

See L. P. Potapov, "O sushchnosti patriarkhal'no-feodal'nykh otnoshenii u kochevykh narodov Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana," *Voprosy istorii*, 1954, no. 6, pp. 73-89; S. E. Tolybekov, "O patriarkharno-feodal'nykh otnosheniiakh u kochevykh narodov," ibid., 1955, no. 1, pp. 75-83; G. P. Basharin, "O patriarkhal'no-feodal'nykh otnosheniiakh v Iakutii kontsa XVIII-pervoi poloviny XIX veka," ibid., 1955, no. 3, pp. 80-89; I. Ia. Klatkin, "K voprosu o sushchnosti patriarkhal'no-feodal'nykh otnoshenii u kochevykh narodov," ibid., 1955, no. 4, pp. 72-80; M. M. Efendiev and A. I. Pershits, "O sushchnosti patriarkhal'no-feodal'nykh otnoshenii u kochevnikov-skotovodov," ibid., 1955, no. 11, pp. 65-76; S. Z. Zimanov, "O patriarkhal'no-feodal'nykh otnosheniiakh u kochevnikov-skotovodov," ibid., 1955, no. 12, pp. 63-67; and "O patriarkhal'no-feodal'nykh otnosheniiakh u kochevykh narodov (k itogam obsuzhdeniia), ibid., 1956, no. 1, pp. 75-80. See also the review of Tolybekov's *Obshchestvenno-ekonomicheskii stroi kazakhov v XVII-XIX vv.* (1959) by I. Ia. Zlatkin and A. S. Tveritinova in ibid., 1961, no. 1, pp. 140-47 and the review of Tolybekov's 1971 monograph restating his original theses by I. Vasil'chenko, "Eshche raz ob osobennostiakh feodalizma u kochevykh narodov," ibid., 1974, no. 4, pp. 192-98.

I can see no connection between the debate and Sino-Soviet relations or de-Stalinization. For a selective review of this discussion see Owen Lattimore, "The Social History of Mongol Nomadism," in W. G. Beasley and E. G. Pulleybank, eds., *Historians of China and Japan, Historical Writings on the Peoples of Asia*, vol. 3 (London, 1961), pp. 328-43.

[14] For example, I. Ia. Zlatkin, "A, Toinbi ob istoricheskom proshlom i sovremennon polozhenii kochevykh narodov," *Voprosy istorii*, 1971, no. 2, pp. 88-102.

[15] N. Ia. Merpert, V. T. Pashuto, L. V. Cherepnin, "Chingis-khan i ego nasledie," *Istoriia SSSR*, 1962, no. 5, pp. 91-110; I. M. Maiskii, "Chingis-khan," *Voprosy istorii*, 1962, no. 5, pp. 74-83.

[16] Newspaper articles in the People's Republic of China praising Chinghis Khan for having united southern and northern China and brought the benefits of Chinese civilization, such as the printing press, to western Asia and Europe, led to the publication of a massive, multi-authored and high-powered rebuttal. See David M. Farquhar, "Chinese Communist Assessments of a Foreign Conquest Dynasty," in A. Feuerwerker, ed., *History in Communist China* (Cambridge, MA, 1968), pp. 175-88 on the Chinese discussions.

The rejoinder was S. L. Tikhvinskii, ed., *Tataro-Mongoly v Azii i Evrope: Sbornik statei* (Moscow, 1970). See the positive but not uncritical reviews by V. V. Kargalov in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1972, no. 5, pp. 179-82 and M. A. Usmanov in ibid., pp. 182-85, and n. 18 below.

[17] Thomas T. Allsen, "Mongol Rule in East Asia, Twelfth-Fourteenth Centuries: An Assessment of Recent Soviet Scholarship," *Mongolian Studies* 3 (1976): 5-28, is extremely

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Despite some dissenting voices[18] and innumerable technical disagreements, there is a consensus on the evolution of the Mongol Empire. Having created the Mongol Empire in its own selfish interests, the feudalizing Mongol elite had to decide between two methods of rule: either they could exterminate their new sedentary subjects and transform their fields into pastures, or they could exploit their sedentary subjects by taxation via the creation of permanent bureaucratic structures. The latter tendency was marginally preferable from the point of view of the conquered peoples, but both policies were highly destructive.[19] This scholarship must be taken seriously.

However, it seems to me that there are fundamental flaws in Soviet research on the Mongol Empire. Certainly, correlating the rise of the Mongol Empire with the socio-political evolution of the Mongols is a step forward over racist diatribes against barbaric Asiatic nomads, but the Soviet orientalists have not found a way to accept the simple fact that the key to Mongol military success lies in the pastoral nomadic way of life, which gave the mounted archer a decided advantage in open battle over the sedentarist infantryman until the gunpowder revolution in warfare. The scale of Mongol conquests of cities would not have been possible without the acquisition of a Mongol urban base to manufacture siege weapons. While feudal relations played a vital role in nomadic mobilization, more emphasis should be placed upon the flexibility of

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thorough. Leaving aside articles by the same authors the following monographs have been of particular relevance to my interests: A. A. Ali-Zade, *Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskaia i politicheskaia istoriia Azerbaidzhana XIII-XIV vv.* (Baku, 1956); I. P. Petrushevskii, *Zemledelie i agrarnye otnosheniia v Irane XIII-XIV vv.* (Moscow, 1960); N. Ts. Munkuev, *Kitaiskii istochnik o pervykh mongol'skikh khanakh: Nadgrobnaia nadpis' na mogile Eliu Chu-tsaia. Perevod i issledovanie* (Moscow, 1965); L. O. Babaian, *Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskaia i politicheskaia istoriia Armenii v XIII-XIV vekakh* (Moscow, 1969); and N. Ts. Munkuev, *Men-da bei-lu ("Polnoe opisanie mongolo-tatar")* (Moscow, 1975).

Soviet orientalists have of late turned to diplomatic analysis of Mongol patents and charters and begun to apply their findings to the *iarlyki* from the Golden Horde to the metropolitans. See, for example, A. P. Grigor'ev, *Mongol'skaia diplomatika XIII-XV vv. (Chingizidskie zhalovannye gramoty)* (Leningrad, 1978) [reviewed by O. D. Chekhovich in *Voprosy istorii*, 1980, no. 7, pp. 148-49] and his "Obrashchenie v zolotoordynskikh iarlykakh XIII-XIV vv.," Uchenye zapiski LGU, no. 403, Seriia vostokovedcheskikh nauk, vyp. 23, *Vostokovedenie* 7 (1980), pp. 155-80; M. A. Usmanov, *Zhalovannye akty Dzhuchieva ulusa, XIV-XVI vekov* (Kazan', 1979) [reviewed by A. L. Litvin and N. C. Iuzeev in *Istoriia SSSR*, 1981, no. 2, pp. 206-209].

[18] In his generally favorable review of *Tataro-Mongoly v Azii i Evrope*, I. Ia. Zlatkin also questions some of the generalizations which trouble me. See *Voprosy istorii*, 1971, no. 8, pp. 161-64.

[19] I. Petrushevskii, "Rashid ad-din i ego istoricheskii trud," in Rashid ad-din, *Sbornik letopisei* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1952), pp. 7-37, and N. Ts. Munkuev, "O dvukh tendentsiiakh v politike pervykh mongol'skikh khanov v Kitae v pervoi polovine XIII veka," *Materialy po istorii i filologii tsentral'noi Azii*, Trudy Buriatskogo kompleksnogo nauchno-issled. inst., Sibirskoe otdelenie AN SSSR, vyp. 8, seriia vostokovedeniia (Ulan-Ude, 1962), pp. 49-67 are basic expositions of this paradigm. I detect too much rhetorical excess in statements from the sources which are supposed to illustrate the first "tendency."

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the clan-tribal social structure, which permitted snowballing amalgamation of peoples. More importantly, the Soviets are committed to a unilinear conception of social evolution in which clan-tribalism and feudalism are mutually antagonistic, successive stages. Thus the retention of clan-tribal elements in the world Mongol Empire is seen as a source of weakness in the feudal Mongol society, whereas the fusion of clan-tribal, feudal, and imperial-bureaucratic (subsumed in Soviet parlance under the feudal rubric) institutions and structures was probably a source of strength. To assert that the creation of the world Mongol Empire had absolutely no positive benefits anywhere seems prima facie one-sided and simplistic.

Soviet scholarship on the Golden Horde, the segment of the Mongol Empire most relevant to this discussion, is consistent with the general line of Soviet oriental studies on the history of the world Mongol Empire. Soviet orientalists, archeologists, and historians have produced a solid corpus of monographs and articles on the history of the Golden Horde.[20] Iakubovskii laid out a narrative political history of the Horde and suggested the outlines of most subsequent thematic research. Fedorov-Davydov has examined the social structure, political organization, art, economics, and materials culture of the Horde; Safargaliev investigated the disintegration of the Horde with a particular interest in regionalism and separatism; Egorov has looked at cities, administration, and centrifugal tendencies; Zakirov has produced the most comprehensive analysis of Golden Horde-Mameluke diplomatic relations; Poluboiarinova surveyed the evidence for the presence of Russians in the Horde. These studies utilize both archeological and historical sources, both the results of digs and excavations and the contents of written texts in Arabo-Persian, Russian, and other languages. Cumulatively they have incomparably enriched our understanding of the history of the Golden Horde as a dynamic and complex polity which at its height rested upon a sophisticated symbiosis of clan-tribal, pastoral nomadic and sedentary urban, bureaucratic elements, which could act as a major power in the Middle East and carry out grand diplomacy, and thereby affecting the social map of the Kipchak steppe.[21]

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[20] N. A. Kuznetsova and L. M. Kulagina, *Iz istorii sovetskogo vostokovedeniia 1917-1967* (Moscow, 1970) is more concerned with the structure of Soviet oriental studies than its content; it contains many lists of conference papers.

[21] The starting point is Iakubovskii's contribution to Grekov and Iakubovskii, *Zolotaia Orda i ee padenie*, which dwarfs Grekov's in quantity and quality. More recent works include: G. A. Fedorov-Davydov, *Kochevniki Vostochnoi Evropy pod vlast'iu zolotoordynskikh khanov: Arkheologicheskie pamiatniki* (Moscow, 1966) and *Obshchestvennyi stroi Zolotoi Ordy* (Moscow, 1973), and many articles [his most recent book is *Monety Moskovskoi Rusi* (*Moskva v bor'be za nezavisimoe i tsentralizovannoe gosudarstvo*) (Moscow, 1981), to which he kindly called my attention]; Salikh Zakirov, *Diplomaticheskie otnosheniia Zolotoi Ordy s Egiptom (XIII-XIV vv.)* (Moscow, 1966) [see M. A. Usmanov's review in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1968, no. 1, pp. 210-12]; articles based upon V. L. Egorov, "Zolotoordynskii gorod (prichiny vozniknoveniia, istoricheskaia geografiia, domostroitel'stvo)," candidate's diss., Moscow, 1973 (accessible to me only through its *avtoreferat*, since I was denied access to dissertations while in Moscow), i.e. V.

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This scholarship hews to the basic Soviet historiographic premise on socio-economic development by interpreting clan-tribal and feudal-bureaucratic institutions in the Horde as mutually exclusive and thus a source of its ultimate downfall. It would seem more plausible that the bubonic plague (Black Death), the shifting of the continental trade routes away from Horde territory by Tamerlane and his destruction of its cities, and the inherent separatist tendencies of so large a geographic domain caused the breakdown in the multiple balances - social, economic, political, and ecological - upon which the Horde depended, a breakdown manifested in but not to be explained by incessant dynastic civil war.

Moreover, Soviet specialists in the history of the Golden Horde have not seriously explored the consequences of their conception of its history for Russo-Tatar relations or the impact of the Mongols on Russian history. One is not surprised. Iakubovskii once tried to suggest that by weakening the Horde, Tamerlane (Timur) objectively contributed to the unification of Russia and thus played a progressive role in Russian history; his analysis was not acceptable,[22] though it has much to be said for it. No one has tried to correlate the establishment of the *baskak* system in Russia with that phase of the Horde's history when its bureaucratic elements were strongest. The Mongols left the Russian political infrastructure intact but restructured that of the Polovtsy, the Volga Bolgars, Khwarism, and the Crimea, the major Horde economic interests were in steppe pastoral nomadism and oriental commerce, to which Russia could contribute little; the dominant thrust of Horde foreign policy was south to the rich pastures and caravan routes of Azerbaidzhan against the Ilkhanids, and the battle with the Ilkhanids was the raison d'etre of the Horde's alliance with Egypt; the Mongols obviously had the political expertise and military capability to govern Russia directly, but chose not to. These and a host of additional facts about the Horde lead to an inescapable conclusion which no Soviet orientalist has ever seen fit to print or explore: Russia was not only on the periphery of the Horde but peripheral to its interests. The Horde exploited Russia indirectly because compared to Khwarism, or Bolgar, or the Crimea, it was a low-yield investment, not because Russian opposition to Horde rule was greater than elsewhere. Horde policy toward the Russian forest zone must be analyzed within the context of the dynamics of the Horde's point of view. The Tatars

L. Egorov, "Prichiny vozniknoveniia gorodov u Mongolov v XIII-XIV w.," *Istoriia SSSR*, 1969, no. 4, pp. 39-49, "Gosudarstvennoe i administrativnoe ustroistvo Zolotoi Ordy," *Voprosy istorii*, 1972, no. 2, pp. 32-42, and "Razvitie tsentrobezhnykh stremlenii v Zolotoi Orde," *Voprosy istorii*, 1974, no. 8, pp. 36-50, and his "Zolotaia orda pered Kulikovskoi bitvoi," in L. G. Beskrovnyi et al., *Kulikovskaia bitva: Sbornik statei* (Moscow, 1980), pp. 174-213 [this volume is the best product of Soviet scholarship on the six-hundredth anniversary of the battle of Kulikovo; I hope to survey this considerable literature at another time]; and M. D. Poluboiarinova, *Russkie liudi v Zolotoi Orde* (Moscow, 1978).

[22] Cf. A. Iakubovskii, "Timur (opyt kratkoi kharakteristiki)," *Voprosy istorii*, 1946, no. 8-9, pp. 43-76 and A. P. Novosel'tsev, "Ob istoricheskoi otsenke Timura," ibid., 1973, no. 2, pp. 3-20.

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tried to extract the most they could with the least expenditure of their own resources. Mongol rule lasted longer in Russia than in China or Persia because by remaining in the steppe the Mongols could retain their pastoral nomadic way of life and hence their military edge. The indirectness of Mongol rule did not lessen Mongol influence on Russia, rather it eliminated Russian influence on the Tatars, who were in part at least sinicized in China and persianized in Persia but were turkicized and muslimized in the Golden Horde.[23] It is not enough to infer that Mongol control over Russia declined during periods of civil war in the Horde, although of course it did; Mongol policy toward Russia should be placed within a much broader context of the overall history and priorities of the Horde.

Soviet specialists in medieval Russian history (like their Western counterparts) have failed to make up for the disciplinary modesty, if not discretion, of Soviet orientalists. Any study of Russian political history of the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries must as a matter of course include the Tatars in the narrative and take some account of their impact.[24] But in the work of even as meticulous a historian as Cherepnin the Tatars are an external and uniformly malevolent presence, who had no policy other than keeping Russia weak and politically divided and served no function other than destruction. At least Cherepnin showed some appreciation of the more opportunistic features of Ivan Kalita's dealings with the Horde, but no Soviet historian can resolve the problem of Alexander Nevskii. Because he successfully fought the Germans and Swedes Nevskii is a national hero, but unfortunately for patriotic sensibilities he collaborated with the Mongols. Thus the Russian princes and *boiare* who failed to save Russia from the Mongols are blamed for Russia's conquest, despite the numbers of them who died in the struggle, but Nevskii's statesmanship earns only kudos. The cowardice and hypocrisy of the Russian Orthodox Church also come in for their share of criticism, although the Church had as little choice as did Nevskii to do other than work with Sarai.[25]

For several decades the most prolific and stimulating student of especially thirteenth-century Russo-Tatar relations has been V. V. Kargalov.[26] Kargalov

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[23] I will discuss this contrast at greater length in "Russia in the Mongol Empire in Comparative Perspective," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, forthcoming.

[24] For example, the standard work of L. V. Cherepnin, *Obrazovanie russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva v XIV-XV vv.: Ocherki sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi i politicheskoi istorii Rusi* (Moscow, 1960) and many related articles. Cf. his "Mongolo-Tatary na Rusi (XIII v.)," in Tataro-Mongoly v Azii i Evrope, pp. 179-203, which is not impressive.

[25] U. Budovnits, "Russkoe dukhovenstvo v pervoe stoletie mongolo-tatarskogo iga," *Voprosy istorii religii i ateizma* 7 (1959): 284-302, incorporated into his monograph cited below, n. 33.

[26] V. V. Kargalov, "Tataro-mongol'skoe nashestvie na Rusi XIII veka," candidate's diss., Moscow, 1962, was accessible to me only through its *avtoreferat*; it seems to be the source of most of his earlier publications. See: V. V. Kargalov, "Mongolo-tatarskie vtorzheniia i peremeshchenie naseleniia severo-vostochnoi Rusi vo vtoroi polovine XIII v.," *Nauchnye doklady Vysshei Shkoly. Istoricheskie nauki*, 1961, no. 4, pp. 134-47; "Sushchestvovali li na Rusi 'voenno-politicheskaia organizatsiia' mongol'skikh feodalov?" *Istoriia SSSR*, 1962, no. 1, pp. 161-65; "Osnovnye etapy mongolo-tatarskogo nashestviia na Rusi," *Prepodovanie istorii v shkole*, 1963, no. 4, pp. 27-39;

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has presented the most detailed narrative of thirteenth-century Russo-Tatar relations and fully synthesized the data in Soviet archeological research to present a graphic picture of the extent and range of Mongol destruction. He has advanced a number of interesting and novel ideas on the Mongol campaigns of conquest; for example, that the Mongols were not attacking Novgorod when the spring thaw forced them to turn south but merely pursuing runaways from the northeast. He has some new theories on the *baskak* system.[27] He has identified the cost to the Russian economy of Mongol taxation and rule; analyzed the effects of Mongol campaigns on population shifts, the rural agricultural sector, and the countryside; and of course discussed the treatment of the Mongol question in Russian historiography.

Once again the most important point is not how many of Kargalov's original conclusions will become standard, but the framework within which he writes. He defines Russo-Tatar relations almost entirely in military and negative terms; this is true of both his scholarly and popular works. There is no hint that a consideration of the Mongol impact on Russia should include discussion of Russian familiarity with the steppe (which is not surprising, since even Poluboiarinova drew no such inference from her data that Russians frequented the Horde). Moreover the internal history, dynamics, and complexities of the

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"Posledstviia mongolo-tatarskogo nashestviia XIII v. dlia sel'skikh mestnostei Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi," *Voprosy istorrii*, 1965, no. 3, pp. 53-58; "Polovetskie nabegi na Rusi," *Voprosy istorii*, 1965, no. 9, pp. 68-73 [background on Kievan *Rus'*– steppe relations]; *Vneshnepoliticheskie faktory razvitiia feodal'noi Rusi*; "Osvoboditel'naia bor'ba Rusi protiv mongolo-tatarskogo iga," *Voprosy istorii*, 1969, no. 2, pp. 145-57; no. 3, pp. 105-118; no. 4, pp. 121-37; "Baskaki," *Voprosy istorii*, 1972, no. 5, pp. 212-16; "Kulikovskaia bitva," *Prepodovanie istorii v shkole*, 1972, no. 5, pp. 18-25; "Kulikovskaia bitva i ee mesto v otechestvennoi istorii," *Prepodovanie istorii v shkole*, 1979, no. 5, pp. 15-23; and *Konets ordynskogo iga* (Moscow, 1980).

All or most of his "popular" (high school or "youth") books concern Russia and the Tatars. See V. V. Kargalov, *Mongolo-tatarskoe nashestvie na Rusi XIII vek* (Moscow, 1966); *Drevniaia Rus' v sovetskoi khudozhestvennoi literature: Dostovernost' istoricheskogo romana* (Moscow, 1968), pp. 94-176; *Moskovskaia Rus' v sovetskoi khudozhestvennoi literature* (Moscow, 1971), pp. 46-183; *Narod-bogatyr'* (Moscow, 1971); *Sverzhenie mongolo-tatarskogo iga* (Moscow, 1973), pp. 73-198.

Kargalov has since turned his original research to the problem of the defense of the southern Muscovite border against the Crimean Tatars in the sixteenth century. He has been a prolific author of historical fiction set in the Mongol period. Finally, he contributed significantly to the popular literature on the anniversary of Kulikovo in 1380.

[27] Kargalov disagrees with Nasonov's use of toponymic evidence that there were Tatar-Russian military-political contingents stationed in northeastern *Rus'* under the *baskaki*; Nasonov's view has retained much support in the Soviet Union, in part because of the high regard in which Nasonov was held.

Kargalov's and Nasonov's interpretations should be compared with the fundamental article of A. A. Zimin, "Narodnye dvizheniia 20-kh godov XIV veka i likvidatsiia sistemy baskachestva v Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi," *Izvestiia AN SSSR*, Seriia istorii i filosofii, 9, no. I (1952): 61-65. Zimin proposed that Russian popular opposition was the catalyst for the establishment and elimination of the *baskak* system on the part of the Mongols. Since all such Russian opposition was crushed, this seems unlikely.

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Horde remain invisible in Kargalov's publications, as if any appreciation of Horde policy toward Russia could be written which did not take into account the nature of Horde society and politics. Social osmosis, cultural understanding, institutional borrowing, or economic cooperation between Russian and Tatar have no place in the "national-liberation struggle of Russia against the Tatars."

Kargalov can also be faulted on methodological grounds for disregarding the achievements of Soviet textologists and literary specialists in the field of Old-Russian chronicle-writing. He is not careful to distinguish entries from contemporary chronicles from others in such late and usually adulterated sources as the sixteenth-century Nikon chronicle. A narrative constructed without regard for the reliability and provenance of the chronicles from which its data are extracted must be viewed with some skepticism.

The most imaginative, nay speculative, analysis of Russo-Tatar relations is that of I. Grekov.[28] His specialization is East European politics rather than Russo-Horde relations per se during the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries. His research has its virtues: he appreciates that the Horde pursued a complicated policy toward Russia; that Sarai considered the Ukraine and Belorussia, not just Vladimir-Suzdalia, within its sphere of influence; that the Horde could and did adjust its program to fit changing circumstances. Unfortunately in applying those premises Grekov has not always been reliable in citing sources or secondary works,[29] and his ruminations seem to outrun his evidence.[30] Grekov gives the impression that he does not realize the improbability that the "Horde" could enforce a uniform and centralized policy toward Russia during a period of intense civil war and internecine struggle such as the third quarter of the fourteenth century. Many Mongol raids on Russia at this time, as Egorov appreciates, were undertaken by leaders over whom the khan(s) had no power or control, and rival khans hardly coordinated their Russia policies. Grekov is

[28] I. B. Grekov, *Ocherki po istorii mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii vostochnoi Evropy XIV-XVI vv.* (Moscow, 1963), pp. 3-146; "K voprosu o datirovke tak nazyvaemoi 'vtoroi dukhovnoi gramoty' moskovskogo kniazia Vasiliia I," in *Problemy obshchestvenno-politicheskoi istorii Rossii i slavianskikh stran* (Moscow, 1963), pp. 141-45; "O pervonachal'nom variante 'Skazaniia o Mamaevom poboishche'," *Sovetskoe slavianovedenie*, 1970, no. 6, pp. 27-36; "Ideino-politicheskaia napravlennost' literaturnykh pamiatnikov feodal'noi Rusi kontsa XIV v.," in *Pol'sha i Rus'* (Moscow, 1974), pp. 378-421; *Vostochnaia Evropa i upadok Zolotoi Ordy (na rubezhe XIV-XV vv.)* (Moscow, 1975); and "Mesto Kulikovskoi bitvy v politicheskoi zhizni Vostochnoi Evropy kontsa XIV veka," in *Kulikovskaia bitva*, pp. 113-41, a slightly expanded version of which appeared as "Kulikovskaia bitva - vazhnaia vekha v politicheskoi zhizny Vostochnoi Evropy vtoroi poloviny XIV v.," *Sovetskoe slavianovedenie*, 1980, no. 5, pp. 3-22.

Grekov informed me that he will soon publish two articles on the *Troitskaia letopis'*, specifically its attribution to metropolitan Kiprian.

[29] O. F. Tvorogov, "Neobkhodimye utochneniia v knige I. B. Grekova 'Vostochnaia Evropa i upadok Zolotoi Ordy," *Trudy otdela drevnerusskoi literatury* 32 (1977), pp. 402-404. [hereafter *TODRL* refers to this journal]

[30] On I. Grekov's 1963 book, see G. D. Burdei, "Nekotorye voprosy diplomaticheskoi istorii vostochnoi Evropy XIV-XVI vv.," in *Mezhdunaroanye otnosheniia v tsentral'noi i vostochnoi Evrope i ikh istoriografiia* (Moscow, 1966), pp. 192-212.

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something of a maverick within Soviet historical scholarship, although his work is treated seriously.[31]

The most recent contributor to the study of Russia and the Mongols is Borisov, whose research exceeds the boundaries of his putative topic, Russian culture under the Mongols.[32] Borisov has shown great originality in analyzing the economic and ideological significance of medieval Russian architecture as a reflection of Russo-Tatar relations, and his discussion of Muscovite intellectual history is not without merit, especially in its attention to the significance of dates in the medieval Christian calendar. But historiographically he takes a very hard line against any imputation of a positive Mongol contribution to Russian history.

Analyses of Russo-Tatar political relations are based primarily upon medieval Russian narrative sources, first and foremost chronicles, but also *vitae*, tales, sermons, travelogues and epics. By and large these sources have been the province of specialists in Old-Russian literature, although some *literaturovedy* are also historians, and historians also do textological research. In addition all studies of Russian views of the Mongols, Russian reaction to the Tatars, and the intellectual history of Russo-Tatar relations derive from these texts. The main lines of much of this research are accessible from the works of Budovnits, although he did not formulate them and his interpretive approach is not favored by Soviet textologists and *literaturovedy*. According to Budovnits[33] the Russian

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[31] The methodological gap between Grekov and the textologists could not be greater. He believes that the conjuncture of events (a favorite expression, from the French *Annalistes* ?) must be taken into account in dating monuments of Old-Russian literature, whereas the textologists, notably Lur'e, view such an approach as unsound. What is obligatory for Grekov is impermissible to Lur'e.

The other great maverick in an ancillary area is L. N. Gumilev, particularly for his arguments that the "Secret History of the Mongols" is anti-Chingissid and that the *Slovo o polku Igoreve* is a thirteenth-century allegorical attack on Nevskii's excessive friendship with Mongol Nestorian Christians. Both conclusions are contained in his *Poiski vymyshelennogo tsarstva* (*Legenda o "Gosudarstve presvitera Ioanna"*) (Moscow, 1970).

For Soviet reactions to Gumilev's work see I. Ia. Zlatkin, "Ne sintez, a eklektika (Po povodu kontseptsii L. N. Gumileva)," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1970, no. 3, pp. 80-88; B. A. Rybakov, "O preodolenii samoobmana," *Voprosy istorii*, 1971, no. 3, pp. 153-59; the benign review of Gumilev's *Poiski vymyshlennogo tsarstva* by N. Ts. Munkuev in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1972, no. 1, pp. 185-89; and the remarks of Borisov (n. 32, below).

[32] N. S. Borisov, "Sotsial'no-politicheskoe soderzhanie literaturnoi deiatel'nosti mitropolita Kipriana," *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta*, seriia 9, *Istoriia*, 1975, no. 6, pp. 58-72; "Russkaia arkhitektura i mongolo-tatarskoe igo (1238-1300)," ibid., 1976, no. 6, pp. 63-79; "Otechestvennaia istoriografiia o vliianii tataro-mongol'skogo nashestviia na russkuiu kul'turu," *Problemy istorii SSSR* 5 (Moscow, 1976), pp. 129-48 (Borisov accuses Gumilev of reviving the theories of Eurasianists, as demonstrated by his frequent citations to works by George Vernadsky, pp. 141-42; I would call these charges exaggerated and distorted); "Russkaia kul'tura i mongolo-tatarskoe igo," candidate's diss., Moscow, 1977, *avtoreferat*; and "Kulikovskaia bitva i nekotorye voprosy dukhovnoi zhizni Rusi XIV-XV vv.," *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta*, seriia 7, *Istoriia*, 1980, no. 5, pp. 56-66.

[33] Among other publications see I. U. Budovnits, "Ideinaia osnova rannikh narodnykh skazanii o tatarskom ige," *TODRL* no. 14 (1958): 169-75 and his *Obshchestvenno-politicheskaia mysl' drevnei Rusi (XI-XIV vv.)* (Moscow, 1960), pp. 291-465.

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sources present a negative view of the Mongol conquest. Expressions of opposition to the Tatars in literary sources written by and for the elite nevertheless express the attitudes of the Russian people (*narod*), which, unlike the feudal lords, never entertained the idea of reconciliation with hated foreign rule. This remains the dominant view of specialists in Old Russian literature.[34]

Anyone writing a history of medieval Russian intellectual history vis-à-vis the Tatars would find it impossible to avoid the studies of the Laurentian chronicle account of the Tatar conquest by Lur'e and Prokhorov; of the tale of Mikhail of Tver' by Kuchkin; of the tale of Mitiai by Prokhorov; of the various texts of the Kulikovo cycle and about the reign of Dmitrii Donskoi by Salmina, Dmitriev, and Begunov; of the texts associated with the Stand on the Ugra river in 1480 by Kudriavtsev; among other works simply too numerous to mention, let alone cite.[35] Such research uncovers the dating, provenance, tendentiousness,

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[34] Use of the *byliny* to demonstrate medieval popular (*narod*) attitudes toward the Tatars, common to Soviet historians and specialists in Old-Russian literature, has been questioned by some – but not all – Soviet folklorists, and remains a controversial topic. See B. N. Putilov, 'Kontseptsiia, s kotoroi nel'zia soglasit'sia," *Voprosy literatury*, 1962, no. 11, pp. 98-111 and "Ob istorizme russkikh bylin," *Russkii fol'klor* 10 (1966), pp. 103-126.

[35] The contention of Prokhorov that the Laurentian chronicle account of the invasion of Batu represents late fourteenth-century opinion has met vigorous opposition from Lur'e. Cf. G. M. Prokhorov, "Povest' o Batyevom nashestvii v Lavrent'evskoi letopisi," *TODRL* 28 (1974): 77-98 and Ia. S. Lur'e, "Lavrent'evskaia letopis'- svod nachala XIV v.," ibid. 29, (1974): 50-67.

On the *vita* of Mikhail of Tver' see V. A. Kuchkin, *Povesti o Mikhaile Tverskom: Istoriko-tekstologicheskoe issledovanie* (Moscow, 1974).

On the literary monuments of the late fourteenth century see: D. S. Likhachev, *Velikoe nasledie: Klassicheskie proizvedeniia literatury drevnei Rusi* (Moscow, 1975), pp. 239-53 for a restatement of his interpretation of the *Zadonshchina*, first expressed during World War II.

For Prokhorov's general conception of the late fourteenth century, see his "Pamiatniki literatury vizantiisko-russkogo obshchestvennogo dvizheniia epokhi Kulikovskoi bitvy," *avtoreferat* dissertatsii na soiskanii uchenoi stepeni doktora filologicheskikh nauk, Leningrad, 1977; *Povest' o Mitiae: Rus' i Vizantiia v epokhu Kulikovskoi bitvy* (Leningrad, 1978); "Kul'turnoe svoeobrazie epokhi Kulikovskoi bitvy," *TODRL* 34 (1979): 3-17; and "Drevneishaia rukopis' s priozvedeniiami mitropolita Kipriana," *Pamiatniki kul'tury: Novye otkrytiia. Ezhegodnik 1978 g. Pis'mennost', Iskusstvo, Arkheologiia* (Leningrad, 1979), pp. 17-30.

Also the articles of M. A. Salmina, " 'Letopisnaia povest' o Kulikovskoi bitve' i "Zadonshchina'," in D. S. Likhachev and L. A. Dmitriev, eds., "*Slovo o polku Igoreve" i pamiatniki Kulikovskogo tsikla* (Moscow, 1966), pp. 344-384; "Eshche raz o datirovke 'Letopisnoi povesti' o Kulikovskoi bitve," *TODRL* 32 (1977): 3-39 (against datings by I. Grekov and S. N. Azbelev); "Povest' o nashestvii Tokhtamysha," ibid. 34 (1979): 134-51 (primarily against the views of V. A. Plugin); and the earlier "Slovo o zhitii i o prestavlenii velikogo kniazia Dmitriia Ivanovicha, tsaria Rus'skogo," ibid. 25 (1970): 81-105, Salmina's work is employed in Ia. S. Lur'e, *Obshcherusskie letopisi* XIV-XV vv. (Leningrad, 1976).

See also L. A. Dmitriev, "Publitsisticheskie idei 'Skazaniia o Mamaevom poboishche'," *TODRL* 11 (1955): 140-155; Iu. K. Begunov, "Ob istoricheskoi osnove "Skazaniia o Mamaevom poboishche'," in "*Slovo o polku Igoreve*" *i pamiatniki Kulikovskogo tsikla*, pp. 477-523; and the recent survey of L. A. Dmitriev, "Kulikovskaia bitva 1380 g. v literaturnykh pamiatnikakh drevnei Rusi," *Russkaia literatura*, 1980, no. 3, pp. 3-29. R. G. Skrynnikov informed me he will publish an extensive article on the Kulikovo cycle next year.

Finally, I. M. Kudriavtsev, "'Poslanie na Ugru' Vassiana Rylo kak pamiatnik publitsistiki XV v.," *TODRL* 8 (1951): 158-86 and "'Ugorshchina' v pamiatnikakh drevnerusskoi literatury (Letopisnye povesti o nashestvii Akhmata i ikh literaturnaia istoriia)," *Issledovaniia i materialy po drevnerusskoi literature* 1 (Moscow, 1961): 23-67.

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antecedents and literary fate of each text, or even chronicle entry, on Russo-Tatar relations. With their access to manuscripts and repositories and their admirable philological skills and tradition, Soviet specialists in Old-Russian literature have virtually dissected the narratives upon which much of the history of Russia under the Mongols has been written. The Soviets are adept at identifying the institutional prejudices of a given text, whether it be a particular prince, city-state, monastery or episcopacy. They are sensitive and creative in determining religious biases rooted in the Christian world-view. Soviet textologists not infrequently criticize their narrative political historian colleagues for concocting narratives from a variety of sources on the basis of selective and subjective judgment of "probability" rather than the textological history of the sources.[36]

Soviet *literaturovedy* manage to disagree with each other rather regularly, and even what appear to be narrow technical questions of textological influence or the dating of a hypothetical, inextant chronicle compilation can arouse heated polemic. But there has never been anyone to question the consensus that Russia was "conquered" in 1237-40, subjected to the "Tatar Yoke" of the "Golden Horde," from which an unsuccessful attempt was made to "liberate" Russia in 1380, and a happier one in 1480. This conceptual framework is so "obvious" that not even the most scrupulous Soviet philologist has even seriously noticed that this is not what the sources say. The verbs used to denote Russia's "conquest" are ambiguous at best, and can just as easily mean "to plunder" or "to capture," without implying or entailing a change in political suzerainty, as "to conquer" and hence to rule. None of the works of the Kulikovo cycle, as I have tried to show, mentions the idea of Russian "liberation from the Tatar Yoke," and neither do those on 1480. The phrase "the Tatar Yoke" is unattested before the seventeenth century, and even the name the "Golden Horde" can be dated no earlier than the writing of the *Kazanskaia istoriia* about the Muscovite annexation of the Kazan' khanate under Ivan IV. The vocabulary of national-liberationist war strikes me, to be charitable, as anachronistic, but the conceptual framework of the medieval Russian sources differs from that projected onto them by scholars. Naturally Soviet specialists such as Lur'e "know" that the secular, political terminology of modern scholarship cannot be found in the medieval sources, but none has drawn from this disparity the self-evident proposition that the contemporary medieval Russian intellectual lexicon must be studied on its own terms before we translate them into ours.

The most ambitious contribution to Russo-Tatar relations by a *literaturoved* is that of Prokhorov, whose schema is as novel and controversial

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[36] A legitimate example of the kind of narrative that strict Soviet textologists descry is Cherepnin, *Obrazovanie russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva*, pp. 595-622 on the battle of Kulikova, or virtually any of Kargalov's works.

Of his numerous methodological pronunciamentos on this subject, see Ia. S. Lur'e, "Kritika istochnika i veroiatnost' izvestiia," *Kul'tura drevnei Rusi* [Voronin Festschrift] (Moscow, 1966), pp. 121-26 and "O nekotorykh printsipakh kritiki istochnikov," *Istochnikovedenie otechestvennoi istorii* 1 (1973): 78-100.

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as that of I. Grekov, although conceived in entirely different methodological terms. On the basis of textological-literary analysis of the history of the tale of Mitiai, Dmitrii Donskoi's candidate for the post of metropolitan of the Russian Orthodox Church, and other written evidence, Prokhorov has propounded the theory that the division in the Russian Church between the Hesychasts and anti-Hesychasts - which is his major concern - included foreign policy, i.e. whether to seek Lithuanian assistance to overthrow the Tatar Yoke. This division paralleled that in Byzantium where anti-Hesychasts favored Catholic aid to resist the Ottomans and Hesychasts opposed Church Union. Prokhorov is willing to draw grand conclusions about political and social history heavily on the basis of the textological history of a chronicle tale, which seems to be excessive, although his contributions to Russo-Byzantine intellectual and cultural history cannot be gainsaid.

Scholars doing research on the texts of Old-Russian literature have been insufficiently sensitive to the conclusions of Soviet orientalists when treating evidence of Russo-Tatar relations. For example, there are few concepts as significant to the history of the Mongol Empire as that of the ulus, the nation-state, the dynastic inheritance, the realm. The Golden Horde was the ulus of Chinghis' eldest son Juchi and his grandson Batu. A number of texts of Old-Russian literature contain passages in which Russia is referred to as the *tsarev ulus*, the ulus of the khan, or a Russian prince is described as an *ulusnik* (which translates roughly as servitor) of the Horde. This Russian manipulation of a Tatar concept, like the better-known Russian assimilation of the principle of Chingissid legitimacy, should have stimulated the attention of *literaturovedy*.

In interpreting what the medieval Russian sources say about the Mongols, Soviet literary specialists adhere just as unconsciously to elements of the tradition of Imperial Russian scholarship as do Soviet historians writing about Russo-Tatar relations and the Mongol impact on Russian history. This same historiographic heritage remains pervasive in Western scholarship on Russia and the Mongols as well, and has usually led to neglect of the Mongol factor or its depiction in uniformly negative terms. It is only when specialists on the Mongol Empire and the Golden Horde, Russian history during the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries, and Old-Russian literature can cooperate and collaborate that a definitive history of Russia and the Mongols will ever be written. No Soviet historian has as yet tried to accomplish this task and integrate the conclusions of these three disciplines, but any historian who does will include in his bibliography the numerous works by Soviet scholars in all of these fields.

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TSAREV ULUS: RUSSIA IN THE GOLDEN HORDE

One of the consequences of the Mongol conquest of Russia was that the Russians became familiar with numerous Mongol political, administrative and fiscal terms. Some were retained after the overthrow of Mongol rule if the Muscovites borrowed or could take advantage of the Mongol institution; others disappear. The list of such terms would include *khan, iarlik, tamga, devter', iam, daroga, tarkhan, baskak, t'ma* and *iasak*. There is another Turco-Mongol term of even greater importance which also found its way into the medieval Russian sources, and which has not been investigated as thoroughly as it should. That is the concept of the *ulus*.

Discussion of the meaning and evolution of the concept of the *ulus* among Inner Asianists seems to have led to the following consensus. The concept of the *ulus* was central to the Mongol Empire. Its original meaning was the entire Mongol nation/empire, for which purpose sometimes compound nouns with *ulus* were employed, such as *ulus ulus* or *irgen ulus*. Each of the heirs of Chinghis khan was granted an *ulus*, the first devolution of the term; thus the Golden Horde, the Mongol successor state on the Volga which governed Russia, was the *ulus* of Juchi. At this point the term *ulus* meant a state structure and territory. Finally the term became applied at the lowest local level, a petty nomadizing unit or administrative district (equivalent to the Russian *volost'*). Thus the term *ulus* mirrored in its evolution the progressive disintegration of the world Mongol Empire.[37]

For the history of the Golden Horde, the development of the concept of the ulus can be traced not only in the Arabo-Persian sources, but also in the medieval Russian texts. The Russians were fully conversant with the term and use it in all of its meanings. The most restricted sense is illustrated by several quotations from the chronicles. In 1360, prince of the Horde Bulak Temer looted all of the cities and *ulusy* along the Volga river.[38] In 1389 Ignatii of Smolensk, travelling down the Volga river in the suite of Pimen, metropolitan - designate en route to Constantinople, identified the *ulusy* of Sarykhoza, Bek-Bulat and Ak-Bugin.[39] In

[37] G. A. Fedorov-Davydov, *Obshchestvennyi stroi Zolotoi Ordy* (Moscow, 1973): 43-44, 111-118. As applied to the Golden Horde and especially to its successor states such as the Kazan' and Crimean Khanates, the word *ulus* was replaced sometimes by the word *iurt*.

[38] *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* (hereafter *PSRL*), XXV: 181.

[39] *Ibid.*, XI: 96.

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1411 tsar' Temir expelled Zeleni-Saltan, son of Tokhtamysh, and took and looted his *ulusy* on the Volga river.[40]

But the medieval Russian sources apply the term *ulus* and a Russianized variant, *ulusnik*,[41] not only to the zone of the Volga river in the Pontic and Caspian steppes. The term is also utilized to refer to Russia, the Russian principalities and forest zone, and the Russian princes. The pattern of such occurrences of the words *ulus* and *ulusnik* deserves careful scrutiny.

There seem to be no instances of the use of *ulus* to apply to Rus' before the middle of the fourteenth century. In the *vita* of Fedor Rostislavovich of Iaroslavl' and Smolensk at one point the khan refuses the request of his wife, the tsaritsa, to marry Fedor, of whom she is enamored, to their daughter, by saying that he is an *ulusnik*.[42] Although these events are ostensibly set in the late thirteenth century, the *vita* was not written until the discovery of Fedor's relics in late fifteenth century, and thus this passage cannot be accepted as thirteenth-century evidence.

The earliest reliable allusion to Rus' as the *ulus* occurs in 1348-1349. Envoys from Olgerd, grand prince of Lithuania, tried to persuade the Horde to align itself with Lithuania against Moscow. Muscovite lobbying, no doubt sweetened with bribes and influence – peddling, led to a denouement other than Olgerd intended: his envoys were arrested and deported to Moscow. To add insult to injury, Olgerd was compelled to ransom his envoys from Moscow, the object of his diplomatic machinations. Aside from indicating Muscovite clout at the Horde and the political finesse, if not sense of humor, of the Horde, this incident also contains a speech, supposedly made in public debate at the Horde, on behalf of Muscovy against Olgerd's proposal. Moscow, the grand principality, Rus', was the tsarev *ulus*, the *ulus* of the khan,[43] the grand prince's patrimony; Olgerd wanted to devastate (*putoshiti*) the khan's *ulus* and insult (*obidit*) the grand prince, the khan's loyal subject. This argument was intended to convince the Horde not to abandon its pro-Muscovite policy, and apparently it succeeded.[44]

Whether Muscovite oratory or Muscovite money played the greater role in the political conflict of 1348-1349 is a moot point; what is intriguing is that

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[40] *Ibid.*, XI: 215.

[41] This was common practice. From *t'ma* (Mongol *tumen*) the Russians derived the term *temnik*: commander of ten thousand; from *iasak* (the tribute in furs), *iasashchik*; and from *tamga* (customs tax, or tax-collector), *tamozhnia*, customs house.

[42] *PSRL*, XXXIII, *Khol'mogorskaia letopis'*, s.a. 1277: 74-75.

[43] On the significance of the Russian translation of the Mongol title khan as tsar', the Russian term for the Byzantine basileus, see Michael Cherniavsky, "Khan or basileus: an aspect of Russian medieval political theory," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XX (1959): 459-476.

[44] *Troitskaia letopis'. Rekonstruktsiia teksta*, ed. M. D. Priselkov (Moscow-Leningrad, 1950): 369. Apparently the term *ulus* does not appear in the Laurentian chronicle, but that is consistent with its omission of such terms as *vykhod* or *iarlik*, common in later chronicles. It is possible that 1348 was the first occasion on which it seemed efficacious to employ the concept.

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the chronicler expected the contention that Rus' was the tsarev *ulus* to carry ideological and political weight in the Horde and to be fully' comprehensible to his own, domestic Russian, audience, which we may presume to be the princely and ecclesiastical elite.

In the *Skazanie o Mamaevom poboishche*, a highly religious narrative about the battle of Kulikovo Field in 1380,[45] grand prince Olgerd (erroneously for Jagailo in this, the Basic Redaction) writes to Mamai that he knows of Mamai's intent to punish (*kazniti*) his *ulus*, his servitor (*sluzhebnik*) Dmitrii Donskoi, who had insulted Mamai's *ulusnik* Oleg of Riazan'.[46] Thus both the terms *ulus* and *ulusnik* appear, and apparently both the principalities of Moscow and Riazan' are included under the rubric of these terms. In the Expanded Redaction of the *Skazanie*, Dmitrii Donskoi is called the *ulusnik* of Mamai.[47] Another manuscript which mixes several redactions imputes to Mamai a speech to Donskoi's envoy Tiutchev, in which he boasts that if he wanted to, he could punish not only his *ulusnik* Dmitrii and so small an *ulus* (*sego malogo ulusa*) but even Jerusalem, a comparison he is unlikely to have imagined but which reflects the Muscovite bookman's frame of reference.[48] The *Skazanie o Mamaevom poboishche* was combined with the "chronicle tale" (*letopisnaia povest'*) about the battle of Kulikovo by the Nikon chronicle to create the Kiprian Redaction of the *Skazanie*, in which uses of *ulus* and *ulusnik* are compounded with typical Nikon legerdemain.[49] Even the Chronicle Redaction of the *Skazanie* in the *Vologodsko-Pennskaia* chronicle contains a sentence in which Jagailo conveys to Mamai his familiarity with Mamai's plan to punish his *ulus*,[50] despite the correction of the name of the Lithuanian grand prince in this redaction of the *Skazanie*.

The fullest versions of the tale of the sack of Moscow by Tokhtamysh in 1382 contain a speech by which the Tatars deceived the inhabitants of the city into opening its gates under a promise of lenient treatment.[51] In one variant of this episode the Suzdal' princes, Dmitrii Donskoi's brothers-in-law who vouch for the integrity of Tokhtamysh's word, inform the Muscovites that Tokhtamysh did not and could not intend any harm to his *ulus*.[52] Once again one notes that

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[45] On the *Skazanie o Mamaevom poboishche*, see Charles J. Halperin, "The Russian land and the Russian tsar: the emergence of Muscovite ideology, 1380-1408," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte*, 23 (1976): 23-37.

[46] *Povesti o Kulikovskoi bitvy*, ed. M. N. Tikhomirov, V. F. Rzhiga and L. A. Dmitriev (Moscow, 1959): 46.

[47] *Ibid.*: 114. Mamai also informs his soldiers not to sow grain in his *ulus* (in the steppe) since they will feed on Russian grain in the fall (p. 112).

[48] *Ibid.*: 451-454.

[49] *PSRL*, XI: 46-69, especially 48.

[50] *PSRL*, XXVI: 125 ff.

[51] On these tales, see Ch. J. Halperin, *art. cit.*: 44-48.

[52] *PSRL*, XV: 442. B. D. Grekov and A. Iu. Iakubovskii, *Zolotaia Orda i ee padenie* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1950): 324, attribute to Tokhtamysh the motive of transforming the Russian Land into a simple Horde *ulus* in 1382, which hardly seems credible.

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this argument is supposed to have been efficacious in persuading the Muscovite townsmen to surrender, and the chronicler presents it without explanation so that it is assumed his audience generally understands why.

In the so-called *epistle* of Edigei, emir of the Horde, written to grand prince Vasilii I after his only partially successful siege of Moscow in 1408,[53] Edigei laments that Rus' used to be the *tsarev ulus*, whose princes and merchants travelled regularly to the Horde and which paid the tribute (*vykhod*) punctually. Now this idyllic situation has come to an end because of Vasilii I's political ingratitude, and the Horde receives no respect from its former *ulus*.[54]

In the events leading to the Muscovite dynastic civil war of the mid fifteenth century, the Horde played a significant and not entirely appreciated role. In 1432 a great debate took place in the Horde. Vasilii II was supported by the *ulus doroga Moskovskii* Min Bulat, his opponent Iurii Dmitrievich by prince of the Horde Taginia of the Shirin clan of the Crimea. The Muscovites and their Horde adherents pictured Iurii as an agent of Svidrigailo of Lithuania, an enemy of the Horde. In his speech *boyar* Ivan Vsevolozhskii told the tsar' that Vasilii II was his *kholop* (slave), and wanted to be grand prince of his *ulus*, according to the khan's *devter'* (census) and *iarlik* (patent), by his grant (*zhalovanie*), versus the claim of Iurii based upon the *gramota* (charter, actually: testament) of the "dead prince" Dmitrii Donskoi, who had left his patrimony to his son Vasilii I at a time when Vasilii I did not have an heir and thus named Vasilii's brother Iurii as next in line. Vsevolozhskii urged tsar' Mehmed to honor the will of Vasilii I which named Vasilii II as his heir. In effect this is what happened.[55]

Vsevolozhskii does not make clear why the khan should value the testament of Dmitrii Donskoi, Vasilii II's grandfather, less than that of Vasilii I, Vasilii II's father, other than that he can do so, as an imperial prerogative, and it is politically expedient. Whatever the legalities of the case, in his highly tendentious and partisan speech, at least as recorded in the chronicle, Vsevolozhskii again invokes the identity of Rus' as the *ulus* of the khan.

In one of the passages of the tales of the Stand on the Ugra in 1480, supposedly the definitive liberation of Russia from the Tatar yoke, accompanying the famous Epistle to the Ugra river of bishop Vassian Rylo of Rostov, Ivan III the Great sends an envoy to the infuriated khan Akhmed of the Great Horde to try to buy him off. Ivan III reminds Akhmed that it is bad policy to make war on his own *ulus* (*voevati vash ulus*).[56] Whatever the historicity of this embassy, it is quite plausible that reference to Russia's status as the *ulus* would have been obligatory in any attempt to defuse military hostilities and restore peaceful relations with the Horde. It is an odd slogan for Ivan III to have proclaimed if he were thinking in terms of Russian liberation from the Tatar yoke.[57]

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[53] On the various texts about this event, see Charles J. Halperin, *art. cit.*: 53-56.

[54] *PSRL*, IV: 110-111.

[55] *PSRL*, XVIII: 171-172.

[56] *PSRL*, XX: 346.

[57] Now see Charles J. Halperin, "The Tatar Yoke and Tatar Opression," in *Russia Mediaevalis* 5:1 (1984), pp. 20-39 [#11].

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The Nikon chronicler of the sixteenth century was extremely inventive in interpolating usage of the concept of the *ulus* into his annals. In several cases the word is used synonymously with patrimony (*otchina*). In 1400 Ivan Mikhailovich, on the death of his father, sends his *kilicheev* (envoys) to Temir-Kutlui to ask for a grant (*pozhalovanie*) of the *iarlik* of his "*otchina i dedina i ulus*," the grand principality of Tver'. Instead the new khan Shadibek sent an envoy with a *iarlik* for the *ulus* to Ivan.[58] Similarly in 1402 on the death of his father, Fedor Ol'govich of Riazan' requested his *otchina i dedina i ulus* from Shadibek, and likewise received it.[59]

But the most imaginative passage utilizing the concept of *ulus* written by the Nikon chronicler was interpolated sub anno 1384.[60] Mikhail' Aleksandrovich of Tver' tried to take advantage of the decline in Moscow's fortunes subsequent to its sack in 1382 by requesting from Tokhtamysh the *iarlik* to be grand prince of Vladimir. In fact Tokhtamysh did not grant this request, but the Nikon chronicler concocts the following speech by Tokhtamysh to explain why:

> "I know myself my ulusy, and each Russian prince in my ulus, and in my *otechestvo* (homeland), who lives *po starine* (according to tradition), and serves me properly (*pravdoiu*), and I reward (*zhaluiu*) him; and for the injustice before me of my *ulusnik* prince Dmitrii of Moscow, I chastized (*postrashil*) him, and (now) he serves me properly, and I reward him according to tradition (*po starine*) and patrimony; and you (Mikhail') go to your patrimony and serve me properly and I will reward you."

In short the Russians were not only familiar with the evolving meaning of the term *ulus* as applied to the Golden Horde and the steppe,[61] but were sufficiently comfortable with it to apply it to themselves, and even russianize it to yield the term *ulusnik*. The Russian princes describe their territories as the *tsarev ulus* or put such a depiction into the mouthes of Horde khans or emirs when they desire to emphasize Russian-Horde friendship, the identity of Rus' and Horde political interests, the unification of Rus' and the Horde in a single political entity, and the foolishness of military hostilities as mutually destructive.[62] Reference to Rus' as the *tsarev ulus* was therefore akin to waving

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[58] *PSRL*, XI: 183.

[59] *PSRL*, XI: 188.

[60] *PSRL*, XI: 84.

[61] The Tverian chronicle records the intention of Tokhtamysh after his defeat by Timur in 1389 to return to his *ulus*, which seems to be a new and later reading. See *PSRL*, XV, *Rogozhskii letopisets*, cols 156-157. The *iarliki* from the khans to the metropolitans of the Russian Orthodox Churches in their Russian translation refer to *ulusnye kniazi* (princes of the *ulus*). See M. D. Priselkov, *Khanskie iarliki russkim mitropolitam* (Petrograd, 1916): 57, 59, 60.

[62] However I have never seen the expression the *russkii ulus* (Russian ulus) in the sources. It is used now and then by A. E. Presniakov, *Obrazovanie velikorusskogo gosudarstva. Ocherki po istorii XIII-XV stoletiia* (Petrograd, 1918): e.g. 109. It is uncharacteristic of Presniakov to have invented a term not found in the sources.

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the flag. As *ulusniki* the Russian princes are obedient and loyal servitors of the Horde, who should faithfully pay tribute and who should be immune to plunder by the Tatars. The degree to which the authors of these sentences in the chronicles manipulate the Turco-Mongol concept of the *ulus* so as to present themselves to the Horde in the most favorable light is very impressive, and suggests a thorough assimilation of the significance and utility of the slogan, previously unappreciated by historians of Russo-Tatar relations.

It is well-known that the *ulus* of Juchi, the Golden Horde, consisted of four divisions: the *Desht-i-Kipchak* (the Polovtsian steppe), Sarai, the Crimea, and Khwarizm in Central Asia. Peripheries such as Rus', the Volga Bolgars, or peoples permitted to retain their own princes such as the Mordva, were not incorporated into his structure.[63] Does this not entail that Rus' was NOT part of the *ulus*? The Russian forest zone was unsuitable for the pastoral nomadic way of life of the Tatars; it was not located on the most lucrative Eurasian trade routes; it could hardly match the economic resources of the Muslim urban centers such as Khwarizm; it was not occupied by the Tatars nor administered directly by them. Russia was not only on the periphery of the vital interests of the Golden Horde, which lay toward the rich pastures of Azerbaidjan and the oases cities of Central Asia, but also peripheral to Horde activities. Russia, far removed from the steppe heartland, was not an integral element in the Golden Horde. There is no conceptual framework or political terminology which seems to accommodate Russia's position in the Golden Horde, since it had its own princes but paid tribute, was only temporarily graced with Mongol officials (*baskaki*) but then only visited by envoys (*posoly*), and which paid Mongol taxes but was not part and parcel of the administrative apparatus of the Golden Horde, the diwan system.[64] But whatever else is true, it is fairly obvious that Russia was NOT part of the *ulus* of Juchi in the strictest sense.

Therefore all Russian declamations of fealty to the *ulus* to which they belonged, the *tsarev ulus*, must be invented fantasies, exercises in bending the truth to suit tendentious political purpose. The Russian elite must have known that Russia was not truly part of the khan's *ulus*, and the role of the Russian princes as *ulusniki* was fictitious. Nevertheless the sources, to be blunt, lie, just as Muscovite ideologues invented the crimes of lèse-majesté against non-Chingissid powers in the Horde like emir Mamai or against Tamerlane himself.[65] One can scarcely believe that the political establishment of the Horde was genuinely fooled by this pose, but no doubt sufficient material compensations could be adduced to persuade the Tatars to humor the Russian pretense.

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[63] For example, V. L. Egorov, "Gosudarstvennoe i administrativnoe ustroistvo Zolotoi Ordy," *Voprosy istorii*, 2 (1972): 40, and G. A. Fedorov-Davydov, op. cit.: 89-93.

[64] See the penetrating remarks of V. L. Egorov in his review of Fedorov-Davydov, "Obshchestvennyi stroi Zolotoi Ordy", *Voprosy istorii*, 1 (1974): 173-175.

[65] Ch. J. Halperin, *art. cit.*: 41-42, 49-51.

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During the Mongol period the Russians were compelled to acquire enormous expertise about the Horde, its geography, society, language, economy and politics. This intelligence information was essential to protect Russian interests vis-à-vis the Horde. Manipulation of key Tatar political concepts and terminology was an essential element of this phenomenon. Usage of the phrase *tsarev ulus* to portray Russia's position in the Golden Horde is a classic case study in the intellectual and political attitudes of Russia toward the Tatars.[66]

[66] Specialization of labor among the various disciplines which are concerned with Russia and the Mongols, notably scholars in Old Russian literature (*literaturovedy*), in medieval Russian history per se, and in the Golden Horde (*vostokovedy*), perhaps explains why the data on Russian usage of the term *ulus* to describe Rus' has never heretofore been juxtaposed to its meaning within the Golden Horde.

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BULGARS AND SLAVS IN THE FIRST BULGARIAN EMPIRE: A RECONSIDERATION OF THE HISTORIOGRAPHY*

In the latter half of the seventh century an unknown number of Turkic pastoral nomadic people, called "Bulgars", crossed the Danube into the country which now bears their name, Bulgaria. The population which they found already occupying that territory was overwhelmingly Slavic. Of the outcome of the interaction between the Bulgars and the Slavs there is no doubt: by the tenth century the Bulgars had been thoroughly assimilated by the Slavs, and, especially under the impact of Christianization and the Slavic liturgy brought to Bulgaria by the disciples of Constantine and Methodius, become Slavic in language and culture, thus forming the new "Bulgarian" nation as it exists to this day.[1] However, the nature of Bulgar-Slavic relations during the early centuries of Bulgarian history and the rapidity of that assimilation remain subjects of some disagreement, although most of the "facts" of Bulgarian history during this period seem generally agreed upon,[2] and some of the contention is a matter of semantics, not substance. Unfortunately, most scholars who have worked in this area have not been cognizant of the methods and concepts of the professional study of Inner Asian, steppe-nomadic, history, and few specialists in the history and language of the Eurasian steppe have addressed themselves to the Balkan Bulgars.[3] Reexamination of the early

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[1] Because of their later Slavicization, the "Bulgars" are not infrequently deprived of their very name in scholarship and called "Proto-Bulgars"; Runciman suggests drawing a distinction between the still Turkic Bulgars and the already Slavicized Bulgarians, which I shall follow. See, S. Runciman, *A History of the First Bulgarian Empire*, London, 1930, Preface.

[2] For this reason I have kept bibliography to a minimum, citing representative works of the various schools, *e.g.* national Bulgarian and Bulgarian Marxist historiography, which usually contain much fuller apparatus.

[3] The exceptions are referred to below *infra*. Gy. Moravcsik, *Byzantinoturcica*, 2 vols., Budapest, 1942-1943, i, pp. 50-58, and 2nd. ed., 2 vols., Berlin, 1958, i, pp. 108-131, contain brief, exclusively political narratives and extensive bibliography, but is less helpful than one would hope on the issue of Bulgar-Slavic relations; moreover, even the second edition is now out of date. R. Grousset, *The Empire of the Steppes. A History of Central Asia*, tr. N. Walford, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1970, confines itself to the observation that with their conversion to Christianity and "increasing Slavic influence", the Turkic Bulgars were separated from the bulk of

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evolution of the Bulgars in the light of the general principles of Inner Asian history suggests an intriguing and hitherto overlooked problem worthy of investigation.[4] This article will focus on how such study changes our understanding of Bulgar-Slavic relations.

The most widely accepted estimate of the number of Bulgars who accompanied khan Asparuch into Bulgaria is that of the founder of modern Bulgarian historiography, Zlatarski, of some tens of thousands. In large measure such estimates are extrapolations from our knowledge of how things turned out, i.e. it is, probably correctly, assumed that if the Slavs eventually assimilated the Bulgars, then they must have outnumbered them considerably from the very beginning. Actually, as some scholars have noted, the Bulgars were obviously numerous enough to defeat the Byzantine army sent against them, which would certainly exclude Derzhavin's "retinue" (*druzhina*), although uniformly very small numbers of horse nomads were quite capable of defeating much larger armies with ease, and of conquering much larger populations. The Bulgar horde, which must have included women and children, must also have been sufficiently large to sustain their separate identity for several hundred years, even if, as we shall see, there is an alternative explanation here too. Little else is known.[5]

The issue of the number of Bulgars entering Bulgaria must be raised because their ascribed paucity of numbers is said to have influenced Bulgar

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the Turkic nations (pp. 176-177). These references are illustrative of the difficulty of finding rigorous Inner Asian analysis of the Balkan Bulgars.

Cf., D. Sinor, *Introduction à l'étude de l'Eurasie centrale*. Wiesbaden, 1963, pp. 97, and 268.

[4] The conception, in fact rather elementary, of Inner Asian history employed in this article is a synthesis of such standard works as Grousset; E. Bacon, *Obok. A Study in Social Structure in Eurasia*. New York, 1958; G. Hambly, *Central Asia*, New York, 1966; K. Grenbeck, "The Steppe Region in History", *Acta Orientalia* 23 (1958), pp. 43-56; 24 (1959), pp. 15-28; 25 (1960), pp. 1-14; L. Krader's numerous works, including "Buryat Religion and Society", *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 10 iii, Autumn 1954, pp. 322-351, "Principles and Structures in the Organization of the Asiatic Steppe-Pastoralists", ibid., 11 i, Spring 1955, pp. 67-92, "Ecology of Central Asia and Pastoralism", ibid., 11 iv, Winter 1955, pp. 301-316, and his *Social Organization of the Mongol-Turkic Pastoral Nomads*, The Hague, 1963; of D. Sinor's many publications, see "Central Asia", in Sinor, ed. *Orientalism and History*, Cambridge, 1954, pp. 82-103, and *Inner Asia, History – Civilization – Languages, A Syllabus*, Bloomington, Indiana, 1969; within V. V. Bartol'd's (Barthold's) 8 volume *Sochineniia* (Moscow, 1963-1973), see his "Dvenadtsat lektsii po istorii turetskikh narodov Srednei Azii", V (1968), pp. 19-192.

[5] F. Dvornik, *The Slavs. Their Early History and Civilization*, Boston, 1956, p. 68; N. S. Derzhavin, *Istoriia Bolgarii*, i-ii, Moscow - Leningrad, 1945-1946: i, pp. 146-147, and 188; S. Bobčev, "Bulgaria under Tsar Simeon", *Slavonic and East European Review*, 7 (1928-1929), p. 621; D. Obolensky, *The Byzantine Commonwealth*, London, 1971, p. 63; Runciman, pp. 27-29; *Istoriia Bolgarii* [Institut Slavianovedeniia, Akademiia Nauk SSSR] Moscow, 1954, ii, p. 58; P. Mutafchiev, *Istoriia na Bulgarskiia narod*, 2 vols., Sofia, 19432, i, p. 92; N. Zlatarski, *Istoriia na Bulgarskata durzhava prez srednite vekove*, 3 vv. in 4 books, Sofia, 1970-1972, i, 1, pp. 187-188.

Ch. Gerard (pseud. G. Sergheraert), *Les Bulgares de la Volga et les Slaves du Danube, Le Problème des Races et les Barbares*, Paris, 1939, is a popular work which stands out most for its melodramatic prose and polite ethnic stereotypes; it follows Zlatarski closely enough to be devoid of any scholarly value.

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attitudes toward the indigenous Slavic population. The Byzantine chronicler Theophanes (writing centuries later on the basis of unknown sources) records that the Bulgars concluded a "pact" with the Slavs to make war on the Byzantines; whether such a treaty actually existed is a matter of enormous contention. One Slavic tribe was relocated from northeast Bulgaria to the western, Frankish border, and seven other tribes agreed to pay tribute to the Bulgars. It has variously been argued that "pact" here means tribute, that the alliance never took place but that an understanding was reached between the Bulgars and one or several other Slavic tribes, or, on the other extreme, that the Bulgars simply conquered the Bulgarian Slavs outright. Despite the plethora of interpretation, nearly all scholars have accepted the premise that the Bulgars and the Slavs shared a common interest in opposing Byzantine supremacy and recognized a need for mutual assistance in doing so. The Bulgars supposedly knew that they were too few in number to take on the vast Byzantine Empire alone, and that they needed the cooperation of the immense Slavic population of the Balkans in that task. The Slavs were ostensibly aware that they were politically divided, and that the Bulgars possessed skills in military techniques and discipline, in political organization and mobilization, which the Slavs lacked and which were crucial to the Slavs if they were to fight the Byzantines. On this basis, then, a mutually acceptable agreement was reached between the Bulgars and the Slavs, which may or may not have been formalized into a treaty.[6]

Certainly the Slavs would not have been inhibited by "racial" prejudices in seeking Bulgar cooperation, as their long association with the Avars in anti-Byzantine raids during the sixth and first half of the seventh centuries clearly attests.[7] Yet, that the Slavs had an interest in making war on Byzantium need

[6] Dvornik, *The Slavs, Their Early History and Civilization*, p. 66; G. Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, tr. J. Hussey, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1969, p. 126 and n. 3; Derzhavin, i, pp. 189-195; V. N. Zlatarski, "The Making of the Bulgarian Nation", *Slavonic and East European Review* 4 (1925-1926), pp. 364-365; C. Jireček, *Geschichte der Bulgaren*, Prague, 1876, pp. 129-130; Bobčev, p. 621; Obolensky, pp. 64-65; Runciman, p. 27; *Istoriia na Bulgariia* [Institute of History of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences], Sofia 1961^2, i, pp. 60-61; Mutafchiev, i, pp. 95-96; Zlatarski, *Istoriia...*, i I, pp. 198-202; I. Dujčev, "Protobulgares et Slaves (Sur la problème de la formation de l'État bulgare)", *Seminarium Kondakovianum* 10, Prague, 1938, pp. 145-150; X. Petrov, "Kum voprosa za obrazuvaneto na purvata bulgarska durzhava", *Slavianska Filologiia* 5, Sofia, 1963, pp. 109-112; unfortunately, the works of W. Swoboda, "Powstanie pánstwa bułgarskiego w Dolnej Mezji. Słowianie – federaci czy tributariusze Protobułgarow", *Slavia Occidentalis* 22 (1962), pp. 49-65 (French summary, p. 66), and "O charakterze pánstwa bułgarskiego do połowy IX w. w świetle jego stosunków z sąsiednimi plemionami słowiánskimi", *Slavia Antiqua* 18 (1971), pp. 83-102 (French summary, pp. 102-103), and the relevant section by Tryjarski in E. Tryjarski, K. Dąbrowski, and T. Nagrodzka, *Hunowie Europejscy, Protobułgarzy, Chazarowie, Pieczyngowie*, Wroclaw-Warsaw, 1975, are inaccesible to me.

[7] See, e.g., *The Cambridge Medieval History*, IV, *The Byzantine Empire*. Part 1, *Byzantium and its Neighbours*, ed. J. M. Hussey, Cambridge, 1966, pp. 480 ff. (by Obolensky).

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not entail that they signed an alliance with the Bulgars.[8] The "alliance" could have easily been coerced; the Slavs, having witnessed the destruction of a Byzantine army by the Bulgars, could have had no illusions of their own military capability to withstand the Bulgar onslaught. Moreover, that the supposed terms of the pact between the Bulgars and the Slavs were so articulated in ethnic terms, as scholars have reconstructed them, seems suspect. The Bulgars were to become the rulers of the new Bulgarian state – as if either people would think in those terms – to whom the Slavs would pay tribute, but the Slavs, like the Bulgars, could retain their own customs and internal autonomy.[9] In large measure the two peoples would live in different regions of Bulgaria,[10] respecting each other's rights and privileges presumably in an early form of "peaceful coexistence"; this formulation is much too modernized. Nevertheless, even if we discount the plausibility of the conclusion of any pact, it remains true that the Bulgars did not seek to "Bulgarize" their Slavic subjects; if anything, they would have resisted that likelihood, as we shall see. Moreover, at least in the earliest period, the Bulgars may have been paying at least as much attention to the Turkic Avars to the northwest and to the various Turkic nomads of the Ukrainian steppe to the northeast, from whom they could have drawn additional "Turkic" population and a reinforced steppe sense of identity and culture, despite their possibly meager initial numbers during the migration to Bulgaria. Finally, this pattern of cultural tolerance of a steppe people for the customs of their conquered sedentary subjects is typical of Inner Asian empires, as is their eventual assimilation; the innumerable cases of barbarian conquerors of China more than demonstrate this tendency. Therefore, integrating early Bulgar history in the Balkans with an Inner Asian state model obviates the necessity for a pact to have produced the known system of Bulgar-Slav relations during the First Bulgarian Empire.

For the two centuries between the arrival of the Bulgars in Bulgaria and their conversion to Christianity under khan Boris-Michael, the major – or at least, best documented and most discussed – problem of Bulgarian foreign policy was relations with Byzantium. In this the Slavs would have to play some

[8] There is a striking parallel here to the sometimes Slavophil insistence in Russian historiography upon the voluntary nature of the "summoning of the Varangians". Most comparative research on Bulgarian-Russian history has been confined to the admittedly fundamental area of culture.

[9] I have no intention here of judging the contention that, despite the fact that the dynasty, ruling class and political institutions of the First Bulgarian Empire were Bulgar, the state was still "essentially Slavic" because of the overwhelmingly Slavic population of Bulgaria. There is an analogous issue of the ethnic identity of the Grand Principality of Lithuania created in the thirteenth century, which has been buffeted about in Lithuanian, Polish, Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Russian historiography to no end.

[10] This is apparently demonstrated by archeological excavations of the geographic distribution of Bulgar and Slavic dwellings. *See*, Zh. N. Vŭzharova, "Pamiatniki Bolgarii kontsa VI-IX vekov, i ikh etnicheskaia prinadlezhnost' ", *Sovetskaia arkheologiia* 1968 iii, pp. 148-159.

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role, since all the border regions between Bulgaria and the Byzantine Empire were inhabited by Slavs. Attempts by Bulgar khans to expand their territory meant acquisition of additional Slavic subjects, something of which they must have been aware and which must have influenced their thinking in some way. The degree to which internal Bulgar politics during these years turned on Bulgar-Slavic relations is another matter, to be sure, but it is altogether plausible that there would be some connection between the treatment of Slavs within Bulgaria and the pursuit of a foreign policy which would benefit from at least the neutrality or perhaps even the active cooperation of other Slavs currently ruled by the Byzantines, given the (perhaps dangerous) assumption of some common Slavic consciousness. Yet, until the reign of Boris the Byzantine sources continue to distinguish the Bulgars and the Slavs within Bulgaria, and the fact remains that the Bulgar aristocracy retained a virtual monopoly on political power – Bulgar clans fought for the right to acceed to the dynasty, and the Bulgar nobles jealously protected and defended their privileges as the ruling class of Bulgaria, opposing attempts by various khans to incorporate the Slavic princely and noble aristocracy into the highest reaches of the political structure. Bulgarian court politics was a function of the rivalry of two fundamentally opposed Bulgar aristocratic factions, those who favored friendly relations with Byzantium and those who saw friendly relations with Byzantium as a threat to Bulgaria's independence and freedom, those who favored giving political equality to the Bulgarian Slavs and those who fought Slavic political rights as an infringement upon the prerogatives of the Bulgar nobility and hence as a threat to the Bulgar way of life. That at least the Slavic chieftains, who did retain some local autonomy even if they fought under Bulgar commissioners, would have enjoyed careers at court need not be doubted, but the Slavs, who were supposed to bear the brunt of the Byzantine aggression against the southern regions of Bulgaria, were also supposed to be most in favor of both Bulgarian independence and the adoption of Christianity, which the Bulgar nobility saw as an instrument of Byzantine domination. In any event, it has been asserted that khans such as Telets, Telerig, Krum and Boris belong to the pro-Slav camp, and khans such as Kormisosh and Omortag to the anti-Slavic opposition. It is true that Krum is recorded as having toasted his military success against the Byzantines with his Slavic princes using the Slavic toast *Zdravitsa*, and that he sent a Slav, Dragomir, as his envoy to Byzantium to negotiate after the war. Runciman notes that Dragomir was the "first unmistakably Slav name to appear in Bulgar official circles", and what deserves mention is that this did not occur until 811-812, on the order of a century and a half after the establishment of the Bulgar state. In a Bulgar reaction to Krum's favored treatment of Slavs, under his successor Omortag we find an inscription on a column glorifying Omortag's defeat of the "Slavs and the Greeks". We can, in this and other cases of reputedly anti-Slavic khans, correlate the

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migration of several Bulgarian Slavic tribes to either Byzantine or Frankish sovereignty with a domestic policy of increased suppression of Slavic aspirations to full participation in the Bulgarian state by a renascent Bulgar aristocracy.[11]

Obolensky cautions against exaggerating the hints that the Slavs of Bulgaria were more receptive to Christianity than the Bulgars, implicitly because they were being exposed to it through fellow Balkan Slavs earlier converted by the Byzantines. There is evidence that some Bulgars also converted to Christianity, even within the dynasty. Nevertheless, the greatest period of anti-Christian persecution does come during the anti-Slavic reign of Omortag. The decision of Boris to bring Bulgaria into the Christian oecumene, whatever its foreign policy determinants, is frequently said to reflect as well a desire to break the power of the Bulgar aristocracy by eliminating the continuing ethnic dualism between Bulgar and Slav within his realm; Christianity was a religion in which all men were equal, it was favored by the Slavs who were willing to use it as a weapon against the Bulgar aristocracy which had refused them entree to power, and it would facilitate the fulfillment of the ultimate dream of pro-Slavic Bulgar khans perhaps beginning with Asparuch, of uniting all the Balkan Slavs under Bulgar leadership and overthrowing the Byzantine Yoke. While this latter formulation may very well be a bit romanticized, it is true that Boris's support for the Slavic liturgy sounded the death-knell of Bulgar supremacy within Bulgaria, and that Boris's son Symeon came within an inch of replacing the Byzantine Empire with a Slavo-Greek Empire of his own.[12]

That the ethnic dualism of the Bulgarian state ended only after her conversion to Christianity presupposes that the Bulgars maintained their separate ethnic identity and social cohesion for several hundred years, a conclusion which simply cannot be emphasized enough in appreciating Bulgar-Slavic relations during the First Bulgarian Empire. Even those scholars who claim that the Bulgars were rapidly assimilated by the Slavs admit that this "rapid" Slavicization was not completed until the ninth century; that the Bulgars were "gradually" Slavicized turns out to mean essentially the same thing, to say nothing of the opposite view that the Bulgars became Slavicized only

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[11] Ostrogorsky, p. 168; Derzhavin, i, pp. 189-195, ii, pp. 7-9; Zlatarski, "The Making...", pp. 369-371; Jireček, pp. 135, and 145; Obolensky, pp. 66, and 83; Runciman, pp. 59, and 77; *Istoriia na Bulgaria*, pp. 64, 70-71, and 84-86; *Istoriia Bolgarii*. i, p. 59; Mutafchiev, i, pp. 122-123, 128-130, 144-150, and 157-158; Zlatarski, *Istoriia*... i 1, pp. 277-281, 302-308, 336, 340, 381-382, and 417-418.

Those who dissent from this conceptualization of Bulgarian politics do so in silence.

[12] F. Dvornik, *Byzantine Missions Among the Slavs*, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1970, p. 247; Ostrogorsky, p. 230; Obolensky, p. 83; Runciman, pp. 93-94; *Istoriia na Bulgariia*, pp. 94-96; Mutafchiev, i, pp. 170-171, 198, and 201-203; Zlatarski, i 2, pp. 9, and 59-66; the best study of the conversion is R. Sullivan, "Khan Boris and the Conversion of Bulgaria: A Case Study of the Impact of Christianity on a Barbarian Society", *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History* III (1966), pp. 55-139.

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"slowly".[13] It would be fatuous to engage in a semantic controversy over whether several hundred years here is a long or a short period; the disagreements within the historiography on this point are more apparent than real, and obscure far too much a much more significant fact, that the Bulgars maintained their collective identity and political monopoly over the Slavs during this time. The institutions through which the Bulgars were able to accomplish this by no means mean feat cry out for discussion; we shall therefore now survey what was available and what has been proposed. In so doing, we will also touch upon the controversial problem of the "Asiatic" contribution to the evolution of the First Bulgarian Empire.

The first area, which can be almost totally dismissed, is language.[14] The Bulgars certainly spoke some kind of Turkic, and we can leave it to the linguists to be more specific. Neither Turkic Bulgar nor Slavic during the seventh to ninth centuries possessed an alphabet;[15] even the "Bulgar" inscriptions of the early ninth century are in Greek, both language (with a few exceptions) and alphabet. Therefore, determining on the basis of contemporary evidence whether the Slavs learned Bulgar or the Bulgars learned Slavic is just about impossible. Krum's Slavic toast was addressed explicitly to a Slavic audience; no one has asked, it seems, whether this "proves" he was bilingual. We do know from un-contested studies by Slavic linguists that the number of words of Bulgar origin in modern Bulgarian ranges from virtually minute – from a half a dozen to a dozen – to non-existent. One cannot attribute this absence of Bulgar linguistic influence on Slavic Bulgarian to the adoption of the Slavic Christian liturgy: in the preceeding several hundred years any linguistic intercourse between the Slavs and the Bulgars would have produced a greater exchange of vocabulary. Therefore one is inclined to propose that the Bulgars in the Balkans lost their native language very early, just as the Mongols in Russia and Persia soon learned Turkic and Persian.[16] This is also typical of the evolution of sedentarized nomadic peoples.

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[13] For a mosaic of opinions, cf., Dvornik, *The Slavs, Their Early History and Civilization*, p. 121; Dvornik, *Byzantine Missions Among the Slavs*, p. 42; Ostrogorsky, p. 127; *Cambridge Medieval History*, IV pt. 1, p. 484 (Obolensky); Derzhavin, i, p. 182; Jireček, p. 135; *Istoriia Bolgarii*, p. 57; *Istoriia na Bulgariia*, p. 79; Bobčev, p. 628; Dujčev, pp. 152-153; Runciman, p. 27.

Obolensky, p. 94, and Dujčev, p. 154, observe that in the absence of sources it is impossible to trace the assimilation of the Bulgars with any exactitude.

[14] Derzhavin, i, pp. 177-179; *Istoriia na Bulgariia*, pp. 94-96; a standard article is S. Mladenov, "Vestiges de la langue des Protobulgares Touraniens d'Asparuch en Bulgare Moderne", *Revue des Études Slaves* i (1925), pp. 38-53.

Virtually all "Turkic" words in modern Bulgarian are of Ottoman origin.

[15] One or several systems of Turkic runiform writing did exist during the seventh to tenth centuries across Eurasia, but their deciphernment remains controversial, and no inscriptions have been definitely linked to the Danubian Bulgars. See, J. Németh, "The Runiform Inscriptions from Nagy-Szent-Miklós and the Runiform Scripts of Eastern Europe", *Acta Linguistics* (Acad. Sciences Hung.) 21 (1971), pp. 1-52.

[16] This is oversimplified, as the Mongols also usually retained their Mongol language, but that the Bulgars learned Slavic, rather than the Slavs learning Bulgar, is the main point.

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The few words from Bulgar which were retained suggest just those areas of steppe culture which were continued in Bulgaria. The most obvious is personal names. A fairly representative list of Bulgar khans (there is dispute about double identities, pretenders, order of succession and the like) runs as follows: Asparuch, Tervel, Sevar, Kormisosh, Vinech, Teletz, Sabin, Umar, Toktu, Pagan, Telerig, Kardam, Krum, Dukum, Dicevg, Omortag, Malomir, Presiam, Boris, Vladimir, Symeon; these run from the earliest dynastic clan of Dulo[17] through that of Vokil, among others. From 681 until the death of Omortag in 831, an even two hundred and fifty years, the names of the khans are generally considered to remain Turkic (although in fact some of their names are clearly *not* Turkic even if they are also *not* clearly Slavic, which is the most relevant consideration). The tide of Slavicization is best epitomized by the all-Slavic names of Omortag's sons, Svinitse, Voin, and Malomir, despite his own anti-Slavic policies. This is, as Dujčev observes, much longer – indeed, three times as long – as the Slavicization of the Scandinavian Varangian dynasty in Kievan Russia. Even after the adoption of Slavic, and then Christian, names, we still find that one of Symeon's sons, in addition to his Christian name, Benjamin, also had a popular (*narodnii*) name, Boyan, which is Turkic, and that the brother of Symeon's grandson and successor Peter was called Doks, also a Turkic Bulgar name (which is quite peculiar since he is called a monk, *chernorizets*, and should have had a Christian name).[18]

This same pattern is also true of the personal and clan names of the Bulgar aristocracy, although much more work needs to be done by linguists on early Bulgarian onomastics.[19] Many – indeed, most – names cannot be identified as either obviously Slavic or Turkic, despite numerous assertions to the contrary. But the clan names Kuviar, Kirigir, Eragar, and the personal names Oskhun and Tsok, all from inscriptions in Greek during the reign of Omortag, are clearly Turkic. The participants at the ecclesiastical council of 869-870 in Constantinople included the envoys of Boris, *i.e.* Zergobula, Sondok *bogatur*, and Tabar, also Turkic. Boris later replaced the governor of Macedonia when he sent the Slavic missionary Kliment there: the old official was named Kurt, a definitely Turkic name, and the new one Dometa, perhaps a Slav. Turkic personal names among the Bulgar aristocracy probably survive into the eleventh century.[20]

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[17] It has been claimed that the Dulo clan derived from earlier Turkic dynastic clans; see, for example, O. Pritsak, *Die Bulgarische Fürstenliste und die Sprache der Protobulgaren*, Wiesbaden, 1955, pp. 61-64.

[18] For lists, cf, Ostrogorsky, pp. 581-582; *Cambridge Medieval History*, p. 779; Zlatarski, *Istoriia...*, i, 2, p. 603; comments of Dujčev, pp. 152-153.

[19] For some sober remarks on the perils of ethno-linguistic analysis of Inner Asian proper names, *see* O. Mänchen-Helfen, *The World of the Huns*, Berkeley, 1973, pp. 376 ff.

[20] I have culled lists of aristocratic names from narratives; these come from: Dvornik, *Byzantine Missions Among the Slavs*, p. 43; G. G. Litavrin, *Bolgariia i Vizantiia v XI-XII vv.*, Moscow, 1960, pp. 383, and 404; Runciman, pp. 93-94; Zlatarski, *Istoriia*, i, 1, pp. 394, 405, and 423, i, 2, pp. 234, and 750-756.

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Through some mechanism unknown to us a basically Turkic but also ubiquitously Eurasian steppe calendrical system, using a twelve-month lunar cycle and animal-titled months, survived in Bulgaria long enough to be written down in Greek, and later half translated and half simply transliterated into Slavic, which is comprehensible only as phonetic Turkic, in the so-called "List of Bulgarian Khans" (*Immenik bolgarskikh tsarei*). The "List", extant in a fifteenth or sixteenth century Russian manuscript, can be divided on internal evidence into two sections, composed in the seventh and ninth centuries respectively. Although scholars still disagree on the precise interpretation of the various terms found in this text, there is little quarrel over the steppe origin of those terms or over the significance of the "List": the Bulgars of the First Bulgarian Empire continued to use an Altaic calendar until the time they entered the Christian fold.[21]

The administrative terminology and structure of the First Bulgarian Empire was Turkic, although not everyone admits as much. The ruler was titled the "khan" or "qan", the traditional steppe imperial title of the supreme and sacred lineage, which can be attested as early as the fourth century among the Juan-Juan, is preserved in the eighth century Orkhon inscriptions in Mongolia, and was later used by the most successful steppe empire in history, the Mongol Empire of Chinghis Khan. The administrative officers bore titles of Turkic origin, although what Menges says of one of them, the tarkan – "Nowhere do we find an exact statement of the meaning of this dignity" – in some measure applies to them all. Historians have surmized that the "kanartikin" was the heir to the throne, the "kavkhan" the prime minister or chancellor, "tarkhans" the provincial governors, "kavkhans" the judges; the "ichigirboil" was commander of the military, and various terms, typically doubled in a common Altaic manner, were military ranks ("oglu-tarkhan," "zhupan-tarkhan", and others). Warriors of the nobility were divided into two classes, the higher-ranking *boili* and the lower *bagaini*; those who distinguished themselves in battle were rewarded with the honorific *bogatur* (later Russian *bogatyr'*). This system continued to be employed by the Bulgars until and perhaps even after their conversion to Christianity. For example, Omortag's various sons all relied upon the advice of the Kavkhan Isbul; Kliment and Naum were greeted upon their arrival in Bulgaria from Moravia by the Bori-Tarkan. Symeon, according to an inscription, was accompanied in a campaign of 922 by his tarkan Kosar (a good Turkic name as well). Gabriel-Radomir, a ruler of the so-called West-Bulgarian Empire and successor state to the First Bulgarian Empire, was dependent at the turn of the eleventh century upon his intimate advisor the kavkhan Dometian, and his (Dometian's) brother, also a kavkhan. Peter Deljan, leader of the anti-Byzantine revolt of 1040-1041, was aided by an

[21] Runciman, pp. 272-279; Zlatarski, *Istoriia...*, i, I, pp. 448-488; O. Pritsak, "Die sogenannte Bulgarische Fürstenliste und die Sprache der Protobulgaren", *Ural-Altaische Jahrbücher* 26 (1954), pp. 61-77, and 184-239, and his *Die Bulgarische Fürstenliste... passim*; B. Nichols, "Die Fürstenliste der Protobulgaren", *Byzantinobulgarica* 2 (Sofia, 1966), pp. 229-236.

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unnamed kavkhan, and the leader of the revolt of 1070-1071, Georgii Voitech, was from a kavkhan family. Therefore, despite the introduction of Slavic and later Greek terminology, basically the Turkic bureaucratic vocabulary survived until the Byzantine conquest, and was sufficiently entrenched in popular consciousness to be remembered through the eleventh century. Only with the creation of the Second Bulgarian Empire in 1186 by the Asenids can we definitely state that the Turkic Bulgar system had disappeared.[22]

The khan-tarkhan system cannot be dismissed, as some have tried to do, merely as a meaningless, anachronistic survival of the Azov steppe. To the medieval mind a title, whether of ruler or official, carried with it a full set of connotations about the nature of rule and the structure of the state and society. The steppe imperial title conveyed sacred, legitimate sovereignty, and its retention suggests in some form a continued steppe conception of government. Similarly, the considerable longevity of the tarkhan system demonstrates, in a more indirect fashion, both the commitment of Bulgar society to the division of political function which it embodied, and satisfaction with its operation. Indeed, only the members of the Bulgar clans were permitted to hold office within the tarkhan system, a practice which reinforced their political dominance and undoubtedly contributed to their affection for it.

The military skill of the mounted steppe archer is well known, and there is no denying the military superiority, at least in the seventh century, of the Bulgars to the Slavs. To some extent this military superiority was continued, since the Bulgarian army consisted of Bulgar cavalry and Slavic infantry. A description of the soldiers of Krum protrays a typical steppe fighting man - in steel cap, leather jerkin, mounted, with bow and arrow, and lance. But steppe military strategy and tactics availed little in the Balkan mountains, and the most successful Bulgarian technique was the ambush, a product less of Slavic influence (that typical Slavic cunning?) than of geography. The Bulgar ruling class did constitute a sort of military, aristocratic caste, but it practiced neither the battue nor the sweeping flanking cavalry movement made famous by the Mongol armies.[23]

In a variety of other, some seemingly petty, ways, the steppe customs of the Bulgars survived in the new milieu. Krum converted the skull of the

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[22] Of the Slavicists: Dvornik, *Byzantine Missions Among the Slavs*, pp. 245 and n. 47 on p. 410; *Cambridge Medieval History*, p. 529 (Dinič); Runciman, pp. 29, 243-244, and 284-288; Derzhavin, ii, p. 28-29; Zlatarski, "The Making...," p. 366; Bobčev, p. 622 and *Slavonic and East European Review* 8 (1929-1930), pp. 99-100, and 107; Dujčev, p. 154; *Istoriia Bolgarii*, pp. 58, and 65 ("primitive steppe government"); *Istoriia na Bulgariia*, pp. 86, and 142 (omitting to say Turkic).

Of the Altaicists: K. H. Menges. "Altaic Elements in the Proto-Bulgar Inscriptions", *Byzantion* 21 (1951), pp. 85-118; V. Beševliev, "Die zusammengesetzten Titel in der protobulgarischen Inschriften", *Ural-Altaische Jahrbücher* 30 (1958), pp. 98-103; G. Fehér, "Der Protobulgarische Titel *Kanar*", *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 36 (1936), pp. 58-62.

[23] Zlatarski, "The Making...," p. 366; Bobčev, p. 115.

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Byzantine emperor into a drinking goblet, definitely a steppe (viz. the fate of the Kievan Sviatoslav at the hands of the Pechenegs) custom, despite the fact that some claim it is more generally still a "barbarian" one (viz. the Langobards on their enemies the Gepidae?). Perhaps the best evidence that the Bulgars retained steppe customs until their baptism is supposed to be the "Responses" of Pope Nicholas I to the questions of the newly-converted Boris. From these we learn that Bulgar women wore veils, Bulgar men turban and trousers; that Bulgar men practiced polygamy, took oaths on their swords (*cf.* the Varangians in Russia), sacrificed dogs and other animals, and used the horse's tail as a standard. Unfortunately, those who have asserted that these are all Turkic, Altaic, or steppe customs seem to be less than fully conversant with the mores of Inner Asia. Veils, turban and trousers are Muslim, not steppe, and the Danube Bulgars (unlike their Volga brethren) were not Muslim at this time; polygamy is simply Asian; sword oaths are pretty much universal for pagan military aristocracies, Altaic or otherwise; animal sacrifice, especially of dogs, is suspect as an Inner Asian practice. Only the horse's tail standard is incontrovertibly steppe. Yet again, none of these customs is Slavic either, a situation as mysterious as Bulgarian onomastics. Other claims are even more specious: the Bulgars could not have retained steppe art forms such as stone sculpture or ceramics because, as even a moment's reflection suggests, pastoral nomads would have little incentive to lug around such items! It is recorded that Krum wanted to hang his lance on the walls of Constantinople; just as Sviatoslav of Kiev later wished; one suspects a steppe habit. Finally, a proverb which recurs on several commemmorative columns (also supposedly a steppe custom) reads: "Live in joy and happiness for a hundred years." This is perhaps of Bulgar provenance, since it is thought not to be Slavic. In a multiplicity of ways, then, it is possible that steppe folkways survived among the Bulgars. Conceivably reexamination of the available ethnographic material on the Bulgars will uncover additional, hitherto unrecognized, and much more reliable Altaic practices, or at least properly identify those practices we do know about.[24]

Perhaps the most important steppe survival among the Bulgars was, of course, religion. Assertions that the Bulgar pagan religion could not adjust to its new environment, that the migration to the Balkans, the transformation of the Bulgars from a nomadic to a sedentary people, the increasing influence of the Slavs – all conspired to sap the strength of the pagan Bulgar religion, fly in the face of the fanatic loyalty to that religion of the Bulgar nobles until and even after the triumph of Christianity. Boris had to suppress a revolt of Bulgar nobles to impose Christianity in the first place, and his designated heir, his son Vladimir, led a pagan restoration years later until Boris came out of his monastic retirement long enough to remove Vladimir from the throne, summon

[24] Jireček, pp. 131-135, and 156; Obolensky, p. 91; Mutafchiev, I, pp. 98-106, 138, and 157; Zlatarski, *Istoriia...*, i, 1, pp. 415-416, 417, and 428; Petrov, pp. 102-104.

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a council, and have his second son Symeon installed as ruler and the Slavic liturgy declared the national rite in Bulgaria.[25]

The pagan religion of the Bulgars was quite varied. It included animistic paganism, the worship of the sun and moon as well as of specific holy places. Augeries, spells and amulets figured prominently in daily life. We can assume that the Bulgars renounced or simply forgot their holy places in the Azov region, but whether they acquired any of the Slavs' sacred mountains or rivers in the Balkans is moot. When Omortag concluded a treaty with Byzantium in 815 the two rulers swore to uphold it according to the ceremonies of the other. The Byzantine emperor, on horseback, spilled water from a cup onto the ground, interpreted horse entrails, pronounced an incantation, and perhaps sacrificed a dog. The symbolism and sanctity of water and importance of the horse to a pastoral nomad leave little ambiguity – this is a steppe ritual par excellence. Bulgar paganism, like all Altaic religions, also included a heavy dose of ancestor worship manifested within the clan; indirect indications suggest the vitality of this belief among the Bulgars until Christianization. Bulgar paganism was an integral element in the Bulgar way of life; Bulgar fear that the adoption of Christianity meant the end of that way of life, and of their own political preeminence at the same time, may not have been far from wrong.[26] It is no wonder that some members of the Bulgar aristocracy fought to the death to prevent the institution of Christianity within Bulgaria.

Scholarly discussion of the contribution of the Turkic Bulgars to the First Bulgarian Empire has sometimes been infused with acute political partisanship, as if admitting that the Bulgars conquered the Slavs and imposed their own political administration on them entailed that the Slavs were incapable of independently creating their own state. Much energy has been wasted on arguing whether the Slavs were superior to the Bulgars, or vice versa, and those who have shown too much sympathy for the Bulgar side have been castigated in violent terms.[27] It is not really important whether the "primitive monotheism" of the steppe belief in Tengri, the Great Blue Sky invoked by Omortag who eventually promised the Chingissid clan hegemony over all who lived in felt tents, is "superior" to the Slavic polytheistic pantheon. Apparently neither the

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[25] Dvornik, *Byzantine Missions Among the Slavs*, pp. 147-148; Obolensky, pp. 85, 97; Runciman, pp. 133-134; Zlatarski, "The Making...," pp. 375-383; *Istoriia Bolgariia*, p. 59. The council is called a *sabor*, *i.e.* by a Slavic term; by this period the Slavic *kniaz'* (prince) had somewhat replaced the title "khan."

[26] Obolensky, pp. 82-83; Runciman, pp. 74, 96, and 105; Zlatarski, *Istoriia...*, i, 1, pp. 390, and 566-576; for an Altaic parallel, see, Mänchen-Helfen, pp. 259-296.

[27] *Istoriia Bolgarii*, p. 57, and Petrov, pp. 92-93, accuse the Mutafchiev school (*cf*, Mutafchiev, i, pp. 114-115, for additional bibliography of works from the 1920s and 1930s of similar bent) of serving Fascism by dividing the Bulgarians from the Soviet Russians in emphasizing Bulgar superiority. Mutafchiev does, i, pp. 98-99, suggest Bulgar superiority in *some* areas, but otherwise he is at least as pro-Slavic as his accusers, of whom Petrov, in general, recognizes slightly more Bulgar continuity than he does. Mutafchiev was, however, the most sympathetic to the Turkic Bulgars.

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Bulgars nor the Slavs tried to impose their pagan religions upon the other; each was satisfied. That the Bulgars were eventually Slavicized does not prove that "Slavic" culture was "superior" to Bulgar culture, only that the Slavs outnumbered the Bulgars; besides, Bulgarian culture thereafter owed most of all to the Byzantines. In the seventh century the Bulgar nomadic aristocracy could have felt nothing but contempt for the sedentary Slavs,[28] and what is amazing is less the fact of their eventual Slavicization than how long the process took.

The preceeding survey supports some reasonably probable conclusions about the Bulgars during the First Bulgarian Empire. The Bulgar aristocracy maintained its own way of life in terms of religion, politics, customs, and social structure, for two hundred and fifty years, thus preserving its sense of identity and collective consciousness. Without these it could not have sustained the Bulgar monopoly on political power. The most significant of these factors, I would contend, was the clan system, since without it intermarriage, which some scholars claim occasionally occured, would have destroyed the exclusiveness of the Bulgar ruling class in at most several generations. Even the Bulgar pagan religion·could not have sustained itself without the clan system, whose units preserved ancestor worship and whose clan heads were, traditionally, religious leaders as well.[29]

No one familiar with the phenominal potency of the clan system among the Altaic and Turkic steppe peoples would be surprised at this development, yet it should be surprizing nevertheless. The power of the clan system among the pastoral nomads lay precisely in its integration into the nomadic cycle and life style. Indeed all aspects of nomadic society – political, social, military and religious – were highly interrelated with the clan, which was the essential political, social, military and religious unit of the steppe. Virtually no one has disputed the prosaic observation that the Bulgars who crossed the Danube almost immediately – if they had not done so already – abandoned the pastoral nomadic way of life and became sedentarized.[30] It could not have been otherwise - the ecology of the Balkans was not designed for a pastoral nomadic society. Yet, despite the loss of the only raison d'être of the entire clan and steppe social system, that system survived, with amazing persistence, for another two hundred fifty years. No lasting reminders of that system remain in modern Bulgaria because the Bulgar society was fundamentally artificial from the time of Asparuch. A system perfectly designed to function within a nomadic society was grafted onto a sedentary one solely to perpetuate a political elite. The Bulgars in Bulgaria retained almost everything of their old form of life except language, their sole concession to their subjects, and the pastoral nomadic way of life that justified the system to which they adhered! How this

[28] Menges, p. 114, which is absolutely true and which everyone else overlooks. It is unnerving to apply this premise to the probability that the Bulgars concluded a friendly alliance with the Slavs upon their arrival in the Balkans based upon mutual need, etc.

[29] Strangely, I have seen virtually no references to shamans in Bulgaria; for an Altaic parallel, *see*, Mänchen-Helfen, p. 268 n. 4.

[30] *Istoriia Bolgarii*, p. 64, interprets a reference to Omortag's moving with his "camp" as signifying that the Bulgars may still have nomadized!

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was accomplished remains a mystery, compounded by a similar development, apparently, among the Hungarians of Hungary, and specialists in Inner Asian studies could do worse than to turn to the problem of the Bulgars of the Danube to look for solutions. On the other hand, Slavicists would do well to shed their provincialism toward the steppe and try to be at least as tolerant toward steppe cultures, societies and institutions as the medieval Slavs were, whose relations with the Avars, Bulgars and Mongols, to name a few, were intimate in the extreme.[31]

It has usually been suggested that the attempt of Omortag to recreate a fully Asiatic culture in Bulgaria was a swan song to a dying way of life.[32] The realization that any genuine "Bulgar" way of life disappeared with nomadism puts things in a different perspective. On the other hand, greater sympathy for the possibly positive impact of the steppe and its Turkic and Altaic peoples upon medieval Bulgaria, I would propose, does enable us better to comprehend two later episodes in Bulgarian history. The cliché consensus is that the Cumans played no significant role in the Second Bulgarian Empire, despite the fact that its founders, the Asenids, are now generally admitted to have been of Cuman origin, that the Cumans reinforced the Bulgarian aristocracy, supplying a later Bulgarian tsar, George Terter, and that Cuman armies formed the cutting edge of the Bulgarian army and in the last decades of Bulgarian independence before the Ottoman conquest, Cuman (and Tatar) mercenaries comprised the entire Bulgarian army.[33] The Bulgarians not only paid tribute to khan Nogai of the Golden Horde in Russia, but Nogai's son Chaku married into the Bulgarian ruling family, and, after his father's death, for a brief time succeeded in ruling Bulgaria as tsar (the medieval Russian title for the khan of the Mongols, the original title of the Bulgar ruler from the seventh to the ninth centuries!)[34] Mutafchiev was horrified at the degeneration of Bulgaria to the point that a Tatar occupied the throne of the Asenids, yet the affinities of the old Bulgars to the Cumans and the Mongols, which this article has not infrequently emphasized, undercuts this attitude. Both the contribution of the Cumans to the Second Bulgarian Empire and the brief period of Mongol ascendancy in Bulgaria constitute historical throw-backs, echoes, to the steppe origins of the Bulgars, similar, in an uncanny way, to the Cuman period of thirteenth-century Hungarian history. Yet, we can only appreciate the true significance of these later developments once we have taken a new look at the impact of the steppe and its peoples upon medieval Bulgaria.

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[31] See, I. Ševčenko, "The New Cambridge History of the Byzantine Empire", *Slavic Review* 27 i (March 1968), pp. 109-118, for some remarks on Greek ethnocentrism in Byzantine history and on the steppe influence in Byzantium.

[32] Mutafchiev, i, pp. 157-158.

[33] F. Dvornik, *The Slavs in European History and Civilization*, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1962, p. 141; Ostrogorsky, p. 404; Mutafchiev, ii, p. 150 – the Cumans were "alien" to the Bulgarians (once the Bulgars became Bulgarians, Mutafchiev refused to credit the possibility of continued affinity for steppe peoples; *see* n. 30).

[34] Ostrogorsky, pp. 439-440; Derzhavin, ii, pp. 132-133; *Cambridge Medieval History*, iv, pp. 535-536 (Dinič); *Istoriia na Bulgariia*, pp. 216-218; Mutafchiev, ii, p. 142, 152, and 155.

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It is hopefully true that other aspects of particularly early Bulgarian history will also become more comprehensible once viewed through the prism of Inner Asian history; it is an exciting historiographic possibility in which Slavicists and Inner Asianists will each have ample room to contribute to the furtherance of historical knowledge.[35]

[35] The most recent study of early Bulgarian history does not address itself directly to the subject of this article, and, on some points of detail, differs from this presentation. Cf. R. Browning, *Byzantium and Bulgaria: A Comparative Study Across the Early Medieval Frontier*, Berkeley, 1975, pp. 45-47, 53 and n. 14 on p. 216, 53, 57, 81, 86-87, 123-130, 132-135, 140, and 144.

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"THE DEFEAT AND DEATH OF BATU"

The figure of Batu looms large in medieval Russian history and Old Russian literature. Batu commanded the Mongol armies which conquered Russia in the thirteenth century, and he was the founder of the Golden Horde, which ruled Russia for nearly two and a half centuries. His descendants sat on the throne of the Golden Horde for as long as it existed. Since Chingis Khan had died before the Mongols subordinated Russia, it was his grandson Batu who played the role of Scourge of God in Russian eyes. Batu served as the model in Old Russian literature of how the worst enemy of Orthodox Christian *Rus'* behaved. Batu's exploits became the standard of comparison for judging Tatar evil-doers in Russian thought. Thus the image of Batu is a legitimate barometer of Russian attitudes toward the Tatars during the period of the "Tatar Yoke."

The image of Batu was relatively stable in Old Russian literature through the fifteenth century, but there is a further blackening of his reputation in two texts from the period of the "liberation from the Tatar Yoke," the epistle to the Ugra River of Bishop Vassian and, from the middle of the sixteenth century, the *Kazanskaia istoriia* (Kazan' History) written about the Muscovite annexation of Kazan'. In passages of these two works the monstrosity of Batu's misdeeds is given even greater accent.

However, the treatment of Batu in two other monuments of Old Russian literature stands distinctly apart. The depiction of Batu in the *vita* of Mercurius of Smolensk and in the "Tale of the Death of Batu" is atypical not only in its historical inaccuracy but more so in its intellectual stance, its attitude toward Batu. The historical significance of texts with unreliable historical information obviously lies in what the texts demonstrate about the mentality and attitudes of their authors and presumably the audience for which they were intended. In the best of all possible worlds it should be feasible to correlate innovations in Russian attitudes toward the Tatars with changes in Russo-Tatar relations. Unfortunately, the vagaries of medieval Russian manuscript transmission make dating texts difficult, and thus integrating their evidence about medieval Russian intellectual history with the broader historical context more problematic. However, a relatively precise case can be made which suggests the historical circumstances in which the "fictionalizing" (as I shall call it) portrayal of Batu could emerge.

The dominant image of Batu was first formulated in the accounts of the Mongol campaigns of conquest in the thirteenth century, that against the

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northeast in 1237-38[1] and Kiev and the south in 1240.[2] In these narratives Batu epitomizes power and its merciless exercise. Other thirteenth-century literary monuments also express this attitude toward Batu. In the reconstructed primary redaction of the *vita* of Aleksandr Nevskii, from the 1280s, Batu is described as an awesome figure, "a powerful *tsar'* from the eastern land, to whom God had subordinated many peoples, from the east to the west." Nevskii is offered the choice of making obeisance to Batu or facing the destruction of his land; he opts for the former. The "honor" which Nevskii receives from Batu is as much a function of Batu's grandeur as it is of Nevskii's much vaunted reputation.[3] Although Batu is not lauded in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, nevertheless Daniil of Galicia-Volhynia does bow before Batu, on bended knee call himself the "slave" (*kholop*) of the khan, promise to pay tribute, and drink kumiss. There is no question of Batu's power in this annal, even if the chronicler is critical of Daniil for submitting to the infidel Horde.[4] Thirteenth-century Russian sources, therefore, created an image of Batu which accurately reflected his power and influence over Russian affairs, and which resonated with the reality of Mongol superiority over Russia at the time.

In literary works about the battle of Kulikovo Field in 1380 Batu emerges as the standard against which subsequent Tatar leaders are compared. In the *Zadonshchina* the Genoese at Kaffa taunt the already defeated Mamai by telling him that he is not the equal of Batu, who had 400,000 warriors and "plundered from the east to the west."[5] In the Expanded Redaction of the "Chronicle Tale" (*letopisnaia povest'*) of the battle of Kulikovo Mamai is credited with the intention of imitating Batu, i.e., spilling Russian blood, looting Russian churches, and destroying Rus'.[6] According to the "Basic Redaction" of the *Skazanie o Mamaevom poboishche* (Narration of the Battle with Mamai), Mamai questioned "old Tatars" about how Batu plundered the Russian Land, took Kiev, killed Russian princes, and looted churches and monasteries. Mamai compared himself to Batu as he gathered many hordes and rode toward *Rus'*.[7] In the literary works of the Kulikovo cycle Batu became the historical model of Tatar destruction of Russia, the classic case, the recognized symbol of Tatar depredations against *Rus'*. It is hardly surprising that in an age in which historicist attitudes played so prominent a role in Russian culture, bookmen or authors turned to Batu as a standard of reference. No foreigner during the

[1] *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* [hereafter *PSRL*], 35 vols. (St. Petersburg-Moscow: Archeographic Commission, 1841-1980), I, cols. 460-66.

[2] *Ibid.*, II, cols. 784-87.

[3] Iu. K. Begunov, *Pamiatnik russkoi literatury XIII v. 'Slovo o pogibeli russkoi zemli'* (Moscow-Leningrad: Nauka, 1965), p. 192.

[4] *PRSL*, 11, cols. 805-08.

[5] *Povesti o Kulikovskoi bitvy*, eds. M. N. Tikhomirov, V. F. Rzhiga, and L. A. Dmitriev (Moscow: Akademiia nauk, 1959), p. 16.

[6] *PSRL*, IV, 75.

[7] *Povesti o Kulikovskoi bitvy*, pp. 44, 47.

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Kievan period could match Batu's achievements, so the general search for historical antecedents to fourteenth-fifteenth century *Rus'* in the Kievan epoch could not supply a suitable candidate. Logically Tatars should be compared to other Tatars, and the reduction of Russia by Batu was an historically unequaled feat. The threat which Mamai posed for *Rus'* could best be presented as dire, if not lethal, by invoking the name of Batu.

Batu retained his infamous status in Old Russian literature and thought to the end of Mongol rule. In the basic narrative of the Stand on the river Ugra in 1480, which supposedly marked the termination of Tatar suzereignty, khan Akhmet is recorded as having wanted to act like Batu, i.e., to plunder *Rus'*.[8] Like Mamai a hundred years earlier, Khan Akhmat fails to equal Batu's performance. The inability of his imitators to reproduce victories might even have enhanced Batu's reputation in medieval Russia.

Two texts about the momentous events of 1480 carry Batu's standard image further. In his Epistle to the Ugra River, Bishop Vassian of Rostov wrote that Batu had plundered the Russian Land, and enslaved (*porabotati*) it. He then assumed the title *tsar'* (*v"tsarisia*) despite the fact he was not entitled to imperial rank because he was an infidel. Moreover, he was not even of imperial birth (*ne tsarska roda*).[9] The metaphor of Russian enslavement to the infidels comes from Exodus along with the rhetoric of Muscovy as the "New Israel" in sixteenth-century Muscovite ideology which culminated in the theory of Moscow-the Third Rome and the Byzantine *translatio*, but as striking is Vassian's attack upon Batu's political legitimacy. Medieval Russian bookmen during the thirteenth to fifteenth century accepted the legitimacy of the Chingisid clan, even fusing the image of the khan and that of the Orthodox Christian Byzantine basileus. Vassian deprives Batu and all of his descendants on the throne of the Golden Horde of their imperial rank. This daring and extraordinary attack on the legitimacy of Tatar rule was necessitated by the need to destroy the image of the khan in Muscovy as an ideological step in the liberation of the new Orthodox tsardom from the infidel.[10] Even so, Vassian's more profound denigration of Batu did not distort his traditional image; rather it developed – one could say exaggerated – the image in conformity with the newer ideological trends of the reign of Ivan III which reached full fruition in the period of his grandson, Ivan IV.

The *Kazanskaia istoriia* is considered by most scholars to have been written in the 1560s in honor of the Muscovite annexation of Kazan'. Its ethos and pretensions reflect the ideological explosion of the reign of the Terrible Tsar. The author of the text did not slavishly imitate the language of Vassian in depicting the career of Batu. According to the *Kazanskaia istoriia*, Batu

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[8] *PSRL*, XVIII, 267.

[9] *Ibid.*, XX, 343; the entire epistle is on pp. 339-45.

[10] Michael Cherniavsky, "Khan or Basileus: An Aspect of Russian Medieval Political Theory," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 20 (1959), 459-76, on Vassian's Epistle, pp. 472-73.

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plundered and enslaved the Russian Land, as in the Epistle of Vassian. But the accusation of dynastic illegitimacy is not repeated; instead, Batu is accused of giving authority (*vlast'*) to whomever he chose, violating Riurikid succession principles.[11] This accusation is factually false; in the thirteenth century the Horde respected genealogical seniority in awarding the patent (*iarlyk*) to the grand-princely throne of Vladimir. The poor history of the author of the *Kazanskaia istoriia* added a new dimension to Batu's political sins. The theme may reflect heightened concern for dynastic succession in Muscovy.

The lack of an echo of Vassian's anti-Chingisid ideology by the author of the *Kazanskaia istoriia* is characteristic of sixteenth-century Muscovite political thought. After the liquidation of the Great Horde, Muscovy still faced serious Tatar threats to its security. The annexation of Kazan' and Astrakhan' and the conquest of Siberia left the powerful Crimean khanate and uncontrolled Nogai hordes to be dealt with; even the conquered areas could not be pacified for decades. Muscovy was compelled to deal with Chingisids from the various khanates throughout the sixteenth century and later; its political establishment could not afford the luxury of endorsing or putting into practice Vassian's dismissal of the imperial status of the descendants of Chingis, and *ipso facto* his grandson Batu. Vassian's maximal assault on Chingisid legitimacy died still-born. Legitimate or no, however, Batu remained a persona of power and danger in Old Russian literature.

For three centuries, then, Batu remained the personification of successful Tatar warfare against *Rus'*. The continued danger from the Tatars substantiated this perception of his role in history. Historically his image was accurate, at least until the second half of the sixteenth century and the *Kazanskaia istoriia*. Batu did, after all, defeat all the Russian principalities. He did not take the title *tsar'* in his lifetime because it was still reserved for the Great Khan of the world Mongol Empire, but his successors did; in any event Batu was in fact independent of the all-Mongol empire. In literary terms Batu's image might be described as serious. So powerful and dangerous a Tatar could not be taken lightly. The Tatars in general were a serious threat to Orthodox Christians, who always had to be vigilant against the godless infidel sons of Hagar. But Batu's image goes beyond this stereotype; Batu personally had to be treated with respect, if not necessarily awe. His biography is neither trivialized nor depicted frivolously. Most importantly, the fundamental fact of Batu's relationship with the East Slavs is never distorted: Batu remained undefeated by the *Rus'* in Old Russian literature as he had been in life. That salient element of his career was never misrepresented.

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[11] G. N. Moiseeva, ed., *Kazanskaia istoriia* (Moscow-Leningrad: Akademiia nauk, 1954), p. 45; *PSRL*, XIX, col. 4.

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However, there are two texts in which Batu is defeated; indeed, in the second he is killed. This is a gross distortion of history which deserves investigation and explanation. The Batu of the *vita* of Mercurius of Smolensk and the "Tale of the Death of Batu" is not invincible, no longer always victorious in battle. The fictitious conditions in which Batu came out the loser in warfare merit close scrutiny.

Mercurius of Smolensk earned martyrdom for defeating a Tatar attempt led by Batu to take his city, or so says his *vita*. Different opinions about the origin and evolution of the text have been expressed.[12] Some scholars consider it no more than a translation of the Byzantine *vita* of Mercurius of Caesarea,[13] which only altered the personal names and locale. Other scholars have found oral; folkloric, and popular motifs in the *vita*, and consider it an expression of popular (*narod*) creativity. Adherents of the latter position concede, however, that the extant versions of the *vita* contain bookish and literary elements. One assumes that a text cannot simultaneously be a translation from a written work in another language and a product of autochthonous, oral, folkloric creation, but this contradiction need not be resolved in the present discussion. Irrespective of its origin, certain assertions seem undeniable. It is extremely dubious that Mercurius of Smolensk ever existed. However, stories about him did circulate in the Smolensk region, and he was the object of a local cult in Smolensk. No manuscript of the *vita* is extant from the sixteenth century. Beletskii, the most assiduous student of the text, concluded that the redaction in the Novgorod Menology was secondary, and that a later, seventeenth-century manuscript probably contained an earlier, primary redaction. This seems convincing; the Menology redaction, as we shall see, contains new language which is probably interpolated since it is characteristic of sixteenth-century re-writing of texts about Russo-Tatar relations. Beletskii attributed the earliest redaction of the *vita* to the end of the fifteenth or the very beginning of the sixteenth century. In addition, the earliest redaction already refers to the "Tale of the Death of Batu,"

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[12] The earlier study of F. I. Buslaev, "Smolenskaia legenda o sviatom Merkurii i rostovskaia o Petre tsareviche Ordynskom," in his *Istoricheskie ocherki russkoi narodnoi slovesnosti i iskusstva*, II (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvennaia pol'za, 1861), pp. 155-98, was thoroughly superseded by that of L. T. Beletskii, "Literaturnaia istoriia povesti o Merkurii Smolenskom: Issledovanie i teksty," *Sbornik otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti*, 99, No. 8 (Petrograd, 1922), 1-95. I cannot find Mercurius of Smolensk in the index to V. O. Kliuchevskii, *Drevnerusskiia zhitiia sviatykh kak istoricheskii istochnik* (Moscow: K. Soldatenkova, 1871). On the *vita*, see also: E. Golubinskii, *Istoriia kanonizatsii sviatykh v russkoi tserkvy*, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Tip. Mosk. univ., 1903), pp. 141, 553; P. P. Mindaliev, "Povest' o Merkurii Smolenskom i bylevoi epos." in *Sbornik stat'ei v chest' D. A. Korsakova* (Kazan', 1913), pp. 258-?; *Istoriia russkoi literatury*, Vol. II, Pt. I (Moscow-Leningrad: Gospolitizdat, 1946), 93; N. K. Gudzii, *Istoriia drevnei russkoi literatury*, 7th ed. (Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 1966), pp. 310-12.

[13] There are allusions to Mercurius of Caesarea in the *Skazanie o Mamaevom poboishche* (*Povesti o Kulikovskoi bitvy*, p. 48) and some texts of the *vita* of Mercurius of Smolensk.

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which can reliably be dated to the last third of the fifteenth century; this confirms Beletskii's tentative dating of the *vita* of Mercurius of Smolensk. The *vita*, therefore, entered Old Russian literature approximately at the turn of the sixteenth century;[14] it is to that period that one must look for historical conditions which might have been conducive to altering the record of Batu's military prowess.

The core of the narrative is simple. When Batu besieges Smolensk, either the Virgin appears in a dream to the deacon of the church of the Crypt monastery or an icon speaks to him with the same message. The deacon is to summon the pious Mercurius, arm him with a magic sword or sometimes sit him on a magic horse, and send him off to battle. Mercurius slices the Tatar regiments to pieces, scaring Batu. In personal combat Mercurius defeats a Tatar champion. Then either the son of that Tatar or an angel appears, to whom Mercurius, as previously instructed, gives his sword. Mercurius is beheaded. Picking up his head he walks back to the city, to be abused vilely by a woman carrying water. He lies down at the gate of the city, but his body cannot at first be moved. After three days the Virgin, with the help of the archangels, removes it to the cathedral. The "marvelous youth," i.e., the angel if he had beheaded Mercurius, and/or the magic horse, if Mercurius had ridden one, disappear. The relics of the decapitated martyr, his head tucked under his shoulder, and sometimes his sword, are said to be visible "to this day."

The direct story line of the *vita* cannot unambiguously be attributed to either folkloric or literary origin. The fantastic elements might be of folkloric derivation, but nearly all of them can be traced to the *vita* of Mercurius of Caesarea. There are two Christ-like *topoi*, the maiden carrying water who insults Mercurius and the three days during which his body lies unburied; these motifs are unlikely to have been of folkloric provenance. Additional details in seventeenth-century manuscripts cannot speak to the question of the text's ancestry and do not contribute to an evaluation of its significance.[15]

The *vita* of Mercurius of Smolensk cannot be correlated with any events of Smolensk-Tatar relations. There was no major Tatar campaign under Batu to

[14] The provenance of the *vita* of Mercurius of Smolensk makes it imprudent to cite the text as evidence of thirteenth-century Russian attitudes toward the Tatars. See I. U. Budovnits, "Ideinaia osnova rannykh narodnykh skazanii o tatarskom ige," *Trudy otdela drevnerusskoi literatury*, 14 (1958), 171-74, and in his *Obshchestvenno-politkheskaia mysl' drevnei Rusi (XI-XIV vv.)* (Moscow: Akademiia nauk, 1960), pp. 347-50; and L. V. Cherepnin, "Mongolo-Tatary na Rusi (XIII v.)," in S. L. Tikhvinskii, ed., *Tataro-Mongoly v Azii i Evrope. sb. st.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1970), p. 189.

[15] For example, Mercurius is said to have been a descendant of a Catholic princely family from Rome which converted to Orthodoxy, and the *vita* is said to be a translation from Polish. Buslaev thought that these details reflected the Hanseatic ties of Smolensk, Western knighthood (*rytsarstvo*) and chivalry, and an unconscious participation of Western civilization in the battle against Eastern barbarity. It probably represents no more than the fad for foreign origin among the Muscovite aristocracy. Some late redactions and manuscripts interpolate references to *Sviataia Rus' or mat' syra zemlia*, or make the Tatar warrior a Pecheneg or Polovtsian.

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reduce the city; that any of his forces even approached it cannot be confirmed.[16] In the later thirteenth century it is possible that Smolensk princes fought in Russo-Tatar armies; by the fourteenth century the city was definitely under Lithuanian influence and became the object of joint Russo-Tatar campaigns. It is an open question whether Tatar officials had ever been assigned to Smolensk; the correspondence between the khans of the Crimea and the King Sigismund I of Poland-Lithuania in the sixteenth century does assign a *t'ma* to Smolensk.[17] Too little is known of the contacts between Smolensk and the Golden Horde to permit any integration of the *vita* of Mercurius with the history of the city of Smolensk.

Rather, the literary history of the *vita* parallels the portrayal of Russo-Tatar relations in Old Russian literature at large. The terminology of the text for describing Russo-Tatar relations is consistent with that of other monuments of medieval Russian literature.The first, shorter redaction, according to Beletskii's classification, records that the "evil *tsar'* Batu" (*zlochestivii tsar' Batyi*) "plundered" (*plenil*)[18] the Russian Land. After his defeat by Mercurius, Batu fled with his petty retinue (*druzhina maid*) to Hungary, where he was killed by the *tsar'/tsesar'* (but not *korol*) Stefan (an allusion to the "Tale of the Death of Batu").[19] This language is conserved from thirteenth-century Russian narratives of Batu's campaigns.

The second, expanded redaction of the *vita* of Mercurius of Smolensk is found in the Novgorod Great Menology, compiled under the direction of Macarius while he was archbishop there (before he became metropolitan in Moscow) during the second quarter of the sixteenth century. It is apparently identical to the Moscow Great Menology text.[20] One may infer that the primary redaction of the *vita* had already been in existence for a time before it was altered to suit the Menology. As in early texts, in his campaign (*nakhozhdenie*) the evil *tsar'* Batu came to the Christian borders of the holy city of Kiev, plundered (*plenil*) it and all of the country (*strana*) of the Orthodox Christian Russian Land, looting churches and murdering clergy. But then, the text

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[16] V. V. Kargalov, *Vneshnepoliticheskie faktory razvitiia feodal'noi Rusi: Feodal'naia Rus' i kochevniki* (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1967), p. 109, n. 3, sees in the *vita* of Mercurius of Smolensk evidence that a small contingent of Tatar troops was defeated at the gates of Smolensk.

[17] S. V. Ikonnikov, *Opyt' russkoi istoriografii*, 2 vols. (Kiev: Tip. Kiev, univ., 1991-1908), II: 1, pp. 503, 508.

[18] The verb *pleniti* is usually translated as "to conquer," but that definition does not fit the context very well: if Batu "conquered" the Russian Land, then how could Mamai in 1380 or Akhmat in 1480 want "to conquer" it? A "liberation" has to precede a "reconquest." Literally the verb *pleniti* means "to take captive," but "to plunder" fits its usage in the medieval Russian sources, since a "plundered" city was not necessarily retained. See I. I. Sreznevskii, *Materialy dlia slovaria drevnerusskogo iazyka*, 3 vols. (St. Petersburg: Otd. rus. Iazykai slov. Akad. nauk, 1893-1912), II, col. 976 s.v. *pleniti*.

[19] Beletskii, pp. 55-57. However, it would appear that the name of the king of Hungary was altered in the transmission: from the erroneous Volodislav to the equally erroneous Stefan.

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 58-74.

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continues in prose reflective of new sixteenth-century Muscovite works about the Tatars, Batu imposed a "heavy pagan yoke...burden" (*tiazhko igo i iarmo...pogansko*, or variously *tiazhko i gorko*, heavy and bitter) on the Christians, and the Russians fell into the "yoke of slavery" (*igo rabotno*). The angel, invisible except to Mercurius, tells him that Smolensk, however, will never be subjected to "slavery" (*rabota*) to the evil barbarians. Mercurius of Smolensk will save his city just as his namesake saved Caesarea from Julian the Apostate. Passages in the *Stepennaia kniga* (Book of Degrees) and the *Kazanskaia istoriia* also apply the term "yoke" (*igo*) to Russia's relationship to the Tatars, although no text from the sixteenth century modifies the noun with the adjective "Tatar."[21] These texts express the ideology of the reign of Ivan IV in which, from safe hindsight, the relationship of Russia and the Golden Horde was reconceptualized. The newer phraseology, interpolated into the *vita* of Mercurius of Smolensk, comes from Exodus, as foreshadowed in the Epistle to the Ugra River of Bishop Vassian. It is rhetorical and metaphorical rather than literal or political. Batu's role is only magnified by equating it, in a series of missing steps, to that of Pharaoh in Egypt who enslaved the Hebrews.

The two redactions of the *vita* of Mercurius of Smolensk retain its central features unaltered. First, the Tatar army at Smolensk is defeated (even if the Menology redaction paints a graphic picture of its success at Kiev). True, Mercurius pays with his life for the supernatural assistance which overcomes Batu's hordes, but the frightened and defeated Batu is forced to flee Smolensk. Only in Russian folklore do the Tatars meet such an ignominious fate. In the folk-epic *byliny* the Tatars never take Kiev from St. Vladimir; the *bogatyri* repulse every Tatar attack. The *vita* of Mercurius thus violates historical accuracy at the same time as it attributes a dishonorable emotion, namely fear, to Batu.

Second, both redactions retain that element of the miraculous which is exceptional compared to other texts about Russo-Tatar relations, even those which supposedly reflect folkloric influence. For example, in the "Tale of the Destruction of Riazan' by Batu" (*Povest' o razorenii Riazani Batyem*), there are no angels or divine apparitions in the episode in which the hero Evpatii attacks the Tatars. Evpatii performs "supernatural" feats of military valor, in return for which Batu treats him with chivalric courtesy and honor, but there is no hint of heavenly intervention. Like Mercurius, Evpatii dies fighting the Tatars, but Evpatii and his retinue are defeated; indeed, their suicidal charge never had a chance of success.[22] In the *Skazanie o Mamaevom poboishche* the battle of

[21] *PSRL*, XXI, 262-63; *PSRL*, XIX, col. 6; *Kazanskaia istoriia*, pp. 54-55. The *Kazanskaia istoriia* also uses the word *iarmo* in connection with the events of 1480: *PSRL*, XIX, col. 8 and Moiseeva, p. 57. Beletskii (pp. 75-82) also reproduced a third redaction, from a Chronograph of the 1680s, in which Batu defeats Koloman of Hungary and returns safely to the steppe. This redaction was influenced by the Hypatian Chronicle account of the sack of Kiev in 1240.

[22] *Voinskie povesti drevnei Rusi*, ed. V. P. Adrianova-Peretts (Moscow-Leningrad: Akademiia nauk, 1949), pp. 13-14.

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Kulikovo is adorned with the full panoply of crusading portents and miracles: Dmitrii Bobrok-Volynskii reads "signs" (*primeti*); the brigand (*razboinik*) Foma has a vision in a dream of saints Boris and Gleb; the Heavenly Host makes its decisive appearance on the field of battle in the guise of a beneficent southern breeze which is the signal for the Russian ambush which turns defeat into victory; and so on.[23] Yet all of these episodes seem almost naturalistic compared to the vita of Mercurius; I know of no other passage in Old Russian literature about the Tatars which can match the picture of Mercurius on his magic horse soaring over the Tatar regiments, cutting them to shreds with his magic sword.

Like all works of Old Russian literature, the *vita* of Mercurius of Smolensk was meant to be read literally, but I would describe its attitude toward Batu as fictionalizing. I do not mean by this that the author of the text used literary artifice to shape his narrative material into an artistic entity, a trait increasingly recognized as far more widespread in Old Russian literature than has hitherto been recognized. Nor do I mean merely that the author invented events or scenes, which is also less than a rarity in medieval Russian sources. Not only is it likely that the episode on which the story of the *vita* is based was fictitious, in the sense of invented, but the treatment of Batu, the portrayal of Batu as a character, diverges, in a way which must have been recognized by author and audience alike, from the standard and historically accurate image of him. A frightened and defeated Batu fleeing with a handful of men from his decimated army is a striking scenario utterly devoid of historical credibility. Yet it was intended to be believed. It seems to me that in modern terms the *vita* would be called historical fiction, a free rendering of historical experience to fit poetic license, entertainment, edification, or the imagination. To apply such literary creativity to Batu, even if the text is an adaptation of a Byzantine *vita*,[24] entails a palpable degree of freedom from actual history. To depict Batu in a manner so removed from that of the accurate historical narrative sources required considerable mental, intellectual, cultural and historical distance from the realities of thirteenth-century Russian history. To the author, adapter, and audience of the *vita* of Mercurius, Batu is already part of an irrelevant historical past; Batu's biography could be altered to suit one's taste, to fit a good story, without worrying about any contemporary implications or consequences.

Obviously for a medieval Russian bookman to narrate a story in which the Tartars are defeated necessitated that the author did not believe the Tatars to be invincible. Supposedly the Muscovite victory at the battle of Kulikovo in 1380 dispelled the myth of Tatar invincibility, so the historical reality which would buttress the *vita* of Mercurius must date from after that glorious event. While I am confident that the *vita* is of later provenance than the end of the fourteenth

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[23] See Charles J. Halperin, "The Russian Land and the Russian Tsar: The Emergence of Muscovite Ideology, 1380-1408," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte*, 23 (1976), 23-37.

[24] See Hugh F. Graham, "Digenis Akritas and the *Devgenievo Dejanie* – A **Reappraisal**," *Studies in Medieval Culture*, 4, No. 3 (1974), 483-95.

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century, I believe that the myth of Tatar invincibility is a myth of modern scholarship, not the medieval Russian sources. All thirteenth-century Russian narratives, let alone the sermons of Serapion, Bishop of Vladimir, attribute Mongol military victory to God's punishment of Russian sins. By definition, the Tatars are not immune to defeat; once God forgives the repentent Christians, they will defeat the Tatars by the strength of that same Christian God. Moreover, the aftermath of the sack of Moscow by Khan Tokhtamysh in 1382 must have created a less than propitious atmosphere for the composition of a text which plays so fast and loose with Batu's reputation.

The literary history of the *vita* of Mercurius would seem to be a function of a broader context than merely Smolensk's isolation from the steppe and greater immunity from Tatar oppression than the Ukraine or Muscovy. The *vita* did enter Muscovite literature, and the perceptions of the intended Muscovite audience should be taken into account in fashioning a context within which the text makes sense historically.

Muscovy's real political leverage vis-à-vis the Golden Horde derived from the fragmentation of the Horde in the middle of the fifteenth century. In place of the Golden Horde there was now the Great Horde, Kazan', Astrakhan', the Crimea, and the Nogais. There was even a Tatar serving khanate as a vassal of Muscovy, namely Kasimov. This turn of events created a new *quid pro quo* between Moscow and the Great Horde, the nomadic heir of the Golden Horde. In 1480 allied Crimean and Nogai Tatars played a role in the denouement of the last serious Great Horde attempt to intrude into the Russian forest zone. In 1502 the Crimean liquidated the Great Horde entirely. The Tatar menace was still serious, but it had receded somewhat, enough to allow literary license to be employed in describing Batu's career. The surviving Tatar khanates and hordes were either allies of Moscow or seemed manageable. In this political and historical environment some members of the elite felt the cultural freedom to play with the image of Batu by composing and transmitting the *vita* of Mercurius of Smolensk.

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The *vita* of Mercurius of Smolensk contains an allusion to the "Tale of the Death of Batu." This cross-reference is not accidental. The image of Batu in the "Tale" is related to that in the *vita*. The "Tale," if anything, takes even greater liberties with history than the *vita*, but its treatment of Batu reflects the same "fictionalizing" attitude toward the Tatars.

The dating of the text is reasonably certain: its earliest preserved versions were written between 1450 and 1480. The "Tale" was not included in the Laurentian Chronicle, the Novgorod First Chronicle of either recension, the Novgorod Fourth Chronicle, or the Sofia First Chronicle (the two chronicles which derive from the hypothetical "compilation" of 1448). It is found in extant Muscovite chronicles beginning with the 1470s, such as the Moscow

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"compilation" of 1479, which probably had antecedents a decade earlier. Its most famous location is in the Chronograph (*Khronograf*) of 1512, which has previously been taken as a decisive confirmation of its authorship, as we shall see. Therefore, the creation of the "Tale" can safely be located to the period after the fragmentation of the Golden Horde but presumably before the supposed "liberation from the Tatar Yoke" of 1480.

The narrative of the "Tale" is fairly stable; abbreviations and embellishments altered it but little. Chronicle and Menology variants retain crucial details quite well. According to the chronicle versions[25] Batu departed Russia "to plunder" (*pleniti*) Hungary. There he captured and seduced the sister of Volodislav, ruler of the Czechs, Hungarians, and Germans. Volodislav had been converted to Orthodox Christianity by the Serbian Saint Sava, but later apostatized to Catholicism. Enraged at the fate of his sister, Volodislav mounted a magic horse and engaged Batu in battle outside Varadin (Radin, his capital), described as if by an eyewitness as set in the rolling hills of Hungary. Volodislav's sister, now enamored of Batu, aided her paramour against her brother. Volodislav defeated Batu's army and slew them both. He than erected a column to mark the site of his victory; the column still commemorates the battle.

"The Tale of the Death of Batu" is replete with errors of history.[26] Batu did invade Hungary, but the rest of the story is fiction, a compound of anachronisms and mistakes. The king of Hungary at the time of Batu's invasion in 1241 was Bela IV, who fled the Tatars rather than defeating them. Batu died approximately in 1256 on the territory of the Golden Horde, not in the 1240s in Hungary. The Serbian saint Sava was not a contemporary of any king Władysław of Hungary. The Hungarian king of the "Tale" is probably an impersonation of the eleventh-century hero Vladislav who defeated the Kumans.[27] St. Sava did reconcile an expelled Hungarian ruler in 1202; this episode has been distorted in his Serbian *vita* to read that he converted an unnamed *korol/kral* to Orthodoxy. Therefore the "Tale" seems to reflect some first-hand knowledge of Hungarian geography and Serbian hagiography. Unfortunately this Hungarian and Serbian background was utilized to concoct a narrative devoid of historical accuracy.

Most discussion of the "Tale" has focused on the question of its exceptionally mysterious origin. The text is set in Hungary, but it survives only

[25] Disregarding variants, the "Tale" is found in the following chronicles: *PSRL*, XV, cols. 394-95; XVIII, 69; XXV, 139-41; XXII, 400-01; XX, 161; VII, 157-59; XXIII, 82-83; XXIV, 96-98; XXVIII, 56-67 (1518 *svod*); X, 135-36; XXI, 288; XXXIII, 71. There is an allusion to the "Tale" in the *Kazanskaia istoriia*: *PSRL*, XIX, 10, and Moiseeva, p. 46.

[26] The standard study of this text is S. P. Rozanov, "Povest' ob ubienii Batyem," *Izvestiia Otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti*, 2nd series, Vol. XXI, Pt. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1916), 109-42.

[27] Denis Sinor, "Le Mort de Batu et les trompettes mués par le vent chez Herberstein," *Journal Asiatique* 233 (1941-42), 201-06, traces Herberstein's allusion to the "Tale" to fourteenth-century German chronicles. He attributes the "Tale" to Pachomius and does not cite Rozanov's article.

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in Muscovite literature. A sixteenth-century manuscript of the *vita* of Mikhail of Chernigov of the redaction of the Suzdal' Efimiev monastery contains a passage in which Mikhail appears in a dream to his daughter Efrosiniia. In that dream he announces to her that the Hungarian King Vladislav has killed Batu, thus emancipating Russia from the authority of the unclean (*svoboditsia oblast' Rossisskiia ot derzhetelei nechestivykh*), an allusion to the "Tale." The source of this interpolation in the *vita* of Mikhail is obvious: this manuscript contains the "Tale of the Death of Batu" as an appendix to the *vita* of Mikhail. And in that appendix the "Tale" is attributed to Pachomius the Serb. Citing this manuscript and the familiarity of the author of the "Tale" with Serbian literature, Kliuchevskii propagated and popularized the view that Pachomius composed the "Tale" for inclusion in his earliest redaction of the Chronograph, in the middle of the fifteenth century, despite the fact that the Chronograph's earliest extant redaction is from 1512.[28] Rozanov laid this theory to rest with a healthy dose of skepticism, although his critique seems to have escaped the attention of many scholars who continue to attribute the "Tale" to Pachomius.[29] Rozanov objected that the opinion of a late scribe was insufficient evidence of attribution, that the style of the "Tale" had no similarities to Pachomius's work, and that the language of the text was devoid of Serbianisms. According to Rozanov the "Tale" did not originate in the Chronograph but in an earlier Muscovite chronicle, probably the "compilation" (*svod*) of 1472. It is possible that a Serb other than Pachomius had visited Hungary, seen the column, migrated to Muscovy and then written the "Tale," but such a literary history could not be confirmed. The recent argument that the Chronograph of 1512 was not originally written by Pachomius lessens the plausibility of his authorship of the

[28] Kliuchevskii, *Drevnerusskiia zhitiia sviatykh kak istoricheskii istochnik*, pp. 146-47.

[29] Accepting the traditional attribution are: N. M. Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva Rossisskago*, 12 Vols. (St. Petersburg: Izd. Evg. Evdokimova, 1892), IV, 20 n. 84; S. M. Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, 29 vols. in 15 (Moscow: Izd. Sotsekolit, 1959-66), II, 632-33, 696, n. 664; A. N. Nasonov, "Moskovskii svod 1479 g. i ego iuzhnoruisskii istochnik," *Problemy istochnikovedeniia*, 9 (1961), 361 which cites the affirmative conclusions of A. A. Shakhmatov and Iablonskii; John L. I. Fennell, *The Emergence of Moscow, 1304-1359* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1968), p. 321 n. 3; D. S. Likhachev, *Chelovek v literature drevnei Rusi*, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Nauka, 1970), p. 82 n. 29; *idem, Kul'tura Rusi vremeni Andreia Rubleva i Epifaniia Premudrogo* (*konets XIV-nachalo XV v.*) (Moscow-Leningrad: Akademiia nauk, 1962), pp. 190, 237 (Likhachev never cites Rozanov's article, but one expects a more critical approach to textual attribution from the author of the section of *Tekstologiia* on "Attributsiia," pp. 287-328, than reliance upon the opinion of a copyist of a late manuscript); and Ia. S. Lur'e, *Obshcherusskie letopisi XIV-XV vv.* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1976), p. 151, who follows Likhachev's views. Accepting Rozanov's objections are Berthold Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde. Die Mongolen in Russland*, 2nd ed. (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1965), p. 23 n. 60, and A. G. Kuz'min, *Riazanskoe letopisanie. Svedeniia letopisei o Riazani i Murome do serediny XVI veka* (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), pp. 188-89. V. T. Pashuto in *Tataro-Mongoly v Azii i Evrope*, p. 213, attributes the "Tale" to a fifteenth-century Russian bookman relying upon Hungarian legends; Jaroslaw Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan: Conquest and Imperial Ideology (1438-1560's)* (The Hague-Paris: Mouton, 1973), p. 121, opines that the origin of the story is unknown.

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"Tale" even more; the redaction in the Chronograph can now be traced more precisely than Rozanov proposed, to the grand-princely chronicle of 1479.[30] The "Tale" may therefore prudently be described as an anonymous work of a writer of unknown ethnic identity, unquestionably addressed to a Muscovite audience.

The "Tale of the Death of Batu" is, like the *vita* of Mercurius of Smolensk, what would nowadays be labelled a work of historical fiction. The image of Batu in the story is even less flattering than in the *vita* of Mercurius. Not only is Batu defeated in battle, but he is killed as well. Batu is presented as a classic Gothic villain, a rapist and seducer of women. Batu is not the undefeated and undefeatable lord from the East to the West, but a mortal ragamuffin who is fallible and weak. It reads like an adventure story, almost akin to an American Western with the usual dollops of sex and violence.

Curiously, there is another passage in a work of Old Russian literature which portrays Batu as a lecher. According to the "Tale of the Destruction of Riazan' by Batu" Prince Fedor Iur'evich was dispatched to Batu with gifts to seek a peaceful resolution of the situation. Batu is informed by Riazani nobles (*vel'mozhi*) that Fedor's wife is "of the Imperial clan" (*tsarska roda*), i.e., a Byzantine princess, and very beautiful. Batu asks Fedor for her; in reply Fedor refuses to hand over a Christian woman for fornication with an infidel. Batu orders Fedor executed.[31] It is not possible to date the creation of this dramatic scene; the "Tale of the Destruction of Riazan' by Batu" is sometimes attributed to the fourteenth or fifteenth centuries, but its manuscripts come from the seventeenth. The difference between Batu's lust in the Tale of Riazan' and the Tale of his death lies in their fruits. In the former Batu does not achieve his goal and rape the woman of his choice, but he suffers no consequences for his evil desire. Instead the defender of marital fidelity and Christian decorum suffers death. In the latter Batu meets an end worthy of his misdeeds.

The erroneous dating of the death of Batu in the "Tale" caused surprisingly few troubles for the chroniclers. Some slight of hand was necessary to insert the "Tale" into the chronicles, which record Batu's return from his three-year invasion of Central Europe. Usually the "Tale" was included in a chronicle after the last entry which mentioned Batu. Further research by specialists in Old Russian chronicle-writing might profitably explore the techniques by which the chronological contradictions generated by the "Tale" were resolved.

The "Tale of the Death of Batu" seems to lack any political purpose. It is extravagant to propose, as Likhachev does, that the participation of Bolgars, Lithuanians, and Slavs in Volodislav's army is meant to convey a program for national liberation of all these peoples from Tatar oppression. Rather, the "Tale"

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[30] B. M. Kloss, "O vremeni sozdanii russkogo Khronografa," *Trudy otdela drevnerusskoi literatury*, 26 (1971). 244-55.

[31] *Voinskie povesti drevnei Rusi*, p. 10. The "Tale of the Destruction of Riazan' by Baty" is a very heterogeneous text which presents more than one point of view of the Tatars.

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strikes me as closer in purpose to the *vita* of Mercurius of Smolensk, i.e., edification or entertainment. The shared perception of Batu in the two texts as a figure whose biography could be rewritten to suit some ahistorical, apolitical purpose, sets them apart from all other monuments of Old Russian literature about Russo-Tatar relations. The ramifications of the composition and preservation of the "Tale of the Death of Batu" in Muscovite culture have never been explored; what would one make of a fourteenth or fifteenth century English tale which wrote that William the Conqueror died trying to conquer Ireland?

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It is easy to understand why the *vita* of Mercurius of Smolensk and the "Tale of the Death of Batu" were retained in mid-sixteenth-century Muscovite literary and ideological compendia and chronicles. Mercurius was a martyr in the battle against the infidel Tatars and had the additional advantage of coming from a newly-annexed border region (Smolensk was acquired from Lithuania in 1512) so that his veneration served to integrate that territory into the greater Orthodox Christian realm. The "Tale" certainly had a didactic element, since both Batu and Volodislav's sister pay the ultimate price for their sins. Both works were – and still are – entertaining reading as well. So the texts were incorporated into Muscovite chronicles and menologies of the reign of Ivan IV.

The Muscovite elite could not afford to view the Tatars with the same intellectual liberties as were subsumed under the perception of Batu in the two works, however. The Tatars were a dangerous contemporary reality; thinking of Batu as some personage from the remote past no longer relevant politically or historically, the attitude projected by the two texts, was not conducive to dealing with the Tatar khanates and hordes bordering and threatening Muscovy. The Muscovite alliance with the Crimea broke down almost as soon as its purpose – the liquidation of the Great Horde – had been achieved, and relations with Kazan' were steadily exacerbated as Muscovy increasingly strove to bring the khanate under full political control. Similar factors relegated Vassian's rejection of Chingisid legitimacy to political irrelevance. The Tatars could not be dismissed as easily as assumed by the *vita* of Mercurius and the "Tale of the Death of Batu." The fictionalized image of Batu was historically inaccurate and politically misleading; it could not guide Muscovite foreign policy. Instead, Muscovite ideology of the sixteenth century magnified Batu's evil and thus enhanced the glory of Ivan III or Ivan IV in defeating the Tatars who were continuing Batu's nefarious deeds. Depicting Batu as defeated in battle lessened his reputation, and apparently did not contribute to desired ideological ends, since it was the standard and historically more accurate image of Batu which was developed in sixteenth-century Muscovite sources.

The ubiquitous vocabulary of religious animosity with which the medieval Russian sources depict the Tatars as evil infidels can be deceptive.

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The presentation of the Tatars in the monuments of Old Russian literature was not as monochromatic as this stereotyped language might lead one to believe. For example, various Tatar khans and officials protect the Petrov monastery of Rostov from Russian Christians in the "Life of Peter, *tsarevich* of the Horde."[32] Batu's chivalrous treatment of Evpatii is another case in point. The differing portrayals of Batu discussed in this article are but one example of the heterogeneity of medieval Russian perceptions of the Tatars, a heterogeneity which is more reflective of the ambiguities and complexities of the impact of the Mongols on Russian history than the superficial generalizations rooted in the conception of the Mongols as no more than an elemental atavistic destructive force.

The *vita* of Mercurius of Smolensk and the "Tale of the Death of Batu" may tentatively be assigned to the overly optimistic "thaw" in Muscovite attitudes toward the Tatars after the Golden/Great Ḥorde had begun to sink into obscurity but before it became clear that the disappearance of the Golden/Great Horde would hardly be synonymous with termination of the "Tatar problem."[33] This optimism was not universally shared, if the failure of the new image of Batu which it generated to displace the older image is indicative, but its products were worth preserving. Perhaps a new appreciation of the contribution of these two texts to a comprehensive analysis of Russian and Muscovite attitudes toward the Tatars will stimulate new research on their poorly-understood manuscript traditions and literary histories by those scholars who have access to the archival repositories.

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[32] Charles J. Halperin, "A Chingissid Saint of the Russian Orthodox Church: The Life of Peter, *tsarevich* of the Horde'," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*, 9, No. 3 (Fall 1975), 324-35.

[33] Mamai is ridiculed in the Bartiash' and Tiutchev episodes of the Expanded Redaction of the *Skazanie o Mamaevom poboishche* (*Povesti o Kulikovskoi bitvy*, pp. 116-17, 121-24). Although manuscripts of this redaction date to the seventeenth century, L. A. Dmitriev believes that it was composed at the end of the fifteenth century, approximately the same decades to which I have assigned the *vita* of Mercurius of Smolensk and the "Tale of the death of Batu." Of course, Mamai was not a khan and did not enjoy Batu's reputation.

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RUSSIA IN THE MONGOL EMPIRE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Nearly all traditional Russian historiography characterized the role of the Mongols in Russian history in one of two ways. Either Mongol influence was minimized or denied, or all Mongol contributions to Russian history were seen as negative. It was argued that the primitive, nomadic Mongols remained in the steppe rather than move to the Russian forest zone, and that the political, social, and moral level of the barbarian Mongols was far inferior to that of the sedentary and civilized Russians; thus Russian borrowing of Mongol institutions was unthinkable.[1] It was also stated that the Mongols' only effect on Russian history was destructive. They razed cities, deported or massacred populations, and wrecked the economy; the standards of political behavior which they imposed were consonant with the cruel and deceitful nature of Asiatics.[2] It is unfortunate that there is still a necessity to expose and discredit the Europocentric, imperialist, and colonialist premises about nomads and orientals which misinform these judgments.

A more balanced appraisal of the impact of the Mongols is long overdue. Although some progress has been made in this regard, one area of interest remains underdeveloped. Clearly no interpretation of Russo-Mongol relations can be convincing unless it takes into account the perspective of the all-Mongol empire. Also, the evolution of the Golden Horde, the Mongol successor state on the Volga river, must be seen in tandem with that of the two other successor states which controlled established agricultural societies, the Yüan dynasty in

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[1] Valentin A. Riasanovsky, "The Influence of Ancient Mongol Culture and Law on Russian Culture and Law," *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, 20.4 (Jan. 1937), 499-530.

[2] V. Szczesniak, "A Note on the Character of the Tartar Impact upon the Russian State and Church," *Études slaves et est-européens*, 17 (1972), 92-98; Tibor Szamuely, *The Russian Tradition* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1975); Oscar Halecki, *The Limits and Delimits of European History* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1950), or his other surveys, in which he states that contact with the Mongols rendered the Russians "un-European," i.e., Asiatic, undemocratic, and uncivilized.

Although these publications espouse exaggerated arguments, they belong to the mainstream historiography on this question; the most extensive, though not unbiased, survey of Russian historiography concerning the Mongol impact on Russia is in V. V. Kargalov, *Vneshnepoliticheskie faktory razvitiia feodal'noi Russi. Feodal'naia Rus' i kochevniki* (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1967), pp. 219-55.

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China and the Ilkhanid dynasty in Iran.[3] The necessity for such an approach was one of the premises of George Vernadsky's Eurasianist volume, *The Mongols and Russia*,[4] but, as with many of the legitimate and stimulating ideas raised in this book, Vernadsky's reach exceeded his grasp. He did not succeed in integrating the narratives of the Mongol empire and Russia, or of Russia and the Golden Horde.[5] Nor was he successful in analyzing the features of Mongol rule common to the Russian, Chinese, and Iranian experiences or the elements which distinguish them.[6]

Recent popular and/or synthetic works have done little to close this gap. Chambers's volume is unoriginal and marred by the usual stereotypes; to blame the Mongols for the introduction of feudalism, which kept Russia "backward" and "oppressed" for six hundred years, suggests a very poor understanding of Russian history.[7] Phillips's work is not much better; in covering a longer period of Russian history, he commits more factual errors.[8] Luc Kwanten's *Imperial Nomads*, which deals primarily with the Mongol empire, suffers from conceptual and factual sloppiness and bibliographic ignorance, particularly so on the Golden Horde and Russian history.[9] I believe that we are beyond the

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[3] Material on the Chaghadayids and Central Asia is too limited to afford a comparison.

[4] George Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia*, Vol. III of Vernadsky and Michael Karpovich, *A History of Russia* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1953).

[5] Neither has anyone else. See, for example, B. D. Grekov and A. Iu. Iakubovskii, *Zolotaia orda i ee padenie* (Moscow-Leningrad: Akademiia Nauk, 1950).

[6] This omission on Vernadsky's part might be explained by the structure of the synthetic volumes he wrote in his multivolume *History of Russia*; this accounts for many of their flaws. Or it may be a function of the Eurasian theory according to which Russia was a parti of Eurasia (when it was not confused with it), but China and Iran were not. This entailed evaluating the Mongol impact on Russia in entirely different terms from the impact on China or Iran. The only possibility we can exclude is ignorance, since Vernadsky knew the material.

[7] James Chambers, *The Devil's Horsemen: The Mongol Invasion of Europe* (New York: Atheneum, 1979).

[8] E. D. Phillips, *The Mongols* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1965). Phillips believes that the Dmitri in Kiev in 1240 was a prince; he was *voevoda* (governor). Phillips omits "the stand on the Ugra river" in 1480 and records Ivan IV as succeeding his grandfather Ivan III, thus skipping Ivan IV's father, Vasilii III.

J. J. Saunders, *The History of the Mongol Conquests* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1971), is derivative and obsessed with Mongol interaction with "world" religions.

[9] Luc Kwanten, *Imperial Nomads: A History of Central Asia, 500-1500* (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1979). See the reviews of Edwin C. Pulleybank in the *American Historical Review*, 85 (1980), 193-94 and Herbert Franke in the *Bulletin of Sung-Yüan Studies*, No. 15 (1979), pp. 106-17; see also Chin-fu Hung, "China and the Nomads: Misconceptions in Western Historiography on Inner Asia," *HJAS*, 41 (1981), 597-628, a review article of the Kwanten book. Kwanten's bibliography omits numerous relevant Soviet monographs, e.g., Fedorov-Davydov, Nasonov, Safargaliev, and Kargalov. Kwanten also has numerous errors. (1) He states that Michael of Chernigov fled in 1240 to Bela Kun in Hungary (p. 134); he actually fled to Bela IV. Bela Kun was the head of the brief Soviet Republic of Hungary in 1919. (2) Dmitrii Donskoi did not defeat khan Toqtamïsh in 1380 (p. 252); he defeated emir Mamay in 1380. Toqtamïsh sacked Moscow in 1382. (3) It is inaccurate to say that in 1480 Ivan III repulsed an attack by the Crimean khanate and severed diplomatic relations (pp. 265-66); faced with an attack by the Great Horde, the Crimean khan Mengli Girey attacked Poland-Lithuania, since Crimea was allied with Muscovy at the time. One could go on.

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point at which even reliable narratives can satisfactorily answer the comparative, analytic, and thematic questions central to an examination of the Mongol impact on Russian history.

Dispassionate investigation of the role of the Mongol empire remains difficult. Given the undeniable destructiveness of the Mongol conquest, as of almost any military conquest, it is understandable that national historiographies treated the role of the Mongols with disdain. However, a comparison of the Mongol impact on Asia and on Europe that consists exclusively of a narrative of depredations can no longer pass for scholarship.[10] Nor will any assertion that the Mongols barbarized China, introducing violence and cruelty into politics,[11] enable us to comprehend the nature of Mongol relations with China and other countries.

In this essay I will suggest the outlines of a comparison of the Mongol impact on Russia with that on China and Iran. Given the present state of knowledge about the Mongol empire and its successor states, all generalizations and conclusions presented here must be considered tentative. It is hoped that specialists in the fields of investigation touched upon will discover neither distortions nor gross errors, but may find stimulus for future research that will inform and modify the interpretation I have articulated.

There is no denying the initially destructive impact of the Mongol conquest upon the economies of all conquered areas; nor can there be any doubt that continued Mongol rule meant submitting to additional raids and expeditions as well as to very high levels of taxation and exploitation. However, this is only one aspect of the economic consequences of Mongol rule. Historically, Inner Asian nomads have given consideration to international commerce when founding empires or simply maintaining relations with sedentary neighbors.[12] The Mongol empire was a conspicuous case in point. Mongol patronage

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[10] Assertions in newspapers of the People's Republic of China that the Mongols had played progressive role in history by unifying China and disseminating the fruits of its civilization, notably the compass, gunpowder, and printing, resulted in the publication of Academician S. L. Tikhvinkii, ed., *Tataro-Mongoly v Azii i Europe* (Moscow: Nauka, 1970). See David M. Farquhar, "Chinese Communist Assessments of a Foreign Conquest Dynasty," in Albert Feuerwerker, ed., *History in Communist China* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1968), pp. 175-88.

[11] F. W. Mote, "The Growth of Chinese Despotism: A Critique of Wittfogel's Theory of Oriental Despotism as Applied to China," *OE*, 8 (1961), 17-18. The assertion echoes that of the Imperial Russian historian Karamzin concerning the Mongol impact on Russia. Neither is persuasive.

This is an objection to the general theory of Joseph Fletcher, "The Turco-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3/4 (1979-80) (Eucharisterion-Pritsak Festschrift), Part 1, 236-51.

[12] For example, Denis Sinor, "The Historical Role of the Türk Empire," *Cahiers d'histoire mondiale*, 1.2 (1953), 427-34. For a different kind of nomadic "trade" with China, see Larry W. Moses, "T'ang Tribute Relations with Inner Asian Barbarians," in J. C. Perry and B. L. Smith, ed., *Essays on T'ang Society: The Interplay of Social, Political and Economic Forces* (Leiden: Brill, 1976), pp. 61-89.

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fostered the extension and development of the international continental caravan routes which ran from the Pacific to the Mediterranean bearing trade in silks, spices, and precious commodities. Archaeological evidence demonstrates convincingly that Russia participated in and profited from Mongol protection of trade.[13] In China, the Muslim religious brotherhoods in particular, but also certain Chinese merchants and religious institutions, benefited from the expansion of foreign trade under Yüan sponsor-ship.[14] In Armenia and Georgia, which were largely subject to the Ilkhanid khanate, the beneficiaries were parvenu merchant families.[15] Cities in Iran along the trade routes recovered from the losses of Mongol conquest and prospered; the new cities founded by the Ilkhanids grew accordingly.[16]

Of course not everyone profited equally. The Mongols taxed commerce; they did not engage in trade themselves. Those who did take advantage of the new opportunities under Mongol rule were not always socially accepted. In China, Muslim merchants were detested, for trade and economic enterprise were frowned upon by the Confucian literati. The landowning aristocracies of Armenia and Georgia looked askance at the nouveau riche merchants who aspired to status equal to their own. In Russia, though, the heavy involvement of princes and nobility in trade mitigated such antagonism. The impact on the economy as a whole, disregarding the social class or ethnic identity of those who made the profits and discounting the kind of regional variation that economic progress usually induces, must have been positive. However, we should remember that cities that were unfavorably located on the Mongol trade routes or that were not in political favor stagnated under Mongol domination, in many cases never recovering from the devastation of conquest.

The impact of the Mongols upon the economies of their conquered territories differed both between China, Russia, and Iran and within each country. Petrushevskii argues that the Mongols so exploited Iran; that the economy remained backward for a half millennium thereafter, but it is hardly plausible that Mongol economic policy was so retrograde.[17] Certain sectors of

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[13] Janet Martin, "The Land of Darkness and the Golden Horde. The fur trade under the Mongols, XIII-XIV Centuries," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, 29.4 (1978), 405-22; Thomas S. Noonan, "Russia's Eastern Trade, 1150-1350; The Archeological Evidence," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, 2, forthcoming. I am indebted to Professor Noonan for providing me with a typescript of this article.

[14] H. Franz Schurmann, *Economic Structure of the Yüan Dynasty* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1956).

[15] L. S. Khachikyan, "Mongols in Transcaucasia," *Contributions à l'histoire russe* (Cahiers d'histoire mondiale; Neuchâtel: Éditions de la Baconnière, 1958), p. 104, and L. O. Babaian, *Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskaia i politicheskaia istoriia Armenii v XIII-XIV vekakh* (Moscow: Nauka, 1969), pp. 119-40.

[16] I. P. Petrushevskii in J. A. Boyle, ed., *Cambridge History of Iran*, Vol. v: *Saljuq and Mongol Periods* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1968), pp. 505-14.

[17] I. P. Petrushevskii, *Zemledelie i agrarnye otnosheniia v Irane XIII-XIV vv*, (Moscow-Leningrad: Akademiia Nauk), pp. 67-113.

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the Iranian economy improved. Viticulture, for example, expanded; the Mongols, before and despite their conversion to Islam, created a larger market for alcoholic beverages. Sericulture and manufacturing also developed, perhaps because of better communication with China. In Iran under the Ilkhanids there was no deterioration in the artisanal crafts,[18] although in Russia there was a decline. This occurred not because Russia suffered worse Mongol devastation, but rather because the Russian economy did not have the resilience or strength, or perhaps simply the wealth, of the Iranian. Most crafts in Russia did recover after about a century, though some skills, especially in the area of luxury-item production, were irretrievably lost.[19] The Mongols did not deflect the basic agricultural economies of Russia, Iran, and China; at least in China they contributed to the agricultural sector by building canals.[20] It seems fair to say that although the economic condition of most of the peasant population deteriorated under Mongol rule, in each conquered society some social elements found a way to make a profit, whether in commerce or in industry or in administration, i.e., through graft and corruption.[21]

It is not possible to compare the levels of taxation in the different Mongol successor states. Each retained a set of common Mongol taxes; for this reason, in studies of the tribute (in Russian, *vykhod*) and other levies, one must search for linguistic equivalents among terms in Russian, Chinese, Mongolian and Turkic, Arabic and Persian, Ṭibetan, Armenian, and other languages.[22] However, each Mongol successor state also retained the indigenous taxation system; Mongol taxes seem to have been superimposed on top of the existing tax structure. Both Iranian taxes and the newer Mongol taxes flourished in Ilkhanid territory, in Iran, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, although sometimes we cannot identify which is which.[23] The same holds true for China. In Russia it

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[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 170, 173, 203-5, 222-23.

[19] B. A. Rybakov, *Remeslo drevnei Rusi* (Moscow-Leningrad: Akademiia Nauk, 1948), pp. 525-38.

[20] Jung-pang Lo, "The Controversy over Grain Conveyance during the Reign of Qubilai Qaqan, 1260-1294," *FEQ*, 13 (1954), 265-85.

[21] A. A. Ali-Zade, *Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskaia i politicheskaia istoriia Azerbaidzhana XIII-XIV vv.* (Baku: Akademiia Nauk Azerbaidzhansk. SSR, 1956), pp. 185-92.

The Muscovite grand prince Ivan Kalita is supposed to have exploited his favorable relations with the Horde to further his own economic interests, but compared to Rashīd ad-Dīn he was a piker. I suspect that the Golden Horde could not have come close to the Yüan or the Ilkhanids in overall wealth, since it did not have the resources to match China or Iran, but I have never seen this point discussed.

[22] H. Franz Schurmann, "Mongolian Tributary Practices of the Thirteenth Century," *HJAS*, 19 (1956), 304-89, and John Masson Smith, "Mongol and Nomadic Taxation," *HJAS*, 30 (1970), 46-85.

[23] See Petrushevskii, *Zemledelie...*, pp. 340-402; Ali-Zade, pp. 193-258; Babaian, pp. 235-82; Berthold Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran: Politik, Verwaltung, und Kultur der Ilchanzeit, 1220-1350*, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1955), pp. 306-34; and V. Minorsky, "Naṣīr al-din Ṭusī on Finance," in his *Iranica. Twenty Articles* (Publications of the Univ. of Tehran, Vol. 775, 1964), pp. 64-85.

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would appear that local Russian taxes were also continued, but it is unclear whether it was the Mongol authorities or the Russian princes who received the revenue. The ability of the Mongols to deal with taxation systems as complex as those in China and Iran discredits the assertions of some Russian historians that the Russians were "too sophisticated" to borrow "primitive" institutions, and therefore could not have adopted Mongol taxes. In fact, the Russians borrowed the commercial tax (*tamga*), the tribute (*vykhod*, later called the *dan'*), and other levies. The Russians even borrowed the Mongol term for treasury (*kazna*) and perhaps the institutional structure it denoted.

The still-centralized Mongol empire of the thirteenth century must have possessed an extraordinary degree of economic expertise. Even all-Mongol taxes were adapted to local conditions; the census in China seems to have followed Chinese practice and counted households, although elsewhere, following the custom of the steppe, the census was a head count. At some stage the tribute must have been allocated in local currency or in native products. To be apportioned equitably, this required not only mastery of exchange rates in dozens of currencies, but also of price and market conditions for all major commodities. The Mongols would not have made the mistake of taxing furs in China or rice in Russia. We do not know how the labor was divided between Karakorum or Tai-tu (Peking) and Saray or Tabriz, but somewhere someone infused a vast and heterogeneous fiscal system with impressive economic data, and the Mongol empire commanded the bureaucratic apparatus which retained and applied this information. It is clear that there must have been pervasive interplay between all-Mongol and indigenous elements in the fiscal systems of the Yüan, Ilkhanid, and Jochid empires.

The all-Mongol empire bequeathed to its successor states a common set of political, military, and administrative institutions: a divine autocracy of the Chinggisid clan modelled on the Orkhon Turk example;[24] the decimal military machine created by Chinggis Khan; the *khuriltai* or acclamation ceremony for deciding the succession; the *jam*, a postal service which linked the vast continental Mongol empire; and an incipient legal[25] and bureaucratic structure. The success with which the Mongols conquered and governed a huge empire was not lost on the Russians, who assiduously copied a number of Mongol political and administrative institutions, including the *jam*, *tamga*, and *kazna*,

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[24] Henry Serruys. "Mongol Altan 'Gold'= Imperial," *MS*, 21 (1962), 357-78, and Igor de Rachewiltz, "Some Remarks on the Ideological Foundations of Chingis Khan's Empire," *Papers on Far Eastern History of the Australian National University*, 7 (1973), 21-36.

[25] George Vernadsky, "The Scope and Contents of Chingis Khan's *Yasa,*" *HJAS*, 3 (1938), 337-60, and Valentin A. Riasanovsky, *Fundamental Principles of Mongol Law* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1965), present opposing interpretations of the Jasagh as imperial and customary law respectively, a debate that may have been rendered superfluous by David Ayalon, "The Great Yasa of Chingis Khan," *Studio Islamica*, 33 (1971), 97-140; 34 (1971), 151-80, establishing that Chinggis Khan never issued a single law code called the Jasagh.

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under their Mongol names.[26] Those historians who would deny a Mongol origin to the Muscovite *jam* invariably invoke the precedent of the Kievan *povoz*. The *povoz*, however, merely provided sustenance to travelling officials; the *jam* moved men, goods, and information. In China it had hundreds of stations and an elaborate bureaucratic structure which moved men and goods, selecting the means of transportation in accordance with local conditions. Not only riders, but also runners were used, since they could more speedily cross rice paddies and other difficult terrain. The *jam* functioned on a different level of bureaucratic sophistication than the *povoz*. Familiarity with the capability of this Mongol institution in China renders implausible any theory which would suggest that the Muscovite *jam* was not borrowed from the Mongols.[27]

Most traditional Russian historiography overlooked the fact that the Mongols, the grand empire or the Golden Horde, possessed governmental institutions; Russian historians treated "the Horde" as no more than a nomadic band of cutthroats and bandits. In reality, Mongol officials were not necessarily more "barbaric" in their conceptions than their "civilized" predecessors. In China the Yüan promulgated a new law code, a synthesis of Chinese and Mongol practice, which has recently been reconstructed.[28] The Yüan code is milder; for example, there was a decrease in the number of crimes for which the death penalty applied. It was also more efficient since practical experience, not book learning, became the basis for selecting judges. Without acknowledging the debt to their antecessors, the Ming, on succeeding the Yüan, retained the code of 1291. In Iran, it is probable that the pervasive role of Muslim religious law, especially after the Mongols adopted Islam, made any Mongol legal input superfluous.[29]

The nature of borrowing of political institutions is complicated by the fundamental contrast between the relationship of the Golden Horde to Russia and that of the Yüan to China and the Ilkhanids to Iran. Although many Mongols in China and Iran did physically distance themselves from their subjects, in Russia the Mongols chose the geographical isolation of the steppe, not moving into the forest zone. This basic contrast is the key to all comparative analysis of the Golden Horde.

All Inner Asian empires founded by nomads who conquered agricultural areas faced the same dilemma. To retain control of a sedentary region1 it was necessary to establish garrisons, but nomads in an urban garrison could no longer participate in the way of life which accounted for their skill at horseback

[26] Gustave Alef, "Origin and Development of the Muscovite Postal Service," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 15 (1967), 1-15.

[27] Peter Olbrecht, *Das Postwesen in China unter der Mongolenherrschaft im 13 und 14 Jh.* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1954).

[28] Paul Heng-chao Ch'en, *Chinese Legal Tradition under the Mongols: The Code of 1291 as Reconstructed* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1979).

[29] Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran*, pp. 373-98.

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archery and thus for their military superiority over sedentary armies. The nomads needed an economic base with sufficient pasturage to enable them to continue their nomadic existence and breed enough horses to mount an army. It was also necessary that this pasturage be in proximity to the sedentary zones they wished to control so that effective military force could be exercised. The absence of adequate pasturage has been cited as an explanation for the inability of any Inner Asian people based on the Hungarian plain, such as the Huns, to sustain an empire in Central Europe, as well as for the retreat of the Mongols from Europe.[30] Nomadic rule was predicated on the capability to move strategic and punitive forces rapidly to locations within the empire in the event of opposition or revolt.

In China this problem was never solved. The Yüan dynasty took on the geopolitical identity of a Chinese empire, both internally, as a regime based on the agricultural heartland and the Chinese bureaucratic apparatus,[31] and externally, as the Yüan continued and expanded Chinese foreign policy interests in Southeast Asia. But the Yüan were threatened when rival Chinggisids seized control of Mongolia and its pastures, thus acquiring the legitimacy of the steppe and the horses to act on that legitimacy. China did not have sufficient pasturage. Historians have been too credulous, accepting the secondhand, self-serving story which claimed that Mongol factions could be expected to massacre the Chinese and turn China into pastureland; this is ecological nonsense.[32] The Yüan did not have enough horses and eventually were compelled to confiscate farm horses ill-suited for Mongol cavalry warfare from the Chinese; this had disastrous effects on the agricultural sector of the Chinese economy.[33] The Yüan faced the same obstacles in controlling Mongolia as any Chinese dynasty

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[30] Denis Sinor, "Horse and Pasture in Inner Asian History," *OE*, 19 (1972), 171-83. Reservations have been expressed about Sinor's computations of the landmass of the Hungarian plain, which are used to support the argument. I believe other factors may have influenced the Mongol decision, but I am in basic agreement with this approach.

[31] John W. Dardess, *Conquerors and Confucians: Aspects of Political Change in Late Yüan China* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1973) argues that early Yüan political conflict represented competing Mongol and Chinese conceptions of rule and power base, and that later Yüan political conflict represented competing Confucian theories; the former contention is more convincing than the latter. Also see his "From Mongol Empire to Yüan Dynasty: Changing Forms of Imperial Rule in Mongolia and Central Asia," *MS*, 30 (1972-73), 117-65.

[32] Supposedly Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai advised Möngke that an empire could be conquered on horseback but could not be ruled from horseback, adding that it would be more profitable to let the Chinese live and farm, and to tax them, than to massacre them and turn China into pastureland. However, this is a repetition of a dialogue which supposedly took place between Lu Chia and the emperor Han Kao-tsu c. 200 B.C. See N. Ts. Munkuev, *Kitaiskii istochnik o pervykh mongol'skikh khanakh. Nadgrobnaia nadpis' na mogile Eliu Chu-tsaia. Perevod i issledovanie* (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), p. 106, n. 97 et passim. Cf. Igor de Rachewiltz, "Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (1189-1243): Buddhist Idealist and Confucian Statesman," in *Confucian Personalities*, ed. Arthur F. Wright and Denis Twitchett (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1962), pp. 211, 214-15.

[33] S. Jagchid and C. R. Bawden, "Some Notes on the Horse Policy of the Yüan Dynasty," *CAJ*, 10 (1965), 246-68.

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encountered in subduing the steppe: distance made garrisoning prohibitively expensive, and there was no military means of eliminating nomadic resistance. In addition to being unable to garrison Mongolia, the Yüan garrisons in China lost military effectiveness because of their sedentary existence. Chinese were even allowed to enter the elite Mongol Imperial Guard. The Mongol army in China collapsed internally.[34]

In Iran the Ilkhanids were in a better position. Northern Iran and southern Azerbaijan offered good pastures, and there was also some acceptable land in southern Iran. The army, which formed the core of the Ilkhanid Mongols, remained nomadic and located in the north where the Mongols constructed their new capitals, Tabriz and Sultaniyya. There were also Ilkhanid garrisons in Iranian cities, although we know little of them.[35] The Ilkhanids, too, acquired the geopolitical foreign policy interests of the indigeneous region, i.e., Iranian ambitions in Syria, Palestine, Anatolia, India, and Afghanistan. The Mongol army had greater staying power in Iran than in China, as is indicated by the fact that when the Ilkhanid empire disintegrated, three of its four successor states were rooted in Mongol tribes: the Jalayir, Oyirad, and Chobanids.[36]

The Mongols in Russia, however, were blessed with the ample pastures of the Pontic and Caspian steppe in close proximity to the Russian forest zone. The Golden Horde did not need to garrison Russia. Indeed, the Mongols did not need even to station permanent administrators in the Russian cities. After the removal of the *basqaqs* (*darughachi*), governors resident in the cities, Mongol control did not weaken. No Russian city was out of reach of easily mobilized nomadic punitive expeditions. Rule from the steppe allowed the Mongols, except for those involved in the bureaucracy in Saray, to continue the pastoral nomadic way of life which assured the continued existence of the nomadic army. Because Mongol rule over Russia was indirect, it lasted a century longer than in China or Iran; the retention of "primitive" nomadism explains the continued Golden Horde military superiority over its Russian subjects.[37]

Although Mongol rule was indirect, it still exerted enormous influence. Muscovite Russia copied Mongol armaments, strategy and tactics,[38] diplomatic

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[34] Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao, *The Military Establishment of the Yüan Dynasty* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1978). See the review by Morris Rossabi in the *Bulletin of Sung-Yüan Studies*, No. 14 (1978), pp. 126-27.

[35] Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran*, pp. 399-421. Cf. John Masson Smith, "Mongol Manpower and Persian Population," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 18 (1975), 271-99.

[36] Petrushevskii, *Zemledelie...*, p. 62.

[37] The best appreciation of this fact is in Perry Anderson, *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism* (London: NLB, 1974), p. 227, but see also V. V. Bartol'd, *Raboty po istorii i filologii tiurkskikh i mongol'skikh narodov* (= *Sochineniia*, Vol. v; Moscow: Izd. Vostochnoi literatury, 1968), p. 135.

[38] Some Mongol military institutions were also retained in China.

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ceremonial,[39] chancellery practices,[40] and certain other administrative and fiscal institutions. In Iran, Mongol terminology was well enough known to be satirized in poetry,[41] yet it seems the Russians borrowed more extensively from the Golden Horde than did the Chinese or the Iranians from the Yüan and Ilkhanids.

Except for conducting some warfare in Eastern Europe against Poland, Lithuania, and Hungary, the Golden Horde did not acquire the geopolitical foreign policy orientation of the Russian principalities. The heartland of the Horde was the steppe. Horde foreign policy focused overwhelmingly upon acquisition of the rich pastures and caravan routes of Azerbaijan, in the pursuit of which a long-term alliance was reached with the Mamluks in Egypt.[42] Russia itself was peripheral to the Horde, not only geographically but also politically and economically. Its military contribution to Mongol armies and economic share of Horde revenue must have been modest. The Mongols of the Golden Horde assimilated into the Turkic-speaking pastoral nomadic population of the Qipchaq steppe; Mongols and Qipchaqs adopted Islam simultaneously. The consequences of this phenomenon for Russo-Mongol relations were unexpected.

In China, the Mongols adopted the full Chinese bureaucratic system, although they rigged examinations in their own favor. In Iran, the Mongols adopted the *diwan* system, the most efficient and advanced administrative system in the contemporary Muslim world. However, the Golden Horde did not copy Russian political institutions; instead, it imported the *diwan* system, along with Islam, from Mamluk Egypt and Khwarizm.[43] The Russians were unable to copy the *diwan* system, not because it was administratively inferior to their own, but because it was too tainted with Islam, an infidel faith. The Golden Horde made no attempt to impose the *diwan* or any other direct administrative system upon Russia. Since the Mongols were successful in establishing systems in China and Iran, it is unlikely that this discretion was motivated by bureaucratic timidity; compared to these countries, Russia was a backwater. Rather, it was not worthwhile for the Golden Horde to govern Russia directly;

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[39] N. I. Veselovskii, "Tatarskoe vliianie na posol'skii tseremonial v moskovskii period russkoi istorii," *Otchet Sv. Peterburgskago Universiteta za 1910*, pp. 1-19. See Alan W. Fisher, "Muscovite-Ottoman Relations in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," *Humaniora Islamica*, I (1973), 207-17.

[40] See A. P. Grigor'ev, *Mongol'skaia diplomatika XIII-XIV vv.* (*Chingizidskie zhalovannye gramoty*) (Leningrad: Izd. LGU, 1978), and Edward L. Keenan, Jr., "The *Yarlik* of Axmed-Khan to Ivan III: A New Reading - A Study in Literal *Diplomatica* and Literary *Turcica*", *International Journal of Slavic Linguistics and Poetics*, 11 (1967), 33-47.

[41] V. Minorsky, "Pūr-i Bahā's 'Mongol Ode,' " and "Pūr-i Bahā and his Poems," in his *Iranica*, pp. 274-91, 292-305.

[42] Salikh Zakirov, *Diplomaticheskie otnosheniia Zolotoi Ordy s Egiptom* (*13-14 vv.*) (Moscow: Nauka, 1966).

[43] Berthold Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde: Die Mongolen in Russland*, 2nd ed. (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1965), pp. 300-312; Vernadsky, pp. 121-30, 214-32; Grekov and Iakubovskii, pp. 122-40; V. L. Egorov, "Gosudarstvennoe i administrativnoe ustroistvo Zolotoi ordy," *Voprosy istorii*, No. 2 (1972), pp. 32-42.

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therefore, the Russian princes, like the Armeno-Georgian kings, princes, and lords, were permitted to retain their positions. The Volga Bolghar and Khwarizmian political elites were less fortunate; the Golden Horde needed complete authority over these trade emporia and liquidated the local dynasties upon conquest. Because Mongol rule over Russia was indirect, the Mongols were less influenced by the Russians than by the Chinese and Iranians.

The Mongols did not alter the basic social structure of any country I they conquered, but the nature of Mongol social relations with each indigenous population varied. In China, the social, linguistic, religious, and cultural mixing was the most complicated. To retain exclusive political monopoly, the Mongols in China continued to adhere to their clan-tribal structure; emperors came from the Chinggisid clan and the Khonggirad supplied the imperial consorts. But to play the role of Chinese emperors, the Yüan submitted at; least partially to sinicization. The strongest pressures for assimilation existed in the Mongol urban garrisons. It is not easy to evaluate the degree of sinicization among the Mongols in China. Until the middle of the fourteenth century few Mongol emperors knew the Chinese language; some of the last Yüan could manage some schoolboy verse, but no more.[44] Garrison Mongol soldiers tended to take Chinese wives (in addition to their Mongol wives in the steppe). They also observed Chinese mourning rituals upon the death of a parent, which, to the detriment of the army, removed; them from service for three years.[45] Both the Chinese and the Mongols, for the purpose of upgrading status, liked to adopt the names and learn the language of the other. There is a series of bilingual stone inscriptions in Chinese characters and Uighur Mongol (and some 'Phags-pa) which gives significant evidence of sinicization, biculturalism, and social assimilation and osmosis.[46] The Yüan emperors perpetuated sacred practices symbolic of their Mongol origin, for example, reading the Jasagh on ceremonial occasions and planting steppe grass outside imperial palaces; however, they also adhered to the Chinese imperial cult, took Chinese imperial names, and were propitiated with posthumous Chinese canonization.

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[44] H. Franke, "Could the Mongol emperors read and write Chinese?" *AM*, 3 (1953), 28-41, and Igor de Rachewiltz, "The Language Problem in Yüan China," *Journal of the Oriental Society of Australia*, 5 (1967), 65-80.

[45] See the discussion in Wolfram Eberhard, *Conquerors and Rulers: Social Forces in Medieval China*, 2nd ed. (Leiden: Brill, 1970), pp. 107 ff.

[46] See the series of articles by Francis W. Cleaves in the *HJAS*: "The Sino-Mongolian Inscription of 1362 in Memory of Prince Hindu," 12 (1949), 1-133; "The Sino-Mongolian Inscription of 1335 in Memory of Chang Ying-jui," 13 (1950), 1-131; "The Sino-Mongolian Inscription of 1338 in Memory of Jigüntei," 14 (1951), 1-104; "The Sino-Mongolian Inscription of 1346," 15 (1952), 1-123; "The Sino-Mongolian Inscription of 1240," 23 (1960-61), 62-75; and "The Sino-Mongolian Inscription of 1348," 27 (1967), 76-102. Many other articles by Cleaves could be cited to illustrate similar phenomena. The Mongols of the Yüan fostered bilingualism, although they did not learn Chinese; rather, "Western Regions" people and Chinese learned Mongolian.

For multilingual seals, see David M. Farquhar, "Official Seals and Ciphers of the Yüan Period," *MS*, 25 (1966), 362-93.

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For the most part, the Mongols in China did not learn Chinese. Westerners who came to China, merchants like Marco Polo[47] or missionaries like Monte Corvino, could get by on Mongolian and Turkic at court. After an initial period of courting Chinese generals and administrators to hasten the process of conquest,[48] the Mongols adopted a multitiered social policy. Mongols were most favored, followed by peoples from the "Western Regions," non-Mongol non-Chinese many of whom were Turks. Northern Chinese came third; Southern Chinese, who had had no previous experience of nomadic conquest and were politically most suspect, came last. The establishment of quotas in the system of examination for entrance into the bureaucracy ensured a politically reliable social mix in the administration. The peoples of the "Western Regions" actively adopted and contributed to Chinese culture[49] and served as intermediaries between their Mongol superiors and their Chinese underlings and subjects. The presence of such multilingual interstitial social units permitted the Mongol elite the greater differentiation from their subjects which ignorance of the Chinese language accorded. For this reason, the Yüan government at times discouraged Chinese and Mongols from learning each others' languages.[50]

Religion was a divisive factor in Yüan China. The evolving preference of the Yüan emperors for Confucianism, combined with their occasional patronage of Taoism and Buddhism, led to severe sectarian strife.[51] Muslim merchants and tax-farmers and isolated Europeans in Yüan service contributed further to the unrest, eventually catalyzing anti-Muslim and anti-Christian backlashes in post-Mongol times. However, the most profound religious cleavages in China were internal and pre-Mongol in origin. Despite efforts to avoid involvement in religious controversy and continue the tradition of shamanist religious tolerance ascribed to Chinggis Khan, the Yüan were helpless to alter the Chinese religious landscape.

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[47] See the provocative article by John W. Haeger, "Marco Polo in China? Problems with Internal Evidence," *Bulletin of Sung-Yüan Studies*, No. 14 (1978), pp. 22-30. For convenience, consult the translation by Ronald Latham, *The Travels of Marco Polo* (London: Folio Society, 1978).

[48] Igor de Rachewiltz, "Personnel and Personalities in North China in the Early Mongol Period," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 9 (1966), 88-144.

[49] L. Carrington Goodrich and Ch'ien Hsing-hai, trans, and annotators, Ch'en Yüan, *Western and Central Asians in China under the Mongols: Their Transformation into Chinese*, Monumenta Serica Monograph xv (Los Angeles, 1966).

[50] The aristocratic French Crusaders of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem used French - and Arabic - speaking Eastern Christians as intermediaries with their Muslim peasants and subjects, which allowed them to avoid learning Arabic. See Joshua Prawer, *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. European Colonialism in the Middle Ages* (London: Weidenfell and Nicolson, 1972). Similarly, the Catholic Spaniards of thirteenth-century Crusader Valencia used Jewish intermediaries with their Moorish subjects. See Robert Ignatius Burns, S. J., *Medieval Colonialism: Post-Crusade Exploitation of Islamic Valencia* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976).

[51] See Igor de Rachewiltz, "The *Hsi-yi lu* of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai," *MS*, 21 (1962), 1-128 inter alia.

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In Iran, the picture was less complicated. The court and the elite learned some Persian,[52] and there is evidence of bilingualism.[53] The religious minorities of Iran, for example the Orthodox Christians and the Jews, caused serious religious problems as the dynasty shifted from its initial sympathy for Nestorian Christianity to loyalty to Sunni Islam. Until the Ilkhanids adopted Islam, the Muslim population detested paying taxes, a practice deemed appropriate only for unbelievers, and decried the religious toleration which the Mongols originally displayed. The Sunni Muslims had rejoiced at Mongol destruction of the Shi'ite Assassins, but they were intolerant of the pleasure which the Armenian Christians evinced upon Mongol liquidation of the Caliphate and the sack of Baghdad. With Ilkhanid adoption of Islam, the situation of the Christians in Iran deteriorated, and Buddhist temples were converted to mosques. The concomitant backlash against the Jews seems, however, to have been an isolated reaction following the execution of an avaricious vizier, who happened to be Jewish. As Sunni Muslims, the Ilkhanids could not completely ignore the divisions within Islam or retain unchanged Mongol shamanist religious toleration.

In the Golden Horde there was a far greater degree of religious and social homogeneity. The Mongols assimilated into the Turkic-speaking pastoral nomadic milieu of the steppe, retaining their own clan-tribal structure (as in Iran and China), eliminating the Qipchaq social units, and incorporating these populations into new groupings with Mongol names, such as the Nogais and the Uzbeks.[54] The Orthodox Christian Russians essentially remained outside the Horde and posed no problem; Armenians, Jews, and Italian Catholics within the Horde served vital economic functions but carried little social weight. Islam united the nomads, the necessary urban populations, the bureaucracy of Saray, and the commercial emporia of Grand Bolghar and Central Asia. It was, therefore, easier to maintain religious toleration, because religious diversity posed no real threat to Mongol hegemony or social order. Religion never divided the Golden Horde against itself, as it did the Yüan and the Ukhanids, because the Mongols of the Golden Horde were not living in a religiously hostile environment. At the same time, the Mongols in the Golden Horde did not face the assimilation problems of the Yüan; adoption of Islam and Turkicization did not intrude on the pastoral nomadic way of life which underlay the military capability of the Golden Horde.

The greater social distance between Russians and Mongols in the Golden Horde did not obviate a need for the Russians to become intimately familiar

[52] Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran*, pp. 452-58.

[53] See Francis W. Cleaves, "The Mongolian Documents in the Musée de Téhéran," *HJAS*, 16 (1953), 1-107.

[54] G. A. Fedorov-Davydov, *Kochevniki Vostochnoi Evropy pod vlast'iu zolotoordynskikh khanov: Arkheologicheskie pamiatniki* (Moscow: Izd. MGU, 1966) and *Obshchestvennyi stroi Zolotoi Ordy* (Moscow: Izd. MGU, 1973).

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with the geography, society, officialdom, politics, and language of the Horde; political survival necessitated precisely such expertise. Medieval Russian chronicles are replete with data on cities and other sites in the Horde, and names of Mongol khans and their relatives, Mongol aristocrats, and officials.[55] We have, however, only one partially bilingual text, a travelogue by the Tverian merchant Afanasii Nikitin, who travelled to India in the second half of the fifteenth century; it includes passages in an oriental patois of Turkic, Mongolian, Arabic, and Persian.[56] Still, the amount of communication between Russians and Mongols in the Horde, and the near total absence of references to translators, suggests there must have been much more bilingualism than our sources indicate.

Ironically, Mongol religious policy, even in Russia, fostered the growth of ecclesiastical landholding. In China, direct patronage of temples naturally had this effect, as did patronage of Muslim religious institutions by the Ilkhanids, evidenced by the spread of *waqf* lands.[57] But also in Armenia, under Ilkhanid rule, monastic landholding increased.[58] The fiscal and judicial immunities granted by the khans of the Golden Horde to the Russian Orthodox Church had similar results.[59] Vestigial Mongol religious tolerance from the shamanist Chinggisid era should be given credit for this development.

The implications for cultural policy of the differing social, linguistic, and religious attitudes of the Yüan, Ilkhanid, and Jochid are quite interesting. In China, the emperors became direct patrons of culture, and opportunistic literati dedicated sycophantic poetry to them in order to curry favor.[60] The Yüan not only played the traditional Chinese imperial role of cultural sponsor, but also to some Extent took advantage of the cosmopolitan opportunities inherent in tihe creation of a world Mongol empire. An Italian even became a member of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.[61] However, since the Yüan were essentially ignorant of Chinese and confident of their political power, they disregarded the writings of dissident Confucian literati who refused to serve them, as long as

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[55] See Charles J. Halperin, "Know Thy Enemy: Medieval Russian Familiarity with the Mongols of the Golden Horde," forthcoming in the *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*.

A similar case could, of course, be made for medieval Armenia. See John Andrew Boyle's articles "Kirakos of Ganjuk on the Mongols," *CAJ*, 8 (1963), 199-214, and "The Journey of Het'um I, King of Little Armenia, to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke," *CAJ*, 9 (1964), 175-89.

[56] *Khozhenie za tri moria Afanasiia Nikitina 1466-1472 gg.*, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk, 1958).

[57] Petrushevskii, *Zemledelie...*, pp. 233-83; Ali-Zade, pp. 135-54.

[58] Babaian, pp. 190-221.

[59] M. D. Priselkov, *Khanskie iarliki russkim mitropolitam* (Zapiski istoriko-filologicheskago fakul'teta Imp. Petrogradskago Univ., ch. 133; Petrograd, 1916).

[60] Francis W. Cleaves, "The 'Fifteen "Palace Poems" ' by K'o Chiu-ssu," *HJAS*, 20 (1957) 391-479.

[61] Bartol'd, pp. 233-35, 382-91; on Chinese coins in Bukhara. p. 156.

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such disaffection did not lead to overt treason.[62] These literati were responsible for the flowering of Chinese drama, sometimes with anti-Yüan themes. They thought it their right to govern, but since that was impossible, they wrote plays. It has even been claimed that Yüan anti-classicism provided a stimulus for the development of literature written in vernacular Chinese as opposed to the formal literary language.[63] Chinese culture did not suffer under the Mongols; the output of literature, architecture, crafts, painting, etc., from the "Western Regions" and from Chinese artists and writers, was substantial and of respectable quality.

In Iran under the Ilkhanids, after the adoption of Islam, Muslim religious culture prospered. We also find sycophantic poetry similar to that written in China. The Ilkhanid period saw the flowering of Iranian historiography, as represented by Juwaynī and Rashīd ad-Dīn.[64] Ilkhanid-Yüan relations also introduced foreign cultural influences. Chinese astronomers established an observatory in Iran with imported equipment, and Chinese miniature painting influenced Iranian.[65] These cultural interactions were, however, ephemeral and sometimes superficial; the ancient cultures of China and Iran were not profoundly altered by the cross-cultural fertilization which Mongol contacts made possible. Nevertheless, these examples supply some cultural evidence to validate Bartol'd's intriguing observation that the Mongol achievement is best seen in the Asian perspective of the unification of East, Central, and West Asia.[66] This view is preferable to the romantic myth that the Mongols fostered cultural understanding between China and Europe.[67] This notion derives from an exaggerated perception of the importance of the Mongol role in the spread of gunpowder, paper money, and printing from China to Europe, and from a cult treatment of Marco Polo. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the degree of mutual understanding between Europe and China was not impressive.[68]

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[62] Wai-Kam Ho, "Chinese under the Mongols," in *Chinese Art under the Mongols: The Yüan Dynasty, 1279-1368*, ed. Sherman E. Lee and Wai-Kam Ho (Cleveland: Cleveland Museum of Art, 1968), pp. 73-112; and F. W. Mote, "Confucian Eremitism in the Yüan Period," in *The Confucian Persuasion*, ed. Arthur F. Wright (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1960), pp. 202-40, 348-53.

[63] See de Rachewiltz's article cited in n. 44.

[64] Rypka in *Cambridge History of Iran*, v, 621-25. Cf. Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran*, pp. 448-50 on architecture.

[65] Grabar in *Cambridge History of Iran*, v. 648-57 on miniatures (although supposedly other visual arts declined, 644-48); E. S. Kennedy, *ibid.*, 672, 678, 679, on astronomy.

[66] Bartol'd, pp. 253-64, 446-53, 615-28, inter alia, his studies of Chinggis Khan and his empire.

[67] See, e.g., the popular Michael Prawdin, *The Mongol Empire*, tr. Eden and Cedar Paul, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1967), and of course a number of grade-B Marco Polo adventure movies.

[68] Igor de Rachewiltz, *Papal Envoys to the Great Khans* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1971), concludes that little genuine understanding could have been mustered between the competing universalisms of pope and khan.

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Although the Yüan emperors and the Ilkhanids played an active role in cultural development, the influence of the khans of the Golden Horde was indirect. Muslim khans of the Horde would not patronize medieval Russian icon-painting or church construction because Christianity was an infidel faith. While the Yüan took some notice of historiography written in Chinese and the Ilkhanids virtually censored Persian chronicle-writing in lands under their control, there is little evidence that the Golden Horde was interested in or informed of medieval chronicle-writing in Russian (or Armenian when such territories fell within the Horde). Ironically, immunities granted by the Mongols enabled the Russian Orthodox Church, via a new monastic mystical movement called Hesychasm, to inspire a major cultural revival in northeastern Russia during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The difference in religion between the Mongols of the Golden Horde and their Orthodox Christian Russian subjects precluded the Horde from taking on a greater cultural role, one which might have been more comparable to Yüan and Ilkhanid roles in artistic areas. In the Horde itself, there was Mongol patronage of the active Muslim religious culture, but few of the products of this culture survived the destruction of the Horde.

The intellectual response of the Russians to Mongol conquest was quite different from that of the Chinese and Iranians. In China, though conquest dynasties were never welcomed, there was a theory to rationalize their appearance, namely, a change in the Mandate of Heaven. Familiarity did not, however, foster good relations, and a simple adjustment easily explained the overthrow of the Yüan, i.e., another change in the Mandate of Heaven. Confucian officials who shifted their loyalty to the Ming were not much criticized.[69] In Iran, historians could draw upon an elaborate Muslim historiography, if need be the theory of the cycle of states and rise and fall of empires, to explain the Mongol conquest. Mongol adoption of Islam greatly facilitated the intellectual adjustment required to present such an argument. But Russia was different. The East Slavs had never been conquered by an infidel pastoral nomadic people, and they had no historical theory of conquest on, which to fall back. By default, they refused to deal with the Mongols in terms of political suzerainty, articulating no consciousness of "conquest" or "liberation." Instead, they presented Russo-Mongol relations as a discrete series of military encounters, either defeats or victories, devoid of ideological significance for Russian sovereignty. The indirectness of Mongol rule undoubtedly rendered such an intellectual pose viable; the presence of Mongol garrisons in the

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[69] Hok-lam Chan, "Liu Ping-chung (1216-1274): A Buddhist Taoist Statesman at the Court of Khubilai Khan," *TP*, 53 (1967), 98-146; John W. Dardess, "The Cheng Communal Family: Social Organization and Neo-Confucianism in Yüan and Early Ming China," *HJAS*, 34 (1974), 7-52; and Dardess, "Ming T'ai-tsu on the Yüan: An Autocrat's Assessment of the Mongol Dynasty," *Bulletin of Sung- Yüan Studies*, 14 (1978), 6-11, who observes that historians may reach conclusions about the Yüan as contradictory as those of Ming T'ai-tsu. (I have not yet seen John D. Langlois, Jr., ed. *China under Mongol Rule* [Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1981.]).

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Russian forest zone would have created too much tension for such a theory to be employed. This reaction is particularly puzzling in that the Russians fully comprehended the basic political principle of the Mongol empire, the blood legitimacy of the clan of Chinggis Khan, and manipulated that principle ideologically to justify their actions in dealing with the Tatars.[70] How the Russians could so have exalted the status of a conquering Mongol dynasty without acknowledging intellectually that they had been conquered is an abiding paradox of medieval Russian intellectual history, but the assiduous attention to the Chinggisid elite may be explained by the direct personal relations between the Russian princes and the khans. The contradiction between Russian ambivalence about conquest and devotion to Chinggisid legitimacy therefore appears to be the intellectual manifestation of the basic contradictions and ambivalences in Russia's relationship to the Golden Horde. This argument, however, must be further developed elsewhere.

The idiosyncratic medieval Russian intellectual response to the Mongols should not obscure the fact that Russia was no more politically servile to the Mongols than were China or Iran; the Mongols were, after all, overthrown in all three countries. The longer duration of Mongol rule in Russia is a function, not of greater Russian subservience, but rather of greater Mongol military power, rooted in more faithful adherence to the clan-tribal pastoral and nomadic way of life. The Chinggisid principle was assimilated by the Russians to a greater extent than by the Chinese or Iranian,[71] continuing into the post-Mongol period.[72] This is comparable only to the adoption of this principle by non-Mongol Inner Asian pastoral nomadic groups.

According to traditional Russian historiography, the Mongols had minimal influence on Russian history, except for the destruction they caused, because they did not move into the Russian forest zone. In China, the Mongols

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[70] See Michael Cherniavsky's seminal "Khan or Basileus: An Aspect of Russian Medieval Political Theory," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 20 (1959), 459-76, and his stimulating "Ivan the Terrible and the Iconography of the Kremlin Cathedral of Archangel Michael," *Russian History*, 2 (1975), 3-28. See also Charles J. Halperin, "A Chingissid Saint of the Russian Orthodox Church: The 'Life of Peter, *tsarevich* of the Horde,' " *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*, 9.3 (1975), 324-35, and "The Russian Land and the Russian Tsar: The Emergence of Muscovite Ideology, 1380-1408," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte*, 23 (1976), 7-103.

[71] Unlike the Chinese and Persian materials, medieval Russian sources show no evidence of familiarity with the *Secret History of the Mongols*, but this might be explained not by ignorance but by the inability to find a place to record such data in the genre system of Old Russian literature. For example, the Russians knew Saray far better than Constantinople but could not record that knowledge since the only acceptable form of travelogue was the pilgrimage. (Nikitin was an exception.) Russian use of Chinggisid ideology is more significant, since the medieval Russian sources, unlike the Yüan Chinese or Ilkhanid Persian, were not under direct Mongol patronage and supervision.

[72] The role of the Mongols in post-Yüan China and post-Ilkhanid Iran, and Muscovite relations with the successor states of the Golden Horde would constitute a separate study.

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were sinicized, and in Iran, they were "Iranicized." However, it was believed that the Mongols in the Golden Horde did not assimilate into the "superior" sedentary Russian civilization, but were merely Turkicized and Islamized. As a result they would have had little to offer Russia and Russia would have taken little from them. I have argued that an objective comparison of Russo-Mongol, Sino-Mongol, and Irano-Mongol relations turns these axioms on their heads. Because Mongol rule over Russia was indirect, it lasted longer than Mongol rule over China and Iran. The impact of the Mongols on Russia was, if anything, greater than on China and Iran, although the religious barrier precluded any influence upon Russia of the Muslim culture or any imitation of the Iranian bureaucracy of the Golden Horde. Because the Horde was based in the steppe, not in the Russian forest zone, and because Russia was rather unimportant to Horde priorities, it would be more correct to say that there was less Russian influence on the Mongols of the Golden Horde than Chinese influence on the Yüan or Iranian on the Ilkhanids. It seems to me that this revisionist formulation is more faithful to Russian and Mongol history.

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THE IDEOLOGY OF SILENCE: PREJUDICE AND PRAGMATISM ON THE MEDIEVAL RELIGIOUS FRONTIER

Historians have long debated the importance of religion as a determining factor in relations between Christians and Muslims during the Middle Ages. On the one hand, each side consigned adherents of the enemy's religion to eternal damnation. Religious animosity provided the *casus belli* of crusade and jihad; Christian and Muslim met each other on the field of battle with great frequency. On the other hand, Christian-Muslim relations also included peaceful commerce, institutional borrowing, and even cultural exchange. Christians and Muslims spent more time fighting their coreligionists than making war on each other. Churches continued to exist in the lands of Islam, and mosques survived under Christian rule as well: Such evidence has led some historians to minimize the degree to which religious intolerance influenced Christian-Muslim contacts during the Middle Ages.[1]

Military conflict led to the creation of conquest societies in which rulers and ruled practiced rival exclusivist religions. In such situations the intensity of Christian-Muslim interaction increased as a result of intimate physical proximity. Frontier/conquest societies, therefore, provide an excellent model for examining the interplay between the biases of religious exclusivism and the unavoidable exigencies of intractable reality. Catholics and Moors in Spain, Byzantines and various Arab and Turkic peoples, French crusaders and Muslims in Palestine, and Russians and Mongols had no choice but to reconcile the ideological imperative of religious antagonism with the inevitable compromises of involuntary coexistence, peaceful or no.[2] In general the frontier functioned as

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[1] For example, Robert S. Lopez, *The Birth of Europe* (London, 1966), 75-76, 78-81.

[2] In each of the cases studied in this article, a religious frontier coincided with an ethnic one, that is, a people of one religion conquered a foreign people of another. There were medieval frontiers, of course, which involved peoples of the same religion, for example, Catholic Normans and Anglo-Saxons; peoples of different branches of the same religion in schism, for example, Catholic crusaders and the Byzantines after the Fourth Crusade; "orthodox" and "heretics." such as Catholic Hungary and Bogomil Bosnia or Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims; or Christians and "pagans," such as Germans and Lithuanians or Slavs. The phenomenon of Christian-Muslim frontier societies, to my knowledge, never involved the same people, but that is very difficult to imagine since religion figured so heavily in the self-consciousness of medieval social groups.

I am using *ethnic* and *people* here merely as generic terms without a specific conceptual content, largely to avoid dealing with the question of medieval nations and nationalism.

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a zone across which mutual influences flowed rather than as a barrier or boundary.[3] Differing historical circumstances in each of these four cases produced different configurations of friendly and hostile relations in each society, and to some extent each situation retained unique features. However, the common problems of religious conquest societies create enough similarity to justify comparison and generalization.

The polarity between religious prejudice and peaceful pragmatism provides a useful heuristic framework within which to analyze medieval Christian-Muslim relations, but not a viable answer to the question as to the nature of the impact of religion on those relations. Few examples of unrestrained hatred or massacre and extermination of the infidel occurred; and totally peaceful cooperation devoid of any religious tension was rarely if ever achieved. Christian-Muslim relations invariable fell somewhere between the two extremes, and it is the complexity and subtlety of the resulting mosaic of mixed relations which arouses scholarly curiosity. A common pattern does emerge from the four cases of medieval religious conquest society, an ubiquitous method of mitigating the conflict between theoretical hatred and practicing tolerance, between open warfare and institutional borrowing, between prejudice and pragmatism. That common resolution of the tension between belief and reality was the ideology of silence.

The Christian *reconquista* of Spain from Islam led to the creation of the thirteenth-century crusader kingdom of Valencia, the best-known example of the intensive relations between Catholic and Moor in medieval Spain.[4] King

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Recent research by social anthropologists suggests that ethnic groups develop not in isolation but in interaction with other ethnic groups. See Frederick Barth, "Introduction," in *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*, Frederick Barth, ed. (Boston, 1969). 9-38.

[3] Owen Lattimore developed the concept of the frontier as a zone to describe relations between the Chinese and their Inner Asian nomadic neighbors. See Owen Lattimore, "China and the Barbarians," in *Empire in the East*, Joseph Barnes, ed. (Garden City, New York, 1934), 3-36; idem. *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (Boston, 1962); idem, *Studies in Frontier History. Collected Papers*, 1928-1958 (London, 1962), especially "The Frontier in History," 469-91.

The dynamics of Inner Asian empire building, in which a pastoral nomadic people acquired sedentary subjects, overlap the processes of religious frontier conquest analyzed in this essay, but demand separate treatment.

[4] Robert Ignatius Burns, S. J.: "Journey from Islam. Incipient Cultural Transition in the Conquered Kingdom of Valencia (1240-1280)," *Speculum*, 35:3 (1960), 337-56; "Social Riots on the Christian-Moslem Frontier: Thirteenth-Century Valencia," *American Historical Review*, 66:3 (1960-1961), 778-800; "The Friars of the Sack in Valencia," *Speculum*, 36:3 (1961), 435-38; "The Organization of a Medieval Cathedral Community: The Chapter of Valencia (1238-1280)," *Church History*, 31:1 (1962), 14-23; "The Parish as a Frontier Institution in Thirteenth-Century Valencia," *Speculum*. 37:2 (1962), 244-51; "Les hospitales del reino de Valencia en el sigle xiii," *Annuario de estudios mediaevalis*, 2 (1965), 135-54 [English-language summary, 751-52]; "A Medieval Income Tax: The Tithe in the Thirteenth-Century Kingdom of Valencia," *Speculum*, 41:3 (1966), 438-52; *The Crusader Kingdom of Valencia: Reconstruction on a Thirteenth-Century Frontier*, 2 vols.

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James I of Arago-Catalonia (1208-76) conquered and ruled Valencia as a colonialist, imperialist conquest society. In his autobiography and propaganda he presented himself as a crusader, expelling the Moors from Valencia and purging it of their evil, but his behavior did not consistently conform to this image. To minimize the cost of conquest in men and money he perforce proceeded more by negotiation than force of arms. He fancied himself an expert on the Moors. Far from decrying the elaborate etiquette and ceremonial upon which the Moors insisted in their negotiations, he delighted in participating knowledgeably in these infidel ways. Rather than deporting the Moors, he issued sweeping guarantees of their political autonomy, religious inviolability, and socioeconomic rights in order to induce them to surrender. Merchants kept their quarters, villages their lands, and nobles their castles. Islam became a licit religion in Christian Valencia.

Catholics constituted less than 15 percent of the population of thirteenth-century Valencia. Inevitably they had to take much of Moorish Valencia as it was, producing a profound symbiosis of institutions. The Catholics retained the topography of existing cities and villages, provincial divisions, the irrigation system, houses, and dwellings. Moorish taxes, including everything from licensing fees, rents, and monopolies to currency, continued in force. James

(Cambridge, Mass., 1967); "Un monasterio-hospital del sigle xiii: San Vicente de Valencia," *Annuario de estudios mediaevalis*, 4 (1968), 75-108 [English-language summary, 752]; "Irrigation Taxes in Early Mudejar Valencia: The Problem of the *Alfarda*," *Speculum*, 44:4 (1969), 560-67; "How to End a Crusade: Techniques for Making Peace in the Thirteenth-Century Kingdom of Valencia," *Military Affairs*, 35:3 (1971), 142-48; "Baths and Caravansaries in Crusader Valencia," *Speculum*, 46:3 (1971), 443-58; "Christian-Islamic Confrontation in the West: The Thirteenth-Century Dream of Conversion," *American Historical Review*, 76:5 (1971), 1386-1434; "The Spiritual Life of James the Conqueror, King of Arago-Catalonia, 1208-1276. Portrait and Self-Portrait," *Catholic Historical Review*, 62:1 (1976), 1-35; "Renegades, Adventurers, and Sharp Businessmen: The Thirteenth-Century Spaniard in the Cause of Islam," *Catholic Historical Review*, 58:3 (1972), 341-66; *Islam under the Crusaders: Colonial Survival in the Thirteenth-Century Kingdom of Valencia* (Princeton, 1973); "Le royaume chrétien de Valence et ses vassaux musulmans," *Annales: economies, sociétés, civilisations*, 28:1 (1973), 199-225; "Spanish Islam in Transition: Acculturative Survival and Its Price in the Christian Kingdom of Valencia," in *Islam and Cultural Change in the Middle Ages*, Speros Vryonis, Jr., ed. (Wiesbaden, 1975), 87-105; "Immigrants from Islam: The Crusaders' Use of Muslims as Settlers in Thirteenth-Century Spain," *American Historical Review* 80:1 (1975), 21-42; "The Muslims in the Christian Feudal Order (The Kingdom of Valencia, 1240-1280)," *Studies in Medieval Culture*, 5 (1975), 105-26; "The Medieval Crossbow as Surgical Instrument: An Illustrated Case History," *Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine*, 48 (1972), 983-89; *Medieval Colonialism: Post-Crusade Exploitation of Islamic Valencia* (Princeton, 1976); "Mudéjar History Today," *Viator*, 8 (1977), 128-43; "The Realms of Aragon: New Directions in Medieval History," *Midwest Quarterly*, 18 (1977), 225-39; and "Socioeconomic Structure and Continuity: Medieval Spanish Islam in the Tax Records of Crusader Valencia," in *The Islamic Middle East, 700-1900: Studies in Economic and Social History*, A. L. Udovitch, ed. (Princeton, 1981), 251-28. Also, Elena Lourie, "Free Moslems in the Balaeries under Christian Rule in the Thirteenth Century," *Speculum*, 45:4 (1970), 624-49; John Boswell, *The Royal Treasure: Muslim Communities under the Crown of Aragon in the Fourteenth Century* (New Haven, 1977); James Powers, "Frontier Municipal Baths and Social Intercourse in Thirteenth-Century Spain," *American Historical Review* 84:3 (1979), 649-67.

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even issued some coins in Arabic. To keep the records he employed many Arabic-speaking Moors. In addition, Jews played a pervasive role as intermediaries between Catholics and Muslims. Christians traded, often in contraband of war, with unconquered Muslims in Spain and North Africa. Christian mercenaries and adventurers frequently sought livelihoods in Moorish lands, although they faced excommunication if they served as soldiers against fellow Christians. Some Catholics superficially adopted the ways of the Moors in dress, food, and names. Since few Catholics seemed willing to migrate to Valencia, James of necessity invited Moors to settle his underpopulated kingdom. The Pope found this anomaly intolerable and threatened to excommunicate the king unless he revoked his invitation. James had to accede, but, as he expected and to his pleasure, his nobles refused to expel Moorish immigrants who had already arrived in Valencia, and their taxes continued to fill his coffers.

In the meantime the Catholic Church built a complete institutional establishment in Valencia and inaugurated a vigorous missionary campaign, led by preachers who had learned Arabic. The few Muslim intellectuals who defected to Christianity fed the Catholic illusion that no intelligent Moor would prefer Islam after having been exposed to Christianity. Some Moors converted for motives unrelated to genuine religious sentiment: avoidance of the gallows or criminal punishment, or the lure of material advancement. The apostasy of some Catholics in Moorish service to Islam, fear of the stake notwithstanding, horrified the Church. When attempts at rapprochement and the peaceful dissemination of Christianity among the Muslim population failed, the Catholics switched to more militant policies. Missionaries in Muslim lands sought, often successfully, the crown of martydom; in Valencia the bells in mosques converted to churches rang out a message of Christian superiority to Islam rooted in naked power. Moors paid the tithe which funded much Catholic activity and Moors constituted the overwhelming majority of the population of Valencia, but Catholic Church records rarely mention them. The Church avoided confronting the unseemly reality of continued Muslim presence in crusader Valencia by the simplest possible expedient - silence.

The Moorish elite continued to think of itself as Muslim. Although Moorish intellectual life had begun to decline before the Catholic conquest, Islam retained the loyalty of its adherents. From the Moorish point of view, the state of Muslim-Christian relations left much to be desired. The Catholic Spaniard nobles did perceive the indigenous Moorish elite as their social equals, accepted them as vassals, and even permitted some Moorish nobles to be dubbed. The similarity of chivalric notions of honor and valor shared by knights of both faiths facilitated such interaction. But other attempts to respect and maintain Morrish institutions backfired. King James transformed Muslim urban and rural communal institutions into legal corporations, a concept alien to Muslims, because this status corresponded to Catholic perceptions and custom. James also acted as the inheritor of the legal rights of the Moorish authorities;

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his meddling in Moorish courts probably undermined them more than benign neglect would have. The various attempts at concession did not satisfy the Moorish aristocracy, which could not resist the temptation to revolt against Catholic authority. A series of bloody rebellions led to the liquidation of Moorish castles and the obliteration of the Moorish aristocracy. The Moors had received too many privileges from King James to reconcile themselves to the loss of political power, especially to infidels, and even a shared chivalric ethos could not prevent civil war. Death or exile faced the unsuccessful rebels, and as a result of internal violence, many Moorish merchants, scholars, nobles, and clergy voluntarily left Valencia for lands still under Muslim political authority. The Catholics did not regret their departure; toleration of continued Moorish presence in Valencia derived from necessity, not preference. Defenseless peasants were the only Moors who remained in Valencia; after several generations they became genuine Mudéjars, Muslims under Christian rule. Deprived of their religious and political leadership and subordinated to an alien faith, the Moors saw their position deteriorate more and more.

The Mudéjars became an oppressed minority. In the fourteenth century they enjoyed royal protection as a function of their subservience to the royal treasury. During wartime, they were the group hurt most because of their vulnerability. The kings did little to interdict constant and violent harassment by hostile Catholics. In addition to victimization by robbers, bandits, rapists, and extortionists, Muslim and even converted Christian Moors fell prey to massive urban riots. The putative insincerity of their conversion provided Christian rioters with the excuse to pillage Christian Moors; Robert I. Burns, S. J., concludes that ethnic hatred survived and superseded supposed religious fellowship. The fines which the king imposed upon the offending cities provided financial restitution to him but scant solace to the Mudéjars.

In this new stage of Catholic-Moorish relations, social interaction could still be intense, but now it reinforced Mudéjars inferiority. For example, joint indulgence of Moorish houses of prostitution only contributed to the Catholic opinion of Moors as immoral and of all Moorish women as fair game. Usage of communal baths, a Moorish institution copied by the Catholics, might have generated a levelling effect, but instead the authorities prescribed separate days for Christian and Muslim use. Nothing inhibited the further expression of religious antagonism; intolerance reached its apex in the expulsion of the Moors from early modern Spain by Ferdinand and Isabella.

The transient synthesis and rough-and-ready tolerance of thirteenth-century Valencia best illustrates both the possibilities and inherent limitations of the medieval religious frontier. The garbled Arabic legal formulas in documents in the Valencian archives, ethnic pluralism, permission for Moors to swear on the Koran, continuous borrowing of institutions, and intimate contact across an all-too-open boundary – these products of the moment, concessions dictated by necessity, did not reflect genuine toleration. No Catholic in Valencia, including King James, could have concluded that Moorish Islam had as much right to

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exist as Catholic Christianity. Circumstance made the licitness of Islam and respect for Moorish custom and institutions, coexistence itself, merely unavoidable, not preferable. Burns concludes: "As if they were a battling married couple, basically incompatible yet unable to disengage, the two worlds lived side by side, erupting or subsiding in eccentric schedule."[5] Christianity and Islam in Spain were "basically incompatible" because neither recognized the ideological legitimacy of the other. In the long run, divorce proved feasible. Early modern Spain amassed the preponderant power to impose, at whatever cost, forced conversion or expulsion upon its Mudéjars. Neither the friendliness nor the hostility between Moor and Catholic should be minimized or exaggerated. Burns perceptively observes that medieval man had no less a capacity for contradiction than modern, but when he could resolve the contradiction by fiat, he preferred bigoted action to hypocritical toleration.

Ultimately hatred outran and overwhelmed cooperation in Spain, or, to put it another way, prejudice outweighed pragmatism. It could hardly have been otherwise. Religiously motivated military conquest threw the adherents of two exclusivist religions into intimate and intense contact. A decline in religious affiliation or overriding circumstances could only delay the inevitable explosion. Yet the degree of compromise, of de facto toleration and temporary cultural osmosis, remains impressive. The delicate balance of the religious frontier could not survive the homogenizing and integrating forces unleashed by the process of building a nation-state in early modern Spain, when even Moriscos (or Marranos), let alone Mudéjars (or Jews), could find no room for themselves in the new monarchy.

Ideological silence girded the edifice of frontier toleration for as long as it endured. A rationale did exist for the continued existence of Muslims in lands acquired for the stated purpose of expelling the infidel faith, namely tradition. In the lands of Spanish Islam, toleration of religious minorities had an ancient lineage. King James merely perpetuated the pattern of multireligious social coexistence which he found in Valencia, reversing the roles of politically dominant and politically subordinate faiths. Necessity dictated that not all Moors be expelled, even that further Moorish immigration be sought: who else but Moors could pay for the Christian state and Church of Valencia? Canon law even supplied a half-hearted and thoroughly anemic justification for toleration of Islam under Christian rule: forced conversions to Christianity lacked legitimacy. One had to tolerate Islam until the Muslims voluntarily adopted the true faith. During this unfortunate and, it was expected, brief period, Muslims were forbidden to insult Christianity or interfere with Christian missionary activities, two almost impossible caveats from the point of view of Muslim piety.[6] In practice the distinction between persuasion and coercion often became blurred. In any event, the Catholic powers of Valencia rarely invoked tradition,

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[5] Burns, *Islam under the Crusaders*, xiii.

[6] Frederick H. Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1975).

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necessity, or the carefully constructed niceties of canon law; silence better served to mitigate the contradiction between the obvious demands of crusader ethos and prejudice and the requirements of everyday life in Spain.

"Feudal" norms played more of a role in facilitating social compromise between Christians and Moors than has been credited to them. Social elitism lent a much-sought respectability, elegance, and grace to the otherwise potentially tawdry process of surrender and negotiating a modus vivendi. Honest friendships, certainly social respect and intimacy, could develop in such circumstances. But such social interaction could not breach the wall of religious exclusivism. A Christian might admire a Moor for his moral qualities, but only with the qualification that such qualities existed despite, not because of, his adherence to Islam. The decency of individual Muslims could not influence the prevailing contempt for Islam as a religion. It was not necessary to articulate this ubiquitous prejudice in every social context, yet it set absolute limits upon the viability of social understanding in Spain.

Religion also restricted cultural and intellectual contact between Christian and Muslim. The demands of imposing a new political order and establishing an ecclesiastical structure in thirteenth-century Valencia left little time for cultural activity, but Spain as a whole served as the intermediary between Catholic Europe and the world of Islam in culture. Evaluations of the impact of Arabic learning upon Christian Europe vary, yet all analyses of the subject attest to the obstacles created by religious attitudes. The Arabs perhaps contributed somewhat to medieval Christian art and architecture, but their influence here was greatest in the minor arts and crafts, such as tapestries, which had the least to do with religious ideology. High culture evolved around religion, and the taint of infidel Islam precluded very much borrowing or influence. Claims have been advanced for the connection between Arabic poetry and that of Provence, or even for Muslim antecedents of Dante, but they remain inconclusive or worse. The most-cited area of Arab influence on Christian culture is in the transmission of classical Greek learning, especially philosophy and science. The ambiguities and difficulties encompassed in that process require more emphasis than they have received. Defenders of religious orthodoxy suspected those intellectuals who studied the pagan philosophy, and even more so since they thereby exposed themselves to the pernicious influence of Islamic intermediaries. Christian Aristotelians came under close scrutiny by Church authorities both for studying Aristotle and for studying him in Arabic dress. However, Christian philosophers studied Arabic commentaries on Aristotle, not the Koran or the Shar'iat, and no Christian ever applied Arabic learning to Christian theology or canon law. Arabic scientific texts often had to be purged of illustrative material which was "too Muslim." Indeed, Muslim Aristotelians often ran into trouble with their own religious authorities, and all students of classical learning on both sides of the religious frontier risked accusations of heresy and practice of impermissible astrology. Any contact with the infidel threatened adherence to one's own faith, but exposure to cultural products

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reflective of infidel religion automatically impugned the exclusive legitimacy of the true faith and deserved the severest condemnation. Muslim transmission of the classical Greek heritage in philosophy and science to Christian Europe in the Middle Ages did not diminish religious antagonism between Christian and Muslim; the transfer took place in an atmosphere of general suspicion and despite the religious hostility of the frontier.[7]

In Catholic Valencia not even King James could offer an ideological defense of borrowing of Muslim political, fiscal, administrative, and economic institutions. As far as I can tell, he never tried to do so. Indeed, silence on this feature of the Christian-Muslim osmosis in Valencia so dominated all written records that invariably only the Arabic name of a tax or institution testifies to its Muslim origin. Obviously – then and now – convenience alone dictated such institutional borrowing; apparently an admission of such opportunism in the face of the religiously inspired rejection of all Muslim practices could not be tolerated. The ideology of silence reigned supreme in this significant sphere of Christian-Moorish contact in Valencia and Spain.

Despite its individual historical features, the pattern of Christian-Muslim relations in Spain – the interplay of prejudice and pragmatism and the function of the ideology of silence – fits the other examples of the medieval religious frontier.

Mortal combat and intense contact characterized relations between the Byzantine empire and Muslims from the eruption of the Arabs out of the desert in the seventh century until the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks in 1453. Byzantino-Muslim relations may be divided into periods: the Arab phase, comprising first the Umayyad dynasty, and after 750 the Abbasid; and the Turkic phase, under the Seljuks, then the Turkmen, and finally the Ottomans. Within these subdivisions of Byzantino-Muslim contact are abiding elements of the pattern of Christian-Muslim relations found in Spain and elsewhere on the medieval religious frontier.[8]

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[7] Gustave E. von Grunebaum, *Medieval Islam: A Study in Cultural Orientation* (Chicago, 1953), especially 1-63; Hamilton Gibb, "The Influence of Islamic Culture on Medieval Europe," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, 38:I (September 1955), 82-98; F. Gabrieli, "The Transmission of Learning and Literary Influence to Western Europe," *Cambridge History of Islam* (Cambridge, 1970), II, 851-89; Richard Lemay, *Abu Ma'shar and Latin Aristotelianism in the Twelfth Century. The Recovery of Aristotle's Natural Philosophy through Arabic Astrology* (Beirut, 1962); Aziz S. Atiya, *Crusade, Commerce and Culture* (Bloomington, 1962), especially 205-50, 257-61.

[8] Speros Vryonis, Jr.: "Isadore Glabas and the Turkish 'Devshirme,' " *Speculum*, 31:3 (1956), 433-43; "Byzantine Circus Factions and the Islamic Futuwwa Organizations (Neaniai, Fityān, Ahdāth)," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 58:1 (1965), 45-59; "Seljuk Gulams and Ottoman Devshirmes," *Der Islam*, 41 (1965), 224-52; "Byzantium and Islam, Seventh-Seventeenth Centuries," *East European Quarterly*, 2:3 (1968), 205-40; "The Byzantine Legacy and Ottoman Forms," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 23-24 (1969-70), 253-308; "Byzantine Attitudes toward Islam during the Late Middle Ages," *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*, 12:2 (1971), 263-86; *The*

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With astonishing speed the Arab tribesmen conquered the richest provinces of the Byzantine empire – Syria, Palestine, and Egypt. Naturally they turned to indigenous institutions in order to govern their newly acquired territories. The Umayyad dynasty has with some merit been labelled neo-Byzantine, since it copied many of the accoutrements of Byzantine bureaucratic autocracy: taxes, weights and measures, chancellery and treasury practices, the Coptic or Syriac Christian scribes to maintain the account books, cities, garrisons, administrative units and divisions, coinage, granaries, corvée, the roads, postal system, vocabulary of agriculture, commerce, crafts, music, law, imperial palaces and their decoration (despite the Muslim prohibition against pictorial representation of the human form), monuments, ceremonial, imperial rescripts, even rhetoric and reasoning. Christian Semitic (not Greek) bureaucratic cadres ran most governmental machinery. In short, Byzantine political, economic, administrative, legal, and artistic influences on the Umayyad dynasty strongly shaped its organization and functioning.

The new Muslim empire of the Umayyads owed much of its structure and ethos to the Christian Byzantine empire it had displaced. The Arabs had no previous experience in controlling such impressive agricultural and urban areas; they had little choice but to imitate and continue the pre-Arab practice. Their neophyte status alone, however, does not constitute a complete explanation of their imitative proclivities; the Spanish Catholics who conquered Valencia also preferred to use Moorish institutions instead of importing and imposing those they utilized in other regions of Spain. The demographics and politics of frontier conquest dictated that it was considerably more practical to prolong the institutions to which the majority of one's subjects were accustomed than to restructure society and government from scratch from a position of numerical inferiority. The use of ethnoreligious intermediaries softened the process somewhat; just as the Spanish Catholics in Valencia relied on Jews, so the Umayyads employed Eastern Christian Semites. Silence alone rationalized such institutional borrowing and co-optation of personnel from the infidel.

Like the Moorish influence on Valencia, Byzantine influence on the Arab empire, no matter how pervasive, proved transient. In 750 the Abbasid dynasty shifted the capital from Damascus to Baghdad. This relocation resulted in an increasing Persian influence and a more vibrant and consistent Islamization of the Arab empire. Christian officials now had to convert or resign; some Byzantine forms gave way to Persian ones. Trilingual intermediaries, often Jews as well as Arabic-speaking Eastern Christians, now supplied the Abbasid empire

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Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh to the Fifteenth Centuries (Berkeley, 1971); "Religious Change and Continuity in the Balkans and Anatolia from the Fourteenth to the Sixteenth Centuries," in *Islam and Cultural Change*, Vryonis, ed., 127-40; and "Nomadization and Islami ation in Asia Minor," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 29 (1975), 41-71. Also, Anthony Bryer, "Greeks and Türkmen: The Pontic Exception," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 29 (1975), 113-48.

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with the intellectual riches of classical Greece, as preserved in Byzantium. Ancient Greek literature and philosophy, science, and medicine found fertile soil in Muslim civilization. Nevertheless, the obstacles and restraints on this cultural transmission foreshadow those of the later Muslim re-transmission of the classical heritage to Christian Europe.

Muslim intellectuals utilized the technical studies of Byzantine Christian scholars to assimilate the ancient Greek learning. Just as Aristotelianism itself, with its integral attitudes toward faith and reason, nature and philosophy, aroused suspicion in the world of Islam, so the Christian environment in which it entered Muslim civilization further complicated matters. Muslim thinkers demonstrated rather little interest in Christianity itself, not out of tolerance but the indifference born of supreme confidence in the eventual universal dissemination of Islam. Muslim authors might present accurate descriptive data on Christian societies in encyclopedias and geographies, but without interpolating any positive judgments of Christianity as a religion. A Muslim might even admire or respect a Christian clergyman, but the religion of the infidel did not thereby earn any kudos. Muslims praised Christians or learned from Christian intellectuals in the same way that Christians praised Muslims or learned from Muslim intellectuals - despite their religion.

The unavoidable coexistence of the Byzantine and Arab empires produced pragmatic compromises akin to those in Spain. A hybrid society arose on the military frontier, which found literary expression in the epic *Digenis Akritas*.[9] Intermarriage, bilingualism, trade, chivalric equality, and migration of peoples characterized Byzantino-Muslim relations. Such friendly interaction even had its parallel in international affairs. Byzantium and the caliphate cooperated in manning joint garrisons in the Caucasus against common foes and in seeking to restrain the increasing depredations of the Seljuks and Turkmen in Anatolia. In diplomatic exchange, Constantinople treated Baghdad with the same grudging equality it usually accorded to the Great Power which held Persia, a concession to reality, despite Byzantine imperial theory, which continued the pattern set with the Sassanids, or by Rome and the Parthians before that. Common sense and necessity justified such behavior; neither rationale found widespread articulation.

Neither provincial nor central pragmatic attitudes toward the Arab empire could, however, intrude into the official Byzantine view of Islam. According to Byzantine Christian religious prejudice, Islam was a pseudo-religion, idolatrous and polytheistic, which advocated sex and violence, practiced a silly ritual, could claim no miracles, and had been sired by a false prophet. It was legalistic and based upon a scripture written in the wrong literary form. Islam as a religion had nothing to be said for it.[10] When Muslim doctors of theology deigned to

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[9] J. Mavrogordato, ed. and trans., *Digenis Akritas* (Oxford, 1956). Hamilton Gibb asserts that there is no equivalent Arabic-language epic.

[10] John Meyendorff, "Byzantine Views of Islam," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 18 (1964), 113-32.

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discuss Christianity at all, as in religious debates, they began by attacking the Byzantines as polytheists because of the doctrine of the Trinity, and proceeded from there. Pragmatic cooperation had no impact on the images Christianity and Islam held of each other.

Seljuk and Turkmen pressure upon the Byzantine citizenry of Anatolia increased under the Ottomans, who slowly annexed Asia Minor, Turkicizing and Islamizing its population.[11] Deprived of their fleeing aristocracy and church hierarchy, the Greek and Hellenized non-Greek population converted to Islam for the usual varied reasons: economic advantage, religious conviction, social mobility, aesthetics, fear, and duress. The mystic, missionary, and activist dervish orders played a central role in stimulating apostasy, because dervish Islam drew heavily from the indigenous folk religion. It retained the holy men, holy trees, holy sites, and magical practices of Anatolia which theological purists of both sides derided as superstition. A Christian monk who became a disciple of a dervish holy man illustrates the degree of religious eclecticism achieved in Anatolia. The receptivity of dervish Islam to the folk religion which preceded even Christianity in Anatolia no doubt facilitated its spread.

Trebizond remained immune to the processes of Islamicization in Anatolia. Safe behind its mountain littoral, the political and ecclesiastical elite remained in place. It assiduously cultivated the Turkic language, intermarriage, commerce with the nomads, and ecological cooperation: the same pastures serviced nomad and farmer in different season. As a result, Christianity survived and Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians continued to inhabit the region.

The nomadic Ottomans enjoyed the status of *ghazi*, warriors of the jihad. They carried the holy war of Islam into the heart of Central Europe.[12] But in building their empire in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries primarily in formerly Byzantine territories, the Ottomans copied copiously from their religious foes. Ottoman ranks included Christian farmers, merchants, scribes, tax-collectors, artisans, warriors, sailors, artists, architects, slaves, and concubines. The Ottoman sultan became the new Byzantine emperor of Constantinople. The sultan played the role of the basileus in selecting a Greek patriarch, just as the Catholic king of Valencia played the role of the Muslim ruler in patronizing Muslim courts. The Ottomans invited Christians to settle in a city whose conquest proved the superiority of Islam over Christianity, just as

[11] Claude Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey. A General Survey of the Material and Spiritual Culture and History c. 1071-1330*, J. Jones-Williams, trans. (New York, 1968), portrays a much lower level of Hellenization in Asia Minor before the Ottoman conquest than does Speros Vryonis.

[12] Gy. Káldy-Nagy, "The Holy War (*jihād*) in the First Centuries of the Ottoman Empire," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 3/4 (1979-80) (Eucharisterion-Pritsak Festschrift), pt. 1, 467-73, minimizes the role of religion in early Ottoman policy. From a different conceptual framework, so does Joseph Fletcher, "Turco-Mongol Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire," *ibid.*, 236-51. *Cf.* Wiktor Weintraub, "Renaissance Poland and the *Antemurale Christianitatis*," *ibid.*, pt. 2, 920-30.

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the Catholics had invited Moors to settle in a kingdom dedicated to expelling them from Spain. The sultan turned Hagia Sophia into a mosque and forbade ringing of the Christian church bells which sullied the purity of Islam, just as in Valencia mosques acquired bells and became churches. Christian *pronoiars* became *timariots*. The Greek community became a millet under an ethnarch, the patriarch. Some institutions which the Ottomans borrowed from the Seljuks may have been of Byzantino-Roman origin, and other Ottoman institutions which look similar to Byzantine ones might reflect parallel evolution. For example, every medieval society whose economy rested upon land-holding and whose sociopolitical order accorded a dominant position to a military aristocracy managed to invent the fief. The Ottoman *timar* could derive from the Seljuk *iqta* just as easily as from the Byzantine *pronoia*, or it might have had a spontaneous creation. Nevertheless, Byzantine influence on the early Ottoman empire cannot be discounted.

Although the position of Greek Christians in the early Ottoman empire was precarious, their status declined even more in the sixteenth century. From the beginning, the Ottomans had extracted the *devshirme* (child-slave levy) from the Christian population to man the janissary corps and serve in other capacities as *gulams* (slaves). Christians remained second-class citizens. The generation of Ottomans who came to power in the sixteenth century, however, had never known Byzantine greatness. As the Ottoman empire became increasingly orthodox Sunni Muslim, respect for the Byzantine heritage declined and the position of the Greek Church deteriorated.[13] In the postconquest century, the status of Greek Christians in the Ottoman empire sank, just as in the case of the Moors in postconquest Valencia. Historians disagree upon whether the emergence in the seventeenth and eighteenth century of the *phanariots*, the Greek elite in Constantinople, exacerbated or ameliorated this situation. The Byzantine contribution to the Ottoman empire waned once the conquerors had solidified their hold sufficiently to be able to devote adequate energies to creating autonomous institutional models, duplicating the shift from the Umayyad to the Abbasid Arab empires.

The Ottomans, like the various Arab empires, never expelled the Christians. According to Islamic law, the Christians, like the Jews, qualified as Peoples of the Book. (Zoroastrians in Persia at first *pari passu* held similar privilege.) They could practice their religion as long as they recognized Muslim authority, paid the poll tax, did not insult Islam, and did not interfere with conversion to Islam. The large size of the Christian population of the Ottoman Balkans, for example, made expulsion scarcely possible; this practical consideration might have been more decisive at times than the qualified theoretical justification of continued Christian existence in the realm of the Defender of the Faith, the Ottoman sultan.

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[13] Steven Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity: A Study of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from the Eve of the Turkish Conquest to the Greek War of Independence* (London, 1968).

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The persistence of the millet system in the Ottoman empire did not invalidate Ottoman commitment to the jihad. Some Islamic fanatics believed that even Peoples of the Book living under Muslim authority should be compelled to convert or face execution or enslavement, but such a policy could never have been applied on a large scale. Probably more of the Muslim theologians expected that all unbelievers, including the Peoples of the Book, would convert to the true faith eventually. Concerning external infidels, the jihad forbade war unless success could be guaranteed. Jihad doctrine permitted truces, but for limited times only, since the imperative of holy war could not be relaxed until all peoples became worshippers of Allah. Thus Islamic doctrine justified the conduct of almost normal international relations with infidel countries when pragmatism prevented the successful waging of the jihad.[14]

Despite the Byzantine image of Islam as virtually beneath contempt, some Byzantine intellectuals echoed Tacitus and painted the Ottomans as noble savages, whose superior qualities explained Ottoman expansion at Byzantine expense. Even within this mythology a religious prejudice intruded. According to the Byzantine writers, Ottomans were Christians in everything but name; they practiced Christian morality despite their adherence to an infidel religion, whereas the supposedly Christian Byzantines had fallen away from the Christian virtues and led dissolute lives. Without accepting an argument which led to apostasy, these authors finessed their religious hostility toward Islam in order to praise their Ottoman future conquerors.[15] Equally stereotyped images of the Turks appear in a Byzantine tale according to which a dervish holy man advised a congregant to hire Greek artisans to build a garden because Greeks were good at building things, whereas Turks showed a greater proclivity toward destruction. Such a slur was as much a distortion of the truth as was the portrayal of the Ottomans as idyllic shepherds, but writers resorted to positive or negative stereotypes whenever it served their purpose, regardless of contrary evidence.

At the beginning of the imperial career, the Ottomans found it easier to co-opt Byzantine institutional models and human resources than to create their own. In time, however, stability, the transformation of the nomadic Ottomans into merchants, craftsman, farmers, and city-dwellers, and an increasing confidence obviated the necessity to borrow infidel ways. Although Ottoman authorities never expelled unbelievers as the kings of Spain did, Christians remained second-class citizens and their institutions and bureaucratic cadres declined in the Ottoman empire after the heyday of the religious frontier of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Orthodox Muslim Ottoman historiography of the sixteenth century and later dealt with the unseemly imitation of Byzantine forms in the earlier Ottoman empire in the simplest possible manner: it threw a

[14] E. Tyan, "Djihâd," *Encyclopedia of Islam* (Leiden, 1965), II, 538-40.

[15] Ihor Ševčenko, "The Decline of Byzantium Seen through the Eyes of Its Intellectuals," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 15 (1961), 167-86.

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discrete veil of silence over the entire subject. The Koran and the Shar'iat provided some ideological justification for tolerating Christian minorities and for not always waging jihad on Christian neighbors, but none whatever for institutional borrowing or letting Christian officials exercise political or fiscal or administrative authority over Muslims. The ideology of silence served its purpose on both sides of the religious frontier of the Middle Ages.

On the opposite end of the Mediterranean Sea from crusader Valencia stood the crusader kingdom of Jerusalem; unlike its sister realm, Jerusalem did not survive. Early studies saw it as an intermediary between the Muslim East and the Christian West, where easygoing religious toleration and the orientalization of the crusaders proceeded apace.[16] Some of the observations about the friendship between the two "races" smack of European imperialism or colonialism; moreover, recent research has thoroughly undermined this romantic and distorted picture.[17]

The crusaders' Jerusalem constituted a French colonial implant in Palestine, albeit one without a mother country. The French strove to separate themselves at all costs not only from the Muslim majority of their subjects but also from the Eastern Christians they had ostensibly come to liberate. They massacred or expelled the indigenous population of the city of Jerusalem itself during the conquest, and took it over as it was, flat-roofed buildings and all. Perhaps they realized that flat roofs were superior to their own styles. Although they retained the existing structures of all conquered cities, the new castles and constructions that they built were in the Romanesque style and with as few concessions to the new topography as possible. Insufficient water made moats impractical, but little more than some local masonry distinguished French crusader castles from those in France. In warfare the crusaders learned from the Arabs to make better use of their own light cavalry and infantry and to stay inside their castles until the enemy departed instead of trying to break sieges, but no self-respecting French noble would ever draw a bow, and crusader siegecraft derived from Byzantine and Armenian as much as Muslim practice. For protection from the sun some crusaders added a cloth cover over their helmets, not to be confused with the *keffiyah*. The French lived in their cities and castles and left the Muslim agricultural population alone. Local *rais* governed the villages, and the absentee French lords exercised control through French-and Arabic-speaking Syrian Christian intermediaries, who saved the French the trouble of learning Arabic. This practice parallels the use of Jews in

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[16] Frederic Duncalf, "Some Influences of Oriental Environment in the Kingdom of Jerusalem," *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1 (1914), 137-45; John L. LaMonte, "The Significance of the Crusader States in Medieval History," *Byzantion*, 15 (1940-41), 300-315.

[17] Joshua Prawer, *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. European Colonialism in the Middle Ages* (London, 1972). *Cf.* Aharon Ben-Ami, *Social Change in a Muslim Environment. The Crusaders' Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Princeton, 1969).

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Valencia and Semitic Christians in the Umayyad empire. The crusaders left local taxes, a mixture of Byzantine and Muslim levies, in place. Early crusader coinage crudely imitated Arabic models, but later the Papacy objected to the "intolerable" phenomenon of Christian slogans in Arabic on the coinage of a crusader kingdom. (One wonders if the papacy took similar note of the less prevalent Arabic-language coinage in Valencia.) Perhaps the lot of the Arab peasant improved, since without a demesne the French lords did not impose corvée, but this material amelioration of the tax load provided the Arabs with small solace for the humiliation of living under an infidel government. The French had no choice but to adopt the local diet, since importation of food was out of the question. The Muslim environment offered mush in the way of creature comforts. Although some French managed to take advantage of the carpets and wallhangings, baths and aquaducts, sewage systems, bed and table linen, porcelain dishes, soaps, dyes, spices, doctors and medicines, and even black slaves and eunuchs, this Mediterranean lifestyle attracted even fewer Catholic lords in Palestine than it did in Valencia. The French transplanted the French way of life to Palestine and lived within it in the midst of the Muslim world.

The Muslim world stimulated no intellectual or cultural curiosity in the French crusaders. In general the French in Jerusalem devoted few efforts to higher culture. Romances and epics about the crusader states were composed in the West, and crusader law came from Europe. Philosophy and science did not exist.[18] The refractory attitude of the crusaders inhibited even the most obvious forms of artistic borrowing. New crusader art works slavishly imitated French models; except for the very Byzantine mosaics and illuminated manuscripts, depictions of the Orient in French crusader art followed European fantasy, not local reality. The crusaders built Romanesque churches and castles, employing local symbols only on some ceramics. If not even climate could induce the French to lessen the distinction between rulers and ruled in clothing - so that no Christian woman, the Palestinian sun notwithstanding, ever wore full veil or trousers - then how much more rigorously did the French avoid contact with the Muslims and Muslim religious culture.

No more than a dozen unavoidably essential Arabic words found their way into the French vocabulary. Missionaries, as in Spain, could and did learn Arabic, but the majority of the French nobility did not, less because of an absence of schools, universities, or creative scholars than the simple lack of desire to do so. The use of multilingual intermediaries helped sustain this facet of social and cultural exclusivism.

The reality of crusader appreciation of Muslim military skill and chivalry should not be dismissed because the relationship between Richard the Lion-Hearted and Saladin has been romanticized in grade-B crusader epic movies; such aristocratic martial and social compatibility could hardly eliminate the

[18] Steven Runciman, *A History of the Crusades* (Cambridge, 1954), III, 489-92.

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Christian-Muslim warfare which brought about occasions for its exercise. It did, however, mitigate some of the harshness of war for noble enemies, as crusaders treated noble Muslim captives with respect and permitted ransom,[19] and Muslim aristocrats reciprocated the courtesy with Christian knights. Parallels to Valencia or the Byzantino-Muslim frontier depicted in the *Digenis Akritas* spring readily to mind.

The various crusader states often spent more time fighting each other than making war on the infidel. Christian diplomacy often demanded alliances with some Muslims against others, not to mention against other Christians. One alliance represents the most extreme case of such religious flexibility: the Assassins paid tribute to the Templars, and rather than see this convenient arrangement altered, the Templars ambushed envoys sent by the king of Jerusalem to convert the Assassins to Christianity. The power of the Assassins forced the Hospitalers and most Outremère states to reach agreements with them at one time or another; the same applied to Muslim states who viewed the sect as heretics. The kingdom of Jerusalem, like Valencia, had its Muslim fief-holders and some Muslim mercenaries. The use of Muslim soldiers or allies aroused the severest objections in the waves of fanatic crusading migrants who brought their unadulterated prejudices fresh from Europe. The crusader kingdom could not survive without reserve manpower, but the new recruits refused to understand that the military weakness of their side made adroit dealings with the Muslims crucial.

William of Tyre personifies the conflict in crusader ranks over relations with the Muslim states. A *pullano* or *poulain*, i.e., hybrid, born of mixed Italian and French ancestry in Jerusalem and well educated in Europe at Paris and Bologna, he had a good working knowledge of Greek and Arabic. No one possessed superior qualifications to serve as an intermediary between the Outremère and Europe. And yet he failed totally in this task. William defended the crusader kingdoms from the criticisms of bigoted newcomers. He insisted that, given Muslim strength and Christian weakness, the only way the Christian kingdoms could survive was through a policy of divide-and-conquer, of seeking Muslim (and Byzantine) allies. The newcomers could not even accept the need for strategic and tactical caution, insisting upon disastrous military adventures and frontal assaults against superior infidel forces. The new arrivals blamed the weakness of the crusader states upon their moral decline; the *pullani* had "gone native," soft and effeminate, an irrelevant exaggeration. William was not pro-Greek, let alone pro-Muslim, but his patriotic devotion to the crusader states enabled him accurately to see the need for pragmatism. He perceived these states as extensions of Europe, hence the title of his *Overseas History*. His most articulated attempt to break the ideological silence which enveloped pragmatic policies on the medieval religious frontier fell wide of the mark. European

[19] Ousâma ibn Mounkidh, *The Autobiography of Ousâma ibn Mounkidh*, George R. Potter, trans. (New York, 1929).

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audiences made the book very popular but overlooked its message; the book succeeded as diverting reading about the exotic and picturesque East. William was subjected to criticism and scorn in the crusader states, too controversial a figure ever to achieve his ambition of becoming patriarch of Jerusalem. The *pullani* program went too far in sacrificing prejudice for pragmatism, and the crusaders therefore rejected it.[20]

The theoreticians of the holy war and crusade could have formulated properly nuanced rationales to justify the kind of policy William of Tyre advocated. In theory it was not mandatory to wage war against Muslim states in all cases;. a Muslim state could enjoy the legitimacy of natural law if it tolerated its Christian minorities, did not interfere with Christian pilgrims, and permitted Christian missionaries to do God's work without impediment. Unfortunately, no Muslim polity could possibly have acceded to such impositions on its treatment of Christians. Besides, according to the Christian theologians, no Muslim could legitimately rule Palestine, the Holy Land of Jesus Christ, regardless of the sacredness of Jerusalem to Islam, and some extremists applied their concept of *reconquista* in such a way as to exclude from political legitimacy any Muslim authority in lands once part of the Roman Empire. Such loaded formulations of the circumstances in which a Muslim state could be granted the right not to be the object of a crusade offered little practical guidance to the crusaders in the Middle East. In fact such armchair theorizing lacked any realistic dimension.

Two hundred years of French Catholic and Muslim contact in Jerusalem did not mitigate their mutual hostility. There was no bridge across the confessional and social gap between conquerors and conquered. The French actively discouraged missionary activities to convert the Muslim population lest a common religion lessen their own monopoly on political power. The canonical scruples against forced conversion were wasted on the French crusaders, since they had no enthusiasm for even voluntary conversion. The supposed religious tolerance of the crusader states derived from self-interest and supreme indifference; the Muslims supplied the only available taxpaying peasants, and keeping them Muslim provided the excuse for absentee governance through third parties. The extraordinary arrogance of the French aristocracy[21] permitted an even smaller amount of pragmatic borrowing between Christian and Muslim in Palestine than in Spain because the French social and cultural disdain strongly reinforced religious fastidiousness.

From the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, Russia fell under the sway of the Golden Horde, the successor state on the Volga river of the grand Mongol

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[20] R. H. C. Davis, "William of Tyre," in *Relations between East and West in the Middle Ages*, Derek Baker, ed. (Edinburg, 1973), 64-76.

[21] *Cf.* David Jacoby, "The Encounter of Two Societies: Western Conquerors in the Pelaponnesus after the Fourth Crusade," *American Historical Review*, 78:4 (1973), 873-906.

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empire founded by Chinggis Khan.[22] However, the Tatars, as the Mongols are called in the Russian sources, did not move into the Russian forest zone. In order to maintain their pastoral nomadic way of life, they remained in the Pontic and Caspian steppe, where they became assimilated with the indigenous Turkic-speaking nomadic population, the Kipchaks. By the fourteenth century, the shamanist Mongols had converted to Islam, so that Russo-Tatar relations became another variant of Christian-Muslim interaction. The Mongols restructured the social and political order of the steppe, the mainstay of international commerce and nomadism,[23] but they left the political infrastructure of Russia alone because of its lesser importance to their economy and polity. Chinggis had decreed the toleration of all religions in his empire, a practice of most Inner Asian empires; thus even the Muslim Golden Horde did not interfere with the Russian Orthodox Church. As a result of the particular relationship between Russia and the Golden Horde, the Mongols influenced Russia, but the Russians did not influence the Tatars.[24] Therefore, unlike the other cases of the medieval religious frontier, in the Russo-Tatar instance, the conquered wound up borrowing the institutions of their absentee conquerors.

The Mongol conquest of Russia was enormously destructive, and the economic drain of subsequent raids and taxes was probably an even greater assault. It is hardly surprising that the medieval Russian sources present the Tatars as cruel and evil infidels, either instruments of divine chastisement for Russian sins or henchmen of the Devil, sowing discord among true Christians.[25] Experience justified such invective, although the Mongol assaults had nothing to do with religion. However, there is another side to the story of Russo-Tatar relations.

Considerable evidence demonstrates that despite the stereotyped negative image of the Tatars in the Russian sources, less hostile relations between the two peoples also existed. A number of Russian princes married Tatar princesses, notably Gleb Vasil'kovich of Rostov, Fedor Rostislavovich of Yaroslavl', and Yurii Daniilovich of Moscow; the princesses converted from shamanism to Russian Orthodox Christianity. The Russians borrowed heavily from Mongol political, military, administrative, and fiscal institutions, for example, the postal

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[22] A. N. Nasonov, *Mongoly i Rus' (Istoriia tatarskoi politiki na Rusi)* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1940); Berthold Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde. Die Mongolen in Russland*, 2nd expanded ed. (Wiesbaden, 1965); B. D. Grekov and A. Iu. Iakubovskii, *Zolotaia Orda i ee padenie* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1950); George Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia* (New Haven, 1953); Charles J. Halperin, *Russia and the Golden Horde: The Impact of the Mongols on Russian History* (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1985).

[23] G. A. Fedorov-Davydov, *Kochevniki Vostochnoi Evropy pod vlast'iu zolotoordynskikh khanov: Arkheologicheskie pamiatniki* (Moscow, 1966); idem, *Obshchestvennyi stroi Zolotoi Ordy* (Moscow, 1973).

[24] Charles J. Halperin, "Russia in the Mongol Empire in Comparative Perspective," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 43:1 (June 1983), 239-61.

[25] Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, "Asia through Russian Eyes," in *Russia and Asia*, Wayne S. Vucinich, ed. (Stanford, 1972), 3-29.

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service (*yam*) which the Mongols had perfected to carry information and people across the Eurasian continent[26]; the division of the army into the five divisions of advance guard, main regiment, left and right flanks, and rear guard; the Mongol customs tax, tax-collector and seal (*tamga*), and treasury (*kazna*); and Mongol diplomatic etiquette.[27] The Russians showed praiseworthy perspicacity in imitating the institutions in warfare and government which had permitted the Mongols to create and control an empire stretching from the Pacific to the Baltic and Black Seas. The Muscovites did not borrow institutions which did not suit them; for example, the census was too equitable for the Russian aristocracy, and the *diwan* system of bureaucracy from Persia bore the taint of Islam. Instead the Russians mostly copied Horde institutions from the all-Mongol empire, preferring Mongol institutions less associated with Islam. This additional religious factor influencing the Russian selection of institutions to borrow, as compared to practices in Spain, the Muslim states, or crusader Jerusalem, did not minimize the extent of borrowing. I suspect that the explanation of the Russian pattern lies in the intense relations of the East Slavs with the Turkic pastoral nomads during the preceding Kievan period, and from the simple opportunism created by the presence in the Horde's institutional framework of structures of both pre-Muslim and Muslim provenance. Both intermarriage and institutional borrowing thus finessed the religious obstacle to pragmatic relations, through conversion and selectivity, but neither activity accords well with the depiction of the Tatars in Russian sources as blood-sucking infidels.

The economic burden which Mongol rule imposed on the Russians was partially offset in two ways. First, Russian princes who participated in joint Russo-Tatar military campaigns shared in the booty. Second, Russians participated in and profited from the expansion of international commerce under the Pax Mongolica. In Russia the Mongols rerouted the fur trade to extract greater revenue; as a result, Muscovite and Ustiug merchants, rather than Novgorodian, reaped the benefits. Russians and Tatars employed some regions of the southeastern frontier, on the Riazan' border, for both agriculture and nomadism, which duplicated the ecological symbiosis of Greek and Turkmen in Trebizond. Booty and commerce mitigated the economic drain of Mongol rule in Russia.[28]

Presumably, those Russian princes, nobles, officials, merchants, and clerics who dealt frequently with the Horde had the greatest incentive to learn

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[26] Gustave Alef, "The Origin and Development of the Muscovite Postal Service," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 15:1 (1967), 1-15.

[27] N. I. Veselovskii, "Tatarskoe vliianie na posol'skii tseremonial v moskovskii period russkoi istorii," *Otchet Sv. Peterburgskago Universiteta za 1910*, 1-19. *Cf.* Alan W. Fisher, "Muscovite-Ottoman Relations in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," *Humaniora Islamica*, 1 (1973), 207-17.

[28] Thomas S. Noonan, "Russia's Eastern Trade, 1150-1350: The Archeological Evidence," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, forthcoming; Janet Martin, "The Land of Darkness and the Golden Horde. The Fur Trade under the Mongols. XIII-XIV Centuries," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, 19:4 (1978), 401-22.

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Tatar, the Turkic dialect which became dominant in the Horde. At first, some baptized bilingual Kipchaks served as translators, although this practice did not equal in scope or significance the use of ethnic intermediaries elsewhere on the medieval religious frontier. Some Arabic names and slogans found their way onto bilingual Russian coins, paralleling Valencia and Jerusalem. The fifteenth-century Tverian merchant Afanasii Nikitin so mastered a kind of oriental patois of Turkic, Persian, and Arabic that he unconsciously slipped in and out of it in composing his travelogue about India.[29] Bilingualism must have been more prevalent than our scanty sources admit.

The Russian princes and nobles shared with the Tatars a sense of aristocratic martial chivalry. If the Tatars had not been noble opponents, there would have been no glory for the Russians in trying to defeat them. Captives on both sides were sometimes treated with respect. The "feudal" ethos which crossed the religious and ecological frontier between Christian sedentarist and Muslim nomad found predictable expression in an epic poem, the *Zadonshchina*.[30] Forms of chivalry thus influenced social relations between Christians and Muslims from Spain to the Balkans and Anatolia to the Middle East and the Russian steppe.

The Russians acquired an intimate familiarity with the geography, personnel, society, mores, and customs of the Horde, an expertise equal to that of King James of Valencia about the Moors. They had no choice but to acquire such knowledge, since political survival in dealing with the Horde depended on it.[31] The Russians fully mastered Mongol political concepts and ideology. They utilized such Mongol terms as *orda* (horde) and *ulus* (people-state) with ease.[32] Most important, they understood the single overriding political principle upon which the Mongol, empire rested, the blood legitimacy of the clan of Chinggis Khan. In literary works intended for a native audience, Russian bookmen manipulated that principle to justify Russian policies toward the Tatars.[33] The

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[29] Afanasii Nitikin. *Khozhenie za tri moria Afanasiia Nikitina 1466-1472 gg.*, 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1958).

[30] *Povesti o Kulikovskoi bitvy*, M. N. Tikhomirov, V. F. Rzhiga, and L. A. Dmitriev, eds. (Moscow, 1959), 9-17. The most popular literary genre for the expression of frontier chivalric relations was the epic poem, hence *El Cid, La Chanson de Roland, 'Digenis Akritas*, and the *Zadonshchina*.

[31] Charles J. Halperin, "Know Thy Enemy: Medieval Russian Familiarity with the Mongols of the Golden Horde," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 30:2 (1982), 161-75.

[32] Charles J. Halperin, "*Tsarev ulus*: Russia in the Golden Horde," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, 23:2 (April-June 1982), 257-63.

[33] Michael Cherniavsky, "Khan or Basileus: An Aspect of Russian Medieval Political Theory," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 20:4 (1959), 459-76; Charles J. Halperin, "A Chingissid Saint of the Russian Orthodox Church: The 'Life of Peter, *Tsarevich* of the Horde,' " *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*, 9:3 (1975), 324-35; idem, "The Russian Land and the Russian Tsar: The Emergence of Muscovite Ideology, 1380-1408," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte*, 23 (1976), 7-103; idem, "The Defeat and Death of Batu," *Russian History*, 10:1 (1983), 50-65; idem, "The Tatar Yoke and Tatar Oppression," *Russia Mediaevalis*, 5:1 (1984), pp. 20-39 [#11].

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Muscovites may even have modelled their dynastic concept upon that of the Chingissids.[34] Despite religious prejudice, the Russians developed a comprehensive, pragmatic expertise and even ideological fluency in Horde affairs.

That the Mongols did not influence Russian high culture was attributable to Russian religion practice, and not to a sense of the superiority of Russian culture to that of the "barbarian" nomads. Horde culture cannot be called inferior; Sarai, the Horde capital, with its aquaducts, caravansaries, *medresses* (religious schools), mosques, and foreign merchants' quarters, rivalled any medieval Russian city. The Golden Horde enjoyed a respectable Muslim religious culture, which is precisely why the Russians could not borrow from it. The Russians did not seek better ways to build a mosque or comment upon the Koran. The high culture of the Horde was untouchable, religiously tabu, to the Russians.[35] Texts of oriental literature which reached Russia before or during the Mongol period had already been sanitized, i.e., Christianized, and it is doubtful that the Russians even knew of their infidel origin.[36] As elsewhere on the medieval religious frontier, those areas of life closest to religion, such as the Russian high culture, most resisted infidel influence.

The Muscovites could not discard all elements of pragmatic relations with the Mongols after the overthrow of the "Tatar Yoke" in 1480. Muscovy still had to deal with the successor states of the Golden Horde; annexation of Kazan' and Astrakhan' waited until the 1550s, and of the Crimea, which became a vassal of the Ottomans, until the late eighteenth century. Chinggisids continued to enjoy high status in sixteenth-century Muscovy, the by then Russian postal service served neither pork nor alcohol to Muslims, and a Muslim could swear an oath on a Koran kept in the Kremlin, a juridical convenience common in Valencia. Muslim envoys prayed daily to Allah in the capital of the Orthodox Christian empire of Muscovy. However, the growing social and political pressures of Russian centralization generated tensions which found their outlet in religious and ethnic antagonism and demands for homogeneity. A virulently anti-Muslim sentiment arose in the militant wing of the Russian Orthodox Church, which produced an aggressive missionary policy in annexed Kazan'. (This novel chauvinism and xenophobia was also directed against Jews.) The development of an early modern nation-state in Muscovy[37] thus produced reactions against elements of the medieval frontier akin to those in fifteenth-century Spain, the Abbasid reaction to the Umayyads, and the later Ottoman reversal of early

[34] Michael Cherniavsky, "Ivan the Terrible and the Iconography of the Kremlin Cathedral of Archangel Michael," *Russian History*, 2:1 (1975), 3-28.

[35] Charles J. Halperin, "Medieval Myopia and the Mongol Period of Russian History," *Russian History*, 5:2 (1978), 188-91.

[36] D. S. Likhachev, *Poetika drevnerusskoi literatury* (Leningrad, 1967), 11-13, identifies this pattern but explains it differently.

[37] Charles J. Halperin, "Master and Man in Muscovy," in *The Tsardom of Muscovy*, A. E. Presniakov, ed., and R. Price, trans. (Gulf Breeze, Florida, 1978), vii-xvi.

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Ottoman practices. Like the Ottoman empire, the Russian empire contained such an ever increasing Muslim population that nothing on the order of an expulsion policy ever became implemented. During the Westernizing reforms of Peter the Great at the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth century, Russia discarded its Mongol institutions. During the seventeenth century, Russian involvement with the steppe in general declined and Russian need for steppe expertise greatly diminished. Therefore, Russia's need for pragmatic relations with the Mongols outlasted Mongol sovereignty by about a century, after which the pressures of prejudice reasserted themselves with new and greater potency.

No medieval Russian source of the Mongol period comments on the Russian familiarity with the steppe, or explains why Russians cultivated such knowledge of the infidel. Russian Orthodox Christian canon law frowned upon socializing with the infidels, but Russian priests could accompany the nomadic Horde to provide for the religious needs of Russian faithful; why Russians joined in nomadic journeys with the Horde went unmentioned. Only the Mongol name betrays the Horde origin of Mongol institutions borrowed by the Muscovites. No medieval Russian merchant had a kind word to say about steppe merchants, and the chronicles treated intermarriage gingerly. A chronicle would criticize a rival Russian prince for employing Tatar military auxiliaries or assistance, but if the chronicler's princely patron relied upon Horde military or political allies, this policy escaped critique. In a late-thirteenth-century sermon, the bishop of Vladimir, Serapion, echoes Tacitus and praises the ethical and moral rectitude of the Tatars. His purpose, however, was to shame the Russians for their sins, and in other sermons he portrays Tatar misdeeds with graphic precision.[38] Like the Byzantine polemicists who invoked the virtues of the Ottomans to explain Byzantine decline, Serapion's sermon represents idealizing propaganda, not accurate sociology. It is the exception which proves the rule that the Russians did not permit their pragmatic relations with the Tatars to soften the religiously hostile portrayal of the infidels in the medieval Russian sources. Silence shrouded cooperation; value judgments concerning Tatars dwelt only on Tatar evil. No medieval Russian writer articulated an ideology for coexistence with the Tatars.

When necessary, Spanish Catholic and Muslim Moor, Byzantine Orthodox Christian and Muslim Arab or Turk, French Catholic and Muslim, Russian Orthodox Christian and shamanist or Muslim Mongol, could all get along with each other, could learn enough of each other's language, customs, geography, political and social structures, mores, and even religion to deal peacefully with each other. In order to survive, minority conquest societies had to adapt to the institutions of the indigenous majority population. Even societies

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[38] E. V. Petukhov, *Serapion Vladimirskii, russkii propovednik XIII veka* (St. Petersburg, 1888), Appendix, 13-15.

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across an open frontier had to acquire sufficient expertise about the enemy to be able to negotiate truces, if not peace treaties. Neither the Spanish Catholics in thirteenth-century Valencia nor the Umayyad Arabs or early Ottoman Turks let religious prejudice so blind them, even in fighting a holy war, that they tried to liquidate the only possible taxpaying populations of their newly acquired territories or aroused massive resistance by instituting policies of forced conversion. The shared social ethos of medieval military aristocracies played a more positive role than has been appreciated in facilitating such pragmatic cooperation. From the Atlantic to the Volga, Christian and Muslim knights espoused common values: noble birth, social elitism, military skill, courage, love of warfare, the joys of hunting. Such shared attitudes graced the processes of negotiating truces and treaties, of transferring allegiances and concluding alliances, of social integration in multiethnic societies. Chivalry contributed to peaceful relations. Thus, in addition to warfare, the medieval frontier also experienced bilingualism, intermarriage, commerce, institutional borrowing, alliances, social osmosis, and even some minimal cultural crossfertilization.

Such social compromises obtained only as long as they were necessary. Altered conditions which removed the necessity for pragmatism permitted prejudice to gain the upper hand. During the Middle Ages, Christianity demonstrated extremely homogenizing tendencies. The Christian Germans in their *Drang nach Osten* did not exhibit much tolerance for the Slavic and Lithuanian populations who stood in their way. The Byzantines did assimilate the Slavic populations of the Balkans which came completely under their control. Islam, because of the social geography of the regions which it dominated, manifested greater social and religious toleration than did Christianity, but even so the Ottomans assimilated the Greek and Armenian populations of Anatolia. During the early modern period of history, the pressures of nation building permitted Catholic Spain and Orthodox Muscovy to accumulate sufficient power to alter the *quid pro quo* with their religious minorities: Spain expelled the Moors, and Muscovy drastically worsened the situation of its Muslim Tatar subjects. When the Abbasids discovered they had less need for Byzantine officials and institutions than had the Umayyads, they discarded them; and the Ottomans changed their minds once experience permitted it. The tendency, proclivity, propensity for religious conformism surfaced in medieval Christian and Muslim states whenever it could, and as strongly as it could.

Thus the medieval religious frontier suffered a precarious existence. It functioned during the interim between the initial conquest and the development of power sufficient to allow the sentiments of the conquered to be disregarded, and also in situations where neither side in the struggle had the ability to eliminate the other. The transience of the frontier derived from its intrinsic instability. The very existence of pragmatic relations with infidels violated the fundamental and immutable thrust of the exclusivist religions of Christianity and Islam.

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Only convoluted and excessively qualified theological arguments were capable of justifying the kinds of pragmatic relations which characterized the medieval religious frontier. One could permit religious toleration, but only without insult to one's own faith. One could conclude truces, but no eternal peace. Stark necessity vaguely rationalized alliances, commerce, or other activities of peaceful cooperation. These meticulously constructed concessions to religious tolerance or minimal recognitions of circumstances beyond one's control rarely intrude into the written records of the frontier/conquest societies, which were supposed to have the greatest need for ideological guidance in relations with religious foes. And in neither Christianity nor Islam did any theory, no matter how sophistic, ever legitimize the borrowing of institutions from adherents of an infidel faith.˙

The demands of religious prejudice prevented the formulation or articulation of any medieval theories genuinely equivalent to modern concepts of peaceful coexistence or détente. One might admire, intermarry with, trade with, even borrow intellectual skills from, the infidel, but never concede the legitimacy of his religion. To admit the legitimacy of the religion of the enemy would have automatically called into question the insistence upon the exclusive religious superiority of one's own. Since religion subsumed under it one's conception of the political and social order – of one's way of life – such ideological tolerance would have undermined the social, political, and cultural foundations of one's own society and polity. For this reason, exchange at the intellectual level, inextricably tied to religion, became even more difficult to achieve.

By and large, therefore, medieval frontier societies preferred to deal with the contradiction between ideal and real, between prejudice and pragmatism, with ideologically motivated silence. If one could not speak ill of one's enemy, it was preferable, and certainly safer, not to speak of him at all. Silence about the implications of borrowing infidel institutions or respecting infidel customs was more effective in permitting such activity to continue than self-serving references to necessity or the circumscribed indulgences of canon law or the Shar'jat. It was less embarrassing to practice the philosophy that the ends justify the means than to articulate it, since the ends were religious and difficult, emotionally and intellectually, to reconcile with such opportunism, although not impossible. An ideology of silence was functional. The phenomenon was so pervasive, from Spain to Byzantium to Palestine to Russia, that it cannot be dismissed as simple hypocrisy. Yes, it was hypocritical, but that accusation hardly does justice to so profound a pattern of medieval sociointellectual history.

Silence is, after all, a powerful ideological tool. It is an effective, if not necessarily admirable, way to avoid the unwelcome implications of refractory reality, to avoid discussing the gap between ideological perfection and preference, and the imperfections of the real world. While silence may serve different functions in different ideologies, in this case I assert that its impact was beneficial. Silence enabled medieval frontier societies to practice, albeit temporarily and with considerable difficulty, a type of religious pluralism which many modern societies seem unwilling or unable to imitate or duplicate.

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THE SIX-HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BATTLE OF KULIKOVO FIELD, 1380-1980, IN SOVIET HISTORIOGRAPHY*

In memory of Michael E. Shaw

The six-hundredth anniversary of the 1380 battle of Kulikovo Field, at which Grand Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich Donskoi defeated a Tatar army led by Emir Mamai, was celebrated in the Soviet Union by the appearance of books, articles, and albums; by the organization of scholarly conferences and exhibitions; and by the opening of a new museum on the battle site.[1] These activities reflected the Soviet consensus about the importance of 1380 in Russian history: the battle of Kulikovo was a great national victory over the Tatars and a significant step toward Russia's eventual liberation from the Tatar Yoke in 1480. The victory of Kulikovo, it is claimed, shattered the myth of Tatar invincibility, gave an immense psychological lift to Russian morale after 140 years of Tatar oppression, and consolidated Moscow's preeminent position as the unifier of Northeastern *Rus'*. Moscow's leadership was so well established that it withstood even the sack of the city in 1382 by Khan Tokhtamysh. Indeed, in 1389 Dmitrii Donskoi usurped the khan's prerogative and willed the grand principality of Vladimir to his son, Vasilii I. Donskoi's testament also made provision for his heirs to retain the Tatar tribute "if God changed the Horde," an expression of untarnished Russian hope for emancipation from Horde rule. Furthermore, the battle of Kulikovo raised the national consciousness of the Russian people and inspired the Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Balkan Slavs to resist their various oppressors as well. Soviet scholars, in conclusion, praise Kulikovo as the most noteworthy battle in fourteenth-century Russian history and endow it with all-European, if not world-historical, significance.

In a single article it would be impossible to survey all Soviet publications on the anniversary of Kulikovo. This essay will discuss Russian-language

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[1] A. N. Kirpichnikov, *Kulikovskaia bitva* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1980), p. 5.

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original research published in 1980 or shortly thereafter as a result of the 1980 conferences.[2] Purely popular works and facsimiles or translations of texts fall outside the parameters of this discussion.[3] Although I shall say a word on the subject, works in the specialized field of medieval Russian art history are similarly excluded. For convenience I have grouped Soviet contributions under several categories of my own choosing: historiography, political history, literary/textual analysis, art, folklore, and monumental commemmoration of Kulikovo. Although such divisions may seem arbitrary at times and cannot avoid some overlapping, they do highlight the variety of disciplinary perspectives on the battle in Soviet scholarship. The essay will conclude with some general observations about Soviet historiography on this occasion.[4]

Two articles specifically treat Russian and Soviet historiography about the battle of Kulikovo. Beskrovnyi's is superficial and unenlightening, but Gorskii's, from his Jubilee conference paper, is thorough.[5] Although he omits

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[2] On the first conference, 4-7 September 1980, in Tula, the city nearest to Kulikovo Field, see M. A. Rakhmatulin, "Nauchnaia konferentsiia v Tule," *Istoriia SSSR*, No. 2 (1981), pp. 232-37. On the second, so-called Jubilee, conference, 8-10 September 1980 in Moscow, see D. N. Shanskii, "Iubileinaia konferentsiia v Moskve," *ibid.*, pp. 237-39; *idem*, "Iubileinaia nauchnaia konferentsiia '600-letie Kulikovskoi bitvy'," *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta*, seriia 8, *Istoriia*, No. 2 (1981), pp. 81-84; V. N. Ashurkov, "Nauchnaia konferentsiia, posviashchennaia 600-letiiu Kulikovskoi bitvy," *Voprosy istorii*, No. 3 (1981), pp. 112-13; *600-letie Kulikovskoi bitvy. Tezisy dokladov i soobshchenii iubileinoi nauchnoi konferentsii 8-10 sentiabria 1980 g.* (Moscow: Moskovskii universitet, 1980) [the only contribution to the Jubilee conference not represented in the "Theses" is R. G. Skrynnikov's "Nekotorye voprosy izucheniia Kulikovskoi bitvy"; Professor Skrynnikov informed me that he did not submit his *tezisy* for the brochure and that his article would appear in a volume to be published by the Museum of the Moscow Kremlin, not yet in print]. On the third conference, 26 September 1980 in Moscow at the Central State Archives of Ancient Acts, see S. M. Dushinov, "Konferentsiia v Tsentral'nom gosudarstvennom arkhive drevnikh aktov," *Istoriia SSSR*, No. 2 (1981), pp. 239-41. Finally, on the fourth conference, held on 6 November 1980 in Kaluga in honor of the 500th anniversary of the stand on the Ugra River as well (Kaluga is the city nearest the site of that event), see L. N. Pushkareva and P. V. Snesarevskaia, "Nauchnaia konferentsiia v Kaluge," *Voprosy istorii*, No. 5 (1981), p. 149. See also I. P. Razmanova, "Knizhnaia vystavka 'Navechno v pamiati narodnoi'," *Istoriia SSSR*, No. 2 (1981), pp. 243-44.

[3] Legible and properly annotated facsimile editions or well-executed modern translations do serve useful scholarly functions, but the facsimile and modern translation volumes for 1980 which I have seen, like illustrated coffee-table books, seem intended to entertain, not to edify. A possible exception is A. A. Zimin, ed., *Zadonshchina. Drevnerusskaia pesnia. Povest'o Kulikovskoi bitve* (Tula: Priokskoe knizhnoe izd., 1980), which supposedly contains a fuller exposition of Zimin's ideas on the relationship between the *Slovo o polku Igoreve* and the *Zadonshchina* than he succeeded in publishing in article form; unfortunately it remains inaccessible to me.

[4] For the broader context of this scholarship, see Charles J. Halperin, "Soviet Historiography on Russia and the Mongols," *Russian Review*, 41, No. 3 (July 1982), 306-22.

[5] L. G. Beskrovnyi, "Istoriografiia Kulikovskoi bitvy," in *Kulikovskaia bitva. Sbornik statei* (Moscow: Nauka, 1980), pp. 6-25; A. D. Gorskii, "Kulikovskaia bitva 1380 g. (Nekotorye itogi i zadachi ee izucheniia v istoricheskoi nauke)," *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta*, seriia 8, *Istoriia*, No. 4 (1980), pp. 3-18.

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publications in philology,[6] Gorskii makes clear that Soviet scholarship on the political and military significance of Kulikovo derives from the rejection of Pokrovskii and from the patriotic ethos of the Great Fatherland War. Gorskii's total exculsion of foreign scholarship from consideration stands in sharp contrast to the integration of foreign citations in the comprehensive bibliography of works about Kulikovo which appeared in conjunction with the anniversary,[7] but it is preferable to the scurrilous attacks on Western historiography strewn about Pashuto's article[8] where such reputable historians as Berthold Spuler and George Vernadsky are accused of being "apologists of the Horde."[9] Since not all Soviet scholars take so hostile a view of non-Soviet research,[10] one can hope that a complete analysis of all historiography about 1380 will in time be written.

The Soviets have made many of their most useful contributions to the study of Kulikovo in political history, particularly in clarifying the course of events which culminated in the battle. Kuchkin, in an article taken from his Tula and TsGADA conference papers, has analyzed in excrutiating detail and fairly turgid prose the historical geography of northeastern Russia before Kulikovo and the political narrative which preceded the conflict. The overall picture of Muscovite ascendancy which emerges is familiar, but the wealth of detail he has provided helps fill in the stage on which Donskoi and Mamai acted.[11] Egorov has written what should now become the standard political history of the Golden Horde on the eve of Kulikovo.[12] He shows that no coherent Horde policy toward Russia accounts for every Tatar raid on Rus' during the internecine strife of the 1360s and 1370s and convincingly demonstrates how gradually the split between Donskoi and Mamai developed. Unfortunately, this fine article is marred by the fantastic assertion, especially for a trained orientalist, that Mamai did usurp the title "khan" in 1380 although he was not a Chingissid. Egorov misreads and misuses two passages in Russian literary works to buttress his case, one which has been rejected by Soviet orientalists and specialists in Old Russian literature.

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6 This omission is not compensated for by A. S. Kurikov, "Pamiatniki Kulikovskogo tsikla i russkoe literaturovedenie pervoi poloviny XIX veka," in *Kulikovskaia bitva v literature i iskusstve* (Moscow: Nauka, 1980), pp. 179-216.

7 "Ukazatel' literatury," compiled by N. A. Aralovets and P. V. Pronina, in *Kulikovskaia bitva*, pp. 289-318, which is indiscriminate in its inclusions and inexcusable in its omissions of relevant American publications.

8 V. T. Pashuto, " 'I v"skipe zemlia Russkaia...'," *Istoriia SSSR*, No. 4 (1980), p. 71.

9 See Charles J. Halperin, "George Vernadsky, Eurasianism, the Mongols and Russia," *Slavic Review*, 41, No. 3 (Fall 1982), 477-93.

10 E.g., A. N. Robinson, "Evoliutsiia geroicheskikh obrazov v povestiakh o Kulikovskoi bitve," in *Kulikovskaia bitva v literature i iskusstve*, p. 16.

11 V. A. Kuchkin, "Russkaia kniazhestva i zemli pered Kulikovskoi bitvoi," in *Kulikovskaia bitva*, pp. 26-113.

12 V. L. Egorov, "Zolotaia orda pered Kulikovskoi bitvoi," *ibid.*, pp. 174-213.

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The military events of 1380 have been the subject of several books and articles.[13] The least noteworthy is by Beskrovnyi; the most competent is by Kirpichnikov, an archeologist and military historian. Kirpichnikov understands how a medieval army was organized and moved, and analyzes Russian weaponry and armor on the basis of archeological artifacts. Charts and plans of army formations and battlefield maps illustrate each stage of mobilization and combat. The weakness of his book is its somewhat uncritical use of Old Russian narratives to provide factual data; his free translation of literary motifs into "realistic" details partially undermines his conclusions. Kuchkin's reconstruction of the battle puts his mastery of the geography of the region to good use. He is original more in details rather than in broad conclusions, but he has, for example, revised the precise location of the battle site and presented some evidence (which deserves further study) that the *Friazi* in Mamai's employ were Venetians from Azov, not Genoese from Kaffa.

In external affairs Floria has reconstructed Russo-Lithuanian relations on the eve of Kulikovo.[14] He traces in excellent fashion the uneven progress of Lithuanian-Horde rapprochement which led to the alliance of Jagaillo and Mamai in 1380. He explains Jagaillo's failure to participate in the battle by his distrust of the loyalty of his Ukrainian forces from Kiev, Volhynia, and Chernigov, whose sympathies lay with Muscovite anti-Tatar aspirations.[15] This contention was echoed in Tula conference papers by Vilna historians Iuchas and Batura. There is evidence of common East Slavic ethnic consciousness and political cooperation, namely the migration of East Slavic princes and nobles to Moscow in the fourteenth century and the contribution to Donskoi's army of the East Slavic retinues by the assimilated Olgerdovichi princes in his service. However, the connection between the putatively pro-Muscovite sentiments of Jagaillo's East Slavic troops and his tardiness in coming to the aid of his ally Mamai in 1380 remains unproven.

A number of scholars have explored the consequences of Donskoi's victory for Russia and East Europe. Grekov tries to correlate minute changes in Moscow's relations with Riazan', Nizhnii Novgorod, Great Novgorod, and Lithuania in 1381-82 to the increase in Moscow's political capital as a result of Kulikovo.[16] As ever Grekov's forte is presenting specific historical events on a

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[13] L. G. Beskrovnyi, "Kulikovskaia bitva," *ibid.*, pp. 214-45; Kirpichnikov, *Kulikovskaia bitva*; and V. A. Kuchkin, "Pobeda na Kulikovskom pole," *Voprosy istorii*, No. 8 (1980), pp. 3-21.

[14] B. N. Floria, "Litva i Rus' pered bitvoi na Kulikovom pole," in *Kulikovskaia bitva*, pp. 142-73.

[15] Local historians of Ukrainian and Belorussian regions, like Great Russian local historians, invariably try to make a case for hometown participation in the national victory of 1380. Tula conference papers by provincial historians made such assertions for Briansk, Kolomna, Riazan', and Smolensk.

[16] I. B. Grekov, "Mesto Kulikovskoi bitvy v politicheskoi zhizni Vostochnoi Evropy kontsa XIV veka," *ibid.*, pp. 113-41, a different version of which appeared as I. B. Grekov, "Kulikovskaia bitva – vazhnaia vekha v politicheskoi zhizni Vostochnoi Evropy vtoroi poloviny XIV v.," *Sovetskoe slavianovedeniia*, No. 5 (1980), pp. 3-22.

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dramatically painted, broad historical canvas. Unfortunately his grand conclusions sometimes rest on a shaky foundation of overinterpreted or even erroneous facts. Pashuto, in an article expanded from his remarks at the Tula conference,[17] makes one valuable addition to our knowledge of the political fall-out of Kulikovo by disputing the fact that Jagaillo's forces looted the returning Muscovite booty train. According to Pashuto only later German chronicles, not the earlier and more reliable ones, mention this detail. If this analysis holds up, it would strengthen the Soviet consensus in two ways. If Jagaillo's East Slavic levies favored Moscow, they would or should not have permitted the attack on the Muscovite booty train; if such an event did not take place, then a contradiction in the Soviet view of East Slavic fraternity would be eliminated. Second, proof that no harm befell the Muscovite booty train would remove an objection to the depiction of Kulikovo as a glorious and untarnished milestone.

Khoroshkevich, in a very curious article which did not originate in any of the 1980 conferences,[18] concludes that the territory of Kulikovo Field itself was probably under Muscovite-Riazani control by the middle of the fifteenth century, that the field was named after its snipes by the author of the *Zadonshchina*, that Dmitrii Ivanovich became Dmitrii Donskoi in the third quarter of the sixteenth century, and that the term *Kulikovskaia bitva* was coined by Karamzin. These convincing conclusions emerge despite the confusing and loosely focused nature of the article as a whole, and they demonstrate the slow evolution of current historical terminology about 1380.

The consequences of the battle of Kulikovo on Muscovite coinage is the main topic of a monograph by Fedorov-Davydov, the conclusions of which were presented in a paper to the Jubilee Conference.[19] He argues that the Horde had imposed a special political burden on Moscow before 1380 because of the latter's growing power: Muscovite coinage needed to include the name of the Khan of the Golden Horde. He traces Muscovite numismatic resistance to this symbolic manifestation of Horde sovereignty through the early fifteenth century, but never explains why non-Muscovite coinage escaped this imposition.[20]

The most ambitious interpretation of the historical significance of the battle of Kulikovo belongs to the Inner Asianist Gumilev.[21] He claims that the

[17] Pashuto, " 'I v"skipe zemlia Russkaia...'," pp. 66-91.

[18] A. L. Khoroshkevich, "O meste Kulikovskoi bitvy," *Istoriia SSSR*, No. 4 (1980), pp. 92-106.

[19] Fedorov-Davydov's conference paper was entitled "Denezhnoe delo Moskvy posle Kulikovskoi bitvy. Otrazhenie bor'by Moskvy protiv ordynskogo iga po dannykh numizmatiki." See G. A. Fedorov-Davydov, *Monety Moskovskoi Rust* (*Moskva v bor'be za nezavisimoe i tsentralizovannoe gosudarstva*) (Moscow: Moskovskii universitet, 1981). I am indebted to Professor Fedorov-Davydov for calling this book to my attention.

[20] See also A. V. Chernetsov, "Ob odnom izobrazhenii na monetakh Dmitriia Donskogo," in *Kulikovskaia bitva v literature i iskusstve*, pp. 175-78.

[21] Lev Gumilev, "God rozhdeniia 1380...," *Dekorativnoe iskusstvo SSSR*, 12, No. 277 (1980), 34-37 (the article carries the notation: "prepared by A. Kurkchi"), and *idem*, "Epokha Kulikovskoi bitvy," *Ogonek*, No. 36 (Sept. 1980), pp. 16-17.

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Great Russian *etnos* was born on the battlefield of 1380. This assertion derives from his 1973 doctoral dissertation in geography,[22] in which he enunciated a theory of the rise and fall of peoples based on his own research on medieval pastoral nomads, on the geographic-ethnographic methods of Grumm-Grzhimailo,[23] and on the theory of the biospheres of Academician V. I. Vernadskii. Since the history of an *etnos* lasts 1200 years, 1980 is the mid-point in the history of the Great Russian *etnos*, now at the summit of its creative powers as measured in biological energy (*passionernost'*). Soviet scholars agree that a self-conscious Great Russian nationality existed in the late fourteenth century, but only Gumilev attributes its creation to a single event. The extravagance of the theorizing behind his conclusions is likely to make Gumilev's views on this topic even more controversial than his conclusions about the Khazars, about the "Secret History of the Mongols," or, as difficult as that is to imagine, about the *Slovo o polku Igoreve*.

The long-term political impact of the battle of Kulikovo should be traceable in the history of northeastern *Rus'* and Muscovite-Tatar relations from 1380 to 1480. Attempts to delineate that impact have so far proven unsatisfactory. Buganov's article, the theme of his Tula conference paper,[24] and Kargalov's monograph, which reflects his Kaluga conference paper,[25] break no new ground. The problem was treated best in a Jubilee conference paper by Leont'ev.[26] Observing that the less dramatic events of 1480 have received less attention in Old Russian literature than the glorious battle of 1380,[27] Leont'ev raised some perceptive and troublesome questions. What were the concrete manifestations of the Tatar Yoke in the second half of the fifteenth century? Since the failed Tatar campaign of 1480 looks identical to the unsuccessful Tatar attack on Aleksin in 1474, why did the former constitute Russian liberation and not the latter? The answers to these questions should be obvious to some Soviet historians and *literaturovedy*, although so far none, to my knowledge, has articulated them. The interpretation of the Stand on the Ugra River as Russia's liberation from the Tatar Yoke was the product not of contemporary political thought but of ideological hindsight. After the liquidation of the Great Horde in 1503 by the Crimeans it slowly became obvious that 1480 had been the last serious attempt to restore Horde

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[22] *Idem*, "Etnogenez i biosfera Zemli." Avtoreferat na soiskanii uchenoi stepeni doktora geograficheskikh nauk, Leningrad, 1973. Gumilev holds an earlier doctorate in history.

[23] *Idem*, "Grigorii Efimovich Grumm-Grzhimailo kak istorik Tsentral'noi Azii," *Materialy po etnografii Geograficheskogo obshchestva SSSR*, vyp. 1 (Leningrad, 1961), pp. 49-58.

[24] V. I. Buganov, "Ot Kulikovskoi bitvy do osvobozhdeniia ot ordynskogo iga (1380-1480 gg.)," in *Kulikovskaia bitva*, pp. 246-64.

[25] V. V. Kargalov, *Konets ordynskogo iga* (Moscow: Nauka, 1980).

[26] A. K. Leont'ev, " 'Stoiane na Ugre' v 1480 godu. 500-letiie sverzheniia ordynskogo iga." This summary is taken largely from *Tezisy*, pp. 6-9.

[27] Robinson, "Evoliutsiia," p. 10, wonders if the very popularity of the battle of Kulikovo as a subject of literature inhibited literary treatment of the stand on the Ugra.

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sovereignty; the Muscovite publicists of the mid-sixteenth century were the first to accord 1480 a major place in Russian history.

Because remarks about the dating of and relationships among the major narrative sources about 1380 occur in virtually every Soviet publication on the topic, our discussion of sources and literary analysis cannot list every opinion. The emphasis will be on textological questions of dating the Kulikovo cycle, which are the most controversial and acrimonious in all Soviet historiography about 1380.[28]

The broadest discussion of the literary works of the Kulikovo cycle comes from the pen of Dmitriev, from a paper at the TsGADA conference.[29] He concludes that the *Zadonshchina*[30] was a source of, and therefore written earlier than, the Short Redaction of the "Chronicle Tale" of 1380 in the *Troitskaia letopis'* of 1408; he therefore attributes the *Zadonshchina* to the 1380s, thus reversing the textological schema of his colleague Salmina at *Pushkinskii dom*. Dmitriev also defends the dating of the *Skazanie o Mamaevom poboishche* which he first proposed in the 1950s, i.e., the second decade of the fifteenth century. He refutes the contention of Salmina and Mingaliev that the Expanded Redaction of the "Chronicle Tale" of 1380 was a source of the *Skazanie* which would automatically relegate composition of the *Skazanie* to no earlier than the 1450s. Dmitriev seems inclined to return to Shakhmatov's theory that all extant works of the Kulikovo cycle derive from earlier non-extant literary prototypes.[31] Dmitriev's criticism of Salmina's textology strikes me as stronger than his

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[28] Two archival-archeographic articles may be mentioned in passing. A. V. Mashtafarov, "Dokumenty TsGADA po istorii Kulikovskoi bitvy," *Sovetskie arkhivy*, No. 5 (1980), pp. 3S-39, calls attention to an undated Muscovite-Riazani treaty, which he and other Soviets attribute to 1381-82, which refers to the "battle beyond the Don," the earliest dated Russian reference to the battle. A. A. Amosov, "Povesti o Kulikovskoi bitve v otechestvennoi arkheografii." *Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 1980* (1981), pp. 62-68, makes some original remarks on the historical significance of medieval Russian miniatures and the problems of interpreting them.

[29] L. A. Dmitriev, "Kulikovskaia bitva 1380 goda v literaturnykh pamiatnikakh drevnei Rusi," *Russkaia literatura*, No. 3 (1980), pp. 3-29.

[30] Dmitriev and many Soviet scholars accept Dmitrieva's doubts that Sofronii of Riazan' wrote the epic poem we call the *Zadonshchina*.

[31] Dmitriev alludes to the influence of the *Skazanie* on medieval Russian art and modern Russian folk art and literature, often via the *Synopsis*. For evidence of this development, see the following articles in *Kulikovskaia bitva v literature i iskusstve*: E. S. Ovchinnikova, "Kulikovskaia bitva v drevnerusskoi miniatiure i ikone," pp. 115-19; I. P. Bolovtseva, " 'Skazanie o Mamaevom poboishche' na ikone 'Sergei Radonezhskii s zhitiiam' XVII veka," pp. 120-28; L. N. Pushkareva and L. I. Sidorova, "Povesti o Kulikovskoi bitve v russkoi lubochnoi kartinke i knizhke XIX-nachala XX veka," pp. 129-53; E. I. Itkina and V. A. Kuchkin, "Rukopisnyi nastennyi list s izobrazheniiam Mamaeva poboishche," pp. 154-74 (the subject of Itkina's Jubilee conference paper); V. Iu. Troitskii, "Kulikovskaia bitva v tvorchestve russkikh romantikov 10-kh - 30-kh godov XIX veka," pp. 217-33; G. G. Elizavetina, "Kulikovskaia bitva i problema natsional'nogo kharaktera v proizvedenikkh russkikh revoliutsionerov-demokratov," pp. 234-46; O. A. Derzhavina, "Kulikovskaia bitva v russkoi dramaturgii vtoroi poloviny XIX veka," pp. 247-57; and I. E. Usok, "Kulikovskaia bitva v tvorchestve Aleksandra Bloka," pp. 258-77.

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textological alternatives, for the connection between the Short Redaction of the "Chronicle Tale" of 1380 and the *Zadonshchina* is very tenuous.

Debate on dating the cycle rages keenly in Soviet scholarship. Grekov's article continues his polemic with Salmina on the dating of the Expanded Redaction of the "Chronicle Tale" of 1380,[32] an issue joined by Kirpichnikov.[33] Although Salmina's textological schema of the relationship between the Short and Expanded Redactions of the "Chronicle Tale" of 1380 cannot be overturned by non-textological criticism such as that of Grekov and Kirpichnikov, it remains true, if discretely overlooked in Soviet scholarship, that the state of the manuscripts makes any absolute dating by textology impossible. The most sceptical attitude toward the Kulikovo cycle was articulated, surprisingly enough, by Pashuto, who declares that nothing precise can be known about the narrative of 1380 because the sources are confused and contradictory, and represent only popular legend (*narodnoe predanie*), not reliable historical writing.[34] The debates will doubtless continue unabated.

Several Soviet scholars have offered fresh interpretations of the contents of the Kulikovo cycle, either as intellectual history or literary analysis. In his Jubilee conference paper and article[35] Borisov illustrates how different bookmen manipulated the concept of Russian unity to propagate different political programs. He is at his best in discussing the ideological significance of the cult of the Virgin, the invocations of Demetrius of Thessalonica, Donskoi's patron saint, and other artistic evidence. His broader theory of the stages of Russian intellectual response to the Tatar Yoke, of which this explication de texte is a segment, awaits more extensive publication before it can be evaluated properly.

Soviet scholars have just begun to appreciate the stylistic and intellectual dissimilarities among the monuments of the Kulikovo cycle. For example, Robinson reveals the heterogeneity of the images of Dmitrii Donskoi and other heroes in the *Zadonshchina*, the "Chronicle Tale," and the *Skazanie* - each patriotic, but each unique in its mixture of popular/secular/epic and ecclesiastical/bookish elements.[36] In much Soviet scholarship, as he rightly observes, emphasis on the common themes of national unity and anti-Tatar struggle has obscured the stylistic differences of the three texts. Robinson's meticulous study is a welcome contrast. Kuskov has written a workmanlike essay on invocations of images from Biblical, Romano-Byzantine, and Kievan history in the works of the Kulikovo cycle,[37] and concludes that the Kulikovo literature was the first to use Kievan metaphors and slogans extensively, a valid

[32] Grekov, "Mesto Kulikovskoi bitvy," pp. 118-22.

[33] Kirpichnikov, *Kulikovskaia bitva*, pp. 8-9.

[34] Pashuto, " 'I v"skipe zemlia Russkaia...'," pp. 84-87.

[35] N. S. Borisov, "Kulikovskaia bitva i nekotorye voprosy dukhovnoi zhizni Rusi XIV-XV w.," *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta*, seriia 8, *Izvestiia*, No. 5 (1980), pp. 56-66.

[36] Robinson, "Evoliutsiia," pp. 10-38.

[37] V. V. Kuskov, "Retrospektivnaia istoricheskaia analogiia v proizvedeniiakh Kulikovskogo tsikla," in *Kulikovskaia bitva v literature i iskusstve*, pp. 39-51.

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if unoriginal point.[38] Only considerable additional research on the individual literary and intellectual features of each member of the cycle will enable scholars to appreciate each work alone and in the context of the entire trilogy. Only in this way will the full richness and texture of the separate literary monuments become apparent. At that point it will be necessary to take the intellectual and ideological heterogeneity of early Muscovite thought into account in analyzing even the dating of the literary works.

Let me conclude this brief survey with some remarks about art, folklore, and architecture. Quite a number of papers and communications at the 1980 conferences by art historians, whose publication I have not traced, correlate artistic works and political history. In its crudest form this approach leads to assertions that without the battle of Kulikovo, an artistic genius like Andrei Rublev could not have arisen in Muscovy. From the summaries of his paper and its "theses," it would appear that even as accomplished an art historian as A. V. Plugin may make such statements. Surely no one would deny that Rublev's career was tied to political developments; after all, the Muscovite secular and ecclesiastical establishment sponsored his activities, and the political-ideological function of specific saintly cults is well established. But to draw a direct line between the battle of Kulikovo and Rublev's "Trinity" or "Saviour" seems at best superficial, and at worst vulgar, for it reduces Rublev's aesthetic and theological beliefs to a mere response to military victory. Oversimplifications of this type are regrettably rife in Soviet scholarship on the Kulikovo epoch.

Debate continues among folklorists on the extent of allusions to Kulikovo in Russian folklore. Pushkareva's article finds fewer such influences than previously asserted.[39] The significance of references to Kulikovo in Russian folklore comprises a legitimate area of investigation of the battle's impact on Russian history, and Soviet folklorists are attempting to fill this lacuna in our knowledge.

On the basis of pioneering archival research Ashurkov has analyzed efforts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to commemorate Kulikovo with appropriate architectural grandeur. In a brief article taken from his Tula conference paper and in the fourth, 1980 anniversary edition of his very popular tourist guide to Kulikovo, he presents this material with a sure hand.[40] Ashurkov understands architecture and makes it comprehensible to the lay reader. He provides current names of historical sites mentioned in the medieval sources and uses blueprints, diagrams, and photographs to illustrate nineteenth-

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[38] Of relevance to the problem of the relationship of early Muscovite and Kievan culture is V. M. Grigor'ian, " 'Slovo o polku Igoreve' i 'Zadonshchina'. Sopostavlenie tekstov," *ibid.*, pp. 72-91, a linguistic think-piece beyond the competence of the present writer.

[39] L. N. Pushkareva, "K voprosu ob otrazhenii Kulikovskoi bitvy v russkom fol'klore," in *Kulikovskaia bitva*, pp. 265-74.

[40] V. N. Ashurkov, "Pamiatniki Kulikovo polia," *ibid.*, pp. 275-88, and *idem, Na pole Kulikovom. 600 let, 1380-1980*, 4th ed. (Tula: Priokskoe knizhnoe izd., 1980).

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and twentieth-century architectural plans which culminated in the construction of the towering obelisk which now marks the site. Naturally Ashkurov points out the political purposes behind the propagation of the historical memory of Kulikovo during the tsarist period.

The contributions of Soviet historians, *literaturovedy*, orientalists, archeologists, art historians, folklorists, and archivists to the scholarship on the six-hundredth anniversary of the battle of Kulikovo are predictably eneven in quality. No purpose would be served here by harping on the potted narratives replete with factual inaccuracies which mar even some of the scholarly works discussed in this essay. It is preferable to call attention to the merits of this scholarship. Political and interpretive studies have all worked toward a better appreciation of the complexities and ambiguities of medieval Russian history and literature, of the slowness and unevenness of the development of alliances and of the heterogeneity among literary sources about the same event. More nuanced political narratives and more subtle literary analysis have emerged from Soviet respect for the integrity of the medieval sources and commitment to mine their contents even more deeply.

The conceptual squabbles among Soviet historians and *literaturovedy* should not be overlooked. While Soviet scholars agree about the significance of the battle of Kulikovo, they disagree about specific matters large and small pertaining to it, ranging from the location of the battle site and the number of troops participating on each side to the roles of key individuals, from the utility of different narrative sources to the interpretation of various literary passages in the texts. Of greater significance are the disagreements about more fundamental approaches to the nature of fourteenth-century Russian and East European history. Pashuto, for example, takes violent exception to Grekov's overall theory because, in his opinion, it accords equal legitimacy to Vilna and Moscow as potential unifying agents of northeastern *Rus'*. Lithuanian expansion eastward, he insists, was aggression. Olgerd should have fought the Teutonic Knights, not besieged Moscow. Grekov's grand paradigm of the competing centrifugal and centripetal tendencies everywhere at work in Eastern Europe during the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries remains controversial. Equally debated in Soviet scholarship is the entirely different theory of Prokhorov on the role of the Hesychast monastic party in East European affairs during that era, to which, for example, Egorov takes exception.[41] Therefore Gorskii's hope for an integrated interdisciplinary Soviet consensus about Kulikovo seems doomed to disappointment.

The methodological divisions among Soviet scholars are even more profound than these conceptual disagreements and equally unbridgeable. The

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[41] Curiously, I can find no work with a 1980 date of publication by G. M. Prokhorov, although the Kulikovo epoch is the focus of his research; nor does he seem to have participated in any of the 1980 conferences. On his theories, see Halperin, "Soviet Historiography," pp. 319-21, and my review of his 1978 monograph in Byzantine Studies, 9, No. 2 (1982), 355-57.

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literaturovedy-textologists such as Lur'e and Salmina insist that details cannot be arbitrarily extracted from a literary text without first taking into account its dating and literary history; historians such as Kirpichnikov, Kargalov, and Grekov persist in using logical criteria such as credibility, reliability, consitency, and coherence in evaluating discrete data from complex narrative sources in order to construct composite narratives. This polarity is not merely a result of disciplinary rivalries. The philologists, themselves, do not agree on the datings of the works of the Kulikovo cycle, as the debate between Dmitriev and Salmina attests; and some historians, such as Kuchkin, do rank literary sources by textological criteria in determining their historical reliability. Still, the debate over the limits and applicability of textology generates much heat in Soviet scholarship.

It is easy to imagine what position would be reached by carrying the "strict" textological approach to its logical conclusion, although no Soviet *literaturoved* has done so in print. If all of the literary works about the battle of Kulikovo were written three-quarters of a century after the fact, then none of their unique narrative details can be accepted as reliable. It must be concluded, moreover, that there is no evidence that anyone at the time appreciated the importance of Kulikovo or made ambitious ideological claims for Moscow on the basis of Donskoi's victory.[42] Grekov objects that Salmina's dating of the Expanded Redaction of the "Chronicle Tale" of 1380 impoverishes historical narrative; in his general pronunciamentos on this subject Lur'e has responded that historical narrative written on the basis of late, unreliable sources is unscientific and not worth salvaging. Ironically, the scholar who has expressed the most sceptical attitude toward the historical value of the literary works of the Kulikovo cycle is Pashuto, and he obviously does not doubt the historical importance of the battle despite his cavalier attitude toward the texts which supposedly tell us what happened and how contemporaries felt.

Thus, Soviet scholarship on the six-hundredeth anniversary of the battle of Kulikovo illustrates that same tension between a universally-accepted broad, substantive consensus and major conceptual and methodological disagreements which is characteristic of recent Soviet scholarship in general. It is necessary to step outside the internal Soviet polemics to appreciate precisely the flaws in that Soviet consensus about the importance of Kulikovo. That consensus does not and cannot document the supposed Russian belief in Tatar invincibility shattered in 1380, nor does it reconcile claims that the Russian "people" accepted such a myth with the Soviets' emphatic insistence on the unbroken pattern of anti-Tatar rebellion in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Russia. That consensus modernizes and exaggerates the ideological message of the works of the Kulikovo cycle, which claim only a military victory over a single Tatar, and

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[42] The reality of the victory, however, cannot be doubted; it is verified by the construction of a church dedicated to Demetrius of Thessalonica, Donskoi's patron saint, in 1380 in Novgorod, and the allusion in the Muscovite-Riazani treaty probably dating from 1381-82.

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a usurper at that, Mamai, not Russian "liberation" from the "Tatar Yoke." That consensus minimizes the significance of the sack of Moscow in 1382 by Tokhtamysh and the degree of Tatar influence in northeastern *Rus'* in its aftermath: in the 1380s Vasilii I was held hostage by the Tatars for several years and Russia had to pay a large, punitive tribute for its temerity in 1380. That consensus omits entirely the Tatar/steppe context of the stipulations in Donskoi's will. Since Khan Tokhtamysh in 1389 was engaged in a titanic and losing struggle with Timur (Tamerlane), he probably approved Vasilii I's hereditary succession to the Vladimir grand principality to secure his Russian rear. The weakening of Horde control imagined in Donskoi's testament should be credited more to Timur than to Kulikovo. That consensus does not confront the serious methodological objections to the proposition that a nationally conscious Russian "people" (*narod*) existed in the late fourteenth century or that elite sources represent its "popular" opinion. As a result of these weaknesses, Soviet scholars present far too optimistic an interpretation of the consequences of Kulikovo in increasing Moscow's power and position vis-à-vis the other Russian principalities and the Golden Horde.

It might be more justified to conceive of the battle of Kulikovo not as a cause of Moscow's success but rather as a reflection of it. In 1380 Moscow was able to mobilize the largest Russian army seen in Vladimir-Suzdalia in centuries (no matter how tendentious the statistics in the sources). Muscovy was confident enough of its might to mount an offensive against the Tatars, to ride across the frontier into the open steppe to meet Mamai in battle. Indeed, the Muscovites foresaw such a strategy as early as 1375 when they imposed an offensive-defensive anti-Tatar military alliance on Tver'. (Even in 1480 the Muscovites assumed a defensive posture.) Muscovite military losses at Kulikovo were so enormous that in 1382 Dmitrii Donskoi could not put an army in the field against Tokhtamysh, which led to catastrophic civilian losses; yet gradually Moscow did recover, because its power base had sufficient resources in the fourteenth century. In conclusion, the battle of Kulikovo Field in 1380 might be more significant as a symbol of Moscow's power before 1380 than as a catalyst for immediate Muscovite political advantage or as the inspiration for heightened Great Russian patriotism and national consciousness after 1380.

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THE TATAR YOKE AND TATAR OPPRESSION

The period of Russian history during which the Mongols of the Golden Horde ruled Russia, from circa 1237 to 1480, is nowadays universally referred to as the "Tatar Yoke" (*tatarskoe igo*). However, the phrase is an anachronism which nowhere appears in Russian sources written during the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries.[1] Instead of trying to establish when the phrase originated[2], scholars have tried to identify contemporary expressions which might be translated as "the Tatar Yoke". The various nominees include the "tomlenie i mrak" (spiritlessness and doom) in Russia because of the Mongol conquest[3], the *žalost' russkoj zemli* ("sorrow of the Russian Land") articulated in the Zadonščina[4], the hope that *Bog peremenit Ordu* ("God would change the Horde") expressed in the will of Dmitrij Donskoj, taken to mean that the Tatar Yoke would be overthrown[5], and the *tjagost'* " ("tax burden") of tribute-payment to the Tatars.[6] While these and many other turns of phrase in the medieval Russian sources bespeak the same negative attitudes toward the Tatars subsumed under the concept of the Tatar Yoke, it remains the case that the actual phrase is not found in Russian sources written under Mongol rule. It is therefore implausible that medieval Russians thought about Tatar suzereignty by employing that concept. Thus it must be something of a distortion to describe the aim of the Tverian uprising of 1327 as the "overthrow (of) the Tatar Yoke"[7],

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[1] John L. I. Fennell in Fennell and Anthony Stokes, "Early Russian Literature", Berkeley, 1974, p. 80 refers to the "so-called" Tatar Yoke, and George Vernadsky, "The Mongols and Russia", New Haven, 1953, pp. v-viii puts the phrase in quotation marks. This is as much as any scholar seems to have made of the absence of the expression in contemporary medieval Russian sources.

[2] M. N. Tichomirov, "Kulikovskaja bitva 1380 g.", in Tichomirov, V. F. Ržiga, and L. A. Dmitriev, eds., "Povesti o Kulikovskoj bitvy", M., 1959, p. 337 observes that the "system of terror" of Mongol rule "received the name the Tatar Yoke", but he does not raise the question of when this took place.

[3] *Istorija russkoj literatury*, tom II, čast' 1, M.-L., 1946, p.49.

[4] D. S. Lichačev, "Kul'tura Rusi epochi obrazovanija russkogo nacional'nogo gosudarstva (konec XIV – načalo XVI v.)", M., 1946, p. 90, repeated in his "Kul'tura Rusi vremeni Andreja Rubleva i Epifanija Premudrogo (konec XIV – načalo XV v.)", M. -L., 1962, p. 87.

[5] V. V. Kargalov, "Osvoboditel'naja bor'ba Rusi protiv mongolo-tatarskogo iga", VI, 1969, 4, p. 134.

[6] Michel Roublev, "The Mongol Tribute according to the Wills and Agreements of the Russian Princes", in Michael Cherniavsky, ed., "The Structure of Russian History", New York, 1970, pp. 34, 37.

[7] M. G. Safargaliev, "Raspad Zolotoj Ordy", Saransk, 1960, p. 66.

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since the Tverians did not formulate their political program with a phrase not in usage at the time. The victory of 1380 at the battle of Kulikovo Field was not presented in the literary monuments of the Kulikovo cycle as Russian liberation from the Tatar Yoke[8], nor do the sources about the "Stand on the Ugra river" in 1480 contain the phrase. One might conclude that the phrase the "Tatar Yoke" is conspicuous by its absence in medieval Russian sources of the Mongol period.

The word *igo* ("yoke") was familiar to medieval Russian bookmen. It was commonly found in scriptural quotations, especially in the stock phrase *rabotno igo* ("yoke of slavery").[9] With a dose of hyperbole and rhetorical extravagence some sixteenth century Muscovite authors applied this concept to political relationships, although not about events of the sixteenth century. The *Stepennaja kniga* ("Book of Degrees") written during the reign of Ivan IV bemoans the fact that the Mongol campaigns of 1237-1238 reduced the Russian nobles (*sinklit*) to the "yoke of slavery"; the nobles now had to do manual labor formerly performed by their slaves and servants.[10] This depiction of the degrading consequences of Tatar rule is sheer fantasy, of course, because the Mongols were extremely sensitive to the social hierarchies of the peoples they conquered. The horror of the author of this passage at the mistreatment of the Russian elite is misplaced. The slavery of the Russian nobles is metaphoric rather than political, so the correlation of Mongol sovereignty and a "yoke" in the passage remains loose.

The second and universally overlooked usage of "yoke" to suggest a political nexus does not even pertain to Russo-Tatar relations. Variant readings in the *Kazanskaja istorija* ("Kazan' History"), usually dated to the reign of Ivan IV, use the term to portray relations between Novgorod and the grand principality of Vladimir.[11] It is said that Novgorod had been in the "yoke of slavery" (*rabotnago iga*) to the grand principality before the advent of the Tatars, but had taken advantage of Tatar rule to free itself from that condition; now Ivan III had returned Novgorod to its rightful state within the grand principality. According to one text, "in the bitter times of Batu they (the Novgorodians) overthrew the yoke of slavery and separated themselves from *Rus'*, the Vladimir *carstvo*" (*gorkaja Batyeva vremčina otvergoša oni rabotnago iga i otdelišasja ot Rusi, carstva Vladimirskago*). According to the

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[8] Charles J. Halperin, "The Russian Land and the Russian Tsar: The Emergence of Muscovite Ideology, 1380-1408", *FOG*, 23, 1976, pp. 7-103 passim.

[9] I. I. Sreznevskii, "Materialy dlia slovaria drevne-russkago jazyka", 3 vv., Sankt Peterburg (SPb.), 1893-1912, I, col. 1019.

[10] *Polnoe sobranie russkich letopisej* (hereafter *PSRL*), XXI, pp. 262-263.

[11] *PSRL*, XIX, p. 6 and G. N. Moiseeva, ed., *Kazanskaja istorija* (M., 1954) hereafter Moiseeva, pp. 54-55.

V. V. Kargalov, "Vnešnepolitičeskie faktory razvitija feodal'noj Rusi: Feodal'naja Rus' i kočevniki", M., 1967, p. 136 quotes this passage on Novgorod and the *igo* without appreciating its importance.

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other variant, Novgorod was neither warred on nor plundered (or perhaps "seized") by Batu (*ne vojvanny ne plenena*). Seeing the confusion among the Russian princes, the Novgorodians threw off the yoke of slavery, separating themselves from the Vladimir Russian *carstvo*, as above, but, this variant continues, after the Novgorodians had turned to the Latin faith "God subordinated them under the yoke of Slavery, the strong and cruel-hearted Novgorodian men, to his holy-named servitor, the blessed and grand prince Ivan of great Muscovy" (*emu pokori bog pod rabotnoe ego igo i žestokoserdyja ljudi novgorodskija tezoime-nitomu emu služe, blagovernomu i velikomu knjazju Ioannu velikoj Moskovii*). What is striking about this passage is the usage of the concept of a "yoke" in an internal context to depict the approved state of affairs between Novgorod and the grand principality of Vladimir/Moscow, not in an external context to depict the hated and despised relationship of Russia to the Tatars[12]. In fact the Tatars did not so grossly lessen Vladimir-Suzdalian authority over Novgorod, and the passage has distorted history to fit a polemical purpose. Although this generalization by the author of the *Kazanskaja istorija* merits further study by specialists in 16th century Muscovite thought, for the present purposes it illustrates the currency and flexibility of the term "yoke" in political and ideological prose of that era.

The third and final passage returns the "yoke of slavery" to the sphere of Russo-Tatar relations. According to the sixteenth century Novgorod Great Menology redaction of the *vita* of Mercurius of Smolensk, Batu imposed a heavy and bitter pagan yoke and burden on the Christians (variously *tjažko igo i jarmo...pogansko or tjažko i gorko*), who fell into infidel hands, into the yoke of slavery (*igo rabotnago*).[13] The exception to this horrid fate is of course Smolensk, miraculously saved from Batu by the sainted Mercurius.

Therefore, the concept of a "yoke" or a "yoke of slavery" as a description of a political relationship arose in sixteenth century Muscovy and found expression in a number of texts. This development is probably related to the major trends in Muscovite ideology, the metaphor of the Russians as the "New Israel" expounded in the "Epistle to the Ugra river" of bishop Vassian and the nascent theory of Moscow-the Third Rome of the monk Philotheus. Exodus and

[12] The *Kazanskaja istorija* (*PSRL*, XIX, p. 8 and Moiseeva, p. 57) uses the word *jarmo* (burden) to describe Russian subordination to the Horde in its section on the Stand on the Ugra river in 1480. Although *igo* and *jarmo* are close in meaning, it seems best for this essay to distinguish them. It should be noted in passing that the *Kazanskaja istorija* is the earliest text to use the term the "Golden Horde" (*Zlataja orda/Zolotaja orda*), as was appreciated by George Vernadsky, "The Mongols and Russia", pp. 138-140. For some discussion of the slow process by which this term was assimilated into Russian historiography see two articles by G. A. Bogatova, "Fenomen 'Zolotaja Orda' ", "Nauka i žizn' ", 1969, 12, pp. 65-66, and "Zolotaja orda", "Russkaja reč' ", 1970, 1, pp. 70-77.

[13] L. T. Beleckij, "Literaturnaja istorija povesti o Merkurii Smolenskom: Issledovanija i teksty", "Sbornik otdelenija russkogo jazyka i slovesnosti", t. XCIX, 8, P., 1922, pp. 58-74, here pp. 61-62, from Soloveckij monastery manuscript 622 (507).

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eschatology thus combined to nourish a world-view in which relations of political subordination were articulated as moral slavery.[14]

Even when applied to Russo-Tatar relations, however, no sixteenth century Muscovite author conjoined the adjective "Tatar" to the noun "Yoke". This crucial step in the creation of the expression which now encapsulates the Mongol period of Russian history cannot be traced precisely, but several assertions can be made about its timing and context. First, the term the "Tatar Yoke" arose in the second half of the seventeenth century. Second, the impetus to its earliest occurrence was the battle of Kulikovo of 1380. Third and finally, the concept probably arose in Kiev among pro-Muscovite Ukrainian intellectuals.

The thread which links these three points about the origin of the term the "Tatar Yoke" is a single text about the battle of Kulikovo, the *Skazanie o Mamaevom poboisce* ("Narration of the Battle with Mamai"), the most popular and most religious member of the Kulikovo trilogy.[15] Its rich and variegated manuscript tradition is replete with interpolations and glosses of all kinds.[16] Most manuscripts date from the seventeenth century. Although the text is clearly of Muscovite provenance, in the seventeenth century it also circulated in the Ukraine. Eventually a redaction of the *Skazanie* was included in an edition of the famous *Synopsis'* of Innokentij Gizel', hegumen of the Kievan Monastery of the Caves and spokesman of Muscovite imperial interests in the Ukraine after the treaty of Perejaslavl'. The pattern of that thread is complex and as yet not completely unravelled.

There are two manuscripts of the so-called "West-Russian" Redaction (*Zapadnorusskaja redakcija*) of the *Skazanie*. In these manuscripts the Narration is accompanied by a set of paragraphs about East Slavic history written, in the opinion of L. A. Dmitriev, by Feodosij Safonovič, hegumen of the Michailovskij Zlatoverskij monastery in Kiev in 1665. These paragraphs were incorporated into the two manuscripts of the West-Russian Redaction of the *Skazanie* by Kochanovskij, "ekonom" of the Kievan Monastery of the Caves, in the 1680s, when the manuscript miscellanies (*sborniki*) were compiled. The first of the thirteen paragraphs is included only in one of the two manuscripts, since the other starts with the fourth paragraph. It begins with its title: "Of the Kievan principality under the evil Tatar yoke (*pod ljutym igom tatarskim*) and in part of the Kievan princes, dominated by the evil Batyj".[17] The

[14] For a garbled sentence according to which a Lithuanian prince in 1272 refused to give himself into the "yoke" of the Tatars, see the very late *Litovskaja letopis'* in *PSRL*, XXXII, pp. 23-24.

[15] On this text see Halperin, pp. 23-27.

[16] See Charles J. Halperin, "Some Observations on Interpolations in the *Skazanie o Mamaevom poboišče*", "International Journal of Slavic Linguistics and Poetics", 23, 1981, /1982/, pp. 93-112.

[17] L. A. Dmitriev, "Kniga o poboišči Mamaja, carja tatarskogo, ot knjazja vladimirskogo i moskovskogo Dmitrija", *TODRL*, XXXIV, 1979, pp. 61-71 discusses *GPB*, Pogodin 1569, and

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paragraph mentions Jaroslav Vsevolodovič Michail of Černigov, Daniil Romanovič and Aleksandr Nevskij, among other princes. The phrase the "Tatar Yoke" does not recur in this paragraph, in any of the other twelve paragraphs, or in the West-Russian Redaction of the *Skazanie*. Presumably the phrase, like the historical material in which it is found, was written by Safonovič in the 1660s. Obviously it was not accorded undue importance by its author or the later writer who utilized it.

Gizel' wrote the first edition of the *Synopsis'* in the Kievan Caves Monastery, where Kochanovskij worked, and published it in 1674. It contains the aforementioned Safonovič material, including the reference to the "evil Tatar Yoke". In addition the phrase appears in a new paragraph, preceding the thirteen paragraphs, which serves to introduce the subject of the battle of Kulikovo. Gizel' wrote that the battle of Kulikovo took place one hundred and fifty years after the institution of the "Tatar Yoke".[18] This usage is retained in the second, 1678 edition of the *Synopsis'*.[19] The third edition of the *Synopsis'* was published in 1680, but not by Gizel'. Someone other than he now inserted a new redaction of the *Skazanie o Mamaevom poboišče* between the two sections which use the phrase the "Tatar Yoke". This redaction of the *Skazanie* does not employ the concept.[20] It would seem that some of the manuscripts of the *Skazanie* copied from the *Synopsis'* also retained some of this accompanying material.[21]

A seventeenth century manuscript of the Expanded Redaction of the *Skazanie* also contains an introductory section which dates the battle of Kulikovo to one hundred and fifty years after the inaugeration of the Tatar Yoke: *Kievskoe knjaženie i vsea Rosii samoderžavstvie pod tatarskim prebyst' igom črez poltorasta let* (The Kievan principality and the entire Russian autocracy had been under the Tatar Yoke for 150 years).[22] The connection

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GPB F. IV. 215. The quotation is found only in Pogodin 1569, f. 71 (see Dmitriev, p. 70). I had the opportunity to examine these manuscripts while in the Soviet Union under the auspices of the International Research and Exchanges Board during Fall 1981. It was at that time that I had access to the three editions of the *Synopsis'* and the manuscript cited in nn. 18-21 infra.

[18] *GBL, otdel redkoj knigi*. The phrase occurs on pp. 110-113, 121-122, both as a heading across the tops of the pages and in the text itself.

[19] *GBL, otdel redkoj knigi*. Same pagination as the 1674 edition.

[20] *GPB, otdel redkoj knigi*, V. 6. 11[b] pp. 70-71, 103[v]-104. V. 6. 11[a] is a variant publication of the 1680 edition with identical text and different pagination; "Tatar Yoke" appears on pp. 122-123, 179-181.

[21] For example, *GPB*, Titov 53, f. 30.

On the *Synopsis'* see P. Miljukov, "Glavnye tečenija russkoj istoričeskoj mysli", SPb., 1913, pp. 7-15; N. L. Rubinštein, "Russkaja istoriografija", M., 1941, pp. 45-48; I. P. Eremin, "K istorii obščestvennoj mysli na Ukraine vtoroj poloviny XVII v.", *TODRL*, X, 1954, pp. 212-222; S. L. Peštič, "Russkaja istoriografija XVIII veka", 3 vv., L., 1961-1971, I, pp. 284-298; M. A. Alpatov, "Russkaja istoričeskaja mysl' i Zapadnaja Evropa XII-XVII vv.", M., 1973, pp. 396-398; and J. L. Black, "L' histoire au service de l' État: le Synopsis du XVIIe siècle et son heritage historiographique", "Laurentian University Review", X, 1, November 1977, pp. 7-15.

[22] *GBL*, fond 256, 368. The *Skazanie o Mamaevom povoišče* appears on ff. 209-247, the quotation on f. 209[v]. A similar sentence prefaces another seventeenth-century manuscript of the

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between this usage and that in the West-Russian Redaction manuscripts of the *Skazanie* and the editions of the *Synopsis'* requires further investigation.

Therefore, although the concept of the "Tatar Yoke" never penetrated into the *Skazanie*, despite the receptivity of that text to interpolations and glosses, it seems to have become associated with it almost as a literary convoy. The century and a half that had elapsed between the campaigns of Batu and the defeat of Mamaj was an imprecise approximation, and intrudes into various manuscripts not only of the *Skazanie* but also of the *Zadonščina*, as an interpolation. The creation of the phrase the "Tatar Yoke" seems almost to have been accidental, in that it was not immediately utilized by the people who created it to describe what we now know as the Tatar period of Russian history. Since the *Skazanie* does not refer to the "Tatar Yoke", it is impossible to see in the battle of 1380 the liberation of *Rus'* from the "Tatar Yoke", which leaves the termini of the epoch so denoted open-ended. Yet the evidence now at our disposal leads to the tentative and unexpected conclusion that the phrase was in the air in the pro-Muscovite intellectual circles of Kiev in the second half of the seventeenth century.

It took considerably longer for the phrase to be definitively established in Russian historiography. In the very late seventeenth century Andrej Lyzlov wrote his *Skifskaja istorija* ("History of the Scythians"). He relied upon the *Synopsis'* for his account of the battle of Kulikovo.[23] Nevertheless it would appear that although Lyzlov invoked the concept of the "Tatar Yoke" but once, it was not in connection with 1380. Lyzlov wrote that an uprising in northeastern Russian cities in 1262 against the baskaki[24] failed "to liberate [Russia] from the Tatar Yoke" (*svoboditisja iga Tatarskago*).[25] This unique and

Expanded Redaction of the *Skazanie*, *GIM*, Uvarov 1434 (492), which refers to the "yoke" (*igo*) without the adjective "Tatar" (*Skazanie*, ff. 1-35^{v}, quotation f. 1). Neither of these manuscripts is included in Dmitriev's list, published in "Povesti o Kulikovskoj bitvy", pp. 481-509. I had examined them in 1971-1972 while doing research in the Soviet Union under a grant from the International Research and Exchanges Board and Fulbright-Hays Fellowships, and had hoped to confirm my excerpts and discover if they came from the Safonovič material. Unfortunately in Fall 1981 I was denied access to *GBL* and *GIM* and could not do so.

[23] On Lyzlov see M. A. Alpatov, "Russkaja istoričeskaja mysl' i Zapadnaja Evropa XVII-pervaja četvert' XVIII veka", M., 1976, pp. 302-312 and the series of articles by E. V. Čistjakova, "Ob avtore 'Skifskoj istorii' A. I. Lyzlova", in "Voprosy social'no-ekonomičeskoj istorii i istočnikovedenija perioda feodalizma v Rossii. Sb. st. k 70-letiju A. A. Novosel'skogo", M., 1961, pp. 284-289; "Russkij istorik A. I. Lyzlov i ego kniga 'Skifskaja istorija' ", "Vestnik istorii mirovoj kul'tury", 1961, 1, pp. 117-127; " 'Skifskaja istorija' A. I. Lyzlova i trudy pol'skich istorikov XVI-XVII vv.", *TODRL*, XIX, 1963, pp. 348-357; and " 'Skifskaja istorija' A. I. Lyzlova i voprosy vostokovedenija", "Očerki po istorii russkogo vostokovedenija", VI, 1963, pp. 3-88.

[24] The chronicles identify the object of the *veče* uprisings as *besermeny*, i.e. Muslims, not baskaki. Cf. n. 35.

[25] Andrej Lyzlov, "Skifskaja istorija", M., 1787, p. 46, the only edition accessible to me. Cf. pp. 5-79 therein on the Scythians to the end of the Great/Golden Horde. In Moscow during Fall 1981 I was denied permission to verify this usage in the oldest and most reliable seventeenth-century manuscript of Lyzlov, *GIM* Sinod. 460.

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ideosyncratic allusion to the "Tatar Yoke" in Lyzlov testifies to the still incipient state of its application to Russian history.

The first great multi-volume history of Russia was written by Tatiščev in the eighteenth century.[26] The heated controversy over Tatiščev's *History* centers upon his use of sources. Did he exclusively transcribe verbatim chronicle and other source enscrupulously transcribe verbatim chronicle and other source entries into his *History* or did he tamper with his quotations, filling in details from other entries, manipulating language, and modernizing lexicon? Upon the answer to that question rests the legitimacy of taking at face value any sentence in Tatiščev whose origin is unknown as an authentic quotation from inextant sources.[27] Like every educated Russian of the eighteenth century, Tatiščev had read Gizel'. One would expect him therefore to invoke the concept of the "Tatar Yoke" in describing the battle of Kulikovo, or, if he did exercise literary legerdomain in fashioning his text, to utilize the phrase throughout his volumes. Neither is the case; as far as I can tell, the phrase "Tatarskoe igo" never and nowhere appears on the pages of Tatiščev's *History*, an anomaly for which no explanation is readily apparent.

Rather than trace the scattered allusions to the "Tatar Yoke" in various eighteenth-century Russian books and journals[28], we may turn to the works of the historian who contributed the most to disseminating the phrase, namely Ščerbatov. In his multi-volum *History* the phrase became well-nigh ubiquitous.[29] However, ambiguities still abound. Ščerbatov based his work heavily upon Tatiščev, which he had read in manuscript; he had also read Gizel' and Lyzlov.[30] Every time Ščerbatov utilized the concept of the "Tatar Yoke" he was diverging from Tatiščev, but he never records his acknowledgment of that discrepancy. There is little question but that to Ščerbatov the "Tatar yoke" began with Batu's conquests and terminated in 1480, but he does not conclude with the assertion that they initiated the "Tatar Yoke" and his section on the Stand on the Ugra river barely mentions the phrase. His usage is also not uniform, and includes various terms, such as the Tatar Yoke, the yoke, the cruel

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[26] M. N. Tatiščev, "Istorija Rossijskaja s samych drevneišich vremen", 7 vv., M.-L., 1962-1968.

[27] The critics, including Peštič, Lur'e, Lichačev and Dobrjuškin present more convincing arguments than Tatiščev's "defenders" especially Kuz'min. For some indication of the extent of the early polemics see S. N. Valk, "Istorija Rossijskaja M. N. Tatiščeva v sovetskoj istoriografii", in Tatiščev, "Istorija Rossijskaja", t. VII, M., 1968, pp. 5-29. The literature on this problem is too vast to cite in full.

[28] See the references to Mankiev in A. M. Sacharov, "Istoriografija istorii SSSR. Do-sovetskij period", M., 1978, p. 55 and to an anonymous article in the "Novye ežemesjačnye sočinenija ch. XIII, 1787, quoted in Peštič, II, p. 35.

[29] The edition accessible to me was M. M. Ščerbatov, "Sočinenija. Istorija Rossijskaja ot drevnejšich vremen", 7 vv., SPb., 1901-1904, III, pp. 86, 109, 158-159, 163-164, 210, 264, 293, 304, 353-356, 379, 404; IV part 1, pp. 37, 236, 240, 241, 246, 287-288, 320, 250, 416, 431, 453-454; IV part 2, pp. 43, 210.

[30] On Ščerbatov as a historian see Rubinštein, pp. 116-137 and Peštič, III, p. 5-48.

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yoke. At least once the term is removed from the Russo-Tatar context altogether, although it still refers to the prospect of foreign rule; accorking to Ščerbatov, grand prince Vitovt of Lithuania wanted to bring Russia under his "yoke".[31] Thus Ščerbatov brought the term into common usage in Russian historical writing.

Ščerbatov's *History* was surpassed by that of Karamzin, although the latter's dependence upon the former has always been a sensitive topic.[32] Karamzin's superlatively written *History* easily superseded Ščerbatov's in the eyes of the public; in the nineteenth century everyone read Karamzin, and Ščerbatov faded into obscurity. In that century the conceptualization of Russian history from 1237 to 1480 as the period of the Tatar Yoke had become automatic. Nevertheless Karamzin does not mention the term in narrating the Mongol campaigns of Batu; its first invocation comes in connection with the martyrdom of Michail of Černigov. From that section of the *History* on, however, the expression becomes a cliché. The Stand on the Ugra becomes the "overthrow of the yoke of the khans" (*sverženie iga chanskago*).[33] The establishment of the concept of the "Tatar Yoke" had been completed by the time Karamzin published his *History*.

The concept of the *tatarskoe igo*, therefore, originated in the second half of the seventeenth century on the foundation of sixteenth-century Muscovite employment of the concept of a "yoke of slavery" to describe Russia's dependence under the Mongols. The phrase was, however, probably coined in the Ukraine. It gained general currency as a description of the period of Tatar rule in Russian history in the eighteenth century slowly and erratically. As a standard concept it dates from the heyday of Imperial Russian historiography in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Obviously the history of the concept of the "Tatar Yoke" belongs to the centuries of Russian history after the liquidation of the Mongol domination which it describes.

The absence of the term the "Tatar Yoke" in the medieval Russian sources has led scholars to search for equivalents in the original texts. No candidate proposed so far is ever used with the consistency or ubiquity of the concept of the "Tatar Yoke" in modern historiography. Surprizingly, however, the most plausible candidate for this role has not previously been so analyzed. That expression is *tatarskoe nasilie* ("Tatar oppression").[34]

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[31] Ščerbatov, IV, part I, p. 366.

[32] The classic critique is Miljukov, "Glavnye tečenija russkoj istoričeskoj mysli", pp. 128-167, 178-224, who emphasizes Karamzin's dependence on Ščerbatov. Current historiographic analysis of Karamzin focuses on his use of sources and the relationship of his text to his "Notes".

[33] N. N. Karamzin, "Istorija gosudarstva Rossijskago", 12 vv., SPb., 1892; rpt. The Hague-Paris, 1969, IV, p. 22, VI, p. 91.

[34] Sreznevskij, II, col. 230, defines *nasilie* as "oppression" (*pretesnenie*) or "coercion" (*prinuždenie*). The latter meaning is rarer.

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According to the Laurentian Chronicle, in 1262 God saved the people of the Rostov Land from the evil and greedy Muslim tax-farmers via a series of *veče* uprisings in which the accursed Muslims were expelled. The Christian Russians *ne terpjaše nasll'ja poganskych* ("could not endure the infidel oppression").[35] The "infidel/pagan" tax-farmers were probably not Tatars but Central Asian Muslims; they may even have been in the service of the Great Mongol Empire rather than the Golden Horde. In any event the "oppression" ameliorated in 1262 is not described as "Tatar" in the Laurentian Chronicle.[36]

The Trinity Chronicle contains an entry for 1266 which should have been included on the folia missing from the defective extant manuscript of the Laurentian Chronicle. Sub anno 1266 it reads: *Togo že leta umre car' Tatarskij Berkaj, i byst' oslaba Rusi ot nasil'ja besermen.*[37] The universally accepted translation of this sentence is: "In that year the Tatar khan Berkaj died, and Russia suffered less from Tatar oppression." The indirect grammatical construction and verbal ambiguity allow of the reverse translation linguistically, but no commentator has ever so interpreted the judgment.

Various historians have tried to present a case for why a chronicler would have concluded in 1266 that Russia's position vis-à-vis the Tatars had improved. Sergej M. Solov'ev wrote that as early as 1266 Tatar rule was weakening, so much so that by the end of the thirteenth century the baskaki were eliminated and Russia was troubled only by Mongol border raids thereafter.[38] This extravagant interpretation grossly minimizes the power of the Mongols over Russian affairs in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Priselkov linked the sentence to the issuance of a *jarlyk* granting fiscal and judicial immunities to the Russian Orthodox Church by Berkaj's successor, khan Mengu-Timur, in 1267.[39] Soviet scholars have adopted this analysis and castigate the ecclesiastical chronicler for selfishly proclaiming that what was good for the Church was good for *Rus'*.[40] However, it is not certain that the 1267 *jarlyk* was the first which the khans issued on behalf of the Church. Church people and properties had been exempted from the 1257 census, so there may have been earlier but inextant patents before 1267, which would invalidate this interpretation of the 1266 annal. Moreover, it cannot be demonstrated that

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[35] *PSRL.* I. col. 476.

[36] In re-writing this passage the redactor of the Nikon chronicle not only attributes the initiative for the expulsion of the Muslims not to the *veče* but to the Russian princes, but also identifies the tax-farmers as Tatars. However the phrase "Tatar oppression" still does not occur, since "their" (*ich*) is substituted for "infidel". *PSRL,* 10, p. 143.

[37] *Troickaja letopis'. Rekonstrukcija teksta.* Ed. M. D. Priselkov. M.-L., 1950, p. 329.

[38] S. M. Solov'ev, "Istorija Rossii s drevnejšich vremen", 15 vv., M., 1963, II, pp. 165, 541.

[39] M. D. Priselkov, "Chanskie *jarlyki* russkim mitropolitam", Pg., 1916, pp. 83-85.

[40] I. U. Budovic, "Russkoe duchovenstvo v pervoe stoletie mongolo-tatarskogo iga", "Voprosy istorii religii i ateizma", VII, 1959, p. 293 and in his "Obščestvenno-političeskaja mysl' drevnej Rusi (XI-XIV vv.)" M., 1960, p. 330. Also "Istorija russkoj literatury", 1946, p. 48 and V. T. Pasuto, "Očerki po istorii Galicko-Volynskoj Rusi", M.-L., 1950, pp. 275-276.

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the chronicler who wrote this sentence was a cleric; it would seem that most thirteenth-century Russian chronicle-writing took place in grand-princely courts. Vernadsky sometimes linked the easing of Tatar oppression to the division of power in the Horde caused by the separatist ambitions of Nogai,[41] or to the elimination of tax-farmers with the establishment of the baskaki and the issuance of the *jarlyk* to the Church.[42] There is no evidence that Nogai's feud with the Volga khanate weakened Tatar authority in the Russian forest zone until the 1280s and the episode of baskak Akhmat of Kursk. Moreover, Akhmat both farmed the tribute and held the office of baskak, and his tenure in office is associated with extreme oppression of Christians. Therefore none of these theories is without serious flaw.

The most circumspect explication of the 1266 statement was advanced by Presnjakov. He observes that the reign in Russia which preceded the composition of that comparison of the present to the past was that of Aleksandr Nevskij. In his opinion the extant data about Nevskij's relations with the Tatars is so sparse and the sources are so reticent to discuss this aspect of his rule that no conclusion about the nature of Nevskij's Tatar policy can be drawn. Therefore there is no way to determine what the chronicler had in mind when he wrote that Tatar oppression of *Rus'* was ameliorated in 1266. All that can be said is that after 1266 a new *modus vivendi* arose between Russia and the Horde which included frequent princely trips to the Horde, the baskak system, envoys, and heavy tribute and taxation.[43] Presnjakov's caution is difficult to fault, and it is imprudent to try to read the mind of the chronicler. Only speculation and guesswork can compensate for the terseness of the chronicler's declaration, and it might be better to forgo the effort. Regardless of Presnjakov's refusal to stretch the evidence beyond safe bounds, he accepted the usual interpretation of the meaning of the quotation.

However, the possibility exists that the sentence's meaning can be interpreted in the opposite sense, although its significance cannot be established without additional data on what prompted the chronicler to record his generalization in 1266. That alternative presents itself from the pattern of occurrences of "oppression" in the Russian sources for the years after 1266.

Serapion, bishop of Vladimir, apparently composed his fifth sermon in the 1270s. In it he mentions, that the Christians suffered from *mnogi bedy i skorbi, rati, golod, ot poganskich nasil'ja* (= "the many sorrows and pains, expeditions, hunger, from pagan oppression").[44] Serapion does not refer to "Tatar oppression", but that is perfectly understandable since he never uses the term

[41] G. V. Vernadskij, "Načertanie russkoj istorii", čast' 1, Praha, 1927, p. 86.

[42] Vernadsky, "The Mongols and Russia", p. 165.

[43] A. E. Presnjako, "Obrazcvanie velikorusskogo gosudarstva. Očerki po istorii XIII-XIV stoletija", Pg., 1918, p. 56, n. 1, pp. 109-110.

[44] E. V. Petuchov, "Serapion Vladimirskij, russkij propovednik XIII v.", SPb., 1888, Appendix, p. 14.

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Tatars, although there is no doubt of whom he had in mind. Serapion may also have been responsible for the allusion to "oppression" (*nasilie*) from the infidels in an anonymous treatise of advice to priests.[45]

According to the Trinity Chronicle, the men who inhabited the two slobody established by baskak Akhmat of Kursk "committed oppression on the Christians" (*nasilie tvorjachu christianom*), which aroused considerable opposition from the local Russian princes.[46] These enclaves seem to hava been populated by a mixed ethnic group of Tatars, Muslims and Russians, and so no adjective is attached to the word "oppression".

The Laurentian Chronicle records sub anno 1300 (incorrectly for 1299) that metropolitan Maksim left Kiev for the Suzdalian Land "ne terpja Tatarskago nasil'ja" (being unable to endure Tatar oppression).[47] This appears to be the first combination of the adjective "Tatar" and the noun "oppression". This sentence is fairly well preserved in the later chronicle Tradition.[48]

The Trinity Chronicle declares that on the accession of Ivan Kalita in 1328 the Russian Land enjoyed forty years of peace (*tišina*) *ot nasilia Tatarskago*" ("from Tatar oppression").[49] The "peace" was broken forty years later by the Lithuanians, not the Tatars, but before the interpolation of the reference to forty years of peace the sentence must have referred to the Tatars. The chronicler is referring to the safety of Muscovy (the *russkaja zemlja*) from the Tatars because of the good relations between Kalita and the Horde. The Lithuanians were hardly a threat to the Volga-Oka mesopotamia in the 1320s.[50]

The Novgorod Fourth Chronicle enthusiastically narrates how metopolitan Aleksej, although trapped in the Horde amidst violent civil war in 1357, still succeeded in escaping alive *ot nasilia poganskich* ("from pagan oppression").[51] In this passage, the phrase "infidel oppression" seems more akin to extortion, blackmail, or robbery than the kind of political and fiscal exploitation usually conveyed by the phrase. The clerical identity of the near victim of Tatar misdeeds might have inspired the reversion to "infidel" as the adjective modifying "oppression" rather than "Tatar".

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[45] See V. A. Kolobanov, "O Serapione Vladimirskom kak vozmožnom avtore 'Poučenija k popom' ", *TODRL*, XIV, 1958, pp. 159-162.

[46] *Troickaja letopis'*, p. 340.

[47] *PSRL*, I, col. 485.

[48] Maksim's departure from Kiev is noted without this explanation in the Sofija First Chronicle, *PSRL*, V, sub anno 1299, p. 203.

Tichomirov discovered a letopisec from the 1680s, *CGADA*, Mazur. sobr. 522, which records this event sub anno 1283 (6791) and changes Maksim's destination to Moscow. Despite these mistakes, it provides a useful gloss on "*nasilie tatarskoe*" = *radi tatarskija obidy i nepokoja* ("because of Tatar insults and disruption"). M. N. Tichomirov, "Kratkie zametki o letopisnych proizvedenijach v rukopisnych sobranijach Moskvy", M., 1962, pp. 51-52.

[49] *Troickaja letopis'*, p. 46.

[50] Despite Lichačev, "Kul'tura Rusi epochi obrazovanija russkogo nacional'nogo gosudarstva", p. 65. Cf. Halperin, "The Russian Land and the Russian Tsar", p. 65.

[51] *PSRL*, IV, p. 63.

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Although fifteenth-century chronicles use the phrase "Tatar oppression" to refer to events of thirteenth and fourteenth century Russian history, I have found no annals in fifteenth-century chronicles about fifteenth-century events of Russo-Tatar relations, which do so. This curious phenomenon might be accidental, although it might repay further investigation.

In the sixteenth century historicist invocations of "Tatar oppression" multiplied. For example, the Nikon Chronicle concludes its narration of the uprising against the Tatars in 1327 in Tver' by observing that "Tatar oppression" (*nasilie tatarskoe*) lay waste to Tver' after the punitive expedition, reducing the land to emptiness and poverty.[52] Similarly, it presents a vita of Michail Aleksandrovič of Tver' sub anno 1399, the year of his death, in which it narrates how his father, Aleksandr Michailovič, because of the murder of Ščelkan Djudenovič, *bratanič* of khan Uzbek, in the Tver' uprising of 1327, had to flee to Pskov, "Tatarskago nasilia i genenia terpeti (ne)" (being unable to endure Tatar oppression and persecution)[53], a somewhat adulterated and convoluted variant of the standard phrase. This is typical of the rewriting of early history in the Nikon chronicle, which took verbiage from extraneous entries and fused it with existing accounts to expand and pad them.[54] The phrase "Tatar oppression" became common enough in the sixteenth century to find its way even into a genealogical book.[55]

"Oppression" in the medieval Russian sources could come from sources other than the infidel Tatars. The treaty of Novgorod and Jaroslav Jaroslavič of Tver', grand prince of Vladimir, mentions the *nasilie* against Novgorod of his brother Aleksandr.[56] According to the Moscow Compilation of the end of the fifteenth century, prince-saint Dovmont rectified the *nasilie* which Pskov was suffering from the *latyna* ("Latins", i.e. Teutonic Knights) in 1272.[57] In 1371, according to the *Tipografskaja letopis'*, the metropolitan of Jerusalem, German, came to *Rus'* in search of alms with which to pay his debts *poneže be im nasilie ot poganskich Sracyn* ("because he had endured oppression from infidel Saracens").[58] These Saracens were no doubt Arab or Turkish Muslims. This same chronicle blames the sorrow of loss of Russian life at the battle of Kulikovo in 1380 on God's punishment of Russian sins, and specifies that those

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[52] *PSRL*, X, p. 195.

[53] *PSRL*, XI, p. 175.

[54] Tatiščev, V, P. 83, seems to have concocted his own statement that in 1327 Aleksandr Michailovič fled to Pskov "ne terpja lukavye besovskie kramoly i tatarskogo nasilija" (unable to endure the vicious devilish slanders and Tatar oppression).

[55] M. E. Byčkova, "Rodoslovnye knigi XVI-XVII vv. kak istoričeski: istočnik", M., 1975, p. 154 quotes a sixteenth-century *rodoslovnaja kniga* to the effect that prince Roman Semenovič Novosel'skij *perešol žiti v Odoev ot nasil'ja tatarskago* ("migrated to live in Odoav because of Tatar oppression"). Byčkova considers this information a legendary fabrication.

[56] *Gramoty Volikogo Novgoroda i Pskova*, ed. S. N. Valk, M. -L., 1949, 2, pp. 10-11. Is this a reference to the imposition of the Mongol census on Novgorod by Aleksandr Nevskij?

[57] *PSRL*, XXV, pp. 150-151.

[58] *PSRL*, XXIV, p. 127.

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evils included hatred, envy, greed, and "oppression" (*nasilie*), obviously of Russians by fellow Russians.[59] Finally, the Novgorodians declared to their archbishop in 1398, in the words of the letopisec Avraamki, *ne možem, gospodine, sego nasil'ja Vasilija Dmitrieviča* (*terpeti*) ("we cannot, lord, (endure) this oppression from grand prince Vasilij Dmitrievic"). Vasilij I of Moscow had seized Novgorodian *pogosty* and *volosty* as his *otčina* ("patrimony").[60]

These examples of the usage of the phrase "Tatar oppression" or "oppression" with other adjectives are not, I suspect, exhaustive of all such occurrences in the medieval Russian sources, but they are sufficient to substantiate several tentative conclusions. First, "oppression" was, so to speak, an equal opportunity employer: the "oppressor" might be an infidel, Tatar, or Muslim, sometimes synonymous, sometimes not, or a Latin or Saracen. Even Russians could be guilty of "oppression" against their countrymen. Secondly, grammatical variations in the phrase seem insignificant. Constructions with or without a preposition (namely *ot* = "from") do not correlate with divergent meanings of the term. Finally, the phrase "Tatar oppression" is not a long-lost equivalent of the "Tatar Yoke". The phrase was too flexible in its usage and too confused with other, non-Tatar oppressions. It was not rigorously applied to the entire period of Tatar rule and does not necessarily even refer to Tatar suzereignty per se, since one could be oppressed by enemies other than one's conquerors.[61] It is safe to observe in passing that the phrase "Tatar oppression" does convey some of the attitude toward the Tatars usually understood by the concept of the "Tatar Yoke".

There is hardly a rule of medieval Russian intellectual history that says that a concept, title, phrase or slogan can only be used with exactly the same meaning in all instances. Such consistency would be difficult to achieve in any circumstances, but particularly so in medieval Russia, with its separate principalities, monasteries, chancelleries, scriptoria, and "open" manuscript tradition; only in the sixteenth century was anything approximating central control over literary production established. An exception to any pattern is always possible, and cannot be dismissed out of hand. Yet no explication de texte of "byst' oslaba Rusi ot nasil'ja besermen" has noticed that there is not a single other case in which usage of the phrase "Tatar/infidel oppression" is intended to convey improvement of the situation of Rus'/Orthodox Christians. Oppression, foreign or domestic, always mean decline, suffering, sorrow, for its victims. The term is never otherwise employed in sentences meant to convey amelioration or betterment in someone's condition. Since we have no idea of the

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[59] *PSRL*, XXIV, p. 148.

[60] *PSRL*, XVI, p. 141. Is this a reference to the temporary seizure of the Dvina Land by Vasilij I?

[61] Although in English and biblical prose it is easy enough to imagine the phrase "the yoke of oppression", I have not seen any such combination as *igo nasilija* in the medieval Russian sources. Perhaps the prevalence of "yoke of slavery" made any other term superfluous.

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substantive context in which the 1266 entry was written and since grammar does not preclude the reinterpretation, might not this entire pattern of usage of "oppression/Tatar oppression" lead one to believe that the sentence should be translated as: "and Rus' grew weaker from Tatar oppression"?[62]

[62] When I consulted Ia. S. Lur'e about the meaning of this sentence, he admitted that he had never specifically studied it but offered a spontaneous explanation that the situation of *Rus'* had worsened. After I explained to him that all previous commentators had read the opposite meaning into the sentence he admitted that linguistically both interpretations were possible.

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RUSSO-TATAR RELATIONS IN MONGOL CONTEXT
TWO NOTES

Russia's relationship with the "Golden Horde", the Juchid khanate in the Kipchak steppes, can often best be understood within a comparative framework of the world Mongol Empire. For example, the reaction of the Mongols in 1223 to the execution of their ambassadors merely repeated a phenomenon which had occurred before and would occur again in Mongol expansion. Evaluations of the battle of Kulikovo Field of 1380 as shattering the "myth of Mongol invincibility" lose credibility when framed against similar claims for the Ilkhanid loss at Ayn Jalut in 1260 or the failure of Yuan invasions of Japan in the 1270s-1280s, which supposedly had the same result. In fact, the "myth of Mongol invincibility" is probably an invention of the separate historiographies of China, Iran and Russia.

The evolution of the "Golden Horde", the Juchid khanate on the Kipchak steppes, is often best understood in the context of the three other successor states of the great Mongol empire, the Yuan, Ilkhanid and Chagataid khanates. In like fashion, the relationship between the East Slavs and their Mongol overlords from the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries is frequently best illuminated by comparison with that of other sedentary peoples subjugated by the Mongols.[1] These axioms apply not only to broad patterns of political, economic, social and cultural interaction, but even to singular events. For example, the data on Mongol and Inner Asian shamanism reflects badly upon the likelihood, as the Novgorod First Chronicle and late redactions of the "Tale of the Destruction of Riazan' by Batu" (*Povest' o razorenii Riazani Batyem*) would have it,[2] that in 1237 a Mongol delegation led by a "witch" (*zhena charodeitsu*) demanded a tithe from Riazan' as a sign of submission.[3] Similarly, the author of the

[1] Halperin (1983), Halperin (1985).

[2] *NPL* (1950), p. 74; Adrianova-Peretts (1949), p. 23, the 1699 Khronograf redaction, not in the 16th century Volokolamsk manuscript, p. 9. The Commentary (p. 294) mentions the Mongol use of clergy as envoys, specifying the *volkhvy* (shamans?) sent by Berke to Hulegu, and the role of women in Mongol society, including the *yarliki* issued to metropolitans of the Russian Orthodox Church by *khansha* Taidula. But fusing these two elements to produce a shamaness-envoy to Orthodox Christians strains credulity.

[3] Despite Halperin (1986), pp. 37-38, the Mongols did have shamanesses: see Heissig (1980), p. 20. According to Boyle (1972), p. 179, the *Codex Cumanicus*, an early 14th century dictionary of Kipchak, included *qam qatun* = sorceress; however, all his concrete examples (pp.

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Expanded Redaction of the "Narration of the Battle with Mamai" (*Skazanie o Mamaevom poboishche*) manifested an imperfect understanding of nomadic diet by inventing a dialogue in which Mamai instructed his soldiers not to plant grain (*khleb*), since they would eat Russian grain after they had defeated the Muscovites;[4] nomads did eat grain,[5] but it would hardly have constituted an appealing prospect compared to the meat and milk staples of nomadic cuisine,[6] and Mamai's nomadic warriors were unlikely to have been farmers themselves in the first place. The present article consists of two notes which will apply an all-Mongol perspective (1) to another passage in the tale of the first contact between the East Slavs and the Mongols, and (2) to the significance of the first famous victory of the Muscovites over the Tatars.

I. "If you have killed our envoys..."

After defeating the Kipchaks and Alans in the Caucasus, Jebe and Subutai, chasing the fleeing Kipchaks, encountered a combined East-Slavic/Polovtsian force in 1223. They sent envoys to these allies insisting that only the Polovtsy were their enemies. At the instigation of the Polovtsy, the Riurikid princes executed the envoys. A second Tatar delegation then appeared, which inquired if the East Slavic princes had "listened to the Polovtsy and killed our envoys".[7] This passage seems very convenient: the Tatar query reads like a literary device to motivate the coming battle. How could the Mongols have guessed that the East Slavs had killed their envoys?

Examining the rise of the Mongol empire suggests a different context in which to understand this diplomatic exchange. Despite the long-standing Inner Asian tradition of diplomatic immunity,[8] the Tatar envoys to the East Slavic princes in 1223 were neither the first nor the last Mongol envoys not to return from their mission. Collating instances of this phenomenon is complicated by the amorphous chronology of the early history of Temuchin, the future Chinggis Khan, and by misuse of sources.[9] What follows here pretends to be no more

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177-193) pertain to shamans. Dalai (1983), mentions sorceresses (*shamanki*), a specific case in which a sorceress foretold the future, and numerous instances of male and female shamans together participating in various rites, sacrifices, and ceremonies under the Yuan (pp. 108, 128, 165-168). Marshall (1996), p. 97 that a female Mongol ambassador, chosen for her knowledge of the local language, was so surprising to the citizens of Riazan' that they perceived her as a sorceress, is highly speculative; there were male Slavic speakers among the Kipchaks aplenty.

4 *PKB* (1959), p. 112.

5 Despite Halperin (1986), p. 112.

6 Mote (1977), pp. 203-210; Smith (1984b); Anderson (1994); Buell (1990), especially 59-63.

7 *NPL* (1950), p. 62.

8 Sinor (1989).

9 The sixteenth-century Nikon chronicle redaction of the tale of the conquest of Kiev in 1240 includes an obviously fictitious interpolation that grand prince Mikhail of Chernigov and Kiev executed Mongol envoys to Kiev (*PSRL* X [1965], p. 116). Benson (1981), p. 119, accepts

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than a reasonable approximation of the lesser moments of Mongol imperial expansion.

In the 1190s Temuchin's ten envoys to the Barin may have been killed.[10] In 1215 one envoy from the Mongol general Muqali demanding the surrender of the city of Hsing-chung on the Ta-ling river in north China was killed by its magistrate, and the other barely escaped with his life.[11] In the same year a rebel Chinese lord in Manchuria killed the Mongol messenger demanding his appearance at the Mongol court.[12] Soon thereafter the Turned, a forest tribe, seized a Mongol officer among them gathering women, as well as an envoy sent to negotiate for the release of the detained officer.[13] After the infamous massacre of his Muslim merchant caravan to the Khwarazmshah in Otrar in 1218, Chinggis dispatched a delegation of a Muslim and two Mongols to protest; one or all of them were executed.[14] In 1219 Juchi sent the Muslim Hussain Jadji to the town of Sighnak in Khwarizm to demand its surrender; he was executed as a traitor.[15] In 1221 an envoy from Tolui to the city of Herat was put to death by the order of the *Malik* or governor, who was still loyal to Sultan Jalal ad-Din and refused to surrender the city.[16] In 1226 a Mongol representative was killed by the vice-commander of the city of Kan Chou while engaged in secret surrender negotiations with its Tangut commander.[17] In 1227 officers of the Sung city of ㄱ-tu tried to force its commander, Li Ch'üan, not to surrender, by slaying the Mongol envoy who had arrived from general Boru.[18] In 1231 the governor of the city of Bailaq forwarded a Muslim envoy from the Mongol general Taimaz to Jalal ad-Din; lest his men learn that Chormaqan, in command of the conquest of the area, had 20,000 troops at his disposal, Jalal ad-Din executed the envoy.[19] Ogodei's envoy to the Southern Sung requesting permission to cross Sung territory in order to attack the Northern Chin Empire was put to death in the 1230s.[20] Some time before the Mongol invasion of

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the historicity of this act because he inaccurately believes that the Nikon Chronicle is "almost our only insight into what took place" then (p. 1). Benson reprinted this book as an appendix to Benson (1991), pp. 265-419, and repeated this 1240 narrative, p. 339. According to Marshall (1996), p. 105, Mikhail's governor Dmitrii had Mongke's envoys murdered, which is equally erroneous.

[10] Howorth (1876), p. 54.

[11] Martin (1950), p. 211. The populace of the city so feared the Mongols that they killed the murderers and surrendered.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 211-212.

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 220-222. Apparently Chinggis sympathized with the Tumed's initial action, less so with their rebellion; eventually a punitive expedition safely recovered both officials.

[14] Boyle (1968), p. 305. Some sources say all three were executed; others that the Mongols were executed, while the Muslim had his beard shaved, a gross insult.

[15] Howorth (1876), p. 76.

[16] Boyle (1968), p. 315.

[17] Martin (1950), pp. 292-293.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 280.

[19] May (1996), p. 29. My thanks to Larry W. Moses for calling this thesis to my attention.

[20] Howorth (1876). p. 119.

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Eastern Europe, according to the monk Julian, Mongol embassies to King Bela IV of Hungary disappeared.[21] In 1238 the populace of the Armenian city of Ani, without the express order of its authorities, killed Mongol envoys to the city.[22] In 1253 the King of Ta-li executed three Mongol envoys from Khubilai.[23] The *casus belli* of Khubilai's 1256 invasion of the Southern Sung was the imprisonment of his envoys.[24] In 1257 the ruler of Viet Nam imprisoned Yuan envoys.[25] Amir Baybars ordered the execution of the Mongol envoys from Kutbugha, acting for Hulegu, who demanded Mamluk submission in 1260.[26] In 1273 the King of Pagan in Burma executed Khubilai's three Mongol envoys.[27] In 1274 Bayan's envoy demanding the surrender of the Chinese city of Cha-yang was killed.[28] Also in that year Khubilai's envoys to the Sung were attacked, one killed, and others wounded, for which the Sung court disavowed responsibility, but the officer Khubilai sent to investigate was also suspiciously assassinated.[29] In 1275 the official Chang shi kie cut out the tongue and hacked to pieces an officer of distinction sent by Bayan to the city of Ting hai to ask for his submission.[30] Later, Ma ki, the governor of the besieged city of Kwe lin fu, cut down the Mongol officer who brought him a diploma of office to secure his surrender.[31] The Japanese had previously ignored the insulting demands of Mongol representatives, but after the Japanese defeat of the Mongol invasion of 1274, they executed Khubilai's envoys in 1275 and again in 1279.[32] Successive envoys from Khubilai with orders for the surrender of the Chinese city of Yang chau were put to death by its resolute governor, who disregarded the counter-signature on the order by the Sung Empress Regent, who had already submitted, promising pardon and terms.[33] The same occurred at the city of Huzhu, where governor Zhao Liangchun killed Mongol envoys asking for surrender.[34] In 1283 the Ilkhan Teguder sent an envoy to the Mamluks, who imprisoned him; the ambassador died in prison.[35]

Even this far from exhaustive survey of Mongol diplomatic history shows that the Mongols were sufficiently arrogant in their self-righteous belief that

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[21] Sinor (1989), p. 344. Sinor speculates this may even have been a factor in motivating the Mongol attack on Hungary.

[22] May (1996), pp. 42-43.

[23] Rossabi (1988), p. 25.

[24] Allsen (1994b), p. 409.

[25] Benson (1991), p. 118.

[26] Amitai-Preiss (1995), p. 36.

[27] Rossabi (1988), p. 214.

[28] Howorth (1876). p. 226.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 228.

[30] Curtin (1908), p. 351.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 356.

[32] Rossabi (1988), pp. 103, 208. Did the 1279 Mongol envoys ask the Japanese if they had executed the 1275 Mongol envoys?

[33] Howorth (1876), p. 235.

[34] Jay (1991), p. 44 n. 2. Jay notes that this was not the only time this happened.

[35] Boyle (1968), p. 365.

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they had been granted a mandate from the Great Blue Sky to rule the world, that the repeated murder or imprisonment of their envoys, often articulating demands for submission, never gave them sufficient pause to rethink their diplomatic strategy, nor to reconsider how sacrosanct envoys really were. While one can wonder if newly-named Mongol envoys thought themselves in need of large life-insurance policies or had hyperactive death wishes, nevertheless the Mongols did not change their ways. The Mongols were, however, sufficient realists that they did, apparently, recognize the pattern, and, therefore, it does not strain credulity that they would, in a very straightforward manner, query the East Slavs in 1223 as to the fate of their first delegation. After all, similar fates had already recently befallen Mongol envoys, most infamously at Otrar. The East Slavic chronicler appears to have faithfully rendered the matter-of-fact Mongol response to the acceptable vagaries of life when one was destined to rule the world.[36] It would be going too far to infer that the Mongol envoys were *agents provocateurs* who were expected to be executed, thus providing the Mongols with an excuse for invasion; after all, the requests for submission already contained all the rationale for submission that the Mongols felt necessary.

II. The Myth of the Myth of Tatar Invincibility

In a recent essay, Peter Nitsche ascribes great significance to the Muscovite victory over the Tatars of Emir Mamai at the battle of Kulikovo Field in 1380. According to Nitsche, the consequences of this battle included the elevation of Moscow's prestige and a fundamental restructuring of the power relationship between the Russian principalities and the Golden Horde. He also observes: "Aber für Russen wie Tataren war die Nimbus tatarischer Unbesiegbarkeit zerstört".[37] Nietsche had expressed the same idea nearly two decades earlier in his contribution to a multi-authored textbook on Russian history.[38] This notion of an "aura" = "myth" of (Mongol-) Tatar invincibility demands a proper critique.

First, in neither of his publications does Nitsche cite any source, Russian or "Tatar", which articulated a belief in the impossibility of a Mongol defeat.[39]

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[36] Sinor mentions diplomats to and from the Huns, Avars, Turks, Uighurs and Mongols who were killed, imprisoned, mutilated or insulted, but the quantity of Mongol ambassadors and envoys killed or detained (I have not enumerated lesser offenses against them) dwarf the experience of their steppe predecessors. This statistical preponderance might be explained by the greater scope of Mongol conquests, the greater offense taken by the recipients of Mongol orders of submission, or better documentation.

[37] Nitsche (1997), p. 78.

[38] Nitsche (1981), p. 606.

[39] Fennell (1983), p. 84, drew his own conclusion that the Latin and Arabo-Persian sources of the thirteenth century paint a picture of Mongol "military invincibility."

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Without such a text, it is impossible to determine if this aura applied to battles, campaigns, or wars: one can lose a battle and win the war, fail in a campaign but return and win the war, and so forth.[40] Since Nitsche had just mentioned the Muscovite victory over the Tatars two years earlier at the battle on the river Vozha,[41] just any defeat of the Mongols could not in his opinion have achieved that result. Nitsche emphasizes that Kulikovo was a large battle in the open field over a Tatar "lord," which begs the question of Mamai's non-Chinggisid status, and implies that a Mongol defeat in a siege could not impair the myth of their invincibility. Defeats, however, were far from absent in the rise of the Mongol empire. Temuchin did lose battles; as he assumed leadership of the Mongol nation, he met defeat at the hands of other Mongol tribes; and after he launched campaigns of conquest against the Mongols' sedentary neighbors, the Mongols failed in battle or, more frequently, in sieges, especially in North China and Korea. All of which, however, proves nothing: a myth of invincibility need not have rested upon a perfectly consistent historical basis; indeed, some myths survive precisely because they are historically false.[42]

Wherever the Mongols went - in East Asia, Central Asia, West Asia, even Eastern Europe - they met rulers, politicians and generals who submitted rather than fought. Nevertheless, this phenomenon, so troubling to historians from or of the sedentary societies from which these opportunists came, does not attest a myth of Mongol invincibility. The people who came over to the Mongol side were deciding a purely pragmatic, empirical question, who was likely to win the battle or war immediately in the offing. These decisions need not evidence a broader myth about Mongol prowess; neither would the panic inspired by news of a Mongol advance.[43] The impropriety of extrapolating any myth of Mongol victory from such defections or panic consists in the complementary fact that wherever the Mongols went, there were always rulers, politicians and generals who opposed them. It is difficult to believe that all of these individuals thought

[40] As we shall see, Rossabi believes the myth of Mongol invincibility survived in the Far East until the 1280s, yet he writes: "He [Khubilai-CJH] had suffered defeats before on foreign campaigns, but the 1280s and early 1290s were replete with disasters". Rossabi (1988), p. 206. Similarly, H. Desmond Martin, despite his own narrative, characterized the Mongols as late as 1223 as "hitherto invincible" (Martin [1950], p. 271) and the army of Chinggis during his last campaign, to punish the rebellious Tangut, as "all but invincible" (*Ibid.*, p. 307).

[41] Nitsche (1997), p. 77.

[42] Treitinger (1956), pp. 168-169 commented that the Roman Emperor had to be *victor omnium gentum*. It was hardly true that every Roman (and Byzantine) Emperor lauded as *invictus* (invincible) went undefeated in battle.

[43] I would separate the generic terror induced by nomads on sedentarists from a particular myth of Mongol invincibility; even those who can be defeated may still inspire terror. For an excellent recreation of that panic, see Sweeney (1994).

Separating such terror from the putative myth of Mongol invincibility is sometimes problematic: Muhammed Khwarezmshah in 1220 urged the inhabitants of Nishapur to disperse to the countryside "rather than attempt to withstand the irresistible Mongols", but when he recover his nerve, he countermanded his own advice and resumed fighting. Boyle (1968), pp. 206-207.

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their opposition futile; the armies who fought the Mongols could hardly have all conceived of themselves as committing suicide, especially because, as we have just noted, they did not all suffer defeat.

Other assertions of Mongol invincibility might have been no more than propaganda. After the Sa-skya Pandita had himself surrendered to the Mongols in 1246, he sent announcements to other Tibetan lords and lamas advising them to pay the Mongol tribute, since resistence was futile. No one listened, suggesting no myth of Mongol invincibility had yet penetrated most of Tibet.[44] Similarly, the Chinese Hao Ching, who already served the Mongels, supplemented Khubilai's letter to the Southern Sung in 1260 by concluding from the Mongols' "awesome military power" that "military resistence was pointless". The Southern Sung disregarded that argument and imprisoned the Mongol envoy.[45]

I know of no written evidence that the Mongols ever asserted a myth of their own invincibility. Although Chinggis claimed the Mandate of the Great Blue Sky to rule over all those who lived in felt tents, an ambition expanded by his successors to world dominion,[46] before a battle or war the Mongols invariably uttered only the pious sentiment that "God would know", i.e. God would determine the victor, the parting shot of the second Mongol delegation to the East Slavs and the Polovtsy before the battle on the river Kalka in 1223.[47]

No East Slavic text known to me, not only for the entire period of the "Tatar Yoke", from 1223 to 1480, but even through the seventeenth century, ever suggested that the Tatars could not be defeated, i.e. that they were invincible.[48] After all, in the *byliny*, East Slavic folklore, the Tatars are never victorious! Indeed, the religious framework of medieval East Slavic culture would not have been conducive to any notion of Mongol invincibility; for infidels to be invincible fighting Orthodox Christians would have entailed the superiority of Satan to God.[49]

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[44] Wylie (1977), p. 115.

[45] Rossabi (1988), p. 81.

[46] The classic studies are Voegelin (1941) and de Rachewiltz (1973).

[47] *NPL* (1950), p. 62. How widespread contrary conclusions have become may be illustrated by Turnbull-McBride (1980), the kind of ostensibly well-informed, illustrated pamphlet which lacks formal bibiography or footnotes, but at its best accurately summarizes existing wisdom for a popular audience. The text by Turnbull (McBride prepared the color plates) contains as a "fact" that the Mongols "believed themselves to be invincible, and most of the vanquished believed it too, regarding them as a visitation from heaven and a punishment for sin" (pp. 27-28). On the explanation of Mongol victory by the sins of the defeated, see below.

[48] Halperin (1986), *passim*.

[49] Discussing Catholic sources, Conneil (1973), especially 134-137, and Sweeney (1982) emphasize that it was essential for Catholic self-esteem to attribute Mongol success to divine chastisement of Christian sins, since only that explanation, assuming Christian repentance, guaranteed the eventual destruction of the Mongols.

The same logic would have held true in Muslim thought until the Ilkhanids officially converted to Islam, which is relevant for discussions of Ayn Jalut (Ain Jalut); see below.

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Since the notion that the battle of Kulikovo shattered the myth of Mongol invincibility did not originate in the East Slavic or Mongol sources, it must derive from later historiography. Two things seem clear: First, Nitsche was neither the first nor the only proponent of this theory, which hardly originated with him. Secondly, this notion is sufficiently widespread that it was invoked by no less a personage that the Minister of Culture of the RSFSR, Iu. S. Melent'ev, in an inaugural speech for the September 1980 Jubilee Conference celebrating the six-hundredth anniversary of the battle of Kulikovo. Before an August assemblage of the "learned councils" of the Historical Faculty of Moscow State University, the Kremlin Museum, and the State Historical Museum, held at the State Historical Museum, he asserted that the "myth of invincibility of the oppressors" (*mif o nepobedimosti porabotitelei*) had been "permanently buried" (*navsega pokhoronen*) at Kulikovo; following Nitsche, he had just mentioned the battle on the Vozha.[50]

Determining when this myth of Russian historiography arose is complicated.[51] Because the battle of Kulikovo Field affected both the Golden Horde and the Russians, we must inspect historical works from both sides of the conflict. Because of constraints of space and bibliographic access, this survey cannot be comprehensive, must be in roughly chronological order, and simplifies matters by overlooking different dates of composition, printing, and reprinting.[52]

The eighteenth-century Russian historian Tatishchev's discussion of Kulikovo did not mention the myth of Mongol invincibility.[53] Nor did it appear in the early nineteenth century Russian historian Karamzin's lush prose about the battle.[54] It was absent from Polevoi's history of Russia.[55] It cannot be found in Hammer-Purgstall's early history of the Golden Horde.[56] It went unmentioned in Soloviev's great mid-nineteenth-century history of Russia; indeed, since Soloviev wrote that "the Vozha battle *again* [my italics – CJH] convinced the Russians of the possibility of defeating the Tatars", he could hardly have believed that the Russians thought the Tatars invincible even before 1378.[57]

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[50] Rybakov (1983), text of speech pp. 270-275; quotation, p. 273; Vozha, pp. 272-273. Cf. Halperin (1984).

[51] I had previously noted the existence of this myth in Soviet historiography, without tracing its evolution: Halperin (1984), p. 298.

[52] Moreover, passing descriptions of the Mongols as "invincible", such as Gibbon (1850), p. 219: "The Roman Pontiff attempted to appease and convert these invincible Pagans by a mission of Franciscan and Dominican friars", cannot be included in this survey.

[53] Tatishchev (1965), V pp. 138-150.

[54] Karamzin (1892), V pp. 37-48. There is a tantalizing hint though: "It appeared that the *Rossiiane* had awakened from a deep sleep. The long-lasting terror (*uzhas*) at the name of the Tatars, as if by the action of a supernatural force, had vanished from their hearts" (p. 39). [My translation cannot do justice to Karamzin's style.]

[55] Polevoi (1833), V pp. 111-132.

[56] Hammer-Purgstall (1840), pp. 325-326 is very slim.

[57] Soloviev (1963), kniga II, tom 3, pp. 284-288; quotation, p. 284.

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However, the conclusions we are seeking appeared full blown, to my knowledge for the first time, in Howorth's monumental survey of Mongol history in 1880. According to him, "the victory on the Don had broken the spell of Tatar invincibility".[58] This is the only place in all of Howorth's *History* that he mentioned this myth; the conclusion came not in his narrative of Kulikovo, but as a rationalization of the (in)significance of the Tokhtamysh's sack of Moscow in 1382. Such a notion cannot be found in Howorth's major sources, namely Hammer-Purgstall for the Mongols and Karamzin (in German translation) for Russia. It may very well be that Howorth, who was not loath to draw his own conclusions, first articulated this myth in connection with Kulikovo.[59] But Howorth's observation did not soon find its way into Russian historiography.[60]

No notion of the myth of Mongol invincibility appeared in Ilovaiskii's text on Russian history,[61] nor in the brief conspectus of grand prince Dmitrii Donskoi's reign in Ekzempliarskii.[62] Kliuchevskii, the greatest Imperial Russian historian of the turn of the twentieth century, barely mentioned Kulikovo at all in his "Lectures", let alone the myth of Tatar invincibility.[63] It does not seem to have appeared in Presniakov's great study of Muscovite history.[64] On the other hand, outside Russia, the notion that the myth of Mongol invincibility was shattered at Kulikovo was grazed by the French historian Rambaud.[65] Expanding Rambaud, the myth of Mongol invincibility shattered at Kulikovo was explicitly invoked by the joint French-Russian emigre multi-volume history of Russia by Miliukov, Eisenmann, and Seignobos,[66] and by Alexandre Eck's history of Russia in French.[67]

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[58] Howorth (1880), p. 228, not in his discussion of Kulikovo, pp. 214-215.

[59] Howorth did not elicit this notion from study of the Latin sources about the Mongols, which did not articulate any myth of their invincibility. See Bezzola (1974); Klopprogge (1993): and Schmieder (1994).

[60] I suspect that it would have been very unlikely for a historian of Russia in Russia between 1880 and 1914 to have read Howorth, not only because it was in English, but precisely because it was about the Mongols. On the other hand, Russian Orientalists would undoubtedly have read it, but would not have written about Kulikovo.

[61] Ilovaiskii (1884) II pp. 115-140. Ilovaiskii wrote the most prominent pamphlet in honor of the five hundredth anniversary of Kulikovo in 1880, to which I no longer have access, but from his extended treatment in his textbook, one would infer that he did not invoke the myth of Mongol invincibility.

[62] Ekzempliarskii (1889), I pp. 112-114.

[63] Kliuchevskii (1956), II pp. 5-27. Lecture 21 on the "rise of Moscow", barely alluded to the battle; indeed, as is well known, Kliuchevskii virtually omitted Russo-Tatar relations from his "Course".

[64] Presniakov (1918), p. 323.

[65] Rambaud (1918), p. 174: "Elle [Kulikovo – CJH] montra aux Russes qu'ils pouvaient vaincre les invincibles." Since, as Sandra L. Levy kindly informed me, the first edition of this textbook appeared in 1878, Rambaud might have partially anticipated Howorth. Howorth did not cite Rambaud.

[66] Milioukov-Seignebos-Eisenmann (1932), I p. 135: "...elle [Kulikovo – CJH] relève le courage du peuple, extame le prestige des conquérants tatars, qui ne passent plus pour invincibles".

[67] Eck (1933), p. 414: Oleg of Riazan' joined forces in 1380 with Mamai because he "devait sortir infailliblement victorieux du conflit, car les Tatars avaient été toujours victorieux". but after the Muscovite bloody victory, the Tattar oppressors "n'était plus invincible."

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The contrast between Western and Russian historiography about Kulikovo began to change about the time of World War II, but only inconsistently. In a 1939 pamphlet for the Red Army – the otherwise unknown P. Kuchin wrote that the significance of the battle of Kulikovo was that "The spectre (*prizrak*) of the past invincibility (*nepobedimosti*) of the Tatars vanished (*ischez*) forever".[68] Nasonov only touched on Kulikovo in a paragraph of his critique of Pokrovskii, and did not allude to the myth of Mongol invincibility at all in his 1940 monograph.[69] In 1941 Mavrodin concluded that "the battle on the Vozha river...convinced the Russians that the Tatars were not invincible (*nepobedimy*)".[70] This confirms that even professional Soviet historians had already heard of the notion, but that Mongol invincibility had not become attached to Kulikovo. The myth did not appear in Likhachev's first serious exposition of his interpretation of the battle of Kulikovo in 1945.[71] In short, the first echoes of this idea in Soviet scholarship were erratic.

After the Second World War, Soviet historiography changed only slowly. In his contribution to a classic volume on Russia and the Golden Horde co-authored with Iakubovskii in 1950, the Soviet historian Grekov did not invoke the myth.[72] The collective Soviet history of the USSR from 1953 did not mention it.[73] Yet it appeared in a 1955 pamphlet by another unknown, Karyshkovskii: "This victory showed that the Tataro-Mongol hordes (*polchishcha*), who were considered invincible (*nepobedimymi*), could be defeated in open battle".[74] Once again, the appearance of the notion did not signal a shift in standard Soviet scholarship. In Tikhomirov's extensive introduction to the popular 1959 publication of sources about the battle, this idea remained unknown,[75] as in Budovnits's 1960 survey of early East Slavic intellectual history from 1960,[76] from the extensive discussion of Kulikovo by Cherepnin in the same year,[77] and even from the more maverick 1975 analysis by I. B. Grekov.[78]

However, V. V. Kargalov, author of numerous articles and monographs on Russo-Tatar relations, not only, in a 1980 pamphlet, wrote that the battle on the river Vozha in 1378 "shattered the myth of invincibility (*mif o nepobedimosti*) of the steppe-dwellers" in open battle (*v polevykh srazheniiakh*). He then contradicted himself and concluded that at Kulikovo Field in 1380 "the traditional belief in the invincibility (*nepobedimost'*) of the conquerors" was

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[68] Kuchin (1939), p. 29.

[69] Nasonov (1940b), p. 85; Nasonov (1940a), pp. 132-135 skirt the battle *per se*.

[70] Mavrodin (1941), p. 84.

[71] Likhachev (1945), pp. 68-81.

[72] Grekov-Iakubovskii (1950), pp. 241-243.

[73] *Ocherki* (1953), pp. 222-228.

[74] Karyshkovskii (1955), p. 61.

[75] Tikhomirov (1959).

[76] Budovnits (1960), pp. 437-462.

[77] Cherepnin (1960), pp. 596-622.

[78] Grekov (1975), pp. 127-165.

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shattered.[79] Mavrodin partially repeated his 1941 formulation in another 1980 pamphlet, writing that by the 1370s Moscow was willing to confront the Mongol khans, "who had been considered invincible (*nepobedimymi*)"; he did not connect the overthrow of the myth either with 1378 or 1380 in this work.[80] In another but fully annotated pamphlet from 1980, the military historian A. N. Kirpichnikov presented a more consistent picture leading to the same conclusion: The recovery of the East Slavs from the Mongol conquest led to reconsideration of "notions of the invincibility of the Golden Horde" (*predstavlenii o nepobedimosti Zolotoi Ordy*); after Russian defeats of Tatar raids and the battle on the river Vozha, "the myth of the invincibility (*mif o nepobedimosti*) of the Horde's cavalry army was shattered on Kulikovo Field".[81] Kirpichnikov reiterated this conclusion in a later article, writing that "On Kulikovo Field was dispersed (*razveian*) the myth of the invincibility (*mif o nepobedimosti*) of the Mongol-Tatar armies, who did not know defeat in the course of long decades", thus forgetting the Vozha battle.[82] Finally, the German Mongolist Weiers, in the 1986 multi-authored textbook on the Mongols which he edited, repeated the now standard observation.[83] Thus Minister Melent'ev's comments were as consistent with Soviet historiography as Nitsche's were with Russian and oriental studies in the West.[84]

Unbeknownst to historians of Russia and unacknowledged by historians of the Golden Horde, the myth of Mongol invincibility exists outside Russian historiography. David Nicolle explains why Chinggis Khan took personal charge of the campaign to finish off Jalal ad Din, the son of the Khwarezmshah, who had just defeated a Mongol army in Afghanistan: "It was clearly vital not to allow the Mongols' reputation for invincibility to be seriously dented".[85] Apparently one defeat was insufficient to tarnish that "reputation". Ratchnevsky displayed some confusion on this subject. According to him, if the governor of Otrar were not just slandering the Muslim merchants in order to loot their caravan, then it might have been true that they were spreading "stories about the power of the Mongol leader [= Chinggis Khan] and the invincibility of his armies". Although "In his battles on the steppe Genghis Khan suffered as many

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79 Kargalov (1980), pp. 35, 113.

80 Mavrodin (1980), p. 33. On the significance of Kulikovo see pp. 54-60.

81 Kirpichnikov (1980), pp. 16, 17, 18, 112.

82 Kirpichnikov (1988), pp. 155-156.

83 Weiers (1986b), pp. 366-367: "Im Verhältnis zwischen Russen und Tataren war diese Schlacht dennoch bedeutsam, als sie Russen wie Tataren gleichermaßen, vor Augen führte, daß die Tataren besiegbar waren."

84 How widespread this evaluation of Kulikovo had become in the West is illustrated by a another popular, profusely illustrated survey, devoid of scholarly apparatus, supposedly embodying the scholarly consensus: Wiencik (1980), p. 63: Kulikovo "did destroy the myth of Mongol invincibility". *Nota bene* Noonan (1997), p. 501: "Kulikovo showed that the Mongols were not invincible" (who really should have known better). Unfortunately I cannot read Podhorodecki (1986).

85 Nicolle (1990), p. 42.

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defeats as he gained victories", yet his army believed in the "invincibility of Genghis Khan.[86] Ratchnevsky did not, however, attribute belief in the Mongols' invincibility to those they conquered.

In 1260 the Mamluk Sultan Qutuz defeated an Ilkhanid army under Kutbugha at Ajn Jalut in Syria. Amitai-Preiss, in the most extensive study of this battle, draws this conclusions about its significance: "The Mamluk victory at Ayn Jalut was hailed by Mamluk writers...because Islam had been saved, the Mongols had been stopped, and the myth of their invincibility had been destroyed".[87] He quotes two Egyptian chroniclers, Nuwayri and Yunini, that "this was the first victory" over the Mongols since Jalal ad Din in Parwan in 1221. However, it is difficult to see here any articulation of a myth of Mongol invincibility. Recounting an earlier Mongol defeat cannot attest a myth of Mongol invincibility. It is unclear if Jalal ad Din's victory did not shatter this myth because the Mongols later defeated him. Regardless of the difficulties with his conclusion, Amitai-Preiss was not the first historian of Ayn Jalut to formulate this evaluation.

In recounting the pre-history of Ayn Jalut, the nineteenth-century orientalist d'Ohsson quoted a letter from Hulegu, obviously ghostwritten by a Muslim, to the Egyptian sultan, in which he spoke of "the glory of our invincible armies"[88] d'Ohsson observed that until 1260 the Mongols had conquered every country they had attacked.[89] When Kutuz sent word to Damascus of the Mamluk victory at Ayn Jalut, "this news caused there a joy all the more lively because the Muslims had despaired of their deliverance from the yoke of the Tatars, hitherto invincible".[90] This may have been the earliest appearance of the myth of Mongol invincibility in scholarship, and it was almost certainly its first application to Ayn Jalut.

Ilkhanid historiography is far from unanimous in following d'Ohsson's lead on Ayn Jalut. On the one hand, the early twentieth-century Mongolist Curtin quoted d'Ohsson,[91] the distinguished specialist in the Mongols in Iran and Russia Berthold Spuler comes close to such a notion,[92] the Mongolist

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[86] Ratchnevsky (1991), pp. 122, 170, 172.

[87] Amitai-Preiss (1995), p. 47.

[88] D'Ohsson (1834), III p. 332 n. 2.

[89] *Ibid.*, p. 332. I do not believe this statement to be true; under Batu the Mongols had attacked several countries in Eastern Europe and the Balkans which they did not "conquer".

[90] *Ibid.*, p. 342: "Cette nouvelle y causa une joie d'autant plus vive que les Musulmans désesperaient de leur délivrance du joug des Mongoles, jusqu'alors invincibles." D'Ohsson did not discuss Kulikovo (cf. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 183-186).

[91] Curtin (1908) lacked scholarly apparatus, bibliography or footnotes. In discussing the Mongol invasion of Khwarezm, he contrasted the Khwarezmian troops with the Mongols, whose skills made them "not merely a terror, but, at that time, invincible" (p. 104). The arrival of the news of the victory of Ayn Jalut in Damascus "caused a joy all the greater since Muslims had despaired of deliverance from the Mongols, deemed until that day invincible" (p. 271). Curtin did not discuss the invasions of Russia and Eastern Europe or the Juchid *ulus*.

[92] Spuler (1955), p. 57: "Das Mamlukische Heer, wie das mongolische überwiegend aus Türken bestehend, hat sich dem mongolische als überlegen erwiesen."

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Weiers echoes the mythology,[93] and the popularizer Marshall follows Amitai-Preiss.[94] However, on the other hand, more specialists, going back to Howorth and including Boyle, Saunders, Smith, Thoreau, Nicolle, and Rossabi, simply failed to mention any myth of Mongol invincibility.[95] Morgan is more cautious, only noting that it "has been argued" that Ayn Jalut broke the "spell of invincibility" enveloping the Mongols.[96]

Howorth made great use of d'Ohsson. Although Howorth did not copy d'Ohsson in applying the myth of Mongol invincibility to Ayn Jalut, could d'Ohsson's invocation (invention?) of that myth have inspired Howorth's conclusion about Kulikovo? It may be more than coincidence that both scholars mentioned the myth of Mongol invincibility only when it had been "shattered", in d'Ohsson in 1260, in Howorth in 1380.

In 1274 and 1281 Qubilai Khan, founder of the Yuan dynasty, dispatched amphibious invasions of Japan; both campaigns ended disastrously. Morris Rossabi, the recent biographer of Qubilai, concludes: "The failures shattered the Mongols' mantle of invincibility in East Asia. Khubilai's subjects noticed that the Mongols were vulnerable. One of the principal underpinnings of their power - the psychological edge of terror they held over their opponents - was badly shaken, if not dislodged",[97] a view echoed by Nicolle, "the myth of Mongol invincibility had been shattered throughout eastern Asia".[98] Neither Rossabi nor Nicolle present any quotations from contemporary texts to substantiate this observation.

It is credible that the Eastern Slavs might not have heard of the Yuan defeats against Japan. Although contacts between the Yuan and the other successor states of the Mongol Empire were perhaps more intense and friendly at the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth century than in many years,[99] still, the "Russian" troops serving as Imperial Guards in China might not have sent letters home mentioning the invasions of Japan. But it is

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[93] Weiers (1986a), p. 304: "Hier [at Ajn Jalut - CJH] nun geschah das Unerhörte: Die Mongolen wurde vernichtend geschlagen."

[94] Marshall (1996), p. 193: Ayn Jalut "utterly smashed the myth of Mongol invincibility", although the battle itself was inconclusive [!].

[95] Howorth (1888), pp. 167-170; Boyle (1968), pp. 351-352; Saunders (1977), although, he considered Ajn Jalut "the first major defeat the Mongols had suffered in a career of almost uninterrupted triumph lasting close on sixty years" (p. 66); Smith (1984a); Thoreau (1983); Nicolle (1990), pp. 113-117; Rossabi (1992), pp. 18-19.

[96] Morgan (1983), p. 231.

[97] Rossabi (1988), p. 212.

[98] Nicolle (1990), p. 67. Benson (1991), p. 236, writes apropos of the 1281 Japan invasion, that this was the "first war" that the Mongol Emperor had ever lost, since Khubilai never tried to invade Japan again.

[99] E.g. Nicolle (1990), p. 74. In the 14th century Abu Bakr al Ahri recorded that in 1326-1327 the Yuan emperor sent his envoy Kuan-chih with *jarlighs* to the armies of the four *uluses* (khanates) of "Khitai, Jaghatai, Dasht-I Qifjaq and Iran", to the Chagadaid ruler Kebek, the Golden Horde ruler Uzbek, the Ilkhanid Abu Sa'id, and to his own forces, to inform them of the grant of a Chinese title to an Ilkhanid noble. Allsen (1991). See also Allsen (1994a).

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beyond argument that the East Slavs would have heard about Ayn Jalut the Golden Horde maintained extensive diplomatic relations with its Mamluk ally against the Ilkhanids,[100] Russians must have been privy to considerable gossip m their frequent perambulations with the Horde on the Volga,[101] and East Slavs fought in Golden Horde campaigns in the North Caucasus against the Ilkhanids.[102] Poliak citing Markrizi, asserted that Russian troops were dispatched with Tatars to Egypt to aid the Mamluks against the Ilkhanids.[103] Even apart from that mechanism,[104] the East Slavs enjoyed direct contacts with the Byzantines, restored to Constantinople soon after Ajn Jalut in 1261, and with Orthodox monasteries in Mt. Athos, and, under Mamluk rule, St. Catherine's in the Sinai desert, and in Palestine itself. It is unlikely some word did not reach the Russian forest zone about such a significant battle in the Middle East. If the "myth of Mongol invincibility" had been shattered in the Middle East in 1260, could it really have survived in Eastern Europe for 120 years thereafter?

From these "provincial" historiographies one would have to conclude that a myth of invincibility accompanied the Mongols into each region they occupied – East Asia, the Middle East, Eastern Europe – which had to be overcome separately in each case. Concerning Syria and Japan, the "shattering" of the "myth of Mongol invincibility" appears to be no more than an ex post facto rationalization of the failure of the Mongols to conquer these countries. Russia, conquered and seeking to overthrow Tatar rule, would not fit this paradigm, but the significant feature is that for the myth to have survived among the East Slavs until 1380 requires a degree of East Slavic isolation from greater Mongol events that cannot sustain criticism.

The very late appearance in Russian-language historiography of the myth that the myth of Tatar invincibility was shattered at the battle of Kulikovo, remains a mystery. Would there have been any reluctance to invoke this argument? At first glance, one would suspect that patriotism might play a role here, but, Karamzin nothing if not a Russian patriot, concluded that the Mongol conquest was responsible for the moral degradation of the Russian people, so arguing that the East Slavs thought the Mongols militarily invincible for nearly a century and a half (a conclusion probably not available in Karamzin's time) should not have caused any problems to later nationalists. Soviet historical studies, after the rejection of Pokrovskii, articulated a broad framework on the

[100] Zakirov (1966).

[101] Poluboiarinova (1978).

[102] *TL* (1950), p. 334.

[103] Poliak (1935), p. 234 *et passim*; noted by Vernadsky (1953), p. 163.

[104] Moreover, surely Khubilai would have heard of so portentous a defeat of his brother and ally Hulegu: from direct contacts, via Papal envoys and missionaries, courtesy of Italian merchants (the Polos), or somehow through Nestorian conduits On the travels of Onggud Nestorian clerics from China to the Middle East and beyond, see texts: Montgomery (1966); Wallis Budge (1928); study: Rossabi (1992).

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evolution of the Russian "centralized" national state which could – indeed, sometimes did – accommodate the myth of Mongol invincibility. Kirpichnikov was an excellent case in point. In this theory, it was not until the Russians had recovered economically from the devastation of the Mongol conquest that they could conceive of overthrowing the Mongol Yoke. The political chaos of the Horde in the 1360s and 1370s was conducive to this realization. Therefore the Russians would have continued to accept the myth of Mongol invincibility until their national consciousness had evolved to the point that they could unite in opposition to the Tatars. Hence, Kulikovo. Certainly our good Soviet Minister did not think he was insulting Russian honor when he invoked the shattering of the myth of Mongol invincibility at Kulikovo!

I think the explanation for the erratic propagation of the myth of Mongol invincibility in later Russian and Soviet historiography derives from two factors. First, one can never overlook the almost congenital disinterest of Russian historians in the Mongols and the desire not to discuss the issue at all.[105] Secondly, Russian and especially Soviet historiography emphasized uninterrupted opposition to Tatar rule by the "indomitable Russian people" from 1237 on, epitomized in the 1257 Novgorod resistence to the Mongol census, the *veche* (urban meeting) risings against Muslim tax-farmers in Vladimir-Suzdalia in 1262, and the massacre of Chol khan and his entourage in Tver' in 1327.[106] This form of patriotic glorification of Russia's "unconquerable" spirit would leave little room for exploring a myth of Mongol invincibility. Such a notion may have been more easily assimilated to Western historiography about Russia with its emphasis upon Russian "servility" under the Tatars, although, again, nationalist historians such as Karamzin shared that belief.

Therefore, the evolution of this notion in Russian historiography remains problematic, and any solution must depend upon far more extensive access to Russian-language publications from 1880, when Howorth published, until the late 1930s. For now, the conclusion that the notion that Kulikovo shattered of the myth of Mongol invincibility originated in Western historical works about the Mongols, made it way to Western-language histories of Russia, and only much later traveled to Russia itself, remains a hypothesis.

Finally, the myth of Mongol invincibility has been perpetuated far too casually in scholarly and popular works. The incompatibility of its application in the Middle East, Russia and East Asia has escaped notice because of the compartmentalization of studies of the significance of the Mongol Empire in Russia, Iran and China. Yes, the Mongols did believe that they possessed a divine sanction to conquer the world; yes, the Mongols intended to inspire, and succeeded in inspiring, mass terror in their enemies; and yes, the Mongols enjoyed a degree of military success which shocked contemporaries and still arouses scholarly study seeking explanations of their military prowess. This

[105] Cherniavsky (1959), p. 459.
[106] Halperin (1982).

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article, however, has suggested that the myth of Mongol invincibility, and its putative fate in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, was invented neither by the Mongols nor by their sedentary victims, but by modern historians.

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THE EAST SLAVIC RESPONSE TO THE MONGOL CONQUEST[1]

Any analysis of East Slavic attitudes toward the Mongol conquest during the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries must confront serious obstacles. Although there are dozens of major narrative texts of various types – tales within the corpus of the chronicles, *vitae*, epics, epistles, travelogues, independent narratives – as well as documentary sources such as wills and treaties,[2] compared to the sources in Chinese,[3] Arabo-Persian[4] or Latin,[5] the aggregate

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[1] An earlier version of this article was read at the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies Convention, Boca Raton, September 27, 1998.

[2] Charles J. Halperin, "A Chingissid Saint of the Russian Orthodox Church: 'The Life of Peter, *tsarevich* of the Horde'," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 9:3 (Fall, 1975), pp. 323-335; Ibid., "Know Thy Enemy: Medieval Russian Familiarity with the Mongols of the Golden Horde," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* U.F. 30 (1982), pp. 161 -175; Ibid., "Russia and the 'Mongol Yoke': Concepts of Conquest, Liberation and the Chingissid Idea" *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 2 (1982), pp. 99-107; Ibid., "*Tsarev ulus*: Russia in the Golden Horde," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 23:2 (April-June, 1982), pp. 257-263; Ibid., "The Defeat and Death of Batu," *Russian History* 10:1 (1983), pp. 50-65; Ibid., "Russia in the Mongol Empire in Comparative Perspective," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 43:1 (June, 1983), pp. 239-261, especially pp. 258-260; Ibid., "The Ideology of Silence: Prejudice and Pragmatism on the Medieval Religious Frontier," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 26:3 (July, 1984), pp. 442-466; Ibid., "The Tatar Yoke and Tatar Oppression," *Russia Mediaevalis* 5:1 (1984), pp. 20-39; Ibid., *Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History* (Bloomington, IN 1985), especially pp. 61-75; Ibid., *The Tatar Yoke* (Columbus, OH 1986) [this volume should have had a subtitle, "The Image of the Mongols in Medieval Russia," and an Index, and been proofread properly].

[3] See the relevant contributions to John D. Langlois, Jr., ed., *China under Mongol Rule* (Princeton, NJ 1981); all of Chan Hok-lam and William Theodore de Bary, eds., *Yüan Thought: Chinese Thought and Religion under the Mongols* (New York, 1982); and Jennifer W. Jay, *A Change in Dynasties: Loyalism in Thirteenth-Century China* (Western Washington University Center for East Asian Studies, Studies on East Asia v. 18; Bellingham, WA 1991).

[4] David O. Morgan, "Persian Historians and the Mongols," in David O. Morgan, ed., *Medieval Historical Writing in the Christian and Islamic Worlds* (London, 1982), pp. 109-124.

[5] The latest monographs are Axel Klopprogge, *Ursprung und Ausprägung des abendländischen Mongolenbildes im 13. Jahrhundert. Ein Versuch zur Ideengeschichte des Mittelalters* (Wiesbaden, 1993), summarized in his "Das Mongolenbild in Abendland," in Stephan Conermann, Jan Kusber, eds., *Die Mongolen in Asien und Europa* (Frankfurt am Main, 1997), pp. 81-101; and with a different problematica, Felicita Schmieder, *Europa und die Fremdem. Die Mongolen in Urteil des Abendlandes von 13. Bis in das 15. Jahrhundert* (Sigmaringen, 1994). I have previously overlooked Devin DeWeese, "The Influence of the Mongols on the Religious Consciousness of Thirteenth-century Europe," *Mongolian Studies* 5 (1978-1979), pp. 41-78.

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source base is not huge. However, it is the qualitative rather than the quantitative limitations of the sources which most inhibit scholarly study. The Rus' sources are almost all anonymous: the exceptions are bishop Serapion of Vladimir's sermons and bishop Vassian of Rostov's "Epistle to the Ugra River." No text was preserved in a manuscript contemporary with the events described; often manuscripts date a century later. Thus, nearly all sources are of uncertain provenance. Texts are commonly assigned dates and locations of composition entirely on the basis of content analysis and *cui bono* argumentation. The social identity of the authors cannot be established definitively. Assuming that all authors were clerics works better for *vitae* than the *Zadonshchina* and is particularly controversial for chronicles,[6] but raises more problems than it solves. A credible history of Church-state relations during the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries has not been written. Controversy continues to surround the attitude of the Church towards the Horde and towards the political unification of northeastern Russia under Muscovite aegis. The metropolitanates of Alexei and Kiprian still arouse heated scholarly disagreement. Some historians continue to take a very cynical view of Church policy toward the Tatars and Moscow as based exclusively upon ecclesiastical material interests.[7] But, the conflict of interests between the Church and secular political powers inevitably resulted in tensions and disagreements. Moreover, the institutional divisions within "the Church" must also be taken into account: the "Church" too often reduces itself to the metropolitan of Kiev-Vladimir-Moscow.[8] Even the hallowed role of Saint

[6] Donald Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols. Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier, 1304-1589* (Cambridge, England, 1998), p. 153 n. 42 attributes all chronicles to clerical authorship, and posits an extreme degree of cultural separation between Church and State, despite admitting some "overlap" in expertise and attitude (pp. 18-26) and omitting more evidence to the same end. For example, it is impossible to establish the clerical status of the compiler or copyists of the "Tatar lexicon" attached to a Greek lexicon. See P. K. Simoni, "Pamiatnik starinnoi russkoi leksikografii po rukopisiam XV-XVII stoletii I-III," *Izvestiia otdeleniia russkago iazyka islovesnosti Imp. Akad. Nauk* XIII (1908), knizhka 1, pp. 175-212.

[7] A. L. Pliguzov, "Drevneishii spisok kratkogo sobraniia iarlykov, dannykh ordynskimi khanami russkimmitropolitam," *Russkii feodal'nyi arkhiv XIV-pervyi treti XVI veka*, chast' III (Moscow, 1987), pp. 571-594; A. L. Pliguzov, A. L. Khoroshkevich, "Otnoshenie russkoi tserkvy k antiordynskoi bor'be v XIII-XV vekakh (po materialem Kratkogo sobraniia khanskikh iarlykov russkim mitropolitam)," *Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma* 37 (1988), pp. 117-130; A. S. Khoroshev, "Batyevshchina i tserkovnaia propoved' neprotivleniia," *Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma* 37 (1988), pp. 131-139; N. A. Okhotina, "Russkaia tserkov' i mongol'skoe zavoevanie (XIII v.)," in A. I. Klibanov, ed. *Tserkov', obshchestvo i gosudarstvo v feodal'noi Rossii. Sbornik statei* (Moscow, 1990), pp. 67-84; A. I. Pluguzov, A. L. Khoroshkevich, "Russkaia tserkov' i antiordynskaia bor'ba v XIII-XV vv. (po materialem kratkogo sobraniia khanskikh iarlykov russkim mitropolitam)," in *ibid.*, pp. 84-102.

[8] N. S. Borisov, *Russkaia tserkov' v politicheskoi bor'be XIV-XV vekov* (Moscow, 1986); A. S. Khoroshev, *Politicheskaia istoriia russkoi kanonizatsii (XI-XVI vv.)* (Moscow, 1986), pp. 73-132; N. S. Borisov, *Tserkovnye deiateli srednevekovoi Rusi XIII-XVII vv.* (Moscow, 1988), pp. 17-121; R. G. Skyrnnikov, *Gosudarstvo i tserkov' na Rusi XIV-XVI vv. Podvizhniki russkoi tserkvy* (Novosibirsk, 1991), pp. 1-126. Neither John Fennell, *A History of the Russian Church to 1448* (London, 1995), pp. 118-239 nor Sergei Hackel, "Under Pressure from the Pagans? - The Mongols and the Russian Church," in J. Breck, J. Meyendorff, E. Silk, eds., *The Legacy of St. Vladimir: Byzantium - Russia - America* (Crestwood, NY 1990), pp. 47-56 broke new ground.

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Sergius in the Muscovite victory over the Tatars at Kulikovo Field in 1380 remains highly contentious.[9] Some recent attempts to address these questions have been greeted quite critically.[10] While additional and more reliable scholarship is on the way,[11] nevertheless, information in particular is lacking on the relationships between chronicles and the principalities, cities or princes for whom they might have been written. It is not credible that differing accounts of political events reflected only ecclesiastical institutional rivalries, such as those between the metropolitan and the archbishop of Novgorod or the bishop of Tver', or between black and white clergy as in the tale of Mitiai, without reference to the secular polities for whom clerics might have served as mouthpieces. East Slavic priests and monks, let alone hierarchs and abbots, did not live in ivory towers.[12] It is difficult to believe that the "pro-Tverian" and "pro-Muscovite" chronicle accounts of the uprising in Tver' in 1327 represented only the opinions, policies, and propaganda of ecclesiastical institutions, not the princely establishments looking over their shoulders.[13] Finally, it cannot be proven who read any of these texts, other than the scribes who copied, redacted, or "borrowed" from them. In short, only provisional answers are available as to who, what, when, where, and why the texts were written.

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[9] A. A. Shamaro, "Kulikovskaia bitva. Dmitrii Donskoi i Sergei Radonezhskii," *Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma* 25 (1980), pp. 36-61; V. A. Kuchkin, "O roli Sergiia Radonezhskogo v podgotovke Kulikovskoi bitvy," *Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma* 37 (1988), pp. 100-116; A. G. Kuz'min, "Tserkov' i svetskaia vlast' v epokhu Kulikovskoi bitvy," *Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma* 37 (1988), pp. 90-99; V. A. Kuchkin, "Dmitrii Donskoi i Sergii Radonezhskii v kanun Kulikovskoi bitvy," in *Tserkov', obshchestvo i gosudarstvo*, pp. 103-126; N. S. Borisov, *I svecha by ne ugasla...Istoricheskii portret Sergiia Radonexhskogo* (Moscow, 1990), especially pp. 204, 220-230, 234-236; V. A. Kuchkin, "Sergii Radonezhskii," *Voprosy istorii* 1992 #10, pp. 75-92.

[10] For a sharp critique of both Khoroshev, *Politicheskaia istoriia russkoi kanonizatsii* and Borisov, *Russkaia tserkov'*, see V. A. Kuchkin, B. N. Floria, "O professional'nom urovne knig po istorii russkoi tserkvy," *Voprosy istor*ii 1988, #11, pp. 144-156. For comparison and critique of Borisov and Khoroshev, see Jaroslaw Pelenski, "The Origins of the Muscovite Ecclesiastical Claims to the Kievan Inheritance," in S. W. Swierkosz-Lenart, ed. *Le origini e to sviluppo della Cristianità Slavo-Bizantina* (Instituto Storico Italiano per il medio evo; Nuovi Studi Storici No. 17; Rome, 1992), pp. 217 n. 9, 218 n. 11, 219 n. 4 Much of this Russian scholarship constitutes a response to the earlier, controversial views of G. M. Prokhorov.

[11] On St. Sergius and the Trinity Monastery, now see Pierre Gonneau, "The Trinity-Sergius Brotherhood in State and Society," in A. M. Kleimola, G. D. Lenhoff, eds., *Culture and Identity in Muscovy, 1359-1584* (UCLA Slavic Studies, New Series, Volume III; Moscow, 1997), pp. 116-145, and David Miller, "Donors to the Trinity-Sergius Monastery as a Community of Venerators: Origins, 1360s-1462," in *ibid.*, pp. 450-474, and for a comment on the weakness of the paradigm of the Church as the "handmaiden" of the Muscovite principality, Gail Lenhoff, "Unofficial Veneration of the Daniilovichi in Muscovite Rus'," in *ibid.*, pp. 391-416.

[12] On the problem of ecclesiastical "regionalism," see A. S. Khoroshev, *Tserkov' v sotsial'nopoliticheskoi sisteme Novgorodskoi feodal'noi respubliki* (Moscow, 1980) on Novgorod, and Ekkekhard Kliug, *Kniazhestvo Tverskoe* (*1247-1485 gg.*) (Tr. A. V. Chernyshova; Tver', 1994), pp. 16-17, 102-103, 169-171, 223-227, 269, 329-332, 353-356, 362-361, 364 [= Ekkehard Klug, "Das Fürstentum Tver' 1247-1485," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 37 (1985), pp. 7-335] on the relationship of the Tverian prince to his bishop.

[13] Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 85-93.

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In addition, the sources have often been misinterpreted. The most blatant prejudice has been and remains modern romantic or integral nationalism. Depictions of Aleksandr Nevskii as a "collaborator" are no more than anachronistic projections of extraneous standards onto the medieval context. Categorizing Nevskii as a "quisling,"[14] or describing Nevskii's policy toward the Mongols as "appeasement,"[15] or ascribing to the Mongols the goal of "the enslavement of entire nations in a medieval version of a 'new order',"[16] or interpreting the Mongol proposal to convert north China to pasture as "the most grandiose 'final solution' in history,"[17] all equate the Mongols with the Nazis, an unpromising approach. If men like Yeh-lu ch'u-ts'ai and Rashid ad Din are seen as realists, not collaborationists,[18] then the same would apply to Aleksandr Nevskii or Ivan Kalita. It takes an orientalist like Egorov to observe that Nevskii might have drawn relevant conclusions about Mongol power by traveling across 7000 kilometers of Mongol-ruled territory to Karakorum.[19]

Even the most fundamental terms in any discussion of Russo-Tatar relations are themselves anachronisms: the term the "Golden Horde" (*Zolataia orda*) originated in the 1560s in the *Kazanskaia istoriia*,[20] and the term *tatarskoe igo* in the 1660s as part of the complex evolution of the *Synopsis* usually attributed to Innokentii Guizel,[21] yet it is difficult to address the general reader about Russo-Tatar relations without employing them.

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[14] Notably, still, Peter Nitsche, "Mongolensturm und Mongolenherrschaft in Rußland," in *Die Mongolen in Asien und Europa*, p. 71.

[15] John L. I. Fennell, *The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 1200-1304* (London, 1983), especially pp. 97-121; replies by O. N. Moskvitina, "Aleksandr Nevskii v zerkale noveishei angliiskoi istoriiografii (O knige D. Fennela "Krizis srednevekovoi Rusi. 1200-1304")," in *Kritika kontseptsii sevremennoi burzhuaznoi istoriografii* (Leningrad, 1987), pp. 127-134, and of the editors of the Russian translation of this volume, A. L. Khoroshkevich, A. I. Pliguzov, "Rus' XIII stoletiia v knige Dzh. Fennela," in Dzh. Fennel, *Krizis srednevekovoi Rusi 1200-1304* (Moscow, 1989), pp. 5-32, particularly pp. 22-25.

[16] Henry Wiencik, Glenn D. Lowry with Amanda Haller, *Storm Across Asia. Genghis Khan and the Mongols. The Mogul Expansion* (Imperial Visions. The Rise and Fall of Empires; New York, 1980), p. 49 by Wiencik.

[17] Horace W. Dewey, "Russia's Debt to the Mongols in Suretyship and Collective Responsibility," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 30:2 (April, 1988), p. 256.

[18] Anatoly M. Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World* (2nd ed. Madison, WI 1994), pp. 224-225. A. K. S. Lambton, "Mongol Fiscal Administration in Persia [Part 1]," *Studia Islamica* 64 (1986), p. 79 characterizes the readiness of especially Turcoman, Turkish or Qara Khitan local rulers to cooperate with the Mongols "remarkable."

[19] Although whether Nevskii can be termed the "first Eurasianist" is more problematic. See V. L. Egorov, "Aleksandr Nevskii i Chingizidy," *Otechestvennaia istoriia* 1997 #2, pp. 48-58, especially 51-55, 56.

[20] The *Nikonian Chronicle*, Serge Zenkovsky, ed/intro, Serge Zenkovsky and Betty Jean Zenkovsky, trs. (Princeton, NJ 1984-1989), 5 vols., habitually translates "*Orda*" as "Golden Horde" (e.g. v. 2, p. 14).

[21] Halperin, "The Tatar Yoke and Tatar Oppression," pp. 21-31 [there is a superfluous line of text on p. 28, next to the bottom, and "Tatiscev" in that paragraph should be "Tatiščev"]. A. L. Khoroshkevich, A. I. Pliguzov, "Rus' XIII stoletiia v knige Dzh. Fennela" p. 21 concede that the term "the Tatar Yoke" was applied to the system of Russo-Tatar relations "later;" even this is better than Daniel H. Kaiser and Gary Marker, comp. & ed. *Reinterpreting Russian History. Readings, 860-1860s* (New York, 1994), p. 81 "the Tatar Yoke, as the Rus' chronicles invariably label it..." Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, pp. 244-245, has discovered the earliest Latin evocation of this phrase, in Daniel Printz.

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The Christian providentialism which infuses our sources has often been treated superficially. It is easy enough to dismiss the assertion that the Mongols invaded the East Slavic principalities out of hatred for Orthodox Christianity. Mikhail of Chernigov's refusal to walk between the two fires was perceived by the Mongols as evidence of political disloyalty, not religious fastidiousness.[22] Mikhail of Tver' was not a victim of Khan Uzbek's adoption of Islam as the state religion of the Horde.[23] Neither Choi khan in 1327[24] nor Mamai in 1380[25] intended to convert the Russians to Islam. Understanding such assertions in the East Slavic sources, however, is another matter.

Medieval East Slavic notions of historical causation require further study. The Mongol conquest was the will of the Christian God, punishment for Orthodox Christian sins. However, the Mongols, as instruments of divine chastisement, were still evil servants of the Devil, who hated Christians; God only permitted the Devil to oppress Christians.[26] The Mongols were not therefore "good," nor was the Tatar conquest "good." Because the Tatars were not Orthodox Christians but blood-sucking, greedy, homicidal barbarians, they listened to the Devil, although it should be remembered that even sinful Orthodox Christians sometimes also did so, and some Mongol khans served the Christian God well by protecting the Orthodox Church.[27] The fluidity of these concepts enabled the bookmen to explain any event in Russo-Tatar relations without questioning the superiority of Orthodox Christianity. Unfortunately, divine punishment for Russian sins could take the form either of infidel raids or infidel conquest.

This narrative framework of vitae and chronicles would be less of a hindrance to an analysis of East Slavic responses to the Mongol conquest if such sources were complemented by a tradition of secular political theory in medieval Rus'. Unfortunately, the East Slavs were silent in this department.[28]

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[22] Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 47-53.

[23] Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 81-85. Even DeWeese, who castigates previous historians for underestimating the significance of Islam in the Horde and takes exception to the notion of Mongol "religious toleration," concludes that Uzbek did not persecute Orthodox or Catholic Christians in his realm; see Devin DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde: Baba Tükles and conversion to Islam in historical and epic tradition* (University Park, PA 1994), especially pp. 95-100. Cf. Denis Sinor, "Some Latin Sources on the Khanate of Uzbek," in Denis Sinor, Bakhtiyar A. Nazarov, eds. *Essays on Uzbek History, Culture and Language* (Uralic and Altaic Series, vol. 156; Bloomington, IN 1993), pp. 110-119.

[24] Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 85-92.

[25] Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 121-124.

[26] See DeWeese, "The Influence of the Mongols," pp. 47-55.

[27] See U. Bamborschke, W. Kosmy, H Meyer-Harder, W-H Schmidt, K-D Seaman, *Die Erzählung über Petr Ordynskij: Ein Beitrag zur soziologischen Forschung altrussischer Texte* (Veröfflentlichungen der Abteilung für Slavische Sprachen und Literaturen des Osteuropa-Instititut [Slavische Seminar] an der Freien Universität Berlin, Band 148; Wiesbaden, 1979), especially pp. 138-159 for an attempt at a distinction between "pro-Tatar" and "Tatarophile" attitudes (in which "pro-Tatar" is actually pro-Chinggisid, and "Tatarophile" is pro-Tatar). Cf. Ostrowski, Muscovy and the Mongols, pp. 138, 146.

[28] Nikolay Andreyev, "Pagan and Christian Elements in Old Russia," *Slavic Review* 20 [21?] (1962), pp. 16-23, especially p. 21, responding to Florovsky, blames Russia's "intellectual

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Consequently, political concepts were expressed in religious terminology; modernizing medieval discourse is risky business.[29]

Serapion of Vladimir described the East Slavs as having been reduced to "slavery" (*rabota/rabotati*) to the infidel,[30] and in 1380 Dmitrii Donskoi and his cousin reportedly preferred death to "slavery."[31] Such "slavery" can just as easily be construed as a metaphor derived from Exodus as political subordination to the Mongols. The phrase "yoke of slavery" (*igo rabotnogo*) merely strengthen the biblical connotations.[32] In some contexts, the term "slavery" must be taken literally, as a reference to the fate of many East Slavs captured by the Tatars, for sale into personal slavery.[33] The dividing line between rhetorical metaphor and political reality is difficult to discern.[34]

The Halych-Volhynian princes embarked on joint military expeditions with the Tatars because they were in the Tatars' "will" (*vole*).[35] To avoid subservience to the Tatar "will" some Riurikid princes also preferred death.[36] No text explicitly correlated being in the Tatars' "will" with "slavery." Expressions with *vole* were used in various circumstances, from who dictated

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silence" on the Mongols, although Francis J. Thomson, "The Nature of the Reception of Christian Byzantine Culture in Russia in the Tenth to Thirteenth Centuries and its Implications for Russian Culture," *Slavica Gandensia* 5 (1978), pp. 107-139, who dates this phenomenon to the Kievan period, blames the Church. Cf. Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, p. 141.

[29] V. A. Kuchkin, "Mongolo-tatarskoe igo v osveshchenii drevnerusskikh knizhnikov (XIII-pervaia chetvert' XIV v.)," in *Russkaia kul'tura v usloviiakh inozemnykh nashestvii i voini X – nachalo XX v.*, ed. A. N. Kopylev (Moscow, 1990), volume I, pp. 15-69, partially understands the dominance of religious over secular themes in the early sources, but then ascribes a "political" conception of Russian unity to the "Life of Mikhail' of Tver'."

[30] Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 70-73. Kuchkin, p. 45, treats this "slavery" as literal. See also the Nikon Chronicle redaction of the *vita* of Mikhail of Chernigov (Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, p. 51), the "Epistle to the Ugra" of Bishop Vassian (Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 155, 159); and *Kazanskaia istoriia* (Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, p. 162).

[31] Dmitrii Donskoi in the Chronicle Redaction, and Vladimir Andreevich of Serpukhov in the Expanded Redaction, of the *Skazanie o Mamaevom poboishche* (Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, p. 112).

[32] In Mercurius of Smolensk (Halperin, "The Defeat and Death of Batu," pp. 54-60, here p. 57); *Stepennaia kniga* about the wives of the *sinklity* after Batu's campaign (*Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* [hereafter *PSRL*], XXI (St. Petersburg, 1908), pp. 262-263). Note that according to *Kazanskaia istoriia*, "yoke of slavery" described Novgorod's relationship to Moscow (Halperin, "The Tatar Yoke and Tatar Oppression," pp. 22-24).

[33] This was the fate of much of the population of Moscow after the sack of the city by Tokhtamysh in 1382 (Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, p. 118).

[34] The most promising political use was the observation of the Novgorod Fourth Chronicle about Batu's campaign's that from that time the *Rus'* "*nacha rabotati*" (began to be enslaved) (*PSRL* IV (St. Petersburg, 1848), p. 32).

[35] *PSRL* II (Moscow, 1962), pp. 872(1274), 881(1280), 888(1282), 892(1283), 897(1287). George Perfecky sometimes translates this phrase as "to be subjects;" George Perfecky, ed. & tr. *The Hypatian Codex. Part II. The Galician-Volynian Chronicle. An Annotated Translation* (Munich, 1973), pp. 89, 95.

[36] Vasil'ko Konstantinovich s.a. 1237-1238, perhaps a later interpolation into the Laurentian Chronicle (Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 35-37); Yurii Ingvarevich in the *Povest' o razorenii Riazani Batyem* (Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, p. 40).

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the terms of a Novgorodian treaty,[37] to a Tverian diatribe against arrogant Muscovite muscle-flexing after the construction of the Kremlin's stone walls.[38] Obviously this concept was so broad that it encompasses everything from a sphere of influence to colonial subordination.

Similarly, many texts bemoan the Tatar "oppression" (*nasilie*), but left unsaid is whether the "oppressive" Horde ruled the East Slavic principalities or merely ravaged them.[39]

It is commonplace to speak of the Riurikid princes as "vassals" of the khan,[40] who go to the Horde to pledge "fealty" in return for which they receive *yarliki*. But despite Pavlov-Silvanskii, most historians of medieval Rus' deny that the East Slavs had feudalism, reciprocal political obligations and explicitly conditional land tenure. Yet this is what vassalage and investiture entail when the terms are employed in their primary, technical sense. The Mongols, according to Vladimirtsov, did practice "feudal" notions in the Chinggisid era; members of the Imperial family and other nobles held lands, pastures, peoples as "appanages;"[41] i.e. "fiefs"[42] Recent scholarship, by Endicott-West,

[37] For example, *Novgorodskaia pervaia letopis' starshego i mladshego izvodov* [hereafter *NPL*], ed. A. N. Nasonov (Moscow-Leningrad, 1950), pp. 31, 45, 46, 50, 61, 68, 80, 81, 88, 89, 94 just from from Elder Recension. Translations in Robert Michell and Nevill Forbes, trs. *The Chronicle of Novgorod 1016-1471* (rpt. New York, 1970), pp. 23, 43, 44, 49, 63, 69, 72, 95, 104, 105, 119 include "on your terms," "at will," "according to his will," "your liberties," "your rights;" *Gramoty Velikogo Novgoroda i Pskova* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1949), p. 132 (1470-1471 draft treaty with Casimir).

[38] *PSRL* XV (St. Petersburg, 1863), vypusk 1, p. 84 s.a. 1367.

[39] Re the 1262 uprisings in Vladimir-Suzdalian cities; the death of Berkai 1286; Serapion; *baskak* Akhmat in the 1280s; metropolitan Maksim's departure from Kiev in 1299; 1328 the "peace" under Ivan Kalita (Halperin, "The Tatar Yoke and Tatar Oppression," pp. 31-38; Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, p. 64). Donald Ostrowski, "Why Did the Metropolitan Move from Kiev to Vladimir in the Thirteenth Century?" *California Slavic Studies* 16(1993), pp. 83-101 (which does not cite Halperin, "The Tatar Yoke and Tatar Oppression") translates the phrase as "Tatar violence," a reference to the Horde civil war immediately south of Kiev. Since the Orthodox Church was under Tatar patronage and could not claim to be "oppressed" by the Mongols, nor would Vladimir, to which the metropolitan fled, have been safer from the Tatars than Kiev, he rejects the translation of "Tatar oppression." Dr. Ostrowski correctly pointed out in his commentary on the earlier version of this article that the term might have had different meanings in different texts. I believe that in this passage the phrase "from Tatar oppression" was used as a cliché or *topos*, which the Church, without regard to logical consistency, could apply to almost any situation involving the Tatars.

[40] For example, Thomas Noonan, "Forging a National Identity: Monetary Politics During the Reign of Vasilii I," in *Culture and Identity in Muscovy*, pp. 495-529 *passim*, although in this case the word is used in a generic sense to mean "subject, dependent or servant," rather than its primary meaning.

[41] Of course, Vladimirstov's conclusions remains controversial, but even his critics conceded that his theory best fit precisely the Imperial Mongol period. On the political vagaries and institutional structure of the appanages in Yüan China, see Elizabeth Endicott-West, *Mongolian Rule in China: Local Administration in the Yüan Dynasty* (Cambridge, MA 1989), pp. 88-103; and David N. Farquhar, *The Government of China under Mongolian Rule. A Reference Guide* (Münchener ostasiatische Studien, Band 53; Stuttgart, 1990), pp. 295-366.

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Schamiloglu and others, de-emphasizes the "autocracy" of the khagans and khans, instead delineating collegial political relations among the pre-Imperial Mongols as well as in the Mongol Empire and its successor states.[43] Grupper describes the relationship between the Chinggis Khans and his Imperial Guard (*kesig*) as "mutual rights and duties," and suggests that this institutional structure was continued under his successors, not only in the Great Khaganate, but in the regional khanates and successor states as well.[44] The inheritance of membership in the Imperial Guard, or in general of political (*darugachi*) and military office, would also constitute a restriction on "autocracy." Manz has suggested that this aspect of the functioning of Mongol imperial administrations carried over into the Timurid realm.[45] Trepavlov attributes a tendency to "dualism" or corulership to the Mongol Empire and its successor states, which would definitely inhibit autocratic tendencies.[46] Sinor concludes that Mongol and other steppe khans were selected by consensus, not violence.[47] Therefore, Mongol "autocracy" cannot be invoked to deny that there were any limits on the authority of the ruler, and therefore there was no "true" "feudalism" in the

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[42] Donald Ostrowski, "The Military Land Grant Along the Muslim-Christian Frontier," *Russian History* 19 (1992), pp. 327-359, equates these appanages and Islamic *iqta*. On *iqta*, see Ann K. S. Lambton, "Reflections on the *iqta*," in G. Makdisi, ed. *Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A. R. Gibb* (Leiden, 1965), pp. 358-376 [which did not discuss the Ilkhanid period for reasons of space, p. 373 n. 1]; *Ibid.*, "Reflections on the *iqta* in Medieval Iran," *Iran* 5 (1967), pp. 41-50 [essentially the same material; ditto oh the Ilkhanid period, p. 48 n. 21]; *Ibid.*, *Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia. Aspects of Administrative, Economic and Social History, 11th–14th Centuries* (Albany, NY 1988), pp. 97-129. Lambton and Ostrowski both question the association of *iqta* with feudalism.

[43] Endicott-West, *Mongolian Rule in China*; Ibid., "Hereditary Privilege in the Yüan Dynasty," *Journal of Turkish Studies* 9 (1985), pp. 15-20; Ibid., "Imperial Governance in Yüan Times," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 46:2 (1986), pp. 523-549; Ibid., "The Yüan Government and Society," in Herbert Franke, Denis Twitchett, eds., *The Cambridge History of China. Volume 6: Alien regimes and border states 907-1368* (Cambridge, England, 1994), pp. 587-615; Ibid., "Aspects of Khitan Liao and Mongolian Yüan Imperial Rule: A Comparative Perspective," in Gary Seaman and Daniel Marks, eds. *Rulers from the Steppe: State Formation on the Eurasian Periphery* (Los Angeles, 1991), pp. 199-222; Uli Schamiloglu, "The Qaraci Beys of the Later Golden Horde: Notes on the Organization of the Mongol World Empire," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 4 (1984), pp. 283-297; and Ibid., "Tribal Politics and Social Organization in the Golden Horde," PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 1986.

[44] S. N. Grupper, "A Barulas Family Narrative in the *Yüan Shih*: Some Neglected Prosopographical and Institutional Sources on Timurid Origins," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 8 (1992-1994), pp. 11-97, quotation p. 45.

[45] Beatrice Forbes Manz, "Administration and the Delegation of Authority in Timür's Dominion," *Central Asiatic Journal* 20:3 (1976), pp. 191-207; and Ibid., "The Office of *darugha* under Tamerlane," *Journal of Turkish Studies* 9 (1985), pp. 59-69.

[46] V. V. Trepavlov, "Sopravitel'stvo v Mongol'skoi imperii (XIII v.)," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevii* 7 (1987-1991), pp. 249-278; and ibid., *Gosudarstvennyi stroi Mongol'skoi imperii XIII v. Problema istoricheskoi preemstvennosti* (Moscow, 1996), pp. 76-102.

[47] Denis Sinor, "The Making of a Great Khan," in Barbara Kellner-Heinkele, ed., *Altaica Berolinensia. The Concept of Sovereignty in the Altaic World* (Asiatische Forschungen, Band 126; Wiesbaden, 1993), pp. 241-258.

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Mongol Empire, the Golden Horde, or the Horde's relationships with the East Slavic principalities.[48] When a Riurikid vassal of the Horde Khan allocated appanages to his sons, this relationship might constitute subinfeudation. When the Khans of the Horde sent joint Russo-Tatar expeditions against Lithuania, Hungary or Poland in the thirteenth century, they might have been fulfilling the obligation of a feudal overlord to protect his vassals, rather than "bleeding" East-Slavic strength to weaken their recalcitrant subjects.[49] Indeed, the *Skazanie o Mamaevom pobishche* and the "Tale of the Battle on the river Vorskla" projected a clear conception of the right of the khan of the Golden Horde (or his surrogate) to invest with the principality of Moscow or its components anyone he chose.[50]

Problems of Christian providentialism, historical causality, and political theory underlie the conundrum of the East Slavic response to the Mongol conquest. The three chronicle accounts of the Mongol campaigns of 1237-1238 and 1239-1240 described the Tatars as "taking" (*vziati*) and "plundering" (*pleniti*) towns and principalities. The verb *pleniti* must be translated as "to plunder" or "to capture" rather than "to conquer."[51] There is no alternative. It is logically inconceivable for *pleniti* to mean "to conquer" if Nevrui and his Tatars *plenili* the Northeast under Nevskii, in 1327 Chol-khan and Uzbek intended *pleniti* Tver', Mamai meant *pleniti* the Russian Land in 1380, Tokhtamysh in 1382, Edigei in 1408, and even Akhmat in 1480.[52] The Tatars cannot still have intended to "conquer" Rus' if they have already "conquered" Rus'. Every "conquest" was not immediately followed by a successful revolt, all of which have somehow escaped recording in the chronicles.[53] It is certainly true that

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[48] Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, pp. 45-47, 88, although skeptical about "feudalism," nevertheless describes the Mongol Empire and the Qipchak Khanate as decentralized, not despotic. There are still adherents of the older view: Thomas J. Barfield, *The Nomadic Alternative* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ 1993), p. 160, categorized the Mongol Empire as the exception among steppe polities, not an imperial confederacy, but an imperial autocracy.

[49] Cf. V. L. Egorov, Istoricheskaia geografiia Zolotoi Ordy v XIII-XIV vv. (Moscow, 1985), pp. 187-192.

[50] M. N. Tikhomirov, ed. *Povesti o Kulikovskoi bitvy* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1959), pp. 44-46; Halperin, "The Russian Land and the Russian Tsar," p. 52.

[51] Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 35-47, despite Gail Lenhoff, *Early Russian Historiography: The Lives of Prince Fedor the Black* (Berlin 1997), facing text (even numbered pages) and translation (odd numbered pages), pp. 216/217, 220/221, 282/283, 304/305 (although literal translation would mar the literary quality of the translation). The Zenkovskys sometimes translate it as "conquer" (*The Nikonian Chronicle*, v. 3 p. 266), more often as "occupy" (v. 2 p. 313) or "capture" (v. 2 p. 323), depending upon context. Although modern Russian *zavoevanie* means "conquest," medieval *voevati* should be translated literally as "to make war."

[52] Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 57 (Nevrui), 97-115 (Kulikovo cycle), 115-121 (Tokhtamysh), 130-135 (Edigei), 149-159 (Akhmat). Cf. Charles J. Halperin, "The Russian Land and the Russian Tsar: The Emergence of Muscovite Ideology, 1380-1408," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 23 (1976), pp. 7-103.

[53] Compare Korea: the Mongols installed *darugachi* after the initial (and insincere) Korean voluntary submission, but had to mobilize major campaigns for decades after the Koreans killed the *darugachi* when they "rebelled." See W. E. Henthorn, *Korea - The Mongol Invasions* (Leiden,

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when an army "takes" or "plunders" a city or principality, this could be a raid or the initiation of a conquest; but it is precisely this ambiguity which is at the center of the problem. Even texts written long after Batu's "campaign" (*nashestvie*) or "incursion" (*nakhozhdenie*) usually retained this deliberately ambiguous vocabulary; the "Tale of the Destruction of Riazan' by Batu" is one case in point.[54] Clearly the East Slavic bookmen who authored and redacted these texts in later decades chose their vocabulary deliberately.[55]

During incremental conquests, of China or Central Asia, the Mongols did appoint governors and assign garrisons to conquered cities at the time of conquest.[56] But during the sweeping Russian campaign the Mongol armies had to adhere to a rigid schedule and did not take, or did not have, the time to install a political apparatus.[57] All references in the sources to governors or Tatar officials imposed on Vladimir-Suzdalia or Kiev in 1237-1240 seem to be anachronisms.[58] Assuming that the Mongol armies came, slew and left, did the

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1963). Cities in north China changed hands often while the Mongols decided to conquer, rather than raid, and even thereafter. See H. Desmond Martin, *The Rise of Chingis Khan and his Conquest of North China* (Baltimore, 1950).

[54] Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 39-43.

[55] N. S. Borisov, *Ivan Kalita* (2nd ed., Moscow, 1997), pp. 89, 152-154 argues that the East Slavs viewed their conquest by the Tatars through the prism of the Slavonic translation of Josephus Flavius' history of the conquest of Jerusalem by the Romans. N. A. Meshcherskii, *Istoriia Iudeiskoi voiny Iosifa Flaviia v drevnerusskom perevode* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1958), pp. 97-115, dated the text to the pre-Mongol period, although its oldest manuscript comes from the fifteenth century. Francis J. Thomson, "'Made in Russia': A Survey of Translations Allegedly Made in Kievan Russia," in Gerhard Birkenfellner, ed. *Millennium Russiae Christianae. Tausend Jahre Christliches Rußland 988-1988* (Schriften des Komitees der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zur Förderung der Slawischen Studien, Band 16; Köln-Weimar-Wien, 1993), pp. 340-341, expresses great skepticism that this translation was done in Kievan Rus'. However, the translation could still have been done before 1223 and would therefore have been available to East Slavic bookmen when the Tatars arrived. The Slavonic text utilized the vocabulary of *plenenie* (its title in Slavonic) and *vziatie* (Meshcherskii, pp. 180, 326, 331,432,433, 436,463) [page references are no more than illustrative, not comprehensive] and *rabota* (Meshcherskii, pp. 264, 342, 384); however, it also manifested a much more articulated consciousness of Roman sovereignty, employing *vlast'*, *pokoriti*, and *tsesarstvovati* with great frequency (Meshcherskii, pp. 167, 185, 200, 246, 276-277, 300, 31, 379, 385, 441, 459, 461). The concepts of slavery, conquest, and captivity overlap historically and metaphorically in this text in a fascinating kaleidoscope far more subtle and complex than anything written about Russo-Tatar relations.

[56] Paul D. Buell, "Sino-Khitan Administration in Mongol Bukhara," *Journal of Asian History* 13 (1979), p. 131.

[57] Nor would the Mongols have stationed garrisons in the Russian forest zone, when its cities were so easily accessible from the steppe.

[58] Only the Nikon Chronicle redaction of the description of the seizure of Kiev mentioned the installation of *voevody* there after its sack; only the Nikon Chronicle redaction of the vita of Mikhail of Chernigov referred to *namestniki i vlasteli* in Kiev and Chernigov. In both cases the use of native terms, rather than *baskaki*, is in and of itself suspicious. Therefore I am skeptical of Donald Ostrowski, "The *Tamma* and the Dual-Administrative Structure of the Mongol Empire," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 61(1998), pp. 262-277, that *baskaki* or *darugi* were appointed in Rus' in 1240. [My thanks to Donald Ostrowski for a preprint of this article.] Ostrowski relies upon the chronologically contaminated paragraph 274 of the "Secret History of the Mongols," supposedly *sub anno* 1229 (*sic re* the imposition of administrators over

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East Slavs know that they were coming back, that Russia had been conquered, not merely raided? Or did the "yoke" not begin until several years later, when Riurikid princes start traveling to the Horde to receive *yarliki*, a practice the chronicles do not relate to the "campaigns" of 1237-1240?[59]

There can be no doubt that Russia was conquered[60]; when the Tatars returned, they sent census-takers and envoys, not armies of conquest, to the East Slavic princes and cities, including Novgorod. Punitive expeditions followed acts which the Tatars saw as rebellion, disobedience by already conquered regions. The East Slavs knew the difference between alliances among Riurikids and Polovtsian princes on the one hand, and the subordination of the East Slavs to the Mongol khans on the other. Tribute (*vykhod* or *dan'*) would not have been confused with bribes or ransom (*okŭp'*). The indirectness of Mongol rule did not ameliorate the burden of Mongol rule. Thomas Allsen has noted that areas administered directly by the Tatars and areas left in the hands of native dynasties owed exactly the same obligations to the Mongol Empire.[61] The decision of the Mongols to remain in the steppe and leave the East Slavic infrastructure in place should not obscure the facts of Mongol rule: bureaucrats from the Mongol Empire conducted the census, Tatar *baskaki* resided in East Slavic cities, and the Khan of the Volga Horde exercised the right to adjudicate disputes over princely succession, to exempt the Orthodox Church from taxation, and to grant Novgorod merchants customs-free passage through

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the East Slavs). More broadly, I am dubious that the "Secret History," a work more of myth, legend, epic, and folklore than history, can sustain the kind of textual analysis of administrative terminology to which Ostrowski submits it. On the "Secret History" see the revisionist series of articles by Larry Moses: "Triplicated Triplets: The Number Nine in the *Secret History of the Mongols*," *Asian Folklore Studies* 45 (1986), pp. 287-294; "The Quarreling Sons in the *Secret History of the Mongols*" *Journal of American Folklore* 100:395 (1987), pp. 63-68; "Epic Themes in the 'Secret History of the Mongols'," *Folklore* 99 (1988), pp. 170-173; "Legends by the Numbers: The Symbolism of Numbers in the *Secret History of the Mongols*" *Asian Folklore Studies* 55(1996), pp. 73-97; and "Motifs of Class, Status, and Unity in the *Secret History of the Mongols*," *Eurasian Studies Yearbook* 68 (1996), pp. 97-118.

[59] Cf L. N. Gumilev, *Drevniaia Rus' i Velikaia Step'* (Moscow, 1992), who argued that the East Slavs were not "conquered" (*podchinena, pokorena*) at all, the Mongols never intended to conquer them, grand prince Iaroslav's "submission" was an alliance, the apportionment of *iarlyki* was purely sumbolic, and other equally dubious assertions (pp. 14 n. 1, 344, 355 n. 336, 418-419 [contradicting his earlier equation of Mongol policy toward Poland and *Rus'*], 464), despite Bruno Daarden, "'I am a genuis, but no more than that': Lev Gumilev, Ethnogenesis, the Russian Past and World History," Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, N.F. 44:1 (1996), pp. 62-68.

[60] Cf. Janet Martin, *Medieval Russia 980-1584* (Cambridge, England, 1995), p. 147 describing the situation after 1237-1240: "Nevertheless, the invasions of the Rus' lands, although not followed immediately by any formal treaty or Mongol occupation, constituted *for practical purposes* [my emphasis-CJH] a conquest."

[61] Thomas T. Allsen, "The Yüan Dynasty and the Uighurs of Turfan in the 13th century," in Morris Rossabi, ed. *China among Equals: the Middle Kingdom and its Neighbors, 10th–14th centuries* (Berkeley, 1983), pp. 243-245; Thomas T. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism: The Policies of the Grand Qan Mongke in China, Russia, and the Islamic Lands, 1251-1259* (Berkeley, 1987), pp. 63-76.

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Vladimir-Suzdalia.[62] The East Slavs definitely did not enjoy "autonomy" under indirect Mongol rule.

It is quite implausible that the East Slavs did not know that the Mongol seizure of their cities in 1237-1240 differed from the Polovtsian looting of Kiev in 1203.[63] The East Slavs did not lack[64] the conceptual skills to articulate a consciousness of Mongol conquest, and they definitely understood, knew and expressed a consciousness of Tatar sovereignty.[65] However, the evidence of that consciousness testifies to that very same ambiguity reflected in the narratives of 1237-1240. It was, after all, the chroniclers who recorded the trips of the Riurikid princes to "the Tatars" and the arrival of census-takers, tax-collectors, administrators, and envoys from the Horde. No chronicler ever explained the appearance of these officials as a result of Mongol conquest; Tatar "raids" or punitive expeditions were attributed to Tatar malevolence or Riurikid feuding, not Tatar rule. This reticence is reincarnated in modem discussions of Tatar rule as no more than a prolonged series of acts of extortion.

But the bookmen did not completely hide the "big picture" from their writings. In the thirteenth century, Daniil of Halicz-Volhynia was criticized by his chronicler for becoming the *kholop* of the Tatars and paying tribute (*dan'*)[66] The *vita* of Aleksandr Nevskii conceded that Batu has "conquered" (*pokoril*) many lands, and that Nevskii did pay him homage. (The text neglected to mention that Rus' was among the "lands" already conquered and that Nevskii's father, grand prince Yaroslav, had already submitted to Batu.)[67] In the fourteenth century, the *vita* of Mikhail of Chernigov explained that since that prince lived on the "land of the khan (*zemli kanove*)," he had to "bow" to Batu. Mikhail of Chernigov was said to have quoted St. Paul to the effect that God had granted authority (*vlast'*), i.e. sovereignty, over Chernigov, to Batu. According to this text, the Tatars "sat" (*osadisha*) in the East Slavic cities, took a census, and collected tribute.[68] This probably fanciful extrapolation from later history employed a very concrete term of East-Slavic political vocabulary: for a prince "to sit" in a city is to assume rule there. In 1327, according to a Tverian account, Chol-khan wanted "to sit" in Tver', although he also intended "to take" and "to plunder" it.[69] Even these fictitious motives are very suggestive.

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[62] *Gramoty Velikogo Novgoroda i Pskova*, #30, p. 57.

[63] Led by a Riurikid, of course, Riurik Rostislavovich. Cf. *PSRL* I (Moscow, 1962), p. 467 (1237-1238), after the Mongols *plenisha* the city of Vladimir, Yaroslav Vsevolodovich came to "sit" there; the chronicler observed that "with his strong hand" God had rescued the Christians from the godless Tatars. Nietsche, "Mongolensturm und Mongolenherrschaft in Rußland," p. 69, interprets this phrase to mean that the East Slavs hoped that the Tatars would not return (which would contradict translating *pleniti* as "to conquer"). The phrase was probably no more than an expression of relief by the survivors of the Mongol siege and storming of the city.

[64] Cf. Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, pp. 146-148.

[65] In my earlier discussions I failed to appreciate this point.

[66] Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 53-56.

[67] Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 56-61.

[68] Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 47-48.

[69] Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 85-92. Note that Choi khan failed.

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In the fourteenth century, a Muscovite spokesman at the Horde supposedly made a speech in which he accused Olgerd of wanting to harm the *tsarev ulus*, the *ulus* of the khan, an admission that Vladimir-Suzdalia was ruled by the Khan of the Horde. Russian princes were described as the *ulusniki* of the Khan in the *Skazanie o Mamaevom poboishche*; Moscow was called the *ulus* of Tokhtamysh in the tale of its sack in 1382; in 1409 Edigei ostensibly described Rus' as the *tsarev ulus* in his "epistle." In the debates over succession to the Vladimir Grand Principality in the Horde in 1432, *boyar* Ivan Vsevolozhskii's repeated this assertion and categorized Vasilii II as the *kholop* of the Khan. Ivan III even tried to dissuade Akhmat from assaulting his own ulus in 1480.[70] Whether or not the East Slavic principalities were indeed integrated into the Juchid *ulus*,[71] the use of this terminology is very telling. Note that on the whole it was employed to persuade the Khan to accommodate Russian interests.[72]

The right to issue coinage was a regalian prerogative in the Middle Ages. The first Muscovite coins, minted during the reign of Dmitrii Donskoi, contained the name of the Khan, Tokhtamysh, and an Arabic inscription. Fedorov-Davydov argues that Moscow had to include the name of the khan as a special sign of subservience, because Moscow constituted the grand principality and thus served as intermediary to the Horde; other coinage bore only illegible scribbles representing Arabic inscriptions. Fedorov-Davydov goes so far as to suggest that a Riurikid prince needed permission from the Khan to issue

[70] On these and additional references, see Halperin, "*Tsarev ulus*,"*passim*.

[71] Egorov, *Istoricheskaia geografiia*, p. 30, concluded that the East Slavic principalities were not part of the "*sobstvenno Zolotoi Orde* (Golden Horde properly speaking);" they were semi-dependent tribute-paying lands. The "semi-dependent" is too generous. The Mongols did not organize their world empire for the convenience of modern scholars. On the anomalous position of Tibet under the Yüan, see Farquhar, pp. 153-157, and Luciano Pelech, *Central Tibet and the Mongols. The Yüan-Sa-skya Period of Tibetan History* (Rome, 1990). On that of Korea see Farquhar, pp. 399-400, and Buell, p. 48 n. 68. Armenia and George both owed military service to the Ilkhanids and Armenian and Georgian military units were "not merely included" but "integrated into the Ilkhanid armies," despite the fact that Armenia was "merely tributary" to the Ilkhans but Georgia was "fiscally incorporated" into the Ilkhanid state, another anomaly; see A. P. Martinez, "Some Notes on the Ilkhanid Army," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 6 (1986) [1988], pp. 149-150,151. There is no simple formula which conceptualizes the relationship of the East Slavic lands in the Juchid *ulus*. Mustafa Kafali, *Alten Orda Hanliğinin Kurulus ve Yükselis Devirleri* (Istanbul, 1976) and István Vásáry, *Az Arany Horda* (Budapest, 1986) may discuss this theme but are linguistically inaccessible to me.

[72] Russia would have been part of the original *inju* ("patrimony) of Juchi, but once the Golden Horde had been established, grants of *inju* to its khan (= royal domain) or Mongol princes and notables (= appanages) would only have been made of steppe land, where herds could nomadize, not East Slavic forest land. For definitions of this term see George Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia* (= George Vernadsky and Michael Karpovich, *A History of Russia*, vol. IV; New Haven, 1953), pp. 122-123; Lambton, *Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia*, p. 356; and Paul D. Buell, "Kalmyk Tanggaci people: thoughts on the mechanics and impact of Mongol expansion," *Mongolian Studies* 6 (1980), p. 47 n. 62. For a reference to *inge begi* in the Golden Horde, see Berthold Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde. Die Mongolen in Rußland* (2nd ed.; Wiesbaden, 1965), pp. 293-294. My thanks to Larry W. Moses for discussion of this point.

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coinage.[73] There can be no doubt, despite Kulikovo, that the Riurikid princes, their *boyars*, the artisans who minted the coins, and the merchants and anyone else who used them, whether they read Arabic or not, understood the significance of the name, slogan, and pictorial representation of the khan, or even the squiggles, on the coins in terms of Tatar sovereignty.[74]

Therefore, the omission of a simple sentence or even clause in the earliest East Slavic tales of 1237-1240, or, even more so, in later versions, that the Tatars *pokorili* Rus' or started *vladeli* Rus', must be considered significant; the bookmen had the means to do so.[75]

When the Muscovites sought "emancipation from the Tatar Yoke," they could hardly phrase their ambitions in those terms, since the term "the Tatar Yoke" did not yet exist, and the narratives of 1237-1240 had not described a political situation from which to be "emancipated."[76] The Kulikovo cycle, notwithstanding nearly all scholarship, contained no hint of anything other than a defeat of Mamai, a prince (emir), not even a legitimate Chinggisid khan. Indeed, the Short Redaction of the Chronicle Tale ended with Khan Tokhtamysh sending envoys to the Riurikid princes, announcing that he had

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[73] G. A. Fedorov-Davydov, *Monety Moskovskoi Rusi* (*Moskva v bor'be za nezavisimoe i tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva*) (Moscow, 1981); Ibid., *Monety Nizhegorodskogo kniazhestva* (Moscow, 1989), p. 154 on Horde permission. However, cf. A. V. Chernetsov, *Types of Russian Coins of the XIV and XV centuries. An Iconographic Study*, tr. H. Barlett Wells (BAR International Series, No. 167; Oxford, 1983), pp. 1, 25-27, 31-33, 63-64, 116, 129-130, 161. For a lucid summary of Fedorov-Davydov's analysis see Noonan, pp. 495-496, 500-505, 507-509. 512-513. Novgorodian (from 1420) and Pskovian (from 1425) coins bore no Arabic inscriptions; neither did Tverian coins (starting 1399-1425), with one fascinating exception (see below). Riazan' coins were almost entirely overstruck Horde coins. On bi-religious Georgian coins under the Ilkhanids, see A. P. Martinez, "*The Third Portion of the History of Gazan Xan in Rašidu 'd-Din's Ta 'xrix-e Mobarak-e Gazani*," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 8 (1992-1994), p. 107 n. 10.

[74] Michael Cherniavsky, "Khan or Basileus: An Aspect of Russian Mediaeval Political Theory," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 20 (1959), pp. 468-470 [rpt in Michael Cherniavsky, ed., *The Structure of Russian History. Interpretive Essays* (New York, 1970), pp. 69-71], initiated modern study of this numismatic iconography.

[75] Such emendations were few and far between and very late: According to the Nikon Chronicle, the Tatars offered to spare Kiev in 1240 if the city *pokorilisia* (Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, p. 46). Seventeenth-century redactions of the *Povest' o razorenii Riazani Batyem* employed *vladeti* and *pokoriti* (Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, p. 43). Cf. the conclusion of the Slavonic version of the tale of the Fourth Crusade: "And thus perished the *tsarstvo* of the God-protected city of Constantine and the Greek Land in the quarrel of the emperors (*tsari*), which the Franks rule (*obladeiut*) [my emphasis-CJH]." *NPL*, pp. 245-246. My sincerest thanks to Paul Bushkovitch for calling this passage to my attention.

[76] The combination of the recalcitrance of the East Slavic chronicles and the anachronism of the term "the Tatar Yoke" led John Fennell to some interesting circumlocutions. After describing the Tatar invasions of 1237-1240, Fennell concluded that "the so-called Tatar Yoke had begun" (Fennell, *The Crisis of Medieval Russia*, p. 84); yet lambasting Nevskii's role in the Tatar punitive expedition of 1252, he then continued: "The so-called 'Tatar Yoke' [N.B. Fennell's introduction of quotation marks – CJH] began not so much with Baty's invasion of Russia as with Aleksandr's betrayal of his brothers" (*Ibid.*, p. 108), and wound up further diluting the concept, referring to "the so-called 'yoke' imposed by the Tatars" (Ibid., p. 162).

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defeated his enemy and their's, Mamai, and the Muscovites sending "gifts" to Tokhtamysh. There is no possible way to interpret these sources as claiming Russian liberation from the Tatar Yoke. Indeed, according to the *Skazanie o Mamaevom poboishche*, Mamai intended *vladeti* Rus' and *sideti* in its cities, but failed, as if his were a new dispensation of Russo-Tatar relations.[77]

Donskoi certainly had ambitions. In 1375 he compelled the Tverian grand prince to coordinate payment of tribute.[78] In his 1389 testament he allowed for the possibility of not paying the tribute, and re-allocated its revenues accordingly.[79] Certainly tribute payment was a manifestation of Tatar rule, but note well the understated expression of this aspiration. Donskoi wondered if God would change the Horde, not the Horde's *vlast'*. There is no way to infer whether termination of tribute payment in 1375 or 1389 was understood as temporary maneuvering or a permanent change. Donskoi's formulation seems modest and ambiguous.[80]

In 1480, no text raised the issue of Russian liberation from the Tatar Yoke Akhmat's wish to plunder Rus' fails, and that is all. Vassian's attempt to undermine Chinggisid legitimacy represented a minority opinion within the Church, and found no resonance in other texts.[81] The most ambitious political statement which Ivan III made in this regard, following Cherniavsky, was the issuance of coinage replacing the name of the khan with his own, .n Arabic.[82]

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[77] Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, p. 108. However, these texts did evince a clear conception that Russia's relationship with the Tatars began with Batu. On this image of Batu, see Halperin, "The Defeat and Death of Batu," especially pp. 50-54.

[78] *Dukhovnye i dogovornye gramoty velikikh i udel'nykh kniazei XIV-XVI vv.* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1950), #9, pp. 25-28, here p. 26.

[79] *Ibid.*, #12, pp. 33-37, here p. 36. On the passage in Semen Ivanovich's testament that the "light not go out," better interpreted as concern over the Black Death than the Tatar Yoke, see now Borisov, *Russkaia tserkov'*, pp. 70-71, who relates it to the Orthodox symbolism of light, the cult of the *Bogoroditsa*, the *Akathistos* hymn, frescoes, and miniatures, which removes it even more from the Tatars.

[80] Johannes Schiltberger, *The Bondage and Travels of Johannes Schiltberger a Native of Bavaria, in Europe, Asia and Africa, 1396-1427* (tr. John Buchan Telfer. Hakluyt Society Works, Series I, NO. 58; London, 1879), wrote that the "Kingdom of the Rewschen" was "tributary to the Tatar king," this clearly after Kulikovo. Cf. A. A. Gorskii, "Moskovsko-ordynskii konflikt nachala 80-kh godov XIV veka: prichiny, osobennosti, rezul'taty," *Otechestvennaia istoriia* 1998 no. 4, pp. 15-24.

[81] Now see A. A. Gorskii, "O vremeni i obstoiatel'stvakh osvobozhdeniia Moskvy ot vlasti Ordy," *Voprosy istorii* 1997 no. 5, pp. 21-37.

[82] G. V. Fedorov, "Muskovskie den'gi Ivana III i Vasiliia III," *Kratkie soobshcheniia o dokladakh i polevykh issledovaniiakh Instituta istorii material'noi kul'tury AN SSSR*, 30 (1949), pp. 71-72 dates the Muscovite coins with *Iban* to the 1480s, despite arguing that they were issued in honor of the 1487 installation of a puppet khan in Kazan', in or near which all the coins were found. (Jaroslaw Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan. Conquest and Imperial Ideology (1438-1560s)* [The Hague-Paris, 1973], pp. 28-29, discusses Muscovite-Kazani political relations in 1487 but does not mention Ivan III's Arabic coins.) Fedorov dated the coins reading "this is a Moscow *denga*" in Arabic to "the end of the reign" of Ivan III, again for use in Kazan'. He also wrote that under Ivan III all Arabic inscriptions were removed from Muscovite coinage except those indicating

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After the liquidation of the Great Horde, one might expect retrospective rewriting of the sources about 1380 or 1480 to broach, however tentatively, more theoretical reinterpretations of those events. But it must be remembered that the Muscovites humored the aspirations of the Crimean Horde to succession to the sovereign rights of the Great/Golden Horde,[83] delivering to Crimea "gifts" which the Muscovite diplomats knew were received as tribute. The Muscovite need to deal not only with the Crimea, but also Kazan', Astrakhan', the Nogais, and the serving Kasimov khanate also dictated that bishop Vassian's attempt to impugn Chinggisid legitimacy could not be followed: it would have seriously undermined the nexus of diplomatic and political relations of Muscovy and the steppe.[84]

It would not be until the middle of the sixteenth century that Muscovy felt sufficiently assured, militarily and politically, for someone to venture to rewrite 1480. In the 1530s or so, the Nikon Chronicle's depiction of the battle of Kulikovo noted that Batu "conquered" [sic] (*plenil*)) and "ruled" (*vladet*) the entire *russkuiu zemliu*; Mamai "ruled" the Horde and wanted to imitate Batu, but he failed.[85] This interpolation implied a sort of lifetime-only sovereignty over the East Slavs to Batu; however, there was no consistent application of such a concept by the Nikon Chronicle over the full course of Russo-Tatar relations. An epistle attributed to the priest Silvester mentioned the "Stand on the Ugra" as one of four major events in world history.[86] The *Kazanskaia*

Muscovite dominance over Kazan', enumerating both the Muscovite coins with *Iban* (p. 72) and those which read "this is a Moscow *denga*" (pp. 73-74). V. A. Kalinin, "Monety Ivana III s russko-tatarskimi legendami," *Trudy Gosudarstvennogo Ermitazha* t. 21, *Numismatika* 5 (1981), pp. 111-116, endorsed Fedorov's 1487 connection, but argued that more of the coins were found in Muscovy than in Kazan. Cherniavsky, p. 470 [rpt. pp. 70-71], accepted the 1480s dating of the *Iban* coins without discussing the Kazan' connection (noted by Robert M. Croskey, *Muscovite Diplomatic Practice in the Reign of Ivan III* [New York, 1987], p. 203 n. 37). Gustave Alef, *The Origins of Muscovite Autocracy. The Age of Ivan III* (*Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 39 [Berlin, 1986]), p. 83 n. 94, endorsed Cherniavsky's, not Fedorov's, interpretation of the *Iban* coins to 1480. See also Noonan, p. 505. Gorskii, "O vremeni...," does not mention the coins. Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, pp. 48, 166, attributes to 1480 the effect of ending Arabic inscriptions on Muscovite coins, which overlooks the *Iban* and "this is a Moscow *denga*" coins. Neither Cherniavsky nor Klug mention a Tverian coin from grand prince Mikhail Borisovich (1461-1486), which, uniquely among Tverian coins, bears an Arabic inscription: the name of the Tverian grand prince. Chernetsov, pp. 332, 129-130, quoting A. V. Oreshnikov, *Russkie monety do 1547* (Moscow, Istoricheskii muzei; Opisanie pamiatnikov, t. 1; 1896), p. 52, #320. The Arabic inscription was deciphered by Baron V. G. Tizengauzen (Tiesenhausen). (Same pagination and enumeration in the 1996 Moscow reprint of this volume.)

[83] For an affirmation of the legitimacy of this continuity and an evaluation of the historiography of Russo-Tatar relations, see Leslie Collins, "On the alleged 'destruction' of the Great Horde in 1502," in A. Bryer, M. Urșinus, eds., *Manzikert to Lepanto: the Byzantine World and the Turks, 1071-1571* (Amsterdam, 1991 = *Byzantinische Forschungen* 16), pp. 361-399.

[84] For a different interpretation of the attitudes of Church and Court to the Tatars from 1448 to 1559, see Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, pp. 135-248.

[85] *The Nikonian Chronicle*, v. 3, p. 266.

[86] Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 160-161.

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istoriia finally periodized Tatar rule, *vlast'* and *pokorenie*, from Batu to 1480, although in the process it conflated the "Stand on the Ugra," the death of Akhmat, and the destruction of the Great Horde in 1502. The "freedom" from "slavery" to which the text alluded subsumed both religious and political connotations.[87] Neither source represented official Muscovite ideology. The *Stepennaia kniga*, with its emphasis upon dynastic continuity, retreated into a largely metaphorical description of Tatar "slavery." By and large, mid sixteenth century Muscovite rewriting of Russo-Tatar relations dismissed most realia of Tatar rule as obsolete "customs" (*obychai*) from which the new tsardom was by definition immune.[88]

In conclusion, there is something different, unique, idiosyncratic and significant about the East Slavic response to the Mongol conquest; the ambivalence and ambiguity with which concepts of Tatar suzerainty or its termination were or were not applied,[89] do distinguish the East Slavic sources from those of other sedentary civilizations conquered by the Mongols.[90] Thomas Allsen's observation about the parochialism of the depiction of the 1250s in the East Slavic chronicles, "On the basis of these sources alone, it is not at all

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[87] Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 161-165. *Obrok* (pp. 162, 164) should be translated here as quitrent, the dues in kind and money owed by a peasant to his landlord, which is still socially demeaning.

[88] Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 172-174. *Die Erzählung über Petr Ordynskij*, pp. 252-253 (text and German translation), the Vita redaction, dated c. 1600, states that bishop Kirill of Rostov went to the Orda "*v to bo vremia kniazhenie Rostovskoe pod" oblastiiu tsarei tekh biashe* (because at that time the Rostov principality was in the region [translated as: Herrschaft = *vlast'iu*] of the tsars [khans]," a borrowed formulation.

[89] A. I. Pliguzov, in the "*Prilozheniia*" to Fennel, *Krizis srednevekovoi Rusi*, p. 270, citing Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, describes the "silence" of the East Slavic sources for the 13th century, which knew more than they wrote and had not yet developed a paradigm of a "yoke" to describe Russo-Tatar relations, but he suggests that this phenomenon ended with 1380. Some appreciation for the lack of explicit repudiations of Horde sovereignty in the "anti-Tatar" sources of the time can be found in A. A. Gorskii, "Politicheskaia bor'ba na Rusi v nachale XIV v. i moskovsko-ordynskie otnosheniia," *Russia Mediaevalis* 7:1 (1992), pp. 88-111 and Ibid., "Moskva, Tver' i Orda v 1300-1339 godakh," *Voprosy istorii* 1995 no. 4, pp. 34-46.

[90] The closest analogy to the situation of the East Slavs might be the Armenians, another Christian society which was conquered by "infidels" but retained its political infrastructure under the Ilkhanids. But the Armenians, who had previously been conquered by various non-Christians, had no conceptual difficulty in admitting that the Mongols had "conquered" them. See Robert Blake and Richard Frye, "The History of the Nation of Archers (Mongols) by Grigor of Akanc," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* XIII: 3-4 (December, 1949), p. 297. Georgia had a similar history and experience under the Ilkhanids. The Georgian Royal Annalist explicitly translated Mongol rule as a "conquest" which made the khans the "sovereign" lords over Georgia with the right to invest its dynasts and require tribute and military service; see *Histoire de la Georgia depuis l'antiquité jusqu'au XIXè siècle, traduite du georgien par M. Brosset*, v. I *Histoire anciénne jusqu'en 1469 de J.* (St. Petersburg, 1849), pp. 512-517, 523, 534-535, 563-564, 589, 607, 607, 612, 643, 628, 638-639, 646, despite which C. Toumanoff, "Armenia and Georgia," *Cambridge Medieval History* v. IV pt. 1 (Cambridge, England, 1966), pp. 625-627, concluded that the Mongols left Georgia "autonomous." Cf. Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation* (Bloomington, IN - Stanford, CA 1988), pp. 40-41, 44.

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apparent that the Rus principalities were part of a much larger political entity stretching from Korea to Asia Minor,"[91] is only the tip of the iceberg. A strong case can be made that the very ambiguity in the sources about the relationship between Tatar sovereignty and its realia, between de jure and de facto, is at the root of scholarly disputes over the date at which the "Tatar Yoke" ended.[92] The only reason historians can debate whether Tatar rule ended in 1380, or with the establishment of the serving khanate of Kasimov, or 1480, or any other date, is that the East Slavic sources did not say what historians expect them to have said. Their intellectual failure to employ terms of sovereignty, except grudgingly and late, in describing the Mongol conquest, or, when using such concepts, their logical failure to connect that development with the Mongol campaigns of conquest, was a large element of their response to that conquest, almost raising denial to an ideological level, a phenomenon not yet fully appreciated or understood in scholarship.

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[91] Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, p. 16. Cf. the conclusion of Sh. B. Chimitdorzhiev, "Russikie letopisi kak istochnik po istorii srednevekovykh mongolov," in *Srednevekovaia kul'tura mongol'skikh narodov. Sbornik nauchnykh trudov* (Novosibirsk, 1992), p. 78, that the Russian chronicles contained less information on Russo-Mongol economic and cultural ties than on political relations. Even he concedes (p. 77) that most cultural exchange took place with the Golden Horde, not Mongolia.

[92] See Lawrence N. Langer, "The End of Mongol Rule in Medieval Rus'," paper, American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies Convention, Boston, November 15, 1996.

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MUSCOVITE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE 14TH CENTURY

The role of the Mongols in the rise of Moscow to a position of political preeminence in 14th-century Russia remains a sensitive and controversial topic in Russian historiography. Those scholars who have concluded that the Mongols did contribute to Moscow's ascension point to two primary areas of Mongol influence: first, the intervention of the Golden Horde (the anachronistic name for the Tatar state centered on the lower Volga river, now commonly described as the Qipchaq Khanate) in the political affairs of the East Slavic principalities;[1] and, second, Muscovite borrowing of Mongol institutions to enforce and expand its rule. Both considerations of Great Russian patriotism and a Europocentric aversion to "Asiatic barbarians" have greatly inhibited scholarly consideration of the merits of the case that the Mongols either altered the course of medieval Russian history or provided models for Muscovy's political order.

Recently, Donald Ostrowski has advanced new and ambitious conclusions about the extent of Muscovite borrowing of Mongol institutions.[2] Although admitting that there is no direct evidence to corroborate his theory,[3] nevertheless he argues forcefully that the 14th century represents a major institutional rift in Muscovy's development, a rift in which Muscovy turned overwhelmingly to Mongol rather than Kievan or Byzantine models on which to construct a new political structure. Muscovite institutional borrowing from the Mongols was so pervasive, Ostrowski implies, that the secular Muscovite court saw itself as a continuation of the Qipchaq Khanate. Furthermore, the secular court was so perceived by the Byzantine-influenced Muscovite Orthodox Church, which

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[1] The most recent, comprehensive argument for that role is John L. I. Fennell, *The Emergence of Moscow* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968).

[2] Donald Ostrowski, "The Mongol Origins of Muscovite Political Institutions," *Slavic Review 49*: 4 (Winter, 1990), 525-42; idem, "The Military Land Grant along the Muslim-Christian Frontier," *Russian History/Histoire Russe* 19: 1-4 (1992), 327-59; idem, *Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier*, 1304-1589 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); idem, "The *Tamma* and the Dual-Administrative Structure of the Mongol Empire," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 61: 2 (1998), 262-77; idem," City Names of the Western Steppe at the Time of the Mongol Invasion," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 61: 3 (1998), 465-75. My sincerest appreciation to Dr. Ostrowski for supplying pre-prints of the latter two articles, discussing these issues with me, and reading earlier drafts of this essay. He is in no way responsible for any remaining errors.

[3] Ostrowski, "The Mongol Origins," 526, 541, 542; Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, xiv.

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sought to replace Muscovy's Tatar ancestry with an invented virtual past of Byzantine Orthodox provenance, and even to eliminate Muscovite institutions of Tatar derivation.[4]

It is impossible within the confines of a single article to address the numerous issues raised by Ostrowski's research. This essay will analyze critically the evidence for a series of Ostrowski's assertions about the origin of Muscovite political and administrative institutions in the 14th century. If these theories are found unpersuasive, then Ostrowski's larger contentions about the relationship of the secular court to the Mongols and the perception of that relationship by the Church should lose some of their persuasive power.

There are serious methodological problems in evaluating the possible Mongol origin of Muscovite institutions beyond the meagerness of the sources on both sides of the steppe-sown frontier. Both Muscovite and Horde institutions may derive from multiple sources, the former from Kievan Rus', Byzantium and the pre-Mongol steppe, the latter from the eclectic common heritage of the world Mongol Empire or its successor states, especially the Mongol Ilkhanate with its Iranian and Islamic forms. Moreover, both Muscovite and Horde institutions might have evolved in response to changing circumstances. Finally, Muscovy might have adapted those Mongol practices it did assimilate, complicating identification of their steppe origin.

It was endemic on the medieval religious frontier not to admit consciously that one had borrowed institutions from conquered or conquering peoples of a different religion. This was true of Crusader Valencia in 13th-century Spain about Islamic Moorish institutions, of the Arab Umayyad dynasty from the 7th century or the Ottoman Empire from the 14th century about Byzantine institutions, and of the French Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem from the 12th century about Islamic institutions.[5] In general the most reliable evidence of the foreign origin of an institution was its name: calques or loan-words betray borrowed institutions even in the absence of admissions of borrowing, even, it must be added, when there is confusion or disagreement about the nature of the borrowed institution itself. In other cases sufficient credible and contemporary evidence about the institution substantiates the reality of borrowing. Despite the objections of hypersensitive Russian historians, there is a compelling case that Muscovy did indeed borrow a variety of Mongol political and administrative institutions, including the *tamga*, the seal for the customs tax as well as the tax itself; the *kazna*, the treasury; the *iam*, the postal system; *tarkhan*, grants of fiscal or judicial immunity; and *den'ga* for money. Muscovite bureaucratic practices, including the use of *stolbtsy*, scrolls to preserve documents, and perhaps some features of Muscovite bureaucratic jargon, may also derive from

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[4]Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, 143, 164-98 (especially 177, n. 57), 245-48.

[5] Charles J. Halperin, "The Ideology of Silence: Prejudice and Pragmatism on the Medieval Religious Frontier," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 26: 3 (July, 1984), 442-66.

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the Qipchaq Khanate, as well as selective legal practices such as *pravezh*, beating on the shins. Certainly Muscovite diplomatic norms for dealing with steppe states and peoples were modeled on Tatar ways. Finally, the Muscovites had no choice but to study Tatar military tactics and strategies, if only to survive by countering them in battle, but the Muscovites also copied Mongol weapons, armaments, horse equipage, and formations.[6] Assertions of Muscovite receptivity to Qipchaq Khanate models cannot be dismissed out of hand.

Yet Ostrowski advances far beyond the limits of these institutions in delineating Mongol influence. He sees a direct parallel between the organization of the central and provincial political institutions of Muscovy and the Qipchaq Khanate, embodied in matching organization charts which demonstrate that the two systems were "direct cognates."[7] According to Ostrowski, the Muscovite Boyar Council, the division of military and civilian authority which he calls"dual administration," the leading Muscovite military and diplomatic official (the *tysiatskii*), the head of the domestic court administration (the *dvorskii*), the provincial administrators (the *volosteli*) – all were direct imitations of the political and administrative structure of the Qipchaq Khanate. These institutions constituted the nerve-center of the Muscovite political establishment; if they were imports from the steppe, then the degree of Mongol influence on Muscovy dwarfs our previous estimates.

To demonstrate this putative congruity one must overcome the methodological obstacles previously enumerated. In no case here is the Muscovite administrative term a calque or loan-word from the Horde. Moreover, their Slavic names, pre-Mongol in origin, precisely conveyed their functions. In many cases we do not have sufficient evidence of what the Qipchaq Khanate practice was, making any projection of it onto Muscovy most speculative. Even granting that both Muscovite and Horde institutions evolved, to verify Muscovite borrowing one must amass clear evidence that at the time of its implementation, the Muscovite institution showed some, if not key, identities with its purported Mongol antecedent. It is the contention of this essay that Ostrowski has failed to supersede these problems and therefore that his case is not convincing.

* * *

The grand prince of Moscow ruled in conjunction with his boyars, whom he consulted in the Boyar Council, a "council of state" which evolved, according to Ostrowski, into the Boyar Duma (how and when, he does not specify). Ostrowski selected the term "Boyar Council" in preference to Boyar Duma in order to imply that the ruler had to consult with *all* boyars in council,

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[6] Charles J. Halperin, *Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 90-95.

[7] Ostrowski, "The Mongol Origins," 530, 531 (chart).

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not just a subset of boyars who were members of the Boyar Duma. (He intends the term "Boyar Council" to translate phrases like "all boyars" in the sources. A meeting of the Boyar Council might also have been called a "gathering" [*sobiranie*].[8] Ostrowski equates the Muscovite Boyar Council with the Council of four *ulusbeys* or *karachi beys* which assisted the Chingizid Khan of the Qipchaq Khanate and dominated its governance. Each *ulus bey* represented one of the four major clans of the Juchid ulus. This institution devolved into each of the successor states of the Qipchaq Khanate, namely the Crimea, Kazan', and Astrakhan' khanates, and even into the Muscovite-serving khanate of Kasimov. Ostrowski cites three texts to demonstrate that there were four boyar clans in Muscovy: the 1350-51 treaty between grand prince Semen Ivanovich and his brothers; the 1371 treaty between grand prince Dmitrii Donskoi and the Lithuanian grand prince Olgerd; and the 1375 Dmitrii Donskoi will. The 1371 and 1375 documents contained four boyar names as witnesses. The 1350-51 contained six, which Ostrowski explains away because three came from the same clan; therefore, four *clans* were represented.[9] By the end of the 14th century the Boyar Council had evolved; it now contained more than four boyars. Nevertheless, Ostrowski finds a vestige of the time when the Boyar Council had comprised only the heads of four clans in the late 15th-century account of the Milanese Barbieri, based upon the testimony of a Muscovite envoy from Ivan III, that four boyars predominated in the Council.[10]

The analogy of the Boyar Council and the *ulusbey* Council is not entirely new, but previously historians have done no more than make passing remarks about the possible parallel.[11] Ostrowski actually tries to substantiate the argument by focusing on the number of boyars. Implicitly the Boyar Council took shape before 1350-51, by which time it comprised either four boyars or representatives of four boyar clans, and this number remained stable until at least 1375. After that, vaguely in the last quarter of the 14th century, the membership size was expanded, for reasons Ostrowski does not explicate.

Ostrowski's analysis begs many broader questions about the Boyar Council which remain controversial. First, was there an *institution* comprised of the grand prince's counselors, or simply a ruler's habit of summoning whoever he chose, whenever he chose, to discuss whatever he chose? Second, if there was such an institution, did it include *all* the Muscovite boyars, or were there

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[8] Personal communication with Donald Ostrowski.

[9] However, Dr. Ostrowski informs me that upon reconsideration he has become skeptical of there construction of the names of the witnesses to this treaty.

[10] Ostrowski, "The Mongol Origins," 533; Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, 45-47.

[11] Mikhail G. Khudiakov, *Ocherki po istorii kazanskogo khanstva* (Kazan': Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1923; reprint Kazan', Fond TIAK, 1990), 188-90, 194-95; Jaroslaw Pelenski, *Muscovy and Kazan: Conquest and Imperial Ideology* (1438-1560s) (The Hague: Mouton, 1974), 54; idem, "State and Society in Muscovite Russia and the Mongol-Turkic System in the 16th Century," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 27 (1980), 162.

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different categories of boyars, some of whom held boyar rank only as an honorific title? Third, if there was such an institution, did it possess legal, constitutional, decision-making power, or was its authority purely consultative, resting on tradition and custom? There is no scholarly consensus on these issues.[12] Ostrowski's analysis bespeaks his positions in these debates, but only implicitly.

There is no disagreement about another salient point which Ostrowski does not confront directly. The term "Boyar Duma" (*boiarskaia duma*) does not appear in any Muscovite source, although its lexical elements ("boyar" and the verb "to think" [*dumati*]) are common enough. The earliest reference to the phrase might be in Giles Fletcher's 1591 travel account, although different historians have evaluated "*boarstua dumna*" differently.[13] Translating a generic phrase as vague as "all boyars" as "Boyar Council" might qualify as linguistic sleight of hand; it takes a very bold translation to transform a social description into a decision-making political institution.

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[12] Richard Hellie, "What Happened? How Did He Get Away With It? Ivan Grozny's Paranoia and the Problem of Institutional Constraints," *Russian History/Histoire Russe* 14: 1-4 (1987), 220 (counselors, no "council"); Nancy Shields Kollmann, "The Boyar Clan and Court Politics. The Founding of the Muscovite Political System," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 23: 1 (Jan.-Mar.1982), 5; idem, *Kinship and Politics: The Making of the Muscovite Political System, 1345-1547* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 8-18, especially 11-14; Robert O. Crummey, *Aristocrats and Servitors: The Boyar Elite in Russia, 1613-1689* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 3-4, 215-20 (traditional, informal, consultative Duma); Sergei N. Bogatyrev, "Blizhniaia Duma v tret'ei chetverti XVI veka. Chast' pervaia (1550-e gody)," *Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 1992* (Moscow: Nauka, 1993), 119-33, esp. 119-26; idem, "Blizhniaia Duma v tret'ei chetverti XVI veka. Chast' vtoraia (1560-1570)," *Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 1993* (Moscow: Nauka, 1995), 94-112; and idem, "Blizhniaia Duma v tret'ei chetverti XVI veka. Chast' tret'ia: 1571-1572. Zakliuchenie," *Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 1994* (Moscow: Nauka, 1996), 64-81, esp. 70-81 (criticizes all previous scholarship, especially notion of a "Duma" including all boyars). I have not yet seen Sergei N. Bogatyrev, "The Sovereign and His Counselors: The Ritual of Consultation in Muscovite Political Culture, 1350s-1570s," (Ph.D. diss., University of Helsinki, 1999) or idem, *The Sovereign and His Counselors: Ritualized Consultation in Muscovite Political Culture 1350s-1570s* (Suomalaissen Tiedeakatemian toimituksia. Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae, Humaniora series, vol. 307; Saarijervi: Gummerus, 2000). My thanks to Marshall Poe for all citations to Bogatyrev's work.

[13] Texts and variants: Lloyd E. Berry, ed., *The English Works of Giles Fletcher the Elder* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), 211; Lloyd E. Berry and Robert O. Crummey, eds., *Rude & Barbarous Kingdom. Russia in the Accounts of 16th-Century English Voyages* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 153; Richard Pipes and John V. A. Fine, eds., *Of the Russe Commonwealth by Giles Fletcher 1591. Facsimile edition with Variants* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 55 (of the facsimile, not the apparatus). Commentary: Vasilii O. Kliuchevskii, *Boiarskaia Duma drevnei Rusi*, 3rd ed. (Moscow, 1902; reprint: Moscow: Ladimir, 1994): 323, n.*; Crummey in *Rude & Barbarous Kingdom*, ed. Berry and Crummey, 153, n. 2; Gustave Alef, "The Origins of Muscovite Autocracy in the Age of Ivan III," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 39 (1986), 177 and n. 1 (Alef did not mention Kliuchevskii's comment, incorrectly cites Berry, ed., *The English Works*, as 221, and fails to indicate Pipes and Fine, cds., *Of the Russe Commonwealth*, 55 is to the facsimile; Bogaryrev, "Blizhniaia Duma..Chast' pervaia," 124-25.

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These considerations place Ostrowski's argument that the Boyar Council was borrowed from the Qipchaq Khanate into their proper historiographic context; we now proceed to the validity of that contention. Equating the Boyar Council and the Council of the four *ulusbeys* implies a social equivalence between Muscovy and the Qipchaq Khanate, specifically between the "clans" (*rody*) of Muscovite boyars and the "clans" of the Juchid ulus. However, the "clans" represented by the *ulusbeys* were not really "clans"; they were much more than "clans." Schamiloglu calls them "ruling tribes," which represented socio-political aggregates of clans united by a fictive genealogy typical of the steppe. For this reason, the Crimean Shirins had no necessary genealogical relationship to the Kazan' Shirins. These "tribes" were fluid and malleable.[14] This social foundation differs totally from the genuinely descent-based clans, in some cases lineages, of the Muscovite boyars, which lacked the social scope, totemic charisma, and political voluntarism of steppe clans. Labeling the Vel'iaminovs and the Shirins both "clans" does not make them comparable social or political entities. The Muscovites could only have equated their own boyar clans with Mongol clans if they were grossly ignorant of steppe society - which they were not, or else they could not have borrowed any institutions from the Horde. Ostrowski's line of reasoning is that when the Muscovites adopted the Council of four *ulusbeys* they adapted it to their own society, equating boyar clans with Horde "tribes." There is no evidence to corroborate such a logical leap.

In a similar fashion, Ostrowski plays fast and loose with the number of boyars/*ulusbeys*. The number of *ulusbeys*, four, was not subject to change. Indeed, the reason Schamiloglu could trace the institution from the Golden Horde through each of its successor states is precisely because the number of members was fixed. In all probability this number derived from cosmology, the four points of the compass. Schamiloglu points out that it was an enormous innovation for the Crimean Khanate to switch to five *ulusbeys*, and afterward that number remained static. Even the number five resonated with Inner Asian cosmology, by adding the center to the four points of the compass. The number of "ruling tribes," Schamiloglu insists, was more important than which entities claimed that status. The number "four" was sufficiently significant, too, that there were four religious *karachi sheyhs* among the Horde's successor states.[15] If the Muscovites made the number of members of their Boyar Council open-ended, then they did not understand what they were copying, suggesting, again, a degree of ignorance which would have precluded borrowing. For this reason, the six signatures on the 1350-51 document cannot be dismissed so easily, and only two documents from the 1370s attest that there were ever four boyars in the Council.

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[14] Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, 33, citing Lindner.

[15] Uli Schamiloglu, "Tribal Politics and Social Organization in the Golden Horde" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1986), 33-79.

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Ostrowski contends that at the time of its formation, the Boyar Council had four members or representatives of four and only four boyar clans, proven by the number of boyar witnesses to government documents. Indeed, this numerical identity is the basis of his argument that the Boyar Council copied the Council of four *ulusbeys*. However, scrutiny of all extant documentation from Muscovy through 1389[16] reveals that neither before, during, nor after 1350-75 was the number of boyar witnesses (or the number of clans they represented) stable, let alone stable at four.

Two charters from Ivan Kalita c. 1328-40 and his c. 1339 will had no boyar witnesses.[17] In c. 1350-51 Semen Ivanovich's treaty has six, including the *tysiatskii* and an *okol'nichii*.[18] Semen Ivanovich's will from 1353 was witnessed only by clerics; so was Ivan Ivanovich's will of c. 1358. Dmitrii Donskoi's grant to Ivan Friazin c. 1363-89 contained no boyar witnesses.[19] Dmitrii Donskoi's immunity grant to Mikula of Novyi Torg, also dated c. 1363-89, was witnessed only by (*okol'nichii*) Timofei Vasil'evich (Vel'iaminov).[20] Donskoi's treaty with his cousin Vladimir Andreevich of c. 1367 contained neither clerical nor boyar witnesses.[21] Dmitrii Donskoi's truce with Olgerd of 1371 contained the names of four boyars, but Nancy Shields Kollmann identifies one as an appanage boyar.[22] Donskoi's 1374-75 treaty with his cousin bore no witnesses, clerical or boyar.[23] Donskoi's 1375 will contained four boyar witnesses, once again including an *okol'nichii*.[24]Donskoi's land exchange and immunity charter with the monk Savva of the Savior Transfiguration Monastery mentioned two boyars and the *kaznachei* (treasurer) as performing the transaction.[25] An immunity charter from Dmitrii Donskoi c. 1363-74 was important enough to contain the name of the *tysiatskii*, Vasilii (Vel'iaminov), but of no other boyars.[26] No boyar names appeared in Donskoi's treaty with Mikhail Aleksandrovich of Tver' in 1375, his treaty with Oleg of Riazan' of 1382, an exchange of land c. 1381-89, or yet another treaty with Vladimir Andreevich of 1389.[27] Donskoi's 1389 will contained no fewer than ten boyar witnesses.[28]

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[16] Vladimir A. Vodov [Wladimir Vodoff], "Zarozhdenie kantseliarii moskovskikh velikikh kniazei (seredina XIV v.-1425 g.)." *Istoricheskie zapiski* 103 (1979), 325-50, proved very helpful in compiling a complete list of published grand-princely *akty* from 1304-1389.

[17] *Akty sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi istorii severo-vostochnoi Rusi*, 3 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademiia Nauk, 1964) [hereafter ASEI], 15-16, no. 2, 16, no. 3; *Dukhovnye i dogovornye gramoty velikikh i udel'nykh kniazei XIV-XVI vv.*, ed. Lev V. Cherepnin (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Akademiia Nauk, 1950) [hereafter DDG], 7-8, no. 1.

[18] DDG 11-13, no. 2.

[19] DDG 13-14, no. 3, 15-17, no. 4; ASEI 3: 16, no. 4.

[20] ASEI 3: 193, no. 178.

[21] DDG 19-21, no. 5.

[22] DDG 21-22, no. 6; Kollmann, "The Boyar Clan," 16.

[23] DDG 23-24, no. 7.

[24] DDG 24-25, no. 8

[25] ASEI 2 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademiia Nauk, 1959): 338-39, no. 340.

[26] ASEI 3: 259-60, no. 238.

[27] DDG 25-28, no. 9, 29-30, no. 10; ASEI 3: 52-53, no. 29; DDG 30-32, no. 11.

[28] DDG 33-37, no. 11.

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There is no pattern to the number of boyar witnesses to these public and "private" charters of the Muscovite grand princes, which varies from zero to ten. In this context, the two documents with four witnesses and the one document personifying four clans are much more likely to be coincidences than a reflection of an institutional standard. In short, there is no evidence that the membership of the Boyar Council was ever set at four.

A different approach suggests the same conclusion. Gustave Alef opined that "the size of the [boyar – CJH] council in the 14th century cannot be established. Neither membership lists nor adequate identification of boyars survive prior to the mid-15th century."[29]Kollmann, while noting the rarity of references to individual boyars in the 14th century,[30] has tried to prove him wrong. Kollmann has thoroughly collated the evidence of published and unpublished charters and grants, chronicles, and genealogies, to assemble the most complete picture of 14th-century Muscovite boyars we have ever had. Of course *lacunae* remain, and Kollmann argues that there were more boyars than those named in the sources. Because being a boyar was, in her opinion, hereditary, the son of a boyar, whose son was a boyar, must have been a boyar himself, even when the sources did not so attest. Extrapolating from her data[31] and other sources, I have charted the number of Muscovite boyars annually from 1346 to 1389. The result is best described as tentative,[32] but it is still instructive that four boyars appear once in the 34 years: in 1374 Ivan Sobaka Fedorovich, Ivan Rodion Kvashnin, Dmitrii Aleksandrovich Monastyrev, and Dmitrii Mikhailovich Bobrok Volynskii. Controlling for the number of clans would lower the numbers of boyars in some years, but not add any years with four "clans" to our analysis. There is no consistency to the number of boyars or boyar clans before or after the documents which were witnessed by four boyars. Indeed, there was obviously no rule that all boyars had to witness any given document, which makes inferring the number of boyars from the number of witnesses very problematic.

Furthermore, Kollmann presents the number of boyars, potential clans represented, and actual clans represented for two of the years in this range, and the results are very significant. For 1371, the year in which the treaty between Donskoi and Olgerd contained four boyar witnesses, the number of eligible boyar clans was ten, the number of families actually represented six, the number

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[29] Alef, "The Origins," 179.

[30]Kollmann, "The Boyar Clan," 5, n. 1.

[31] Kollmann, *Kinship and Politics*, Appendix 2, Clan Biographies, 199-241.

[32] For example, Vasilii Protas'evich Vel'iaminov was attested as a boyar in a document dated 1350-51 (to convert the Byzantine calendar) and died in 1356, so I counted hin as a boyar from 1350 (most of the March year would have been in 1350) until 1356. I also include appanage boyars and *okol'nichie*. See Appendix. I found no boyars for 1357-66, which is inconceivable: no Muscovite grand prince could function without boyars. I infer a gap in the sources, not a total discontinuity in the boyar class.

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of boyars seven, and the number of *okol'nichie* zero. Only three of these boyars, I. F. Sobaka Fominskii, D. A. Monastyrev, and D. M. Volynskii, signed the treaty. The fourth signature was by an appanage boyar not included in Kollmann's count. Boyars I. R. Kvashnyn, D. M. Minin, V. V. Vel'iaminov and his brother T. V. Vel'iaminov, did not witness the document. Four clans had no eligible male at the time: Akinfovich, Kobylin, Okat'ev, and Pleshcheev. In 1389, there were eleven boyars representing seven of the ten eligible dans.[33] There is no evidence that one of the four *ulus* "tribes" represented by an *ulusbey* was ever unable to supply an adult male member of the Qipchaq Khanate Council; if the Muscovites equated their own boyar clans with Horde "clans," then they overlooked the impact of their vastly different demographies on their ability to supply council members. Concretely, the data on 14th-century boyars contradict the notion that there was ever any imposition of a four-boyar-clan standard in Muscovy, which then increased.

Therefore, the number of boyars or boyar clans was not fixed at four because it was never fixed at all.[34] These numbers did not evolve, they simply varied. If there was never any norm of boyars or boyar clans at four, then there is no basis for arguing that the increase in the number of Boyar Council members represents a Muscovite adaptation of a four-member Qipchaq Khanate institution.

The four *ulusbeys* shared equal status. Ostrowski's counts of "four" include an *okol'nichii* as a boyar, which itself raises other questions. Ostrowski repeats sympathetically Vernadsky's assertion that in the 14th and 15th century the *okol'nichii*[35] was the equivalent of the Horde *bakaul* or quartermaster general, although the responsibilities of that office changed later.[36] But Vernadsky did not cite any passage in which the *okol'nichii* exercised logistical responsibilities, nor did he consider the likelihood that a quartermaster-general would witness an immunity charter.[37] This interpretation of the term also confuses Ostrowski's counts of boyar witnesses. If *okol'nichii* was an office, then it is not very likely that it was also a kind of status, a sub-type of the rank of "boyar."[38] In later Muscovy, the *okol'nichie* definitely occupied the second-rank status among the boyars.[39] Discarding Vernadsky's groundless speculation

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[33] Kollmann, *Kinship and Politics*, 76.

[34] Kollmann, *Kinship and Politics*, 45: "The number of boyars was not fixed during the Muscovite period."

[35] The first reference to a Muscovite okol'nichii, 1351-52, unfortunately comes from the reconstruction of the witness list to grand prince Semen's treaty with his brothers, which Dr. Ostrowski now questions. Fortunately other references, e.g. Donskoi's 1375 testament, leave no doubt that the term dates to the second half of the 14th century.

[36] Ostrowski, "The Mongol Origins," 536.

[37] Vasilii O. Kliuchevskii, *Istoriia soslovii v Rossii*, 3rd ed. (Petrograd, 1916; reprint Russian Series, v. 16: Hattiesburg, MS: Academic International Press, 1969), 135-36, concluded that the early functions of the *okol'nichii* were insufficiently known.

[38] Cf. Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, 46, n. 38.

[39] Kollmann, *Kinship and Politics*, 97-104, discusses this issue for the reign of Ivan III.

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restores the *okol'nichii* to the counts of boyars in the 14th century, but obscures any possible analogy to the single-tiered fout-*bey* Horde Council.

Any "royal council" (*curia regis*) in the 14th century, sedentary or nomadic, would exercise the highest political authority beneath the ruler, and, given the traditional nature of society, its membership would have some "aristocratic" hereditary features. These generic similarities alone fit both the Boyar Council and the Council of four *karachi-beys*, and they are insufficient to prove borrowing. Comprehensive analysis of the patterns of boyar witnesses to grand-princely treaties and charters, and of the number of boyars and boyar clans, during the 14th century, invalidates the contention that the Boyar Council at any time contained four members from four clans. The documents cited to prove that point turn out to be accidental and atypical. Thus, the Boyar Council did not imitate the most prominent and distinctive feature of the Council of four *ulus beys*. Kollmann concluded that the senior member of a boyar clan by genealogical seniority represented that clan in the Boyar Duma. However, she concedes that there were exceptions, as well as instances in which multiple members of the same boyar clan held Duma rank simultaneously. Any analogy to the representative nature of the four members of the *ulusbey* Council remains therefore no more than approximate, especially since we know nothing of the selection criteria of *ulusbeys*, which could have been political as well as genealogical. Therefore neither in its size nor its principles of selection of membership did the Muscovite Boyar Duma match the Council of four *ulusbeys*.

If the Boyar Council was not borrowed from the Qipchaq Khanate, then the likelihood that the Muscovite administrative structure it commanded also derived from Mongol models certainly recedes. We do not, however, need to rely only on such abstract deduction to refute Ostrowski's claims of Horde origin for Muscovy's leading officials, to which we now turn.

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Ostrowski equates the Muscovite office of *tysiatskii* (chiliarch, "thousand-man") with the Horde's office of *beklaribek* (*beylarbey, beylarbek, ulugbek*). He suggests that the *tysiatskii*, a pre-Mongol title whose office evolved differently in each of the post-Kievan polities, became in Muscovy the head of the army and foreign affairs. Ostrowski's organization chart shows the *tysiatskii* reporting to the grand prince and the Boyar Council, like the *beklaribek* vis-à-vis the khan and the four *karachi beys*. When Vasilii Vel'iaminov died in 1374, the office was abolished, but its functions were continued as the "grand lieutenant" (*bol'shoi namestnik*).[40]

Tysiatskii is not a translation of *beklaribek*, which would be "prince of princes" or "emir of emirs." The sources, while leaving little doubt as to the

[40] Ostrowski, "The Mongol Origins," 532-33.

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importance of the *tysiatskii*, who may have been second in power only to the Muscovite grand prince himself, are quite vague as to his functions; assigning him responsibility for foreign affairs and the army might be excessively precise. As we have seen, the *tysiatskii* was a witness to a treaty of Semen Ivanovich c. 1350-51, but of no other treaty; he was a witness to an immunity charter of Dmitrii Donskoi c. 1363-74, which hardly seems appropriate for the head of the military and diplomatic establishment, but of no other "private" charter. These anomalies suggest that it might be premature to attribute functional specialization to the office. Certainly it sounds very peculiar for the Muscovites to redefine a native term to have the meaning of a Mongol one instead of translating die Mongol word, only shortly thereafter to abandon it altogether for yet another redefined native term. For Muscovy all known occupants of the office of *tysiatskii* were boyars, but it is impossible to determine if this was a requirement of office.

On the Mongol side, there is even greater ignorance concerning the responsibilities and occupants of the post of *beklaribek*. The *beklaribek* definitely exerted great influence in the Horde. The references to the *beklaribek* do not permit deciding whether he was one of the four *ulusbeys*, a difficulty all too analogous to the uncertain boyar status of the *tysiatskii*. Worst of all, the sources on the Horde shed very little light on who was *beklaribek*. Most specialists on the Qipchaq Khanate describe Nogai (who ran virtually his own state at the end of the 13th and the beginning of the 14th centuries in die western regions of the Qipchaq Khanate), emir Mamai (khan-maker and loser at Kulikovo Field in 1380) and emir Edigei (another power behind the throne at the turn of the 15th century) as *beklaribeks,* but this is only by inference – no source directly attributes this title to any of these suspects.[41] While Nogai's genealogy is unclear, most specialists do not doubt that he was a Chingizid. If so, it is suspect diat he could represent the "tribal" aristocracy in contrast to the dynasty. Too little may be known about the *beklaribek* to project his administrative office onto the Muscovite *tysiatskii*.[42] Two unknowns do not make for a very convincing known.

[41] Vadim L Egorov, *Istoricheskaia geografiia Zolotoi ordy v XIII-XIV vv.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1986), 47 (Nogai), 58-59 (Mamai); Andrei I. Pliguzov and Anna L. Khoroshkevich, "Otnoshenie russkoi tserkvy k antiordynskoi bor'be v XIII-XV vekakh (po materialem Kratkogo sobraniia khanskikh iarlykov russkim mitropolitam)," *Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma 37* (1988), 126 (Mamai); and Halperin, *Russia and the Golden Horde*, 43, n. 51 (Mamai). Schamiloglu also joins this tradition. Unfortunately, any light shed on this or any of the issues raised in this essay by Mustafa Kefali *Alten Orda Hanli'inin Kurulus ve Yükselis Devirleri* (Istanbul: Edebijat Fakultesi Matbaasi, 1976) or Istvan Vasary, *Az Arany Horda* (Budapest: Kossuth Könyukindó, 1986) is linguistically inaccessible to me.

[42] Cf. Khudiakov, *Ocherki*, 205-09, who did not mention a *beylarbey* (or a vizier) among Kazan' officials (*chinovniki*).

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Unlike the *tysiatskii*, the Muscovite *dvorskii*, or major-domo, according to Ostrowski, answered only to the grand prince; Ostrowski traces the *dvorskii* to the vizier of the Qipchaq Khanate.[43] For Muscovy, clearly die *dvorskii* was not a boyar, but of much lower social rank. Ostrowski accepts die observation of al Omari that the Qipchaq Khanate had the same administrative structure as the Ilkhanate.[44] In the Ilkhanate the vizier, following the Saljuk model,[45] was a highly literate professional bureaucrat. His primary responsibility was financial management, but he also played a significant role in diplomacy, especially dynastic marriages, and was expected to accompany the sultan on campaign. During civil unrest his private army sometimes came into play. Under the Ilkhans the vizier was, in Spuler's apt phrase, "die erste Minister," a virtual prime minister. The office was held by men of enormous expertise, influence, wealth, and status, such as Shams ad-Din Juvaini, brother of the historian, and the historian Rashid ad-Din. The vizier under the Ilkhans headed an elaborate hierarchy of *diwans* (councils), which were charged with purely civil functions, especially tax-collection.[46]

The question of the vizier in the Qipchaq Khanate is a particularly thorny one. As Ostrowski notes, Schamiloglu has concluded that there was no vizier in the Horde, that his functions were performed by a *qarachi bey*. This scepticism has some antecedents: Vernadsky registered doubts about whether the official called "vizier" of the Qipchaq Khanate by the Arabic and Persian sources actually bore that title.[47] If Schamiloglu is correct that the Golden Horde had no vizier, then either it had no *diwans,* which would negate the similarity of the Juchid and Ilkhanid administrative structures, or one of the *ulusbeys* possessed bureaucratic expertise far beyond anything usually attributed to the tribal aristocracy of that time.

The existence of *diwans* in the Qipchaq Khanate is a difficult problem in and of itself. A. Iu. Iakubovskii wrote that the Golden Horde must have

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[43] Ostrowski, "The Mongol Origins," 530, 532.

[44] Although al Omari added that the Qipchaq Khanate vizier had less authority than his counterpart in the Ilkhanate, and that the Qipchaq Khanate "sultan" less authority and less wealth than the Ilkhan.

[45] Ann K. S. Lambton, "The Internal Structure of the Saljuk Empire," in *The Cambridge History of Iran.* V. *Saljuk and Mongol Periods*, ed. John A. Boyle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 247-49, 260-69.

[46] John A. Boyle, "The Dynastic and Political History of the Il-khans," in *The Cambridge History of Iran*, ed. Boyle, 356, 369-70, 382, 384, 398, 402, 405-07, 409, 412 presents intermittent data on viziers. Berthold Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran: Politik, Verwaltung, und Kultur der Ilchanzeit, 1220-1350*, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1955), presents a definition of the vizier's office (282-85) and a list of all its occupants (285-88).

[47] George Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), 212.

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organized its *bitichki* (scribes) into *diwans*, even if direct evidence to this point is lacking. Iakobovskii cited Stefan Orbelian that the *basqaq* of Ilkhanid Armenia was also vizier, but he did not discuss the function of the vizier in the Juchid ulus.[48] Berthold Spuler mentions the vizier and the four *ulusbeys*, but not the word *diwan*.[49] Egorov posits the existence of *diwans* in the Golden Horde, headed by the vizier, who was inferior in status to the *beklaribek*.[50] Logically, then, the office of vizier and *diwans* went hand in hand. The vizier in the Ilkhanate and elsewhere was often called the "vizier of the diwan," meaning the central or "great" *diwan* at the apex of a hierarchy of regional *diwans*.

What is known about the vizierate renders it highly unlikely that the Muscovite *dvorskii* occupied an analogous office in Muscovite administration. The Muscovite *dvorskii* lacked the status or expertise attached to the vizier in the Ilkhanate or the Qipchaq Khanate. The *dvorskii* was not a highly skilled literate bureaucrat and tax collector, he did not command troops or negotiate marriage alliances, he was not the equivalent of the prime minister, he did not accumulate great wealth in the service of the grand prince. There is no substantial similarity between the offices or the officials who held them. By background, status, and function, the Muscovite *dvorskii* did not resemble the Golden Horde's vizier.

In Egorov's organization chart of the Khanate, the vizier supervised the "*diwan* of various offices (*palaty*) headed by secretaries." In Ostrowski's adaptation of this chart, the vizier headed a "board of administration [;] *daruga* and *basqaqs*."[51] Ostrowski's alteration obscures the central role of *diwans* in the vizierate. He neither justifies his emendation of Egorov's chart nor discusses whether he thinks there was a Muscovite equivalent to the *diwans*.[52] Kollmann and Vodoff describe the 14th-century Muscovite "bureaucracy" as a handful of jacks-of-all-trades scribes (*d'iaki*) who did everything,[53] hardly the equivalent of the bureaucratic resources mobilized by the divan system.

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[48] Boris D. Grekov and Aleksandr Iu. Iakubovskii, *Zolotaia orda* (Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe izdatel'stvo, 1937), 99-100.

[49] Berthold Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde. Die Mongolen in Rußland 1223-1502*, 2nd ed. (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1965), 301-02.

[50] Egorov, *Istoricheskaia geografiia*, 169-72.

[51] Cf. Ostrowski, "The Mongol Origins," 531 with Vadim L. Egorov, "Zolotaia orda pered Kulikovskoi bitvoi," *in Kulikovskaia bitva. Sbornik statei* (Moscow: Nauka, 1980), 176.

[52] *Diwan* just means "council," but referring to the "divan of the four *qarachi begs*" (Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, 168) confuses the problem of the "great" or central *diwan* of the Saljuk/Ilkhanid administrative model. Alan Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978), 20-21, also refers to the "divan" of the four *karachi beys* in the Crimean Khanate, as did Khudiakov to the Kazan' Khanate. Dr. Ostrowski now informs me that he believes that both the Qipchaq Khanate and Muscovy had *diwans*, that the Boyar Council in Muscovy was a *diwan*, and that the vizier of the Qipchaq Khanate might have had his own *diwan* separate from the *diwan* of the four *qarachi beys*. I would draw a hard and fast distinction between policy-making political *diwans* and the bureaucratic fiscal *diwans* subordinate to the vizier.

[53] Kollmann, "The Boyar Clan," 7; Vodov, "Zarozhdenie," 346.

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According to Ostrowski, the Mongol Empire was organized in a dual administrative structure, a division between civilian and military responsibilities, despite overlapping functions, between the military *basqaqi* (the Turkic term found in the East Slavic sources; in Mongol called the *tammachi*) and the civilian *darugi* (the Turkic and Mongol term found in the East Slavic sources; in Persian *shihna*).[54] Ostrowski argues that both types of governors were established in Rus' after the campaigns of 1237-40.[55] Furthermore, the military *basqaqi* were removed when and where the Mongols no longer found them necessary, that is, after an area had been fully pacified. Ostrowski equates the Muscovite *namestnik* (lieutenant) with the civilian *darugachi*, and the Muscovite *volostel'* with the military *basqaq*. In his chart of the administrative structures of the Muscovite principality and the Qipchaq Khanate, the Boyar Duma supervised the *volosteli* who directed the *namestniki* of villages and towns, and the Council of four *karachi beys* controlled the "heads of tumans" who in turn oversaw the "heads of regions and towns." [56]

Ostrowski recounts the division of opinion among Inner Asianists as to whether *basqaq* and *dargua* were separate offices or two terms, in different languages, for the same office, before he sides with those who differentiate between them. He reproduces the texts usually employed to equate the terms, the interpretation he does not share. Juwaini called Tort-Aba both *basqaq* and *shihna*; Juvayni called Chin Timur a *basqaq* but Rashid ad-Din called him a *shihna*. Ostrowski tries to finesse these passages as possible errors, or changes in office rather than vocabulary, but his special pleading seems forced.[57]

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[54] Ostrowski, "The Mongol Origins," 530; Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, 36-44 (I omit other linguistic variants from the chart on 40); and Ostrowski, "*The Tamma*," *passim*.

[55] Ostrowski eventually rejects the evidence of the 16th-century Nikon chronicle that a *voevoda* (= *basqaq*) was appointed to Kiev in 1240, but relies upon paragraph 274 of *The Secret History of the Mongols* that *darugachin* and *tammachin* were assigned to the Orosut. (Ostrowski, "*The Tamma*," 277, contains an error attributing this development to 1229; it should read "c. 1240.") Since the passage on which Ostrowski relies carries no year, his dating is based upon its "content and placement" in the alone (Ostrowski, "City Names," 465). Because the paragraphs in *The Secret History* about the Rus' are chronologically inconsistent and substantively convoluted, it is imprudent to rely upon them for dating phenomenon in the East Slavic principalities. On the other hand, simple analogy suggests that the Mongols imposed the same administrative structure on the Rus' as elsewhere in their empire.The chronology of their activity, however, remains indefinite.

[56] Ostrowski, "The Mongol Origins," 581; idem, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, 44-45. Note that the *namestniki* subordinate to the *volosteli* are separate, in Ostrowski's schema, from the *bol'shoi namestnik* who replaced the *tysiatskii* in 1374. Dr. Ostrowski kindly suggested an analogy to "lieutenant" and "lieutenant general" or better perhaps to "secretary" and "secretary of state."

[57] Ostrowski, "*The Tamma*," 271, 273-74.

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Exploring this issue for the Mongol Empire would take us too far afield, so instead we will focus on what the sources tell us about these officials in the Rus' principalities.

The references to the *basqaqi* in the East Slavic sources[58] do not demonstrate that the *basqaqi* commanded troops, surely a *sine qua non* for a Mongol official assigned to an unpacified district. *Basqaqi* are recorded in the city of Vladimir in 1269, the city of Rostov in 1308, and the Riazan' border as late as the 1350s-1380s. There is no evidence of violent anti-Tatar activity in those places at those times. While a *basqaq* might accompany a military campaign, as did *basqaq* Argaman of Vladimir in 1269 against the "Germans," there are no unambiguous references to regiments or even major garrisons under *basqaq* authority. *Basqaq* Akhmad of Kursk lacked even the minimal forces required to deal with two recalcitrant backwater princelings; the troops who accompanied an unnamed *basqaq* and an otherwise unidentified prince Fedor in Kiev in 1331 might have belonged to the prince. The Mongols were hardly so inept as to assign military governors to cities and regions without assigning sufficient military resources to sustain Mongol rule. This entire issue is moot since the Mongols never occupied or garrisoned the cities of the Russian forest zone, because no region therein was out of reach of nomadic Tatar contingents from the nearby steppe.[59] There seems to be nothing specifically "military" about the *basqaqi*.

Ostrowski is quite correct that the division between civilian and military functions in the Qipchaq Khanate, as in any conquest state, tended to be very blurred. As we have seen, the quintessentially "civilian" vizier, even in the Ilkhanate, had personal troops. A member of the Imperial Guard (*kesig*) might be assigned under the Yuan in China as a (civilian) *darugachi*; he would retain his military status, and thus would function in both elements of the administration. However, the distinction between the military and bureaucratic chains of command would have been quite precise. And we know the military chain of command for the Mongol Empire and the Qipchaq Khanate very clearly: the decimal commanders often, 100, 1000, and 10,000 men, which clearly did not contain the *basqaq*.[60]

Thus, the division between military *basqaq* and civilian *daruga* which Ostrowski posits as a uniform feature in the world Mongol Empire and all its successor states does not seem to have held true for the activities of those officials in the East Slavic principalities, irrespective of whether these were

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[58] Halperin, *Russia and Golden Horde*, 33-39; Charles J. Halperin, *The Tartar Yoke* (Columbus, OH: Slavica Press, 1986), 75-80.

[59] This is the major ecological and historical difference between Mongol rule in Russia on the one hand, and Mongol rule in China and Iran on the other. See Charles J. Halperin, "Russia in the Mongol Empire in Comparative Perspective," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 43:1 (June, 1983), 239-61.

[60] *Tüman* can refer either to a military unit of 10,000 troops, or to an administrative district supplying 10,000 recruits.

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separate offices or different names for the same office adapted from on-site to absentee governorship.[61]

It is very doubtful that the *volostel'* exercised the functions of the *basqaq*, military or otherwise. The *volostel'* obviously administered the *volost'*, a territorial, not military unit.[62] The *yarlik* from Khatun Taidula to Metropolitan Aleksei, 1354, was addressed to "the *temniki* (commanders of 10,000) and to the *tysiatskie* (commanders of 1,000)[63] and to the princes and to the *sotniki* (commanders of 100) and to the *desiatniki* (commanders of 10) and to the *volosteli* and to the city *dorogi* and to the princes and to the traveling envoys (*mimokhozhim poslom*)."[64] The redundant reference to "princes" suggests that this passage has not been preserved without distortion, but two points stand out about the *volosteli*. First, they are mentioned after the full decimal military hierarchy, from the highest (10,000) to the lowest level (ten). Second, they are distinguished from the city administrators (*dorogi*),[65] perhaps because the *volost'* they administered was not urban, or perhaps because there were rural *dorogi* (called *volosteli*?). The allusion to *volosteli* in Dmitrii Donskoi's 1389 testament attributed judicial, not military, functions to them, as did all 14th-century East Slavic treaties and charters.[66] The *volostel'* did not administer a census or supervise conscription, since Muscovy borrowed neither the census nor conscription from the Mongols. Ostrowski presents no Muscovite source to substantiate the "military" functions of the *volosteli*.

Ostrowski offers no evidence that the 14th-century *volostel'* was superior in the administrative hierarchy to the *namestniki*; the documents discussed by Kashtanov rather suggest that urban and rural districts were separate but equal.

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[61] There is a striking and consistent pattern in East Slavic references to these officials: *basqaqi* were always on-site in Rus', whereas *darugi* were always in the Horde. The significance of this dichotomy for interpreting their mutual functions and relationships has not been fully resolved.

[62] Robert C Howes, *The Testaments of the Grand Princes of Moscow* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967): 81-82. Vodov, "Zarozhdenie," 341, states that the *volosteli* were listed with other unfree court servitors in the will of Ivan Ivanovich, which stipulated that *d'iaki*, *kaznachei*, *tiiuny*, and *volosteli* be set free upon his death. However, DDG no. 4, 16, 19, reads *posel'skie*, not *volosteli*.

[63] Here *tysiatskii* is an translation of the Mongol *minggan*, not to be confused with the Muscovite official supposedly in charge of the military and diplomacy. I am guilty of some interpretation here: the manuscripts of the *iarlyk* read "*tysiashchnye*" "*tysiashchniki*" and "*tysiashch'nye*."

[64] *Pamiatniki russkogo prava*. Vypusk III. *Pamiatniki prava perioda obrazovnaiia russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo iuridicheskoi literatury, 1955), 470.

[65] It is impossible to say if *basqaqi* were assigned to cities or districts in the East Slavic principalities: Argaman of Vladimir, Akhmad of Kursk, and Telebuga of Rostov are associated with cities, unlike Milei in the village of Bakota, but the "cities" may represent larger geographic districts. The *basqaqi* on the Riazan' frontier or die *basqaq* accompanying prince Fedor of Kiev could have been assigned to a city, district or region.

[66] Howes, *The Testaments*, 214; Sergei M. Kashtanov, "L'administration locale et la propriété foncière en Russie au XIVe siècle, " *Revue des Études Slaves* 63 (1991), 175-83.

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Ostrowski's equation of *namestnik* and *dorogi* lacks firm documentation. In the 14th century Muscovite *namestniki* were urban, i.e., the deputies of the appanage princes assigned to their "thirds" of Moscow, or, perhaps this early, continuing Kievan practice, and certainly later, as "governors" of cities.[67] Like the Muscovite *doroga* assigned to Grand Bolgar temporarily in the 1370s, but unlike 14th- and 15th-century Qipchaq Khanate *dorogi*, the *namestnik* was always an on-site administrator, not an absentee.

In general, then, the Muscovite system of local administration, of *namestniki* and *volosteli*, does not owe its origin to Mongol models, and we cannot compensate for the gaps in our understanding of their activities by invoking Tatar analogues. Muscovite local governance was not a continuation of Qipchaq Khanate administration of the East Slavic territories via a division between military and civilian officials.

* * *

Ostrowski's argument that the administrative structure of 14th-century Muscovy duplicates that of the Qipchaq Khanate, epitomized by his parallel organization charts, might be summarized by the cliché saying that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. The likelihood that each institution discussed here derived from a putative Mongol antecedent – Boyar Council from the Council of four *karachi beys tysiatskii* from *beklaribek, dvorskii* from vizier, *volostel'* from *basqaq* – is enhanced by the parallel relationship of those parts to each other.

Unfortunately, organization charts always look neater on paper than in reality. More importantly, there are unresolved ambiguities and contradictions between the two charts. The vizier of the Qipchaq Khanate is connected to his "board of administration" by a solid line, but the *dvorskii* of Muscovy and his "*d'iaki* and *puti* (*prikazi*)" are tied together only by a more tentative dotted line.[68] The *basqaqi* of the Qipchaq Khanate reported to the (civilian) vizier, not the (military) *beklaribek*, and were not part of the "army" commanded by the *beklaribek*.[69] Athough Ostrowski equates the *basqaq* and the *volostel'*, they do not occupy parallel positions: the *basqaq* in the Qipchaq Khanate reports to the vizier, in the location in the Muscovite chart of the *d'iaki* and *puti*, whereas the place of the *volostel'* in the Horde chart belongs to the "heads of *tumans*."[70]

[67] Howes, *The Testaments*, 81; DDG no. 2, 12, 13; no. 6, 22 (Tverian *namestniki* and *volosteli*); no. 11, 32.

[68] I assume *prikazi* (administrative departments) is here only to explain *puti*, since the *prikazi*, some of which did develop out of the *puti*, cannot be documented before the middle of the 16th century.

[69] Dr. Ostrowski does believe the *basqaq* answered to the military authorities.

[70] Dr. Ostrowski now recognizes that for consistency he should have put the *bitikchi* (scribes) in the Qipchaq Khanate chart in the same place as the Muscovite *d'iaki* (scribes), replacing the "board of administration." Similarly, the (civilian) *namestniki* should report to the (civilian) *dvorskii*. The confusion arises from distinguishing *basqaqi* and *darugi* both by function and area of administrative authority.

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Supposedly the *volosteli* and the *namestniki* replaced the *basqaqi* and the *darugi* respectively, yet according to the organization charts, the *volosteli* supervised the *namestniki*, but the *basqaqi* and the *darugi* appear administratively on the same level. The parallelism of the charts decreases, the more closely they are analyzed.

As we have seen, some of the similarities which Ostrowski identifies may be more apparent than real, others either lack evidence or are contradicted by the sources. If the fulcrum or hub of his organization charts – the equation of the Boyar Council and the *karachi* Council – fails, then much of the analogy at large may also fall. The argument from adaptation can only be applied once the fact of initial borrowing has been established. I would argue that the dissimilarities of the institutional pairs Ostrowski has asserted are greater than the similarities. Distortion beyond recognition during adaptation cannot be used to prove borrowing of foreign institutions. Ostrowski's case, while serious, cannot be accepted.

If there was no "institutional rift" in Muscovite history in the 14th century, if Muscovite borrowing of Mongol institutions was selective and utilitarian, not pervasive and all-encompassing, then historians need to take another look at the possibility that Muscovy's core administrative structures were adaptations of indigenous forms from the Kievan period. Kliuchevskii began his study of the Boyar Duma with the Kievan period, and continued it uninterrupted through Muscovy in the 17th century; as institutional history, leaving aside his Great Russian bias, this conception may still have merit.[71]

Moreover, if 14th-century Muscovy was not as Mongol-influenced as claimed, perhaps the cosmic consequences sometimes attributed to Moscow's victory in the battle for supremacy in northeastern Rus' need to be reconsidered. Peter Nitsche's not entirely rhetorical question seems apposite here: would the history of Russia have been fundamentally different had Tver' defeated Moscow in this contest?[72]

In addition, if Muscovy's secular court in the 14th century was not universally modeled on the Tatars, then perhaps it was also not as "Tatar" in the 16th century;[73] the quantity of Mongol borrowing might not have reached the point that it had a qualitative effect upon the self-conception of the Muscovite court and elite. Thus we need to reevaluate Ostrowski's views of the conflict between the Byzantine Church and the "Tatar" Court during the reign of Ivan IV, the likelihood that the *oprichnina* was created as a Tatar state, and the

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[71] Kliuchevskii, *Boiarskaia duma*.

[72] Peter Nitsche, "Mongolensturm und Mongolenherrschaft in Rußland," in *Die Mongolen in Asien und Europa*, ed. Stephen Conermann and Jan Kusber (Kieler Werstücke, Reihe F: Beiträge zur osteuropäischen Geschichte, Band 4; Frankfurt am Main: Peter Land, 1997), 79.

[73] I have similar objections to Ostrowski's arguments tracing *pomest'e* (conditional land grants) to *iqta*, the *zemskii sobor* (Council of the Land) to the *quriltai*, *mestnichestvo* (precedence) to steppe clan society, *krugovaia poruka* (collective responsibility) to Chinggis's practices of government, and so forth. Space precludes expounding those criticisms here.

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Simeon Bekbulatovich episode. Recognition of the Mongol factor in 16th-century Muscovy should not be confused with exaggeration of Tatar influence.

Appendix: Muscovite Boyars, 1346-89

	Name	Remarks	Years of Service
1.	Fedor Sviblo Andreevich		1375-1389
2.	Ivan Khromoi	brother above	1389
3.	Aleksandr Ostei	brother above	1384-1389
4.	Aleksandr Andreevich Beleutov		1384-1389
5.	Fedor Konstantinovich Krasnoi Fominskii		1346
6.	Mikhail Kriuk	son above	1381-1389
7.	Ivan Sobaka Fedorovich	brother above	1371-1389
8.	Ivan Uda	brother above	1383-1389
9.	Andrei Petrovich Khvost		1346-1356
10.	Andrei Ivanovich Kobyla		1346-1347
11.	Fedor Kosha	son above	1389
12.	Ivan Rodion Kvashnin		1370-1389
13.	Dmitrii Minin		1367
14.	Aleksandr	brother above	1382-1383
15.	Dmitrii Aleksandrovich Monastyrev		1371-1378
16.	Mikhail Ivanovich Morozov		1382
17.	Vasilii Okat'evich		1350-1351
18.	Timofei Volnii	son above	1380
19.	Semen	brother above	1389
20.	Aleksandr Fedor Pleshshev		1375
21.	Vasilii Protas'evich (Vel'iaminov)		1350-1356
22.	Vasilii Vasil'evich	son above	1367-1373
23.	okol'nichii Timofei	brother above?	1389
24.	Mikhailo Aleksandrovich	brother-in-law of #21	1350-1351
25.	? Vasil'evich	Vel'iaminov	1350-1351
26.	Ivan Fedorovich Vorontsov	a. Vel''iaminov	1389
27.	Semen Timofeevich	Vel'iaminov	1380-1382
28.	"Ivan, syn' Grigoryi Chiurovina, called Dranitsa"	Tale of Mitiai	1379
29.	Dmitrii Mikhailovich Bobrok Volynskii		1371-1389
30.	Ivan Mikhailovich	appanage	1371
31.	Yurii Vasil'evich Kochevin Oleshenskyi	?	1377

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Year	Total Boyars	Year	Total Boyars
1346	3	1373	5
1347	2	1374	4
1348	1	1375	6
1349	1	1376	5
1350	5	1377	6
1351	5	1378	5
1352	2	1379	5
1353	2	1380	6
1354	2	1381	6
1355	2	1382	8
1356	2	1383	7
1357-66	0	1384	8
1367	2	1385	8
1368	1	1386	8
1369	1	1387	8
1370	2	1388	8
1371	6	1389	13
1372	5		

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KLIUCHEVSKII AND THE TATAR YOKE

The great Imperial Russian historian Vasilii Osipovich Kliuchevskii died in 1911; in 1986 Robert O. Crummey wrote:

> Seventy-five years after his death, Kliuchevskii still captivates us. A man with a profound sense of irony, he would surely appreciate his standing and reputation today. Although his works are dated in some respects, they are still fresh and fascinating. His writings are remarkably free of doctrinaire pronouncements; yet many of his views still hold historians of Russia prisoner. All his readers, like his listeners in his own day, are well aware of the brilliance of his literary style: the powerful stream of his words tends to sweep aside our doubts and questions. To put it simply, Kliuchevskii is still the single most influential historian of Russia.[1]

Other historians concur. Robert F. Byrnes concluded that "Russian, Soviet and Western scholars almost unanimously agree that Vasilii Osipovich Kliuchevskii (1841-1911) was the greatest historian of Russia whom Russia has produced."[2] Marc Raeff credited Kliuchevskii with being "as much the creator of modern Russian national consciousness as his forerunner, Karamzin, was that of Russian imperial consciousness."[3] Laudatory evaluations of Kliuchevskii's significance in Russian historiography could be multiplied *ad infinitum*.

Given Kliuchevskii's continuing influence on the study of Russian history, it is hardly surprising that he remains the object of historiographic study. In the West, Kliuchevskii studies were marked by the 1986 journal double-issue[4] and the appearance in 1995 of a full-length English-language biography.[5] In Russia the Kliuchevskii "wave" threatens to become a *tsunami*.[6] Reprints and publication of

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[1] Robert O.Crummery, "Kliuchevskii's Portrait of the Boyars," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* [hereafter C-ASS], 20, nos.3-4 (Fall-Winter 1986), 341.

[2] Robert P. Byrnes, "Kliuchevskii on the Multi-national Russian State," *Russian History*, 13, no. 4 (Winter 1986), 313.

[3] Marc Raeff, "Foreward," C-ASS. 20, nos. 3-4 (Fall-Winter 1986), 201-02.

[4] Marc Raeff, ed., "Kliuchevskii's Russia: Critical Studies," *ibid.*

[5] Robert F. Byrnes, *V. O. Kliuchevskii, Historian of Russia* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1995) [hereafter Byrnes, Kliuchevskii].

[6] In 1986 Riasanovsky referred to the "Kliuchevskii revival" as having begun in 1956-1957: Nicholas V. Riasanovski, "Kliuchevski in Recent Soviet Historiography," C-ASS, 20, nos. 3-4 (Fall-winter 1986), 458, far too modest a term for the post-1986 period.

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previously unpublished material abound; Penza, which claims pride of place as Kliuchevskii's home town, now has a Kliuchevskii House-Museum, located, appropriately, on Kliuchevskii Street[7]; and Penza higher educational institutions have sponsored a series of conferences, whose theses appeared as the "Kliuchevskii Papers."[8] The Smithsonian Astrophysics Observatory named Planet 4560 in Kliuchevskii's honor.[9] Excerpts from his *Course on Russian History* have been reworked for use as an elementary school textbook in Penza.[10] In the post-1991 Russian cultural context, "Back, to Kliuchevskii," a slogan whispered after the rejection of Pokrovskii, seems to have come home to roost. Indeed, the Kliuchevskii phenomenon has become so great that concern has been expressed at its excesses.[11]

Even given the quantity and quality of existing Kliuchevskii scholarship, much research remains to be done before Kliuchevskii can be fully understood, a goal impeded by his personal reticence and intellectual complexity. Many aspects of Kliuchevskii's research remain to be investigated. It is often recognized that Kliuchevskii continues to define the problematica of Russian history even when his own proposed solutions have been superseded. It is equally true that subjects omitted from Kliuchevskii's oeuvre, especially from his five-volume *Course on Russian History*,[12] for that very reason continue to suffer scholarly neglect This has particularly been the case with the thorny, sensitive and controversial topic of the influence of the Mongols (called Tatars in the East Slavic sources) on Russian history.

Historians have nearly unanimously criticized Kliuchevskii, especially in his *Course*, for failing to pay sufficient attention to the Tatars. As early as 1932 George Fedotov noted the absence in the *Course* of any discussion of Tatar

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[7] E. A. Kriuchkova, "O muzee V. O. Kliuchevskogo v Penze," in *Kliuchevskii Sbornik materialov*. Vypusk I (Penza: Penzenskaia pravda, Arkheograficheskaia komissiia Rossiiskoi A. N., Department Kul'tury Penzenskoi oblasti, 1995), pp. 350-54.

[8] E. M. Persanova, "Kliuchevskie chteniia v penzenskom gosudarstvennom pedagogicheskom institute im. V. G. Belinskogo," in *Kliuchevskii. Sbornik materialov*, pp. 354-57; see pp. 363-70 for bibliography.

[9] R. A. Kireeva, "Slovo o Kliuchevskom," in *Kliuchevskii. Sbornik materialov*, p. 140.

[10] E M. Persanova, "Tvorcheskoe nasledie V. O. Kliuchevskogo v shkol'nom kurse otechestvennoi istorii," in *Kliuchevskii. Sbornik materialov*, pp. 224-31.

[11] S. O. Shmidt, "K chitateliu," in *Kliuchevskii. Sbornik materialov*, pp. 3-6 warned that sometimes it felt as if Kliuchevskii's judgments were being "iconicized" (ikonizirovat'), although Kliuchevskii would have altered his conclusions in light of newer research. Shmidt himself was not. however, stinting is his own praise of Kliuchevskii: S. O. Shmidt, "Kliuchevskii i kul'tura Rossii," *ibid*., pp. 323-35. In reviewing this volume, K. B. Umbrashko, "Pod sen'iu kolokolov Rossii. Novaia kniga o Kliuchevskom," *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, 2 (1997), 187-89, also noted a tendency to "canonize" Kliuchevskii as a result of the current "vacuum" in historical studies (here p. 187).

[12] "More than any other single work, for much of the twentieth century Kliuchevsky's Course has shaped the conception of Russia's history in the minds of educated Russians, and even, to a considerable degree, of non-Russians." Marshall S. Shatz. "Introduction: Vasily Kliuchevsky and Catherine the Great," in *V. O. Kliuchevsky, A Course of Russian History. The Time of Catherine the Great*, ed.-tr. Marshall S. Shatz (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), p. ix.

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influence "or lack thereof."[13] In 1941 Michael Karpovich, who had attended Kliuchevskii's lectures, observed that "One of the most striking deficiencies of the Kliuchesvki scheme is his practically complete neglect of the Asiatic aspects of Russian history"; the Mongol domination of Russia was "barely mentioned."[14] V. A. Aleksandrov and A. A. Zimin, in their "Commentary" to the 1956-1959 publication of Kliuchevskii's work, wrote that Kliuchevskii "practically" paid "no attention" to the Mongol-Tatar Yoke, in which he followed the widespread emphasis in late nineteenth-early twentieth century historiography exclusively on internal development.[15] And Byrnes, in his recent biography, concluded that "In effect, [Kliuchevskii] ignored the Mongols."[16]Again, there is no need to belabor this point,[17] but the views of Nechkina deserve special mention. Nechkina objected to Tikhomirov's criticism of Kliuchevskii for neglecting the Tatar Yoke, arguing that a course was never comprehensive,[18] the lecturer always chose the problems to be discussed. However, Nechkina conceded that Kliuchevskii "practically" omitted the Tatars from his study of the Boiar Duma, "almost always avoided" the question of the Tatar conquests although he did attribute to the Tatars the final separation of northeastern from southwestern Rus', and "forgot" the Tatars even more consistently than Solov'ev. Yet, Nechkina insisted, in the published version of his *Course* Kliuchevskii paid more attention to the Tatars than ever before.[19] Certainly Nechkina did protest a bit too much.

Paradoxically, Kliuchevskii, in an unpublished review, criticized volume 1 of Bestuzhev-Riumin's 1872 history of Russia for its weak evaluation of the significance of the Mongols. Rus' had been conquered in the thirteenth century, and was ruled by the Tatars for more than two centuries. Such a lengthy period

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[13] Marshall S. Shatz, tr., "Kliuchevskii's Russia' by George P. Fedotov," C-ASS, 20, nos. 3-4 (Fall-Winter, 1986), 215.

[14] Michael Karpovich, "Kliuchevski and Recent Trends in Russian Historiography," *Slavonic and East European Review*, 21, no. 56 (March 1943), 36-37. Karpovich added that this omission had been corrected with a vengeance by the Eurasianists, led by another of Kliuchevskii's undergraduate students, George Vernadsky.

[15] V. O. Kliuchevskii, *Kurs russkoi istorii* 2 (= *Sochineniia*, II; Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1957), 400. [The five volumes of the *Kurs russkoi istorii* constituted the first five volumes of this eight-volume set; hereafter references will be to *Kurs russkoi istorii or Sochineniia*, volume number, and the year of publication.]

[16] Byrnes, *Kliuchevskii*, p. 124.

[17] Anatole Mazour, *Modern Russian Historiography*, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand, 1958), p. 137; idem, "V. O. Kliuchevsky: The Scholar and Teacher," *Russian Review*, 32, no. 1 (Jan1973), 26. It is sadly indicative of the deficiencies of George Vernadsky, *Russian Historiography. A History*, ed. Sergei Pushkarev, tr. Nickolas Lupinin (Belmont, MA: Nordland, 1978), that in discussing Kliuchevskii, Vernadsky, a specialist on Russia and the steppe, said nothing about Kliuchevskii's treatment of the topic (pp. 128-39), although he had, of course, read Karpovich's article (see p. 368).

[18] Which Tikhomirov had conceded: M. N. Tikhomirov, "K vykhodu pervykh trekh tomov sobraniia sochinenii V. O. Kliuchevskogo," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 8 (1958), p. 155.

[19] M. V. Nechkina, *Vasilii Osipovich Kliuchevskii. Istoriia zhizni i tvorchestva* (Moscow: Nauka, 1974), pp. 48, 233, 439-40, 443, 478-81.

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of Mongol rule, Kliuchevskii insisted, must have left traces upon Russian history, but unfortunately scholars confused internal developments with Mongol influence. Bestuzhev-Riumin rejected the view that the Muscovite tsar replaced the Tatar Khan but he contradictorily attributed the notion that the Muscovite tsar owned all the land as his patrimony to the model of the Mongol Khan.[20] Kliuchevskii traced the notion that the Muscovite grand prince/tsar owned the realm as private property to the domestic evolution of the apanage principle.

Analysis of Kliuchevskii's views of the "Tatar Yoke" requires close study not only of his *Course*, but also of all his other scholarly publications which mention the Tatars, which he had at his disposal when preparing the printed version (as opposed to earlier lithographed versions) of the *Course*. His unpublished works and personalia provide further insights. This examination of Kliuchevskii's attitudes toward the Mongol role in Russian history will look at the way the structure of the *Course* shapes the reader's perception of its contents on the Tatars; the influence of West-European historiography on Kliuchevskii's views of the Tatars; and the limits of Kliuchevskii's personal and intellectual horizons related to the Tatars in particular and Orientals in general. Kliuchevksii's treatment of the Tatar Yoke was not as simple as most historians have implied.

The only place to begin is with Kliuchevskii's masterpiece, the *Course on Russian History*. The perception that Kliuchevskii neglected the Tatars in this lecture course derives first and foremost from its structure. Kliuchevskii's *Course* was organized thematically. He did not reproduce the kind of detailed political narrative of Karamzin or Solov'ev. This structure lies at the heart of Kliuchevskii's treatment of the Tatars. Not devoting a separate (even if untitled) lecture entirely to the Tatars inevitably created the impression that Kliuchevskii had not assigned great significance to the topic. Moreover, because Kliuchevskii did not concentrate all his observations on the Tatars in one place, his comments are inevitably scattered throughout a variety of lectures, where they are all too easily missed. Even if noticed, the impact of Kliuchevskii's remarks about the Tatars was dissipated by their dispersal. Any narrative history of the East Slavs during the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries cannot fail to mention the Tatars with great frequency. Because Kliuchevskii did not compose a narrative, he could get away with omitting large segments of Russo-Tatar relations from his *Course*, and those events too important not to mention could be alluded to in passing. The perception that Kliuchevskii neglected the Tatars is in part a function of the "paucity" of references to the Tatars in his lectures; that very paucity derives from the thematic structure of the *Course*, which permitted Kliuchevskii not to deal with the intrusion of the Tatars into the daily lives of the East Slavic

[20] V. O. Kliuchevskii, "Russkaia istoriia K. Bestuzheva-Riumina (SPb, 1872, t. I)," in V. O. Kliuchevskii, *Neopublikovannye proizvedeniia* (Moscow: Nauka, 1983), pp. 153-55, 156-68, 163 n. 18.

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principalities during these centuries. Moreover, because Kliuchevskii did not conduct original research on the topic of Russo-Tatar relations, much, if not most, of what he did say was derivative, and is all the more easily overlooked amidst Kliuchevskii's brilliant original thoughts, adorned in their strikingly vivid language. Therefore, the literary framework of the *Course* both permitted Kliuchevskii to say less about the Tatars and drew attention away from what he did say about them.[21]

Kliuchevskii minimized the influence of the Tatars on Russian history in another structural way, by another sort of omission. There was no "Tatar period" in Russian history in Kliuchevskii's schema.[22] Kievan Rus', urban, commercial, on the Dnepr' river, from the eighth to the thirteenth century, was succeeded by appanage-princely ·Rus', free-agricultural, in the Volga-Oka mesopotamia, from the thirteenth century to the middle of the fifteenth century. Thereupon followed the period of Great Russia, the Muscovite tsardom and its boyars, military-landowning, until the Time of Troubles.[23] Kliuchevskii did not date the beginning or end of his periods by specific political events. The "periods" are more like "phases" of East Slavic history, and the transition from Period I to Period II was gradual, since migration to the northeast began in twelfth century. Quite explicitly, however, Kliuchevskii's schema itself denied the contention that the Mongol conquest of 1237-1240 initiated a significantly new period of East Slavic history, which continued until the reputed "liberation from the Tatar Yoke" in 1480. In short, the Tatar influence on Russian history was insufficient to define a chronological period.

For all that, Kliuchevskii did have more to say about the Tatars in his *Course* than one would think at first reading. The prehistory of Russo-Tatar relations was the involvement of Kievan Rus' and the steppe. Kliuchevskii emphasized the geographical proximity of the East Slavs to Asia, to the transcontinental route of "nomadic hordes, numberless terrible guests" who invaded or traversed their territory (I, 47). The East Slavs long remembered the

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[21] Terence Emmons asserts that Kliuchevskii's *Course* needs to be analyzed on the basis of recent work in historical theory and methods about narrative, such as Louis Mink, Hayden White, and Jack Hexter. Terence Emmons, review of Byrnes, Kliuchevskii, in the *American Historical Review*, 102, no. 5 (Dec. 1997), 1530-31.

[22] Although Kliuchevskii slipped by referring to the "Mongol period" in V. O.Kliuchevskii, *Drevnerusskiia zhitiia sviatykh kak istoricheskii istochnik* (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), p. 24. He also observed that Solov'ev rejected all notions of periodization as artificial interruptions of the historical process; Kliuchevskii listed the "udel" (apanage) and "Mongol" as potential discarded periods, although no schema could possibly contain both. See V. O. Kliuchevskii, "Sergei Mikhailovich Solov'ev († 4 oktiabria 1879 g.)," in V. O. Kliuchevskii, *Ocherki i rechi. Vtoroi sbornik statei* (Petrograd: Literaturno-izdatel'skii otdel narodnogo komissariata po Prosveshcheniiu, 1918), p. 15. N. L. Rubinshtein, *Russkaia istoriografiia* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1941), p. 462, distorted Kliuchevskii's views of the Tatars as a factor in periodizing Russian history.

[23] Kliuchevskii, *Kurs russkoi istorii*, (1956), I: 32-33. Subsequent references to the *Course* in this section will be in the text in parentheses, by volume (I or 2 only) and page number.

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"predatory" (*khishchnyi*) Asiatic peoples who from the eighth to the seventeenth century posed a critical threat to their lives and livelihoods (I, 68). It was the steppe nomads who barred East Slavic expansion into the richest adjacent agricultural lands to the south and southeast. Kliuchevskii discounted the influence upon the East Slavs of the Iranian and Turkic peoples of the Pontic and Caspian steppe before the East Slavic migration to the Dnepr' river valley (I, 105-06). The exception was the Khazars, who abandoned the "typical predatory steppe life" for urbanization and commercial endeavors. The "Khazar yoke" over Kiev was, therefore, not particularly severe, and even profitable (I, 125-27), but it was cut short by the Pechenegs (I, 130-31). Defense against "steppe barbarians" became one of the Riurikid princes' priorities (I, 160-62), although the Kievan grand prince took on the Khazar title of "Kagan" (I, 163). The most powerful steppe threat to the Kievan Rus' were the Polovtsy, a frightening scourge (*bich*) to the East Slavic eastern frontier of the "civilized Christian world" (*kul'turno-khristianskogo mira*). Other steppe tribes such as the Torki fled the Polovtsy, becoming semi-sedentary, partially Christianized, border troops for the East Slavic princes. Not even treaties or intermarriage could mitigate the untrammeled brigandage and rapine of the Polovtsy. Thus the East Slavs constituted the left flank of the European Christian Crusades against the Middle East, paralleling the battle against the Moors in Spain (I, 279-82).

The Polovtsy, by cutting the Black Sea trade routes, contributed to the decline of Kievan Rus' and the migration of the East Slavs to the southwest and northeast. This process began before the Tatar invasions; the Tatar devastation of the Kievan region accelerated an existing migration process; the Tatars did not originate any new trends in East Slavic history (I, 102). Tatar destruction did complete the ruin of the Kievan region, forcing the relocation of the Metropolitan of Kiev to Vladimir in 1299, facilitating later Lithuanian and Polish acquisition of the Kievan Rus' homeland, destroying the unity of the *russkaia zemlia* (I, 284-85; II, 23; I, 334).[24] Thus the descendants of grand prince Mikhail of Chernigov emigrated to the Oka region (I, 342).

In his famous lecture on the "rise of Moscow" (II, 5-27) Kliuchevskii picked up the thread of the impact of the Tatars on Russian history. For more than a century, Moscow's geographic isolation protected it from destructive Tatar raids; the father of the future St. Sergius fled Tatar (and other) depredations in Rostov to Radonezh (II, 11-12). The Tatar invasion reduced the northeastern economy to "terrible chaos" for the remainder of the thirteenth century, and the Tatars inhibited Slavic migration to the south and southeast, as had the Turkic neighbors of Kievan Rus', until Muscovite expansion down the Volga in the sixteenth century, but by the fourteenth century the economic recovery had

[24] Kliuchevskii reified the concept of the russkaia zemlia, treating it as if it were equivalent to a nineteenth-century nationalist conception of "Russia" rather than a political myth manipulated by the East Slavic elite from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries.

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advanced to the point that captives in the Horde could be ransomed (II, 14). Muscovy expanded by outright theft, purchase, and by taking advantage of the opportunities created by exploiting its Tatar allies. In the first half of the fourteenth century Tver' prematurely thought the time ripe to overthrow the Tatars, but its 1327 uprising was crushed. Ivan Kalita found money, rather than force, more effective in influencing the Horde. His successors Semen and Ivan II both found favor there. The Muscovite princes bought the Vladimir grand principality, the right to collect the tribute for the Horde, using the blind Horde as a weapon to forge the anti-Tatar weapon which Dmitrii Donskoi wielded against the Tatars in 1380 in a national war that united virtually all of northeast Russia (II, 20-23). In his will Donskoi anticipated liberation from the Tatar Yoke (II, 37-38). Moscow was aided by the support of Metropolitan Petr, who sometimes traveled to the Horde on behalf of his- flock (II, 25).

In a "sub-chapter" explicitly entitled "The influence of the Tatar Yoke" Kliuchevskii insisted that the Tatar khans had not imposed a new political order on the "enslaved" East Slavs, wanting only tribute, using *iarliki* (charters) to indicate their favor. Even the Tatars were shocked at the treatment of the naked corpse of (later sainted) grand prince Mikhail of Tver' by Iurii Daniilovich of Moscow. Of all the progeny of Vsevolod "Big Nest" before Donskoi, only Aleksandr Nevskii demonstrated much integrity. The Moscow house pursued self-preservation and self-aggrandizement with barbaric and fratricidal ferocity; only subordination to the Horde imposed some semblance of unity on the formerly united *russkaia zemlia*. Horde corruption served Moscow's ends, and the Khan could serve as "God's cudgel" in Moscow's interests even as late as 1431, when Vasilii II sought Horde "justice" in his dynastic dispute with his cousin (II, 42-44). Even Novgorod paid Tatar tribute (*vykhod*) in the form of the *chernyi bor* (II, 61). In the first half of the fifteenth century the Golden Horde splintered, leading to the creation of the Kazan' khanate (II, 106), the Astrakhan' and Crimean khanates, the Nogai hordes (II, 208), and the Muscovite serving khanate of Kasimov, from which, under Muscovite rulers from Vasilii II through Ivan IV, many baptized Tatars entered Muscovite service, such that in the seventeenth-century Barkhatnaia kniga 17 percent of boyar clans were of Tatar origin (II, 204-06; cf. n, 140). In 1480 the Tatar Yoke[25] ended without a fight after archbishop Vassian reproached Ivan III for his inactivity (II, 122, 136). Russia guarded the eastern gates of Europe against "nomadic predatory (*khishchnoi*) Asia," permitting, in the fifteenth and. sixteenth centuries, Western Europe to explore the New World in peace, free from Muslim assaults. In the sixteenth century Muscovy went on the offensive, attacking "Asiatic nests" (in Kazan' and Astrakhan'), saving European culture from Tatar blows, acting as the rearguard of Europe (II, 397-98).

[25] Kliuchevski used the phrase "the Tatar Yoke," albeit sparingly, to describe the oppressive rule of the Tatars, despite his insistence that the centuries of that rule did not constitute a "period" of Russian history.

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One unexpected conclusion can immediately be drawn from this summary of Kliuchevskii's observations on the Tatars in his *Course*. Given the limitations of a non-narrative structure, Kliuchevskii managed to include much more Tatar information than expected. Nechkina was correct that the Tatars played a serious, if secondary, role in Kliuchevskii's depiction of the separation of southern from northeastern Rus', and that Kliuchevskii did mention Tatar economic, political and social influence on the East Slavs. If Kliuchevskii had brought all these comments together, he could have fashioned an entire lecture, not just a sub-topic, on the Tatars, which would have given the lie to the conclusion that he "neglected" or "omitted" the Mongols from his study. Instead, it would have constituted a derivative statement from the school which saw the Tatars as having no, or only negative, influence on Russian history.[26] But Kliuchevskii did not bring this material together.

Kliuchevskii's presentation of the role of the Mongols in the rise of Moscow is more than a discriminating integration of the views of Karamzin and Solov'ev. Kliuchevskii not only rejected Karamzin's emphasis on the role of the Tatars in aiding Moscow and Karamzin's exalted opinion of the Moscow princes, he drew upon all the venomous sarcasm and satire for which he was so famous to depict their depravity. But even then Kliuchevskii accorded the Tatars a serious, if, from their point of view self-destructive, role in Moscow's progress. Kliuchevskii followed Solov'ev in downplaying the contribution of the Muscovite princes in Moscow's ascendance: the Daniilovichi were tools of forces bigger than their petty policies. Moscow's ascension owed more to its geographic location, as per Solov'ev, than to the political skills, or rather, economic rapaciousness and political ruthlessness, of its princes. Moreover, Kliuchevskii introduced the notion that Moscow was the ethnographic center of the "Great Russian nation," which recognized in Moscow the instrument of its (re-)unification and therefore supported its aspirations. Geographic, economic, ethnographic reality made Moscow a national unifying center, a role realized by Dmitrii Donskoi at the battle of Kulikovo.[27] Within this grand scheme of things, the Tatars were an accidental force, malevolent and destructive, but still and all

[26] Michael Cherniavsky classified Kliuchevskii among those historians who concluded that the Tatars had contributed to political and administrative centralization, placing Solov'ev among the group which saw the Tatar Yoke as of little significance. Michael Cherniavsky, "Khan or Basileus: An Aspect of Russian Mediaeval Political Theory," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 20 (1959), p. 459 n. 1, reprinted in Michael Cherniavsky, ed. *The Structure of Russian History: Interpretive Essays* (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 65, n. 1 (on p. 74 endnotes).

[27] Kliuchevskii explicitly characterized Karamzin's views as containing more feeling than fact. Solov'ev's explanation of the rise of Moscow based upon material, economic and geographic considerations rather than the personal qualities of the Muscovite princes was, in Kliuchevskii's opinion, far stronger. Circumstances created the opportunity for Moscow's success. See Kliuchevskii's anonymous "Dvadtsatipiatiletie Istoriii Rossii S. M. Solov'eva", from *Drevniaia i novaia Rossiia* t. 1, no. 1 (1877), 107-13, published in *Sochineniia* 7 (1959), 126 n. 1 which is on pp. 465-69.

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temporary. The degree to which Kliuchevskii revised Solov'ev has been a bone of contention within Russian historiography since at least 1912,[28] but there was little if any disagreement between them on the effects of Mongol rule on Russia.

Kliuchevskii left a great deal about Russo-Tatar relations from his own prior publications out of his *Course*. It must be remembered that he chose what to include and what to exclude. Examination of his other research demonstrates conclusively that ignorance of Russo-Tatar relations did not motivate most of his omissions. Kliuchevskii knew far more about the significance of the Tatars in Russian history than he wrote in the *Course*. What Kliuchevskii had to say about the Tatars in these other works was often a function of their scope and form; therefore, it is preferable to discuss most works separately; such an approach has the additional benefit of illustrating how often the Tatars intruded into Kliuchevskii' s writings.

In Kliuchevskii's manuscript notes for writing his "candidate's" thesis on foreign travel accounts to Muscovy, he argued out the evidence for dating each text, material he did not include in the printed version. To date Barbarino's account Kliuchevskii analyzed the chronology of Gireid rulers of the Crimea and the timing of the Ottoman conquest.[29] Kliuchevskii did not delve into Crimean history in his *Course*.

In his anonymous supplements to the Russian translation of P. Kirchmann's *Geschichte Arbeit und Kultur*, published in Russian as *Istoriia obshchestvennogo i chastnogo byta. Chtenie v shkole i doma* (1867), Kliuchevskii admitted that the East Slavs traded with the Pechenegs for milk, butter, cheese; borrowed the millet beverage *buza*; and bought sheep, meat and wool for clothing. Under Tatar rule the Russians borrowed so many elements of Tatar dress that most of their clothing terms derived from the steppe, as Richard Hellie has recently quantified; copied their style of haircuts; borrowed steppe weapons, sabers, armaments; replaced the Slavic term for money (*kun'*) with the

[28] In the volume *V. O. Kliuchevskii. Kharakteristiki i vospominaniia* (Moscow: Nauchnoe slovo, 1912), see especially M. M. Bogoslovskii, "V. O. Kliuchevskii kak uchenyi," pp. 26-44; M. K. Liubavskii, "Solov'ev i Kliuchevskii," pp. 45-58; B. I. Syromiatnikov, "V. O. Kliuchevskii i Chicherin," pp. 59-73; and P. N. Miliukov, "V. O. Kliuchevskii," pp. 183-217; also A. E. Presniakov, "V. O. Kliuchevskii (1911-1921)," *Russkii istoricheskii zhurnal* 8 (1922). 203-24, and A. E. Presniakov, "S. M. Solov'ev i ego vliianie na razvitie russkoi istoriografii," in *Voprosy istoriografii i istochnikovedeniia istorii SSSR* (Moscow-Leningrad: Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1963), pp. 73-86, a 1920 talk; A. A. Zimin," Formirovanie istoricheskikh vzgliadov V. O. Kliucheskogo v 60-e gody XIX v.," *Istoricheskie zapiski* 69 (1961), 178-96; R. A. Kireeva, *V. O. Kliuchevskii kak istorik russkoi istoricheskoi nauki* (Moscow: Nauka, 1966), pp. 202-10; and A. N. Shakhanov, "Uchitel' i uchenik: S. M. Solov'ev i V. O. Kliuchevskii," in *Kliuchevskii. Sbornik materialov*, pp. 304-21. Cf. A. N. Medushevskii, "Posleslovie," in V. O. Kliuchevskii, *Skazanie inostrantsev o Moskovskom gosudarstve* (Moscow: Promitei, 1991), pp. 291-321. Solov'ev is usually grouped with the "state" or "juridical school", but cf. Gary Hamburg, "Inventing the 'State School' of Historians, 1840-1995," in Thomas Sanders, ed., *Historiography of Imperial Russia. The Profession and Writing of History in a Multinational State* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 98-117.

[29] E. G. Chumachenko, *V. O. Kliuchevskii - istochnikoved* (Moscow: Nauka, 1970), pp. 23-24, Citing ORF II AN SSSR, f. 4, *op.* 1, *ed. xr.* 95, I. 5.

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Tatar word *den'ga*, and learned children's and adult games such as knucklebones, bones, and chess from or via the Tatars.[30] In his *Course* Kliuchevskii did not mention East Slavic trade with or cultural borrowing from the Tatars.

In an early version of his lectures, read to the Higher Courses for Women (Ger'e courses), Kliuchevskii mentioned that the nomadic border guards of the Kievan period were called *Chernye Klobuky*, who constituted an element of the Kievan prince's military might and participated in his civil wars. After the death of Vladimir Monomakh, the East Slavs could no longer acquire booty and slaves by raids on the nomads in the steppe, as evidenced by die military failure immortalized in the *Slovo o polku Igoreve.* The decline of cultural life in post-Mongol conquest Rus' was documented by the survival only of dry chronicles from the later thirteenth century; Nevskii's refusal to live in Kiev corroborated the Tatar ruin of that city; and the regular succession according to Kievan dynastic rales of Riurikid princes to the grand-princely throne from 1240 through the end of the thirteenth century illustrated Tatar non-interference in the East Slavic political order. Kliuchevskii noticed that Aleksandr Nevskii and his brother Andrei traveled to the Horde[31]; alluded to the history of Fedor of Iaroslavl'; and provided a detailed narrative, replete with Tatar envoys, punitive expeditions, and political meddling, of the political feuds of Vladimir-Suzdalia from 1296 through the fourteenth century, in which he characterized Iurii Daniilovich as a Machiavellian, in contrast to the Don Quixote Mikhail of Tver', who prematurely thought he could tilt at the Horde. The fourteenth-century Muscovite princes were more in tune with their times and with the needs of the Russian people (*narod*) than their Tverian rivals, their unlimited egoism and arbitrariness (*proizvol*) enabled them to accumulate the resources to lead the national struggle against the Tatars. The idea of national unity around Moscow did not precede Moscow's success but arose after it had achieved political preeminence; in other words, the early Muscovite princes had not formulated unselfish national goals before they embarked upon their successful, if immoral, careers. Dmitrii Donskoi's 1388 treaty with his cousin Vladimir Andreevich of Serpukhov created a contingency plan for the retention of the Tatar tribute should "God deliver, save" Muscovy from the Horde. Allusions to Aleksei Popovich from folklore were inserted into sixteenth-century versions of the tale of the battle on the river Kalka. Murza-Chet and Serkiz were fourteenth-century Tatar ancestors of Muscovite boyar clans. Kliuchevskii compiled an admittedly incomplete list of 200 sixteenth-century boyar family names; of these, 46 were old *boiare*, "over 80" serving Riurikovich princes, 42 from

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[30] V. O. Kliuchevskii, *Istoriia russkogo byta. Izobreteniia i usovershenstvovaniia sredstv k udovletvorenniiu nastoiatel'nykh zhiznennykh potrebnosti: chteniia v shkole i doma* (Moscow: Vash Vybor TSIRZ, 1995), pp. 11, 15 n. 1 (from Kliuchevskii's draft, not printed), 33, 43, 47, 48, 61-62, 66, 69. This 73-page booklet was put together by R. A. Kireeva.

[31] Kliuchevskii did not note that Nevskii and his father traveled to Mongolia.

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Lithuania or Gediminovich, and "the rest," approximately 30, came from the Horde or Volga Finn tribes.[32]

The Ger'e lectures fill in several gaps *vis-à-vis* the *Course*.[33] First, if evidence were required, they prove that Kliuchevskii was conversant with the thirteenth-fifteenth century chronicles which form the building blocks of any political narrative of the period. Kliuchevskii, as his specialized course on source-study substantiates, certainly had assimilated the Laurentian, Hypatian, Novgorod, Tver', Voskresen'e, Sofia, and Nikon chronicles.[34] He knew the details of Iurii Daniilovich's marriage to the sister of Khan Uzbek, Konchaka, and her unfortunate fate after capture by the Tverians. He was familiar with the different chronicle versions of the 1327 Tver' uprising.[35] Secondly, the Ger'e lectures definitively prove that when Kliuchevskii constructed a political narrative, he had to, and did, mention the Tatars frequently. It seems unlikely anyone would have criticized these lectures as "neglecting the Tatars." But Kliuchevskii did not incorporate such detailed narrative into his *Course*.

After chronicles, saints' live constitute the second major source genre on which thirteenth to fifteenth-century narrative is constructed. Kliuchevskii's famous master's dissertation on northeast Russian *vitae* certainly provided him with more insight into those sources than virtually any other historian of his time. The monograph contained analysis of dates of composition, authorship, and the. literary history of texts either passed over in silence or barely mentioned in the *Course*. Kliuchevskii coordinated the facts of Akhmyl's raid on Tver' in 1322 and khan Berke's conversion to Islam in order to date the life of tsarevich Petr. He also mentioned the office of *baskak*. Kliuchevskii discussed the lives of Avraamyi of Smolensk,[36] Aleksandr Nevskii, Mikhail of Tver', metropolitan Petr, St. Sergius of Radonezh and St. Stefan of Perm'.[37] Analysis of the *vita* of metropolitan Aleksei included mention of his trips to the Horde and of his receipt of a *iarlyk* from Taidula, the wife of khan Chanibek. Kliuchevskii discussed the life of Mikhail of Chernigov, with its appended (and late, fantastic) tale of the Death of Batu in Hungary. He gave greater consideration to the life of Fedor of Iaroslavl', with its legendary stories about Batu. Summary of the life of archbishop Iona of Novgorod elicited allusions to

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[32] V. O. Kliuchevskii, *Lektsii po russkoi istorii, chitannye na Vysshikh zhenskikh kursakh v Moskve, 1872-1875* (Moscow: Gumanitarayi izdatel'skii tsentr' VLADOS, 1997), pp. 115, 139-45, 175-77, 193-96, 201-12, 224, 253-54, 258, 261, 267, 269 (obviously a different "count" than that in the *Course*). R. A. Kireeva and A. F. Kiselev edited this 813-page volume. Kliuchevskii uncritically accepted legendary *boiar* genealogies about Tatar *rod* ancestors.

[33] Similar narrative material can be found in Kliuchevskii's college textbook: V. O. Kliuchevskii, *Kratkoe posobie po russkoi istorii* (Moscow: Progress-PANGEIIA, 1992, rpt. of 5th edition, 1906). pp. 44, 30, 61, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 76, 87, 88, 97, 99.

[34] On Kliuchevskii's knowledge of the chronicles, see Chumachenko, pp. 154-61; Kireeva, *V. O. Kliuchevskii*, pp. 49-59.

[35] See V. O. Kliuchevskii, "Kurs lektsii po istochnikovedeniiu," *Sochinenia* 6 (1959), 9-39.

[36] He did not discuss the legend of Merkurii of Smolensk.

[37] He did not inform his readers of the use of Horde regnal years in this *vita*.

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the battle of the river Vorskla in 1399, which Vitovt lost, and of Vasilii II's capture by Tatars, neither of which was mentioned in the *Course*.[38]

Much debate about Kliuchevskii's study of saints' lives has focused upon his negative conclusion about their value as historical sources, contested at his dissertation defense, and in most scholars' opinions, repudiated by Kliuchevskii himself in his subsequent publications. In this monograph Kliuchevskii rarely if ever elucidated hagiographic data which he did believe of value as historical evidence. Kliuchevskii therefore missed a golden opportunity to do what he had done in his study on travel accounts to Muscovy and what he criticized Platonov for not doing in the latter's study of narratives about the Time of Troubles: Kliuchevskii did not mobilize the contents of the *vitae* to construct an image of the Tatars and especially of the Tatar Khans in East Slavic hagiography.

In his specialized course on terminology, Kliuchevskii traced the word *kabala* to Hebrew, but failed to mention that this form of slavery might have entered Muscovy from the Horde. Nor did he suggest a Horde origin for beating on the shins, *pravezh*. But he did identify the steppe origin of *tamga* and *tamozhnia*. While he did not see anything Mongol in the Muscovite *iam* system, he saw a resemblance to "eastern letters" in Muscovite calligraphy and the use of scrolls. To illustrate the notion of *sloboda*, Kliuchevskii invoked the story of *baskak* Akhmat of Kursk, not mentioned in the *Course*. He observed that Donskoi was compelled by Tokhtamysh to resume tribute payments in 1384, but did not note Tokhtamysh's sack of Moscow (which would hardly have been compatible with Kliuchevskii's emphasis upon Moscow's geographic isolation from steppe inroads). Finally, he observed that when the word *den'ga* was copied from the Horde in the second half of the thirteenth century, *many* [my emphasis-CJH] Tatar words also entered the Russian lexicon.[39] Had Kliuchevskii so chosen, he could have put together several incisive paragraphs, if not pages, in his Course on Muscovite borrowing of Mongol fiscal, political and military institutions as a counterpoint to Russian borrowing of Tatar customs, dress and games, but he did not.

In his study of the *Boiar Duma*, his doctoral dissertation, Kliuchevskii provided yet more narrative detail on East Slavic-Tatar relations not repeated in his *Course*. He noted the population losses in Galicia-Volhynia under grand prince Daniil, but did not rehearse the famous chronicle entry excoriating Daniil's reconciliation with Batu. He concluded that "love of the *russkaia zemlia*" in literature declined in the middle of the thirteenth century, which Kliuchevskii might have attributed as much to the provincialism of the apanage system as to the aftereffects of the Tatar conquest. Kliuchevskii discussed the Tale of the Battle on the river Kalka a bit. He noted that even after Kulikovo,

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[38] Kliuchevskii, *Drevnerusskiia zhitiia sviatykh*, pp. 38-43, 57, 65-71, 71-74, 87, 88-98, 98-112 (also on St. Sergius, 117, 129-32), 139-40, 146-47, 171-74, 184-85.

[39] V. O. Kliuchevskii, "Terminologiia russkoi istorii," *Sochineniia*, 6: 167-71 (especially 168 n. 69), 170, 229-30, 187, 205, 207-08, 237, 248, 254, 259.

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money rather than arms defended Muscovy's southeastern border against the. Tatars. When he referred to the office of *kaznachei*, the term for which derived from the term *kazna*, he did not mention its steppe origin. He cited several instances of the redemption of Russian captives in the Horde in the fourteenth century by the Nizhnii Novgorod merchant Taras Petrov and by the boyar Novosil'skii. He mentioned Vasilii I's acquisition of Nizhnii Novgorod in the Horde and its occupation with Horde assistance. Concerning the siege of Moscow of 1408 he alluded to emir Edigei's epistle to Vasilii I and other narrative texts. He enumerated Saburov, Godunov, Starikov, Sorokoumov, and Beleutov as clans of Muscovite boyars by the middle of the fifteenth century which originated in the Horde, and discussed a reference in a seventeenth-century *mestnichestvo* dispute to the Vel'iaminovy as of Horde origin. Finally, he noted that the Muscovite grand prince called himself tsar' to distinguish himself from the Khan of the Golden Horde, also called tsar', and quoted the epistle of archbishop Vassian of 1480 querying how an orthodox tsar could rank lower than a Muslim tsar.[40]

Kliuchevskii's rejection of some claims for Tatar social influence shows up negatively in his specialized course on the history of estates in Russia.[41] Kliuchevskii's depiction of the apanage period did not mention any new-found servility in the Russian people, *pace* Karamzin. Both the boyars and the peasants retained freedom of movement, the former under the "right of departure," the latter because serfdom did not begin developing until the end of the fifteenth century. Kliuchevskii did not see the later regimentation of Muscovite society as an imitation of Chinggis Khan's *Iasa* or steppe society, but rather as a response to the necessity for defense against the Tatars and other enemies, echoed in the famous last sentence of George Vernadsky's *The Mongols and Russia*: "Autocracy and serfdom were the price the Russian people had to pay for national survival." He did not attribute the Muscovite *terem* to steppe influence.

In other works, Kliuchevskii did not speculate on a Mongol origin of Muscovite "collective responsibility" (*krugovaia poruka*).[42] He devoted some attention to the significance of the term *ordyntsy*.[43] Similarly, Kliuchevskii connected the Surozhane, fourteenth-century Muscovite merchants who traded on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, with the Genoese and Tatars.[44]

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[40] V. O. Kliuchevskii, *Boiarskaia duma Drevnei Rusi. Dobrye liudi drevnei Rusi* (Moscow: Ladomir, 1994), pp. 60, 75, 95, 109, 120-21, 159, 161, 168, 212-13, 248.

[41] V. O.Kliuchevskii, *Istoriia soslovii v Rossii* (Hattiesburg, MS: Academic International Press, 1969; Russian Series v. 16, reprint of 3rd edition, Petrograd, 1916), pp. 73-95.

[42] V. O. Kliuchevskii, "Sostav predstavitel'stva na zemskikh soborakh drevnei Rusi," *Opyty i izsledovaniia. Pervyi sbornik statei* (Moscow: Moskovskoe gorodskoe Arpol'do-Tret'iakovskoe Uchilishche Gliukhkonemykh i P. P. Riabushinskii, 1912), p. 515.

[43] V. O. Kliuchevskii, "Po povodu stat'i D. Golokhvastova 'Istoricheskoe znachenie slova <kormleniia>'," in *Sochineniia*, 7: 432-35.

[44] Kliuchevskii, "Sostav predstavitel'stva na zemskikh soborakh drevnei Rusi," p. 464.

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Kliuchevskii lent credence to the old notion that the necessity of Ancient (*Drevniaia*) Rus' to engage in exhaustive battle with eastern barbarians (either pre-Mongol or Mongol – CJH) had as a result her isolation from the cultural achievements of the West.[45]

In his famous study of the significance of St. Sergius, Kliuchevskii argued that there had been a risk that the superficial and external misfortune of the Mongol conquest would permanently scar the Russian psyche, inducing timidity, depression, loss of pride, moral torpor, and hopelessness, psychological consequences far more difficult to overcome, Kliuchevskii implied, than the material losses of the Tatar incursions. St. Sergius raised the moral level of the Russian people (*narod*), enabling them to overcome a century of humiliating enslavement to Asiatic barbarians. In 1380 Sergius consecrated Dmitrii Donskoi, infusing him and the Muscovite army with his own moral vigor and spiritual fortitude. Sergius inspired a spiritual awakening, the rebirth of national consciousness, without which the victory of Kulikovo would not have been possible. With their newfound self-confidence the Russian people overcame the legacy of shame of the subordination of a European people to Asiatic barbarians.[46] Surely if the Mongol conquest caused such profound changes in the social psychology, morality, and civic consciousness of the East Slavs for nearly a century and a half, it can hardly be said to have been without consequence. Nevertheless, Kliuchevskii did not use the arguments of this talk, given at the Trinity-St. Sergius Monastery, in his *Course*.[47]

Kliuchevskii criticized Ikonnikov for interpreting Mongol patronage as the key factor in monastic colonization of the Moscow and northeastern regions,[48] but he criticized Gorchakov for overlooking the evidence of the

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[45] V. O. Kliuchevskii, "Pamiati A. S. Pushkina," *Sochineniia* 8 (1959), p. 307.

[46] V. O. Kliuchevskii, "Znachenie Prep. Sergiia dlia russkogo naroda i gosudarstva," *Otzyvy i rechi*, pp. 194-209; anonymous English translation: V. O. Kliuchevskii, "St Sergius: The Importance of his Life and Work," *Russian Review*, 2, no. 3 (London, 1913), 45-59. Kliuchevskii's interpretation of monasticism not as a rejection of the world but as a civilizing force, emphasizing its secular rather than spiritual significance, corroborates Paul Bushkovitch, "V. O. Kliuchevskii as a Historian of Religion and the Church," C-ASS 20, nos. 3-4 (Fall-Winter 1986), 357-66. Kliuchevskii is now rightly accused of neglecting religion and the Church in his Course and to some extent in general; also cf. Gregory Freeze, "Russian Orthodoxy in Prerevolutionary Historiography. The Case of V. O. Kliuchevskii," *ibid.*, 399-416, and Robert F. Byrnes, "Between Two Fires: Kliuchevskii on Religion and the Russian Orthodox Church," *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook*, 6 (1990), 157-85.

[47] Noticed perhaps first by George Fedotov, "Kliuchevskii's Russia' by George P. Fedotov," p.218 (on other omissions, pp. 215-18); and by S. A. Mezin, "V. O. Kliuchevskii kak istorik russkoi kul'tury X-XVII vekov," in Kliuchevskii. *Sbornik materialov*, pp. 175-76. Kliuchevskii's interpretation depends upon a literal reading of the "life" of St. Sergius and disregard for Kliuchevskii's own analysis of the dating and literary history of the text; let alone upon totally unsubstantiated (and unprovable) assertions about the mood and consciousness of the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century "Russian people."

[48] V. O. Kliuchevskii, "Novye issledovaniia po istorii drevne-russkikh monastyrei. Razbor sochinenii V. Ikonnikova," in *Otzyvy i otvety. Tretii sbornik statei* (Petrograd: Literaturno-izdatel'skii otdel Komissariata Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia, 1918), p. 53.

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khan's *iarlyki*.[49] These criticisms seem contradictory, unless Horde fiscal and judicial immunities helped the hierarchs of the Church acquire already settled lands but did not facilitate the settlement of new lands by monastic entrepreneurs.

Kliuchevski in none of his research, as far as I have ascertained, mentioned the Horde *iarlyk* which granted Novgorodian merchants free and safe passage through Vladimir-Suzdalia, nor speculated on the positive economic role of international trade with and through the Horde upon the economic revival of Novgorod and northeastern Russia from the middle of the thirteenth to the middle of the fourteenth century, until divisions within the Horde and the rise of Timur altered the caravan routes. While Kliuchevskii is sometimes praised for anticipating the "new history" in the United States or the *Annales* school in France, he never appreciated the social implications of intimate East-Slavic relations with the Polovtsy and other, nomads in the Kievan period or the Mongols in terms of biculturalism and bilingualism, the shared social ethos of epics such as the *Slovo o polku Igoreve or Zadonshchina*. He had such an aversion for military history it is no wonder he never completely appreciated Muscovite borrowing of the Mongol military formation or understanding of Tatar tactics and strategy. He never confronted the significance of Mongol patronage for the material and spiritual development of the Church, which gave Golubinskii such trouble. And he lacked any understanding of Chingissid ideology or its manipulation by Muscovite bookmen in their presentation of Mamai, Timur, and Edigei. Many aspects of Russo-Tatar relations totally eluded Kliuchevskii.

Yet we must draw the inescapable conclusion that Kliuchevskii knew far more about Russo-Tatar relations than he chose to include in his *Course*. Even a partial list would include the *iarlyki* to the Church; the *baskak* system; Muscovite borrowing of the *tamga*, *kazna* and other fiscal institutions, as well as weapons; popular borrowing of Tatar clothing, foods, and games; Horde impact on Muscovite society in the form of such groups as the *ordynsty* and *chislenniki*; and numerous narrative texts, *vitae*, and events of Russo-Tatar relations only a narrative could fully convey. Kliuchevskii admitted more Tatar influence on Russia's political, economic, social and cultural development than it seems; he identified short-term and long-term effects of the Tatar conquest; and he took a very negative attitude toward that influence. Had Kliuchevskii synthesized all this material into one, let alone two, lectures in his *Course*, it would have been far more difficult to deny the consequences of the Tatar role, or even to confine them to negative destruction and isolation. More important psychologically, Kliuchevskii would not have been comfortable with the role in Russian history thus accorded to the Tatars.

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[49] V. O. Kliuchevskii, "Razbor sochineniia o. Gorchakova, 'O zemel'nykh vladeniiakh vserossiiskikh mitropolitov, patriarkhov i sv. Sinoda," *ibid*., p. 221.

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Kliuchevskii did not want to give the Tatars their due in his *Course* or in general. He avoided conceding some Tatar influence by misdirection: If the Mongols directly affected fourteenth-century Russian political history, they had not interfered in thirteenth-century grand-princely succession or restructured the political system; if the Tatars had so devastated the Dnepr' region that the south became isolated from the northeast and fell prey to "alien" Poles and Lithuanians, then the migration of East Slavs out of the south had begun earlier[50]; if the Tatar conquest devastated the Russian psyche, then thanks to St. Sergius the Russian people recovered. He simply did not draw conclusions from evidence of Muscovite borrowing of Horde institutions such as the treasury or taxes, any more than that of Kievan borrowing of the title *kagan.* Kliuchevskii chose to find other topics more important to the course of Russian history.

The sources of Kliuchevskii's obfuscation of the Tatar issue may be found in two locations: in some of his public and private comments about the Tatars, and in nineteenth-century European historiography.

Kliuchevskii always wore a mask in public, and often in private, but sometimes his personal attitudes do emerge. Kliuchevskii observed that Solov'ev thought that in battle, "European quality always celebrated victory over Asiatic quantity."[51] In his celebrated study of the "ancestors of Eugene Onegin," Kliuchevskii observed that a Europeanized member of the eighteenth-century Russian gentry "was regarded as a Tatar in European dress" by West Europeans.[52] Kliuchevskii compared the period of Biron's influence under Empress Anne to a *tatarshchina*,[53] i.e., a period of evil Tatar oppression. According to Kliuchevskii, Peter the Great knew that he would be seen in the West not as a European ruler (*gosudar'*) but as an "Asiatic despot."[54]

[50] In his own lifetime Ukrainian national historians rejected the theory Kliuchevskii inherited from Pogodin that the inhabitants of the Dnepr' river valley had migrated en masse to Vladimir-Suzdalia; subsequent archeological research has substantiated the Ukrainian critique.

[51] V. O. Kliuchevskii, "S. M. Solov'ev kak prepodovatel'," in *Ocherki i rechi. Vtoroi sbornik statei* (Petrogard: Literaturno-izdatel'skii otdel Narodnogo komissariata po Prosveshcheniiu, 1918, rpt of 1915), p. 35. According to Ana Siljak, "Christianity, Science and Progress in Sergei M. Solov'ev's History of Russia," in *Historiography of Imperial Russia*, pp. 215-238, to Solov'ev, following Guizot, Asia was despotic, stagnant, passive and indolent, in contrast to Europe with its practical, vigorous Christianity. Cf. Edward C. Thaden, "Frederich Meinecke and Russian Historicism," in Edward C. Thaden, in collaboration with Marianna Foster Thaden, *Interpreting History: Collected Essays on Russia's Relations with Europe* (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, East European Monographs CCCIV, 1990), pp. 53-72. This statement is also factually in error: smaller armies of mounted steppe archers often defeated larger armies from sedentary states, and Barn's forces were never defeated when he invaded Central and Eastern Europe.

[52] V. O. Kliuchevskii, "Evgenii Onegin i ee predki," in *Ocherki i rechi*, p. 80; Marshall S. Shatz, tr., "Evgenii Onegin and His Ancestors' by V. O. Kliuchevskii," C-ASS, 16, no. 2 (Summer 1982), 241.

[53] V. O. Kliuchevskii, "Imperatritsa Ekaterina II," in *Ocherki i rechi*, p. 343.

[54] V. O. Kliuchevskii, "Petr Velikii sredi svoikh sotrudnikov," *ibid.*, p. 489. Cf. V. O. Kliuchevskii, *Skazanie inostrantsev o Moskovskom gosudarstve* (Petrograd: Literaturno-zdatel'skii otdel Komissariata Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia, 1918), p. 173.

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Kliuchevskii clearly disagreed with Schlözer that a numerous people, regardless of their level of development, were more important historically than a small state, which had achieved a degree of culture, sarcastically noting that according to Schlözer's criteria, compared to Chinggis Khan, - Alcibiades (Alkiviad) was no more than a "village elder" (*sel'skii starosta*).[55] Kliuchevskii frequently declared that under serfdom the gentry oppressed the peasantry worse than under the Tatar Yoke.[56]

In his university textbook Kliuchevskii interpreted the expansion of the Russian Empire into Central Asia and Russia's relationship with the Orthodox Balkan subjects of the Ottoman Empire in a prejudicial fashion. He endorsed Russian efforts in the eighteenth and nineteenth century to free Balkan Christians from the "Turkic" or "Muslim" (*magometanskogo*) yoke and stigmatized the "religious fanaticism of the Turks." He advised Russia to deal with her Asiatic populations according to the demands of "European Christian civilization." He referred to the objections of "yellow races (*rasy*)" to "the achievements of Russian culture and expansion in the Far East," i.e., Japanese and Chinese opposition to Russian activities in Manchuria. The battle between civilized Christianity and uncivilized Islam continued.[57]

In an 1861 letter, Kliuchevskii, newly arrived in Moscow, informed Gvozdev that he had visited what the Moscovites call their "market" (*rynok*); in Moscow no one says "bazaar" (*bazar*), because "bazaar" is a Tatar word, "although nobody had such an extensive and painful acquaintance with the Mongols as the Muscovites" (*nikomu ne prokhodilos' tak chasto i tak bol'no znakomit'sia s tatarem, kak v Moskve*).[58] Kluchevskii listed among the negative circumstances of Russian history the *tatarshchina*, *vizantievshchina*, and *boiarshchina*.[59] He excoriated the hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church for their "Mongol relationship to priests' pockets," i.e., greed.[60] In his diary-like notes, Kliuchevskii concluded that Peter had turned a "semi-Asiatic state," i.e., Russia, into a European power, but he likened Peter's mostly foreign officeholders, the Meisters, Dichters, Kommisars, Räte, to *baskaki*, *temniki*, and *chislenniki*. The Emperor Paul he labeled an Asiatic Despot, while lambasting Alexander I's "Asiatic cowardice." [61]

Kliuchevskii's controversial memorial speech in honor of Emperor Alexander III claimed that until the latter's reign, Russia had been viewed by and large as the advance guard (*avant-gard*) of "Asiatic barbarianism", an

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[55] V. O. Kliuchevskii, "Lektsii po russkoi istoriografii," *Sochineniia*, 8: 448-49.

[56] Nechkina, *Vasilii Osipovich Kliuchevskii*, pp. 521-522.

[57] Kliuchevskii, *Kratkoe posobie po russkoi istorii*, pp. 144-52 *passim*.

[58] Kliuchevskii, Letter 4, Sept 3, 1861, to P. P. Gvozdev, in *V. O. Kliuchevskii, Pis'ma. Dnevniki. Aformizmy i mysli ob istorii* (Moscow: Nauka, 1968), p. 25 [hereafter Kliuchevskii, PDA]. My sincerest thanks to Professor Ben Eklof for assistance in translating (freely rather than literally) this somewhat awkward construction.

[59] Kliuchevskii to P. P. Gvozdev, Letter 9, Oct. 27, 1861, *ibid*., p. 56.

[60] Kliuchevskii to P. P. Gvozdev, Letter 18, June 14, 1862, *ibid*., p. 97.

[61] "Dnevnikovye zapisi 1902-1911," *ibid*., pp. 392, 393, 316-17.

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eternal threat to European civilization, despite the fact that Russia had saved Europe from slavery to Batu and Napoleon. Nevertheless Europe saw Russia as "advance Asia" (*peredniuiu Aziiu*), an enemy of European freedom, a representative of Mongol stagnation (*kosnost'*). It was Alexander III's great service to show that Russia was part of the European family of nations and civilization.[62]

But Kliuchevskii's most revealing remarks came in the midst of Russia's catastrophic defeats in the Russo-Japanese War. On May 16, 1904 he wrote:

> Asia enlightened Europe, and Europe conquered Asia. Now Europe is enlightening fallen Asia. Will Asia repeat the same operation on Europe? That depends on the European party of anarchy, if this party quiets down in view of the Yellow Peril (*Zheltoi opasnosti*). Europe will be defeated by the yellow pygmies, if [it] will carry on outrageously and murder even old empresses. White Europe will overpower Yellow Asia. Victory is possible through the unity of the European peoples, and it is achievable only in the course of battle with anarchy.[63]

Kliuchevskii presented the Russo-Japanese War in racist terms. The "yellow pygmies" were the Japanese, a common epithet at the time. The "forces of anarchy" were revolutionary movements in Europe.[64] If the forces of anarchy demonstrate self-restraint because of the war, then Russia will win the war. If the forces of anarchy carry on, even murdering "old empresses" (Empress Elizabeth of Austria, age 61, was murdered by an Italian anarchist in Geneva in 1898), then Europe will be defeated.[65] Russia will be victorious only if supported by the European powers. Kliuchevskii thus linked opposition to "anarchy" with support for Russia's war against Japan. For our purposes, it is more important that Kliuchevskii was familiar with racist views of contemporary European/Asian relations which could have influenced his historical conclusions, than that he only gave vent to racist ideology in a moment of national crisis.

In all of his writings, published and unpublished, Kliuchevskii always chose his words with enormous care, and the published form of his *Course*

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[62] V. O. Kliuchevskii, "Pamiati v boze pochivshego gosudaria imperatora Aleksandra III," in *V. O. Kliuchevskii, Literaturnye portrety* (Moscow: Sovremennik, 1991), pp. 408-11.

[63] As printed in Kliuchevskii, PDA, p. 305, this passage is contradictory, the conclusion of Nechkina, *Vasilii Osipovich Kliuchevskii*, pp. 446-47. I owe the re-punctuation presented here to Professor Paul Bushkovitch, to whom I wish to express my sincerest appreciation for rendering nonsense into sense.

[64] Nechkina specified "Russian revolutionary movements," which contradicts both Kliuchevskii's adjective "European" and the reference to murdered empresses; see next note.

[65] I owe the interpretation of the allusion to Elizabeth to Paul Bushkovitch. Nechkina omitted the phrase about murdering empresses when she quoted this passage, and provided no possible explanation.

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embodied the results of thirty years of scrupulous, meticulous and painstaking editing.

Kliuchevskii's terminology, therefore, was very consciously chosen. And as far as steppe nomads were concerned, that vocabulary represented all of the most stereotyped Eurocentric notions about steppe nomads, Muslims, and Asians, in short the Orient, rife in European culture since the classical Greeks, and still ubiquitous in many contemporary textbooks of Russian history. A background lecture on Chinggis Khan and the rise of the Mongol empire would have been too great a distraction in his lecture course, but Kliuchevskii disregarded the fact that the Golden Horde had a government, a bureaucratic structure, international diplomatic relations, cities. Kliuchevskii's very choice of words relegates the Tatars virtually to the status of an atavistic evil, whose actions did not require intelligent historical analysis because they were inspired by no more than primitive malignant urges. To Kliuchevskii, the Tatars represent the standard of oppression, exceeded only by his particular *bête-noire*, the Imperial Russian gentry. Kliuchevskii's image of the Tatars was propagated within the broader paradigm of the antagonism of nomads and farmers since time immemorial, hence the more benign view of the sedentary, hence partially civilized, Khazars[66] but its coloration came from religious animosity, the war of Christendom and Islam which turned Russia into yet another *antemurale*, a set of images Kliuchevskii took from Solov'ev.

Certainly these overlapping pejorative images and attitudes about the Orient, Asia and Islam were endemic in Russian thought of Kliuchevskii's lifetime. Russians and Europeans alike described as "Asiatic" or "Tatar" whatever characteristic of Russian life, institutions or culture they disliked. This intellectual genealogy of these attitudes goes back to Montesquieu and the Encyclopedists, to Hegel and the notion of "ahistorical peoples," and can be found in Marx and Engels and that line of ideology which led to the Asiatic Mode of Production and the theory of Oriental Despotism. But it is one thing to find such blatant Eurocentric bias in the ideological polemics of a professional revolutionary such as Plekhanov,[67] and quite another for them to influence the scholarly works of a professional historian of Kliuchevskii's caliber.

As an undergraduate student, Kliuchevskii took a field in "world" (*vseobshchaia*) history with Eshesvkii. Like his predecessors at Moscow University, the widely known and influential Granovskii and the more obscure Kudriavtsev, Eshevskii understood "world" history as what would until fairly

[66] David Christian, *A History of Russia, Central Asia and Mongolia*. Volume I: *Inner Eurasia from Prehistory to the Mongol Empire* (Oxford, England: Blackwell, 1998), pp. xv-xvi, criticizes "the 'logocentrism' (the bias towards literate sources and literate societies) and 'agrocentrism' (the bias towards agrarian, urban civilizations) of modern historiography."

[67] E.g., Samuel H. Baron, "Plekhanov's Russia: the Impact of the West upon an 'Oriental' Society," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 19 (1958), 388-404, reprinted in Samuel H. Baron, *Muscovite Russia. Collected Essays* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1980), Essay XII.

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recently in the United States have been called "Western Civilization": ancient Near East, Greece and Rome; medieval, early modern, and modern Europe.[68] Kliuchevskii's professors and later colleagues at Moscow University, including Solov'ev, had traveled and trained in Western Europe, and were thoroughly conversant with European historiography.[69] Kliuchevskii requested permission to travel in Europe three times, but was always denied and never went.[70] He read French, German and English, and was familiar, although it is sometimes difficult to tell whether at first- or second-hand, with the luminaries of contemporary European historical scholarship.[71] In music he loved Beethoven, Mendelssohn, and Liszt; in theater, Molière, Shakespeare, and Hugo.[72] Kliuchevskii's Eurocentric judgments, his ambivalence about Russia's place in Europe and sensitivity to West-European arrogance *vis-à-vis* non-European Russia, were all fundamental elements of his intellectual and cultural world-view, typical for any educated, i.e., Europeanized intellectual of late Imperial Russia. Given that intellectual background, he was hardly likely to look favorably upon the Tatar influence in Russian history. Even when Kliuchevskii emphasized the distinctiveness of Russian historical evolution compared to West-European, West-European history remained the standard by which the past of Russia - or anywhere else - would be judged.

Too much should not be made of Kliuchevskii's provincialism as a source of his nationalist exclusion of non-Russians from his history.[73] If he did not travel in Western Europe, he wanted to. Solov'ev did spend considerable time in Europe, and Solov'ev's attitude toward the Tatars was. indistinguishable from Kliuchevskii's. Kliuchevskii might have been less conversant with modern European history than Solov'ev, but he did teach it, and he was probably more

[68] V. P. Bezuskul, *Vseobshchaia istoriia i ee predstaviteli v Rossii v XIX-nachale XX veke*, 2 vols. (Leningrad: Akademiia nauk, 1929-31), 1: 47-64, 65-77, 77-80.

[69] Byrnes. *Kliuchevskii*, pp. 28-45.

[70] *Ibid.*, p. 46

[71] V. O. Kliuchevskii, "[Metodologiia russkoi istorii]," *Sochineniia v deviati tomakh* (Moscow: Mysl', 1989), 6: 53-57 discuss the theories of Bossuet; François Laurent, Études sur l'histoire de l'humanité; and Hegel; 80, François Odysse Barot, Lettres sur la Philosophie de l'histoire.

[72] Byrnes, *Kliuchevskii*, p. 23.

[73] Despite Robert F. Byrnes, "The Young Kliuchevskii: 'Under the Bells' of Penza." *Slavonic and East European Review*, 67, no. 4 (Oct. 1989), 564-80, apparently translated as R. Berns, "Molodoi Kliuchevskii: 'Pod sen'iu kolokolov Penzy'," *Zemstvo* (Penza), No. 4 (1994), tr. V. Dvorniakov. For example, Byrnes wrote that there was no evidence of Kliuchevskii's interest in the Mordvinians, Meshcheriaks and Tatars who surrounded Penza, but Kliuchevskii "must have been aware" of them (pp. 567-568). Cf. Albert Parry, "Vasily Osipovich Klyuchevsky (1841-1911)," in Bernadotte Schmitt, ed., *Some Historians of Modern Europe* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 196: Kliuchevskii grew up in Penza, where Russians lived "cheek by jowl" with conquered Tatars and semi-assimilated Finnish Mordvin and Meshcheriak. Perhaps in Penza Kliuchevskii learned to ignore the Tatars.

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familiar with medieval and early modern European history, of greater relevance to evaluating Mongol influence.[74]

There were extraneous professional considerations conducive to the same result. Kliuchevskii could not have studied oriental history at Moscow University. In 1855 instruction in oriental languages and area studies had been centralized by the creation of the Faculty of Oriental Languages at St. Petersburg University, which drew faculty from Moscow, Kazan',[75] and Odessa (the Richelieu *lycée*).[76] Instruction in oriental languages continued in Moscow at the Lazarev Institute, which shared faculty and students with Moscow University, as well as active participation in the Oriental Commission of the Moscow Archeological Society,[77] and there was a professor of oriental languages at Moscow University when Kliuchevskii was a student, with whom he studied Sanskrit (during his comparative religion phase),[78] but Kliuchevskii could not have taken a course in oriental history as an undergraduate.

However, he could have become familiar with how things looked from Sarai, or even Karakorum, by reading: Hammer-Purgstall in German,[79] D'Ohsson in French,[80] even Howorth in English,[81] and most conveniently of all, numerous studies in Russian.[82] Frähn (Fren) and Savel'ev studied Golden Horde

[74] M. V. Nechkina, "V. O. Kliuchevskii o Frantsuzskoi revoliutsii 1789 g.," *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, 5 (1969), 109-15; V. O. Kliuchevskii, "Zapiski po vseobshchei istorii" Publ. R. A. Kireevy, A. A. Zimina. Vstup. Stat'ia M. V. Nechkina," *ibid.* 5 (1969), 116-21, 6 (1969), pp. 92-102; M. D. Rabinovich, "Evoliutsiia kursa vseobshchei istorii V. O. Kliuchevskogo (Po materialem lektsionnogo kursa 1879/8O g.)," *ibid.* 6 (1969), 103-08; V. O. Kliuchevskii, "Noveishaia istoriia Zapadnoi Evropy v sviazi s istoriei Rossii (konspekt)," in V. O. Kliuchevskii, *Neopublikovannye proizvedeniia*, pp.198-291. Byrnes, Kliuchevskii, pp. 67-68, described his knowledge of modern European history as "shallow,' but conceded that he had taken Eshevskii's medieval history course.

[75] S. M. Mikhailova, "Razvitie orientalistiki v Kazanskom universitete v XIX veke," in Catherine Evtuhov, Boris Gasparov, Alexander Ospovat, Mark von Hagen, eds., *Kazan, Moscow, St. Petersburg. Multiple Faces of the Russian Empire* (Moscow: OGI, 1997), pp. 275-301.

[76] V. V. Bartol'd, "Obzor deiatel'nosti fakul'teta vostochnykh iazykov," in V. V. Bartol'd, Sochineniia, 9 (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), 21-196

[77] A. P. Baziiants, "Sozdanie instituta vostochnykh iazykov v Moskve (pervaia polovina XIX v.)," *Ocherki po istorii russkogo vostokovedeniia* 6 (1963), pp. 270-301; idem, *Lazarevskii institut v istorii otechestvennogo vostokovedeniia* (Moscow: Nauka, 1973).

[78] A. A. Starikov, "Vostochnaia filologiia v Moskovskom universitete (A. V. Boldyrev i P. Ia. Petrov)," *Ocherki po istorii russkogo vostokovedeniia*, 3 (1960), 147-65. Petrov, 1852-1875, taught Arabic, Persian and Turkish, but mainly Sanskrit.

[79] Josef Freiherr von Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des Goldenen Horde in Kiptschak* (Pesth: C. A. Harleben's Verlag, 1840).

[80] Constantin D'Ohsson, *Histoire des Mongoles depuis Tchinguiz Khan jusqu'a Timour Bey ou Tamerlin*, 4 vols. (Le Haye-Amsterdam: Les Frères van Cleef, 1834; rpt. Tientsin, China, 1940).

[81] Henry Howorth, *History of the Mongols from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Centuries* (London: Longman, Greens&Co., 1876-1927), 4 volumes, although this is a derivative and compilative work, whose material on Russo-Tatar relations was cribbed from the German translation of Karamzin. Volume I appeared in 1876, II in 1880, III in 1888. Volume IV would not have been relevant to Kliuchevskii.

[82] For full bibliography, see D. Iu. Arapov, "Russkoe vostokovedenie i izuchenie istorii Zolotoi Ordy," in *Kulikovskaia bitva v istorii i kul'ture nashei rodiny (materialy iubileinoi nauchnoi konferentsii)* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1983), pp. 70-77.

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coins, Sablukov the internal structure of the Golden Horde, Grigor'ev the *iarlyki* to the Russian Orthodox Church by the Khans of the Golden Horde, Tereshchenko the archeology of the Volga region. I. N. Berezin, the occupant of the chair (*kafedra*) of Oriental History at St. Petersburg University, published studies of the Mongol Empire and the Golden Horde throughout the 1850s and 1860s, culminating in his translation of Rashid ad-Din.[83] Vel'iaminov-Zernov published bis four-volume study of Kasimov in 1863-1866. In 1884 Tizengausen (Tiesenhausen) published his excerpted translations of Arabic sources about the Golden Horde (volume II on the Persian sources remained unpublished until 1941, III and IV are still unpublished). Even within this scholarship, unfortunately, Kliuchevskii might have encountered the very same Eurocentric prejudices to which he gave voice. Berezin emphasized the negative aspects of Islam, the religion of the "false prophet" Mohammed, which retarded learning and civilization, and fed the Oriental preference for fantasy over reality.[84] Berezin was equally prejudiced against nomads.[85] Even so, the second half of the nineteenth century was an exciting time in oriental studies, particularly in Russia. Archeologists excavated.the Mongol capital at Karakorum and discovered the Orkhon river Türk inscriptions from the eighth century; ethnographers gathered significant information on the Muslim and Buddhist, Turkic and Mongol inhabitants of the Russian Empire; Russian Mongolists and Sinologists, based in the Peking Religious Mission, analyzed Chinese and Mongolian texts about the origin of the Mongol Empire. This intellectual ferment later contributed to the Eurasian movement Kliuchevskii was a contemporary of this great flowering of Russian oriental studies. However, it is impossible to prove or disprove whether Kliuchevskii familiarized himself with this scholarship, but it is self-evident that he did not apply its insights to his understanding of Russian history.[86]

It would have been impossible to learn something of a professional, objective approach to Inner Asian history by reading Buckle's history of England, Guizot's history of France, or Ranke's history of Germany: the Mongols had not conquered any of these countries, and the West European experience of Huns, Magyars, and Mongols, not to mention Ottoman Turks,

[83] See V. V. Bartol'd, "I. I. Berezin kak istorik," in *Sochineniia,* 9: 737-56 for complete citations. Oddly, V. V. Bartol'd, "Istoriia izucheniia Vostoka v Evrope i Rossii," in *Sochineniia* IX 199-482, did not discuss scholarship on the Mongol Empire or the Golden Horde.

[84] Kliuchevskii shared the stereotype of "Muslim fatalism": V. O. Kliuchevskii, "Grust'. Pamiati M. Iu. Lermontova," in *Ocherki i rechi*, p. 136; Kliuchevskii, PDA, Letter 14 to P. P. Gvozdev, Jan 27, 1862, p. 76.

[85] Bartol'd, "I. I. Berezin kak istorik," p. 737; Arapov. pp. 74-75.

[86] *Istoriia otechestvennogo vostokovedeniia do serediny XIX veka* (Moscow: Nauka, 1990), pp. 116. 120, 137, 199-202, 216, 248, 258-66, 274-84, 289-305; *Istoriia otechestvennogo vostokovedeniia do 1917 goda* (Moscow: 'Vostochnaia literature' RAN, 1997), pp. 8, 15, 22-43, 82-102, 154, 157-76, 182-88, 189-91, 204-06, 236-62, 316, 354-75, 381-91. These volumes, too, do not bring together into one chapter or section all Russian scholarship on the Mongol Empire or the Golden Horde.

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only fed the cliché of the barbarous, greedy, blood-thirsty nomads ravaging civilized Europe. The Mongols, despite their creation of an empire capable of conducting a census from China to Russia to Iran, belonged to the uncivilized world of the Orient, a world considered so static that Bartol'd had to argue that modern historical scholarly techniques could be applied to its past.

Moreover, the thrust of mainstream nineteenth-century European historiography explained history through internal, domestic causation, notably factors such as geography. The intrusions of less "civilized" peoples were insignificant and transient in their consequences. The organic nationalism that developed in Europe as a reaction to Napoleonic universalistic rationalism, Hegelianism, positivism,[87] indeed, virtually all trends of European thought which could have influenced Kliuchevskii, were consistent in this regard. The greater the emphasis on national self-consciousness, cultural autochthony, organic development, the less scope left for possible "alien" non-national historical influences.

From his Russian teachers Kliuchevskii would have imbibed the same wisdom: from Solov'ev, from Buslaev with his focus on *narodnost'*.[88] Kliuchevskii believed in the "flow" of Russian history, as a "seamless web," an organic process driven by impersonal forces.[89] There was no room for Mongol discontinuity in such a schema. But Kliuchevskii did not minimize Mongol influence alone. He sought ways to deal with the "Normanist" question which downplayed Scandinavian influence.[90] He was ambivalent and sometimes hostile toward Byzantine influence (*vizantievshchina*).[91] And, of course, he was obsessed with the impact of European influence on Russia, although at least he did not question its very existence. Kliuchevskii's attitude toward Mongol influence should not be separated from his treatment of these other instances of "foreign" influence. Given Kliuchevskii's animosity toward Scandinavian, Byzantine, and West European influence, he could hardly have treated the Mongol role in Russian history evenhandedly. Ironically, in his special lectures on Western influence in post-Petrine Russia Kliuchevskii declared that "until

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87 On Kliuchevskii as a positivist, see P. S. Shkurinov, *Pozitivizm v Rossii XIX veka* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1980), pp. 312-23.

88 V. O. Kliuchevskii, "F. I. Buslaev kak prepodovatel' i issledovatel'," *Sochineniia v deviati tomakh* (Moscow: Mysl', 1989), 8: 345-51.

89 Robert F. Byrnes, "Kliuchevskii's View of the Flow of Russian History," *Review of Politics*, 55 (1993), 565-91, reprinted in *Historiography of Imperial Russia*, pp. 239-61. Cf. S. A. Golubtsev, "Teoreticheskie vzgliady V. O. Kliuchevskogo (1911 – 12 maia – 1921)," *Russkii istoricheskii zhurnal* 8 (1922), 178-202; A. I. Karagodin, *Filosofiia istorii V. O. Kliuchevskogo* (Saratov: Saratov University, 1976). Both A. I. Karagodin, *Metodologicheskie printsipy istoricheskikh issledovanii V. O. Kliuchevskogo* (Saratov, 1982) and I. Kh. Shteingauz, *Sotsiologicheskie vzgliady V. O. Kliuchevskogo* (Irkutsk, 1977) remain inaccessible me.

90 V. O. Kliuchevskii, "Nabroski na variazhskomu voprosu," *Neopublikovannye proizvedeniia*, pp. 113-23.

91 Byrnes, "Between Two Fires," p. 168. Kliuchevskii's attitude toward Byzantine influence requires further study.

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that time [the seventeenth century-CJH], Russian society had lived under influences of indigenous origin: the conditions of its own existence and the promptings of the country's own character."[92] Such a judgment denied Mongol, Norman, and Byzantine influence upon the medieval East Slavs.

Whether or not Kliuchevskii founded a "school,"[93] none of his students sought to correct their master's presentation of the role of the Tatars in Russian history. None, so far as I know, even questioned it. Criticism of Kliuchevskii's views of the thirteenth-fifteenth centuries came from the St. Petersburg historian A. E. Presniakov, who also treated the Tatars as an external factor in Russian history, and focused on Kliuchevskii's conceptualization of the "appanage" period of Russian history.

Certainly Soviet and some other critics of Kliuchevskii's supposed "neglect" of the Mongols would not have disagreed with his overwhelmingly negative assessment of their impact upon Russia, in part because they shared the national prejudices which shaped Kliuchevskii's views. Their complaint was that Kliuchevskii did not blame the Mongols enough, did not devote enough space to the harmful, baneful, dreadful consequences for Russia of the Mongol incursion. Recent scholarship on the relationship of the East Slavs and their nomadic steppe neighbors continues to confront this ideological Eurocentric opposition to a more even-handed and up-to-date study of this problem.[94]

In conclusion, if it is superficially true that Kliuchevskii "neglected" or "omitted" the Tatar role in Russian history, then it must be added that he did so deliberately, not inadvertently. It is only half-true to say that he "forgot" them. Kliuchevskii had an excellent memory, and he remembered the Mongols all too well. Even given the possible limits of his knowledge, he knew full well how extensive the Mongol impact on Russian history had been. His ambivalence toward this knowledge derived from a typically nineteenth-century European prejudice against nomads, Asians, and Muslims, and was fueled by a typically post-Petrine Europeanized Russian sensitivity to Russia's inclusion within civilized Europe. Kliuchevskii could never admit that European accusations of Russian "Tatarness" were valid. It would be accurate and fair to say that Kliuchevskii minimized Mongol influence on Russian history despite what he knew as a historian, because that was what he wanted to be true.[95] Evaluations

[92] Marshall S. Shatz tr., "Western Influence on Russia after Peter the Great' by V. O. Kliuchevskii," C-ASS, 20, 3-4 (Fall-Winter 1986), 469.

[93] T. Emmons, "Kliuchevskii i ego ucheniki," *Voprosy istorii*, 10 (1990), pp. 45-61, a slightly different version of which appeared as Terence Emmons, "Kliuchevskii's Pupils," *California Slavic Studies*, 14 (1992), 68-98, and was reprinted in *Historiography of Imperial Russia*, pp. 118-45.

[94] Donald Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steepe Frontier, 1304-1589* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998).

[95] Or, to be colloquial but not facetious, when it came to the Tatars in Russian history, Kliuchevskii had a major hang-up.

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of Kliuchevskii as a historian should begin to grapple with the implications of his disingenuous treatment of the Tatar Yoke. Those contemporary Russians who extol Kliuchevskii's works in general and his *Course* in particular as the "true history of Russia" should ponder the extent to which Kliuchevskii was the prisoner of dated prejudices inimical to historical scholarship.

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THE MISSING GOLDEN HORDE CHRONICLES AND HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE MONGOL EMPIRE[1]

In his study of the spread of Islam in the Golden Horde, Devin DeWeese makes the following observation:

> [N]o written history of the Golden Horde reflecting an internal perspective appears until the fifteenth century at the earliest...[Written histories] come not from the center of the Golden Horde itself, but from Central Asia, where they emerge first for Ṫimurid, and later for Shibanid Uzbek, patronage of Islamic historiographical endeavors. There is thus no indigenous historiographical tradition in the Jüchid *ulus*; if something existed along these lines, no remnant or record of it has survived. What did exist in the way of 'historical' production was the body of oral tradition reflected in the historical works produced in Central Asia and Iran.

DeWeese finds evidence that legendary narratives about Berke's conversion circulated soon after his succession to the throne, that authentic oral traditions of Uzbek's establishment of Islam as the state religion of the Horde derived from the fourteenth century, and that epics among the Uzbeks, Noghays, Bashkirs and Tatars about Idigü (Edigei) took shape in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and, to judge from echoes thereof in Schiltberger or the later ibn Arabshah or Barbara, perhaps even in Edigei's own lifetime.[2]

To my knowledge there has been only one attempt to explain this absence at the Golden Horde court of official written historiography in broader cultural terms. It belongs to the specialist on the Golden Horde and the Ilkhanate Berthold Spuler and I will return to it later in this essay. DeWeese's assessment of this non-phenomenon may be placed within the broader context of the development of historiography in the World Mongol Empire and its successor

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[1] I wish to thank Professor Devin DeWeese for invaluable assistance in preparing this essay. Although he has saved me from many mistakes, he is in no way responsible for any remaining errors.

[2] Devin DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde: Baba Tükles and conversion to Islam in historical and epic tradition* (University Park, Perm. 1994), pp. 85, 143 (quotation), 150, 411-420.

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states. Within this framework, the causes of the lack of native narrative written sources will become both more obvious and more understandable.·

Before Chinggis Khan thrust the Mongols on to the world historical scene, they were, of course, illiterate. The earliest work of the Mongol historiography of the Mongol Empire is the famous and in many ways still mysterious so-called *Secret History of the Mongols*.[3] Leaving aside the question of its historical accuracy,[4] there is no doubt whatsoever that this work originated as an oral composition, something to be recited, not read. Chinggis had ordered Mongol youth, not to mention non-Mongol employees of the Mongol Empire, to utilize the Uighur script for Mongol written texts, but the *Secret History* was created and designed, linguistically and stylistically, for oral presentation, after the death of Chinggis, perhaps in 1228 or 1240.[5] Moreover, it drew exclusively from oral sources-legends, folklore, epics, genealogies, which had never been recorded in writing.[6] The *Secret History* itself therefore does not reflect any Chinese influence. The Mongols began their imperial history without indigenous written history-writing precedents.

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[3] In English the best scholarly translations of the reconstructed Mongol text are Francis Woodman Cleaves, tr. & ed., *The Secret History of the Mongols* (Cambridge, Mass. 1982) [labeled Volume I, but Volume II, Commentaries, never appeared] and Igor de Rachewiltz, tr., "The Secret History of the Mongols," *Papers on Far Eastern History* 4 (1971), pp. 115-163, 5 (1972), pp. 149-175; 10 (1974), pp. 55-82; 15 (1976), pp. 41-75; 16 (1977), pp. 27-65; 18 (1978), pp. 43-80; 21 (1980), pp. 17-57; 23 (1981), pp. 111-146; 26 (1982), pp. 39-84; 30 (1984), pp. 81-160; 31 (1985), pp. 21-93; 33 (1986), pp. 129-137 [the de Rachewiltz translation is to appear in book form].

Arthur Waley, *The Secret History and other Tales* (London, 1963), pp. 217-291, is a translation of the Chinese summaries; Wei Kwei-Sun, tr. & ed., *The Secret History of the Mongol Dynasty* (*Yuan-Chao-Pi-Shi*) (Aligarh, India 1957) is a complete translation of the Chinese text; Paul Kahn, *The Secret History of the Mongols. The Origins of Chinghis Khan* (San Francisco, 1984), is a poetic adaptation of the Cleaves translation. Urgunge Onon, tr. & annotator, *The History and The Life of Chinggis Khan (The Secret History of the Mongols)* (Leiden, 1990) is a translation of the Mongol text.

[4] For a relatively recent survey of several scholarly issues surrounding the *Secret History*, see David O. Morgan, *The Mongols* (Cambridge, MA 1990), pp. 9-14.

[5] This comes out strongly in the studies of the *Secret History* by Larry Moses: "Triplicated Triplets: The Number Nine in the *Secret History of the Mongols*" *Asian Folklore Studies* 45 (1986), pp. 287-294; "The Quarreling Sons in the *Secret History of the Mongols*", *Journal of American Folklore* 100:395 (1987), pp. 63-68; "Epic Themes in the 'Secret History of the Mongols'," *Folklore* 99 (1988), pp. 170-173; "Legends by the Numbers: The Symbolism of Numbers in the *Secret History of the Mongols*," *Asian Folklore Studies* 55 (1996), pp. 73-97; and "Motifs of Class, Status, and Unity in the Secret History of the Mongols," *Eurasian Studies Yearbook* 68 (1996), pp. 97-118.

[6] Igor de Rachewiltz, "Some Remarks on the Dating of *The Secret History of the Mongols*," *Monumenta Serica* 24 (1965), p. 190 n. 28, rejected the contention of Gari Ledyard, "The Mongol Campaigns in Korea and the Dating of *The Secret History of the Mongols*", *Central Asiatic Journal* 9:1 (March, 1964), pp. 12-16, that the *Secret History* utilized written sources "for some dates and campaigns."

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It is not clear when the first Mongol historiography was written down in Uighur script, or of what it consisted.[7] During the reign of Qubilai, Chinese scholars convinced him that it was necessary to record the "veritable records" of earlier Mongol rulers. It is possible that the *Secret History* or an independent version of the life of Chinggis had already been recorded, because the *literati* expressed the need only for biographies of Chinggis's sons. This material, in Mongol in Uighur script, was translated into Chinese and presented to Qubilai in 1288 and 1290 by the National History Office which the Confucian scholar Wang O had convinced Qubilai to resurrect.[8] The *Altan debter* (Golden Book) which Rashid al-Din was denied permission to read, as well as the *Tobchi'an* of Chinggis which two Mongols, Tash-Qaya and U'a-Buqa, at the Yüan Imperial library, refused the Chinese scholar Yu Chi permission to see in order to fulfill the order of Yüan emperor Jaya'atu (Chinese Wen-tsung, 1330-1332) to compile a "Compendium of Government", both seem to have referred to this alternative to the *Secret History*. In both cases, security, that is, the need to keep Mongol history "secret" from the conquered hoi polloi, was cited as justification for the restricted access.

During the Yüan dynasty, there was history writing, namely, the preparation of the official and formal histories of the three preceding dynasties whom the Yüan had conquered, the Kitan Liao, the Jurchen Chin, and the Chinese Southern Sung. These works continued the Chinese historiographic tradition, already a millennium old. They were written in Chinese, although by ethnically mixed commissions. They could not be written at all until the question of who had been the legitimate rulers of China before the Yüan had been resolved, a question which was Chinese intellectually and could hardly have been a major concern to the Mongols, if at all, until very late in the Yüan. It was because the Tangut Hsi-Hsia, who had ruled Chinese territory, were insufficiently sinicized (and the lack of a Tangut political patron or sponsor at the Yüan court) that a Hsi-Hsia history was not written. However rushed, lacking in coherence or consistency, biased, or stylistically inferior by Chinese standards the histories of the Liao, Chin, and Sung may have been, they followed Chinese models entirely: annalistic narratives of reigns; tables; thematic chapters or treatises on such topics as the economy, the army, and "foreign affairs" with the barbarians; and biographies of leading personalities,

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[7] Igor de Rachewiltz, pp. 185-206; Igor de Rachewiltz, "Brief Comments on Professor Yü Ta-chün's Article 'On the Dating of the *Secret History of the Mongols*' *Monumenta Serica* 37 (1986-1987), pp. 305-309; William Hung, "The Transmission of the book known as *The Secret History of the Mongols*," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 14:3-4 (December, 1951), pp. 433-492; Onon, pp. viii-ix.

[8] Hok-lam Chan, "Chinese Official Historiography at the Yüan Court: The Composition of the Liao, Chin and Sung Histories," in John D. Langlois Jr., ed., *China under Mongol Rule* (Princeton, 1981), p. 63 n. 20.

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including members of the royal family, imperial relatives, ministers and generals. They also adhered to the Chinese frame of reference in evaluating politicians: good and bad advisors and rulers were judged largely by Confucian values. The literary style is Chinese, regardless of how much Kitan or Jurchen vocabulary intruded into the text. In short, the Mongol Yüan perpetuated the Chinese cultural and political tradition of historiography; their only innovation, perhaps because of their alien origin and multiethnic sensitivity, was the addition of dictionaries of Jurchen and Kitan terms.[9]

After the overthrow of the Mongol Yüan dynasty, the *Secret History* was written down in phonetic Chinese characters with an interlinear Chinese translation and Chinese chapter summaries, for Chinese scholars under the Ming. This was not for the purpose of writing the *Yüan shih*, the Chinese history of the Yüan dynasty, but sometime between 1368 and 1398, since it was used between 1403 and 1408. The Ming history of the Yüan followed the traditional Chinese historiographic pattern as well, even to the point of discontinuing the dictionaries of foreign terms of the Liao and Chin histories (unfortunately, as a Mongol dictionary in the *Yüan shih* would have been extremely useful to modern scholars). Nevertheless and significantly, the Ming scholars did not utilize the *Secret History* to write the *Yüan shih*. If it had not yet been translated into Chinese, they could have caused it to be translated for their use, so one must infer that ignorance of its existence did not motivate their restraint. Rather, the intellectual incompatibility of the *Secret History* with Chinese historiography seems a more plausible explanation. The Chinese historians could easily censor politically sensitive material, or somehow discretely finesse recounting what would seem to them to be the less edifying events in Chinggis' life. Nor did the *literati* blanch as recording "barbarian legends" per se in their histories.[10] However, tracing the origins of legitimate Emperors of the Middle Kingdom, who ruled with the Mandate of Heaven, to a wolf and a doe, might have been too much for them. They could not have incorporated such material into their annals of the Yüan.[11]

Parallel developments can be found in Ilkhanid Persia. Juvaini had visited Möngke's court, been to Mongolia twice and seen much of the Mongol empire, Rashid al-Din consulted Mongol informants, Bolad, a Yüan envoy to the Ilkhanate, and Ilkhan Ghazan himself, but both wrote Persian-language, Persian-style Islamic chronicles, although Rashid al-Din's conception of a universal history was strikingly innovative. The rhetoric and panegyric of

[9] Chan, pp. 56-196.

[10] Denis Sinor, "The Legendary Origin of the Türks," in Egle Victoria Žygas, Peter Voorheis, eds., *Folklorica: Festschrift for Felix J. Oinas* (Bloomington, IN 1982), pp. 223-257.

[11] The absence of material from the *Secret History* in the chronicles of the East Slavs, vassals of the Golden Horde, or of the Armenians and Georgians, subordinate to the Ilkhanate, is a separate question.

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Juvaini and Rashid al-Din were typically flowery literary Persian, and the ethos fundamentally Muslim, replete with innumerable quotations from the Koran. However much the interpretation of the Mongol conquest differed in Juvaini and Rashid al-Din from the émigré Persian-language history written in Delhi by Juzjani under the Ghurids, to whom Juvaini's "world conqueror" is "the accursed", all perpetuated the pre-Ilkhanate historiographic tradition of Iran. The same is true for less famous Persian historians of the Ilkhanate, such as Wassaf and Qazvini.[12]

The Chaghataid Khanate possessed no indigenous history-writing during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The already Muslim cities of Transoxania continued to some extent to produce other types of written works, such as city histories, biographical dictionaries, administrative manuals, Islamic jurisprudence, and hagiographies. The largely nomadic hordes of Moghulistan, previously populated by Turkman and Ghuzz, would have been devoted to oral historical genres. The Chaghataid khans did not patronize chronicle writing of the type discussed in this essay.[13]

Therefore the Mongols began their imperial career with an oral historical tradition even after they had acquired some of the literate aspects of imperial governance. In each successor state of the Grand Mongol Empire, the Mongols adopted the historiographic conception of their more numerous indigenous subjects. In China and Persia, this meant patronizing written history-writing. In the Chaghataid and Jochid realms, there was no local written historiographic tradition for the Mongols to emulate. In the Golden Horde, therefore, the weight of the argument is that the Mongols could only have adopted the oral literary traditions of the Qïpchaqs, and therefore, that written Golden Horde narrative chronicles never existed.[14]

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[12] 'Ata-Malik Juvaini, trans. John Andrew Boyle, *The History of the World Conqueror*, 2 volumes (1958 - reprinted Seattle, 1997); John Andrew Boyle, tr., Rashid al-Din, *The Successors of Genghis Khan* (New York, 1971); David O. Morgan, "Persian Historians and the Mongols," in David O. Morgan, ed., *Medieval Historical Writing in the Christian and Islamic Worlds* (London, 1982), pp. 109-124; Morgan, *The Mongols*, pp. 21-22. Boyle's introduction to Juvaini, vol. I, pp. xxviii-xxix, contrasts Rashid al-Din's plain and simple style with the more erudite and sophisticated prose of Juvaini.

[13] John E. Woods, "The Rise of Timurid Historiography," *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 46. 12 (1987), p. 81. This characterization does not apply to the Arabic-language "Supplement to the dictionary 'Surah' " of Abul'l Fadl b. Muhammed, known as Jamal Qarshi. In 1282 he had translated into Persian the Arabic-language dictionary of al-Jauhari, and at the very beginning of the fourteenth century, he wrote the "Supplement" at the request of the head of the local priesthood in Kashgar. While it contains dynastic information and data about shaykhs and scholars, it is not a "chronicle" of the kind discussed here. Barthold observed that he did not know a "single Muslim literary composition written at the desire of any Jaghatay Khan." W. Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Conquest* (4th edition; Philadelphia, 1977), pp. 51-52. Devin DeWeese kindly called my attention to this source.

[14] There is a separate issue of the language in which the court of the Golden Horde

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But analysis of the phenomenon of Golden Horde historiography should not be confined to the Golden Horde itself. The Golden Horde retained enough vitality to give birth during the fifteenth century to its own successor states, namely the Kasimov khanate in Muscovite service, and the khanates of the Crimea, Kazań, Astrakhań, and Siberia, as well as three Nogai Hordes. What is known about history-writing in these polities, and in later Mongolia, sheds additional light upon the problem of the missing Golden Horde chronicles.

The Central Asian territories of Khwarezm, which had been part of the Jochid *ulus*, and of Transoxiana, under Chaghataid control, became the core of Timur's great empire. The extant Timurid histories of the very end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth century – Nizam ad-Din Ali Shani, Taj al-Din Salmani, Mu'in al-Din Natanzi, Ghiyas al-Din Ali Yazdi, Hafiz-i Abru and Sharaf al-Din Ali Yazdi – were all written in Persian, the dominant "civilized" language of Central Asia and Khorasan,[15] and relied on Rashid al-Din for their versions of early Mongol history.[16] It is possible some of the Timurid histories which have not survived were written in Turkish, Arabic or even Greek. No historical narratives had been written in the Chaghataid appanage, Transoxiana or Mughalistan, between the death of Chinggis in 1227 and Timur's creation of an independent state in 1370. The motivation for the development of Timurid historiography thus appears to have been Timur's ambition and achievements.[17]

The absence of a written historiographical tradition even in the urban centers of Central Asia before Timur has been noted by historians trying to reconstruct the history of the region, but never explained. Even the dynasty of the Khwarezm shahs did not patronize indigenous chronicle-writing, although Jalal ad-Din was the inspiration of the refugee history by al-Nasawi.

Grigor'ev, "Ofitsial'nyi iazyk Zolotoi Ordy XIII-XIV vv," *Tiurkologicheskii sbornik* 9 (1977), pp. 81-89. But even the find of a birchbark text containing written Mongol, in square script no less, on Golden Horde territory does not alter the likelihood that historical compositions in Mongol at the Jochid court would have been oral. See N. N. Poppe, "Zolotoordynskaia rukopis' na berest'e," *Sovetskoe vostokovedenie* 2 (1941), pp. 81-136, reprinted in N. Poppe, *Mongolica* (Farnborough, England, 1972). Anyone in the late fourteenth century Horde who understood a Mongol-language oral historical tale would also have spoken Turkic and could have remembered it in the Turkic language, even when the Mongol language had been forgotten. (Indeed, most perplexing aspects of this birchbark are the use of square script so far west, which Poppe noted, and the presence of Uighur-language material, this late, on the Volga, which he did not comment on.) Therefore, I do not believe the disappearance of the Mongol language in the Golden Horde explains the absence of Horde historiogaphy.

[15] Yuri Bregel, *Notes on the Study of Central Asia* (Indiana University Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, Papers on Inner Asia, No. 28; Bloomington, 1996), pp. 35- 36.

[16] Mihaly Dobrovits, "The Turco-Mongolian Tradition of Common Origin and Historiography in Fifteenth-Century Central Asia," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 47 (1994), pp. 269-277.

[17] Woods, "The Rise of Timurid Historiography," pp. 81-108.

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The Kazań khanate did not generate any written chronicles.[18] Any carryover of Volga Bulghar traditions would not have helped to do otherwise, since the Volga Bulghars also lacked any written historical tradition. Down through conquest in the sixteenth century by the Muscovites, Kazań (and Astrakhań) rulers did not sponsor the composition of written historical accounts. During the eighteenth century a new identity as Bulghar Muslims took shape among the population of the Volga-Urals region, in which the recent modus vivendi between the Muslim *ulama* and the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly played a catalytic role. This identity found expression in the nineteenth century in histories tracing direct historical continuity back to Bulghar rather than the Chinggisid Kazań dynasty; indeed, "Tatar" was considered a pejorative appellation by this population. A secular "Tatar" historical consciousness began to be espoused only later.[19]

The history of the Siberian Taybughid biys, who were not Chinggisids and were overthrown in the sixteenth century by the Shibanid Chinggisid Kuchum, can be written only on the basis of seventeenth-century Siberian Russian chronicles, the Esipov, Stroganov, and Remezov chronicles, which preserved Taybughid, presumably oral, history and legends.[20]

At the turn of the seventeenth century Qadyr 'Ali-Beg, an émigré from Siberia, wrote a chronicle in Turkic for khan Uraz-Muhammed of the khanate of Kasimov, one in Muscovite service. Significantly, his only identified written historical source was Rashid al-Din, translated from Persian into Turkic. The chronicle is manifestly Islamic in consciousness, and made use of folklore. Although Qadyr 'Ali-Beg wrote as a court historian for Uraz-Muhammed, the work, c. 1602, is dedicated to Muscovite tsar' Boris Godunov.[21] A later

[18] See Jaroslaw Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan: Conquest and Imperial Ideology, 1438-1560s* (The Hague-Paris, 1973), pp. 13-16, despite the argument in M. A. Usmanov, *Tatarskie istoricheskie istochniki XVII-XVIII v.* (Kazań, 1972), pp. 26-32, that such sources might have existed and been lost in the Muscovite conquest and later fires. Allen J. Frank, *Islamic Historiography and "Bulghar" Identity Among the Tatars and Bashkirs of Russia* (Leiden/Boston, 1998), pp. 12-13, points out that the twelfth-century Andalusian al-Gharnati cited an inextant history of Bulghar, and a 1550 report by Hajji Muhammed Sharif Hajjitarkhani to the Ottoman Sultan of the repulse of a Muscovite attack on Kazań has survived; nevertheless, he concludes that "We have no evidence that narrative histories were compiled in the region during either the period of the Kazań Khanate, or in the Golden Horde." My thanks to Devin DeWeese for the reference to Frank's monograph.

[19] Uli Schamiloglu, "The Formation of a Tatar Historical Consciousness: Sihabäddin Märacni and the Image of the Golden Horde," *Central Asian Survey* 9:2 (1990), pp. 39-49; Frank *Islamic Historiography*, especially pp. 47-157. On Schamiloglu's article, cf. Frank, *Islamic Historiography*, pp. 123-124 (especially p. 124 n. 1), 149-157.

[20] Allen J. Frank, *The Siberian Chronicles and the Taybughid Biys of Sibir'* (Indiana University Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, Papers on Inner Asia, No. 27; Bloomington, 1994), especially pp. 1-7. I owe this reference to Devin DeWeese.

[21] Usmanov, pp. 33-96; Frank, *Islamic Historiography*, pp. 13-14.

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seventeenth-century Anonymous history of Chinggis Khan, replete with "shamanist" historical legends, did not even utilize the history of the Turks by the Khivan Chinggisid khan Abu'l Ghazi.[22]

The Crimean khanate did not possess any written historical sources until the middle of the sixteenth century. No previous occupant of the peninsula – the Goths were as unlikely candidates as the Italians, who had other interests – had fostered written historical works. From the sixteenth century until the annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Empire under Catherine the Great, indigenous chronicles were written in the Crimea. The earliest work, written after the death of Sahib Giray in 1551, was the *Tarih-i Sahib Giray Khan*; the second, *Tevarih Dest-i Kipçak*, by Abdullah ibn Rizvan, dates from 1623-1640; in the early 1650s Kerimli Haci Mehmed Senai authored the *Üçünçü Islam Giray Khan Tarihi*; finally, in the eighteenth century Seiid Muhammed Riza generated the last Crimean chronicle. These chronicles as a group emphasized the separateness of the Crimean state, even if under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Sultan, the importance of the Chinggisid inheritance, the value of a Crimean identity, and opposition to Ottoman "interference".[23] From the imposition of Ottoman control in the last quarter of the fifteenth century, the Crimean Khans had become vassals of the Ottoman Sultans, who determined dynastic succession, stationed governors, built forts and mosques, installed garrisons, dispatched artillery and janissaries to assist Crimean campaigns, and generally meddled at will in local affairs. Ottoman chronicles first arose in the fifteenth century, primarily in Turkish (but sometimes in Arabic, Persian, or even Greek), and followed Persian models, reaching the pinnacle of their success in the sixteenth century and included such historians as Efendi, Ibn-i Kemal, Mustafi Ali, Mustafa Selaniki, and Mustafa Noima.[24] Since the Crimean chronicles did not arise until some three quarters of a century after the establishment of Ottoman control, it would be reasonable to infer on general principle alone that they were inspired by earlier Ottoman models, but we have much more concrete evidence that the Crimean authors had been motivated by Ottoman example. Senai, although unfamiliar with Ottoman historiography, wrote his history in learned Ottoman Turkish with frequent Persian and Arabic "poetic" and religious insertions, and was familiar with laudatory literature in Ottoman Turkish.[25] Abdullah ibn Rizvan was the son of the Ottoman *qapudan*

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[22] Usmanov, pp. 97-133; Frank, *Islamic Historiography*, pp. 14-20.

[23] Alan W. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars* (Stanford, 1978), pp. 35-36.

[24] Stanford Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. Volume I: *Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808* (Cambridge, England 1976), pp. 145-147.

[25] See the review of Olgerd Gorka, Zbigniew Wojcik, eds., *Historia chana Islam Gireja III* by Hadzy Mehmed Senai z Krymu (Warsaw, 1971), by Omeljan Pritsak in *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* I (1977), pp. 130-133.

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of Kaffa; he also wrote his work in Ottoman Turkish, and even dedicated it to the Ottoman Sultan Ibrahim and his vizier Qara Mustafa Pasha.[26]

Mongol historical writing resurfaced in the seventeenth century – Sagang Sechen, Lubsandanzin (Blo-bzang-bs Tan-'dzin), the Anonymous *Altan Tobchi*, the *Shira Tu'uji* (Yellow Chronicle) – and once again the stimulus was foreign. Presumably the fleeing Yüan had brought at least one manuscript of the *Secret History* back to Mongolia with them. However, as often as not the seventeenth-century Mongol histories seem to have borrowed from an oral version of the text, or from the common fund of oral stories and legends which inspired and exceeded those in the *Secret History*. In other words, the writing down of the *Secret History* in China had not altered the historical consciousness of the still-nomadic Mongols in Mongolia, who retained an oral historical tradition, and the refugee Yüan Mongols, even if they preserved a manuscript of the *Secret History*, reverted to the same cultural mode. The seventeenth-century Mongol histories did not draw from any indigenous Mongol written history between the time of the *Secret History*, or the overthrow of the Yüan in 1368, and contemporary times. The new written Mongol histories, aside from borrowing from each other, found overwhelming literary inspiration in Buddhist historical works saturated by Indian and Tibetan lore and legend. The motivation of these works was to integrate Chinggis into the Buddhist historical and cosmological framework as much as to record the glorious deeds of present Mongol rulers. Typically, the authors were lamas.[27]

Thus the origins of written historiography in the later Golden Horde testify to largely political motivations inspired by frequently foreign models. Timur's grandiose ambitions and conquests generated a broad historiography rooted in Persian antecedents. The dedication of the Kasimov chronicle to Boris Godunov suggests political opportunism, again drawing inspiration from a Persian source. Seventeenth-century Mongolian historiography derived from

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[26] Ananiash Zaionchkovskii (Ananiasz Zajaczkowski), "Letopis' kipchakskoi stepi' (*Tevarikh-i Desht-i Kipchak*) kak istochnik po istorii Kryma," in A. S. Tveritinova, ed., *Vostochnye istochniki po istorii narodov iugo-vostochnoi i tsentral'noi Evropy* v. II (Moscow, 1969), pp. 10-28. Ibn Rizvan's sources, Hafiz Mohammed Tashkendi and the well-known traveler ibn Arabshah, also place ibn Rizvan in a typically Ottoman cultural context.

[27] Ts. Zh. Zhamtsarano, *Mongol'skie letopisi XVII veka* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1936), translated by R. Loewenthal as C. Ž. Žamcarano, *The Mongol Chronicles of the Seventeenth Century* (Göttinger Asiatische Forschungen, Band 3; Wiesbaden, 1955); L. S. Puchkovskii, "Mongol'skaia feodal'naia istoriografiia," *Uchenye zapiski instituta vostokovedeniia* 6 (1953), pp. 131-166; Charles R. Bawden, *The Mongol Chronicle Altan Tobči: Text, Translation, and Critical Notes* (Göttinger Asiatische Forschungen, Band 5; Wiesbaden, 1955); N. P. Shastina, ed. & tr. *Shara Tudzhi. Mongol'skaia letopis' XVII veka* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1957); John R. Krueger, tr. Sagang Sechen, *The Bejewelled Summary of the Origins of Khans. A History of the Eastern Mongols to 1662*. Part One: Chapter One through Five. *From the Creation of the World to the Death of Genghis Khan* (The Mongolia Society Occasional Papers, #2; 2nd edition; Bloomington, 1967 [all published]); N. P. Shastina, *Lubsan Danzan [Blo-bzan Bstan-'dzin], Altan Tobchi ("Zolotoe skazanie")* (Moscow, 1973).

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Buddhist influence, perhaps generated by the political interests of the new Buddhist church. In the Crimea the Ottoman connection both motivated chronicle-writing and provided some of its building blocks.

We can now turn to Spuler's remarks about the lack of Golden Horde chronicles.[28] Spuler draws a valid, if prejudicial, contrast between what the Jochids could learn culturally from the Qïpchaqs and what the Ilkhaṇids could learn from the Persians. The Persians, Spuler noted with approval, could generate a Juvaini or Rashid al-Din, but the illiterate Qïpchaqs were culturally barren. Unfortunately, Spuler casts this discrepancy in terms of level, rather than type, of culture, and formulates the comparison negatively, rather than positively. In addition, Spuler limited his comments to the Jochid and Ilkhanid khanates. At its simplest level, he is undoubtedly correct: the Qïpchaqs, unlike the Persians, could hardly supply their new Mongol rulers with a cultural model of written historiography. Nevertheless, the phenomenon he is trying to explain is more complex than his contrast allows.

The Golden Horde engaged in extensive diplomatic relations with the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt, its ally against the Ilkhanate. To conduct this Middle Eastern diplomacy, the Golden Horde mastered all the proper techniques of Middle Eastern written diplomatic correspondence, including the appropriate niceties of types of paper, inks, calligraphy, and formulas.[29] Obviously the Qïpchaqs could not have carried on such sophisticated formal international relations, yet Qïpchaq inexperience in this realm hardly inhibited the Jochids. This was because the Jochids inherited the diplomatic traditions of the Grand Mongol Empire, which already utilized written communication, and because the Golden Horde recognized that it needed to adapt to regional diplomatic patterns in order to protect itself and function. Necessity was, therefore, the mother not of invention, but of imitation.

Similarly, the Qïpchaqs had never organized a state, and could hardly have found any use for domestic documents such as grants of land, or fiscal judicial immunities. Here too the Golden Horde did not require inspiration from its Qïpchaq subjects. Instead, the Jochid rulers continued the imperial Mongol tradition of written charters with such fidelity that documents from Karakorum and the Horde adhered to the same formulae and diplomatics.[30]

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[28] Bertold Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde. Die Mongolen in Rußland 1223-1502* (2nd ed., Wiesbaden, 1965), pp. 1-2. Any comments on this phenomenon in István Vásáry, *Az Arany Horda* (Budapest, 1986) or Mustafa Kafali, *Altïn Orda Hanlïğïnïn ·Kuruluş ve Yükselis Devirleri* (Istanbul, 1976) are linguistically inaccessible to me.

[29] Salikh Zakirov, *Diplomaticheskie otnosheniia Zolotoi Ordy s Egiptom (13-14 vv.)* (Moscow, 1966).

[30] A. P. Grigor'ev, *Mongol'skaia diplomatika XIII-XIV vv. (Chingizidskie zhalovannye gramoty)* (Leningrad, 1978). Of his subsequent articles, see for example A. P. Grigor'ev, "Formuliar zolotoordynskikh zhalovannykh gramot," in *Tiurkologiia 1986: k 80-letiiu Akad. A. N. Kononova* (Leningrad, 1986), pp. 76-84; ibid., "Iarlyk Mengu-Timura: Rekonstruktstiia soderzhaniia," *Istoriografiia i istochnikovedenie istorii stran Azii i Afriki* 12 (1990), pp. 53-102. Grigor'ev is so convinced of the stability of this tradition that he attempts to reconstruct the

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The adoption of Islam as the official religion of the Horde led, primarily under Central Asian influence, to the creation of a Muslim culture in the Golden Horde, which has been insufficiently studied. Arabic script was utilized for Turkic-language grave inscriptions in Bulghar; some literary works were also written in Arabic-script Turkic languages. On the other hand, Jochid patronage was responsible for some works in Arabic and Persian. The dissemination of Arabic-language copies of the Koran and the Sayings of the Prophet, or the generation of written judicial decisions based upon the Shari'at, on Golden Horde territory, require further investigation. It might be easier to document this scriptural and legal culture in peripheral urban areas of the Jochid *ulus*, such as Volgar Bulghar or Khwarazm, than in its nomadic core or the Sarais.[31] The conversion of the Mongols and Qïpchaqs to Islam went hand-in-hand with their mutual assimilation, but it remains the case that the Qïpchaqs were not Muslims when the Mongols arrived in the Qïpchaq Steppe, and did not play a formative role in the evolution of Horde Muslim culture.

Consequently, the absence of Qïpchaq models for written diplomacy, domestic governmental decrees, or religious and judicial expression did not preclude their development in the Golden Horde, because the Horde either brought its own Mongol institutional antecedents to bear, or, convinced of the need for a change, found a suitable foreign model to emulate.

Imitation of the Mamluks in diplomacy and religion did not extend to the rich Arabic-language historiography patronized by the Mamluk Sultans-al-Mansur, ibn-Dawadari, al-Makrizi, al-Umari, al-Safadi, al-Yunini, ibn Duqmaq, ibn Taghribirdi, Abu Shama, al-Aini, al-Yusufi – arguably the largest collection of Arabic-language chronicles for any medieval Muslim state.[32] Despite their

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putatively authentic Horde documents behind original East-Slavic literary works, namely the "epistle of Edigei" and the "*iarlyk* of Akhmad Khan"; see ibid., "Vremia napisaniia 'iarlyka Akhmata'," *Istoriografiia i istochnikovedenie istorii stran Azii i Afriki* 10 (1987), pp. 28-89; and ibid., " 'Iarlyk Edigeia': analiz teksta i rekonstruktsiia soderzhaniia," *Istoriografiia i istochnikovedenie istorii stran Azii i Afriki* 11 (1988), pp. 55-93. On the *iarlik* of Akhmad see Edward L. Keenan, Jr., "The *Yarlik* of Axmed-khan to Ivan III: A New Reading - A Study in Literal *Diplomatica* and Literary *Turcica*," *International Journal of Slavic Linguistics and Poetics* 11 (1967), pp. 33-47; on the "epistle of Edigei," Charles J. Halperin, "The Russian Land and the Russian Tsar: The Emergence of Muscovite Ideology, 1380-1408," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 23 (1976), pp. 55-56.

[31] DeWeese, pp. 68-70. On the common literary culture of fourteenth-century Khwarezm, the Golden Horde and Mamluk Egypt, see A. Bodrogligeti, "A Collection of Turkic Poems from the fourteenth century," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 16 (1963), pp. 245-311.

[32] Donald Presgrave Little, *An Introduction to Mamluke Historiography. An Analysis of Arabic Annalistic and Biographical Sources for the Reign of al-Malik an-Nasir Muhammed ibn Qala'un* (Freiburger Islamstudien, Band II; Weisbaden, 1970), pp. 1-99; Donald P. Little, "The Recovery of a Lost Source for Bahri Mamluke History: *Al-Yusufi's Nuzhat al Nazi fi Sirat al-Malik al-Nasir*," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 94 (1974), pp. 42-54, reprinted in Little, *History and Historiography of the Mamluks* (London, 1986), Essay II; Donald P. Little, "An Analysis of the Relationship between Four Mamluk Chronicles for 737-745," *Journal of Semitic Studies* 19 (1974), pp. 252-268, reprinted in Little, *History and Historiography*, Essay III;

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military and political rivalry, the Golden Horde copied political institutions such as the vizierate and the diwans from the Ilkhanate, but not the practice of patronizing court historians. Thus the Golden Horde's greatest ally, the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt and Syria, and its greatest enemy, the Mongol Ilkhanate in Iran, maintained impressive written historiographic traditions, but the Golden Horde borrowed chronicle-writing from neither. Clearly a cultural dynamic was at work which has not as yet been fully appreciated in scholarship.

The history of historiography in the successor states of the Great Mongol Empire suggests, in conclusion, that the Mongols abandoned their native oral history only under the impetus of someone else, mostly their subjects. The Mongol rulers adapted indigenous traditions of historical preservation. In China, written Chinese dynastic annals, and in Iran, written Persian chronicles and world histories, provided a model; these societies supplied native cadres willing to serve their new Mongol sovereigns and in the process to preserve the sedentary cultural norms which predated Mongol conquest. Certainly as conquest dynasties the Ilkhanids and Yüan might have employed Persian and Chinese language history-writing to shore up their legitimacy to their subjects; this is particularly likely in the case of Qubilai, and plausible in that of Ghazan. But it is equally valid to argue that these historical narratives arose from the needs of the Persians and Chinese to rationalize to themselves their conquest by the Mongols; it is difficult to envision Hülegü thinking he needed Juvaini to sustain his regime. The Chaghataid khanate, although it definitely did not lack for literate, sedentary subjects, apparently lacked a comparable need for written historiography. In the Jochid realm the vast bulk of the population was Qïpchaqs, whose literature was oral, consisting primarily of epics, as reflected in the literature of the Kievan East Slavs (the tale of Otrok and the Wormwood), and genealogies, ubiquitous to all nomadic tribes.[33] The Jochid Mongols assimilated into and ultimately restructured this Qïpchaq demographic pool. Regardless of how long this process took, during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the Qïpchaqs could hardly have supplied the Khans of the Golden Horde with a model of written history from which to draw or intellectual cadres to carry on such a tradition. Jochid expressions of legitimization would most likely have taken the oral form of epics, legends, and genealogies. Within this comparative perspective of the Mongol empire and its various successor states, it would have been perfectly consistent for the Golden Horde not to have developed any written court chronicles. The lack of need and the absence of inspiration were but two sides of the same coin. Instead, the Jochids perpetuated the traditions of oral, largely epic, literature of the Mongols, reinforced, in all

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Li Guo, *Early Mamluk Syrian historiography: Al-Yunini 's Dhayl Mir'at al-zaman*, 2 vv. (Islamic History and Civilization Studies and Texts, v. 21; Leiden, 1998).

[33] In the Qïpchaq diaspora, circumstances did lead to the production of a Qïpchaq written literature, for example, in the Mamluk sultanate, or Armeno-Qïpchaq literature among Crimean refugees in Poland. Thus one cannot say the Qïpchaqs lacked the ability to adopt written literature.

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likelihood, by the habits of their Qïpchaq subjects. The Jochids lacked an incentive to replace what they thought they already had, namely, an adequate and satisfying historical memory. Only later, in peripheral areas of the Horde, in response to cultural stimuli specific to those times and places, did written historiographic works appear, in Central Asia, Kasimov, and the Crimea.

But two additional points deserve mention. First, the absence of written histories in various of the polities discussed here is often attributed to political instability, as in the Chaghataid realm, or the absence of rulers to patronize official court historiography, for example in conquered Kazań. Certainly this was an element of the picture. But it is not the whole story. Khan Uzbek of the Golden Horde ruled as stable, if not necessarily as rich, a state as the Ilkhan Ghazan or the Yüan founder Qubilai, and he did sponsor written Islamic works. But Khan Uzbek did not hire a court historian to record his deeds for all posterity in writing. This choice was made quite independently of the prevalence of the techniques of written culture in his realm, in diplomacy, government, and religion. Written historiography apparently did not seem necessary or advisable to him, and certainly not "superior" to oral epic. Perhaps historians, despite the inconvenience thus wrought to themselves, ought to rethink Uzbek's attitudes from the perspective of his own culture.

Finally, from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, previously unwritten legendary material about Chinggis Qan was put to paper, from Mongolia, to Central Asia, to the Volga-Ural region, to Egypt.[34] West of Mongolia this novel folkloric material reflecting assimilation of Mongol legendary motifs and themes by indigenous non-Mongol, mostly Turkic, peoples. Historians have mostly been concerned with the historical accuracy, or inaccuracy, of these writings about Chinggis, whether in seventeenth-century Mongolia or elsewhere. For example, the presentation of Chinggis as a Muslim is more than an historical falsity. But the penetration of the Chinggisid cult and its adaptation by vast numbers of steppe peoples is itself a major fact of Eurasian cultural history, which should be mapped and correlated with the demographic movements of Mongols, Qïpchaqs, and other nomadic peoples who could have disseminated Chinggisid legends, and the rise and fall of Chinggisid dynasties. The preservation of oral historiography about Chinggis strikingly different than the *Secret History* in later written works on Golden Horde territory, including Kasimov, Kazań, and the Crimea, provides vivid testimony of Chinggis's charisma throughout an immense demographic zone from one end of Eurasia to the other and beyond, brought to light, ironically enough, by pondering the absence of written court historiography in the Golden Horde of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

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[34] Ulrich Haarmann, "'Großer Vater Mond' und 'Schwarzer Löwenjunge' - eine mongolisch-kiptschakische Ursprungssage in arabischer Überlieferung," in Stephan Conermann, Jan Kusber, eds., *Die Mongolen in Asien und Europa*, Kieler Werkstücke, Reihe F: *Beiträge zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* (Frankfurt am Main, 1997), pp. 121-138.

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IVAN IV AND CHINGGIS KHAN*

In 1793 Nikolai Novikov published in his "Prodolzhenie drevnei Rossiiskoi Vivliofiki" a very curious letter (*gramota*) from the Nogai Affairs (*nogaiskie dela*), the Muscovite records of their relations with the Nogai Tatars. In it the Nogai Mirza Belek Bulat addressed Ivan IV not only as "White Prince" ("belyi kniaz'") and "White Tsar" ("belyi tsar'"), widely used titles in the Nogai correspondence, but also as the "true son" ("priamyi syn") of Chinggis Khan, the "son of Chinggis" ("Chingisov syn").[1] One would think that such an assertion of a genealogical link between the Terrible Tsar and the Scourge of God would have aroused comment in print, if not at the time, then at least in twentieth-century studies of East Slavic-steppe, and specifically Muscovite-Tatar, relations, but it did not do so[2] until 1981, when Alexander Bennigsen cited it in an article which has been virtually ignored in scholarship even since.[3]

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* This article could not have been written without the generous assistance of numerous colleagues. While specific acknowledgments are provided below, I should like here to express my appreciation to Donald Ostrowski for reading an earlier version of this essay, and most of all to record my sincerest gratitude to Michael Khodarkovsky for extensive consultation in the preparation of that version, which was presented as a paper at the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies Convention, Pittsburgh, PA, November 22, 2002. Neither is responsible for my interpretation of his research.

[1] *Prodolzhenie drevnei Rossiiskoi Vivliofiki* [hereafter *PDRV*]. Chast' 8. S.-Peterburg 1793 (Reprint: The Hague, Paris 1970), pp. 316-317.

[2] It is not mentioned in George Vernadski, *The Mongols and Russia*. New Haven 1953; Michael Cherniavsky, "*Khan or Basileus: An Aspect of Russian Medieval Political Theory*," in: *Journal of the History of Ideas* 20 (1959) pp. 459-476 (reprinted in: idem (ed.) *The Structure of Russian History*. New York 1970, pp. 65-79); Edward L. Keenan, *Muscovy and Kazan, 1445-1552: A Study in Steppe Politics*. Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University 1965; or Charles J. Halperin, *Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History*. Bloomington, IN 1985, to name the obvious American suspects, or in Bi-Arslan B. Kochekaev, *Nogaisko-russkie otnosheniia v XV-XVIII vv*. Alma-Ata 1988, pp. 73-110 (on the reign of Ivan IV). The review of this volume in: *Russian history/Histoire russe* 17 (1990) 1, pp. 103-104 was written by Michael Khodarkovsky, but erroneously attributed to Richard Hellie (the erroneous attribution is perpetuated in Vadim v. Trepavlov, *Istoriia Nogaiskoi ordy*. Moskva 2001, pp. 22, 634, 637, 711 [my thanks to Michael Khodarkovsky for lending me his personal copy of this volume, inscribed by the author]). Andreas Kappeler, „Moskau und die Steppe: Das Verhältnis zu den Nogai-Tataren im 16. Jahrhundert," in: *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 46 (1992) pp. 87-105 discusses several aspects of Muscovite-Nogai relations extremely well, and mentions "White Tsar'" (p. 102; see below), but does not quote the passage in question.

[3] Aleksandr [Alexander] Bennigsen, "Ekumenizm tsaria Ivana Vasil'evicha Groznogo. Moskva, Kazan' i Ottomanskaia Porta v 1552 godu," in: *Zinaida Shakovskaia*, Rene Gerra

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Craig Kennedy discussed it in his unpublished doctoral dissertation[4] and also pointed it out orally to Donald Ostrowski, who in turn brought the text to the attention of astounded scholars in his 1998 monograph.[5] Since then, the text has been utilized twice to my knowledge, by Michael Khodarkovsky and Vadim Trepavlov.[6] But Belek Bulat Mirza's mind-boggling characterization of Ivan's genealogy requires additional analysis, especially in the context of Muscovite culture and ideology. Such an analysis will also have to confront the complex problem of Belek Bulat Mirza's use of the title "belyi tsar'."

I

First of all, it must be said that Ivan IV was not a descendent of Chinggis Khan. Even if we accept the purported Chinggisid ancestry of his mother, princess Elena Glinskaia, embodied in a legendary Glinskii clan genealogy,[7]

[Guerra], Evgenii Ternovskii (eds.), *Russkii al'manakh*. Paris 1981, pp. 268-276, here pp. 272-273. Only Petko Ivanov, *Why is Ivan 'White'?: A Study in the History of the Russian Monarch's Unofficial Title*, unpublished paper, 1996, cites Bennigsen's article. My sincerest thanks to Norman Ingham for calling this impressive and original paper to my attention, and to Mr. Ivanov for permitting me to read it.

[4] Craig Kennedy, *The Juchids of Muscovy: A Study of Personal Ties between Emigre Tatar Dynasts and the Muscovite Grand Princes in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries*. Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University 1994, pp. 117-121 (background), 123-125 (text).

[5] Donald Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols. Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier, 1304-1589*. Cambridge, MA 1998, pp. 182-183.

[6] Michael Khodarkovsky *Russia's Steppe Frontier. The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800*. Bloomington, IN 2002, pp. 35, 44, 106-107; Trepavlov, *Istoriia Nogaiskoi Ordy* p. 630. (Trepavlov did not cite this passage in any of his earlier publications, almost all written before 1998, but even in his 2001 magnum opus he did not include Ostrowski in his ample bibliography.)

[7] *Rodoslovnaia kniga po trem spiskam*, in: *Vremennik Obshchestva Istorii i Drevnostei Rossiiskikh* 10 (1851) pp. 1-266, here pp. 84, 157, 195. Historical inaccuracies abound in this sometimes incoherent narrative. Chinggis Khan did not campaign on the Volga; the Great Horde (*bol'shaia orda*) did not exist in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries; Mamai, defeated on the Don by Grand Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich, was never an "ordynski tsar'." See M. E. Bychkova, "Rodoslovie Glinskikh iz Rumiantsevskogo sobraniia," in: *Zapiski otdela rukopisei Gosudarstvennoj biblioteki im. V. I. Lenina* 38 (1977) pp. 104-135, esp. 107-111. While Bychkova admits (p. 122) that the Glinskii clan founder, Aleksa *kniaz'*, grandson of Tsar Mamai, was "legendary," she does not comment on other fictitious elements in the genealogy. It is possible that the "Tatar" ancestry was not invented until after the clan had emigrated from Poland-Lithuania, although its precise dating still remains open. My sincerest thanks to Paul Bushkovitch and Nancy Shields Kollmann for the Bychkova citation, to Nancy Shields Kollmann for consultation (e-mail, June 27, 2002), and to Ann Kleimola for confirming the incoherence of the "full" genealogy. This legend has been accepted far too often by historians. Omeljan Pritsak, "Moscow, the Golden Horde, and the Kazan Khanate from a Polycultural Point of View," in: *Slavic Review* 26 (1967) 4, pp. 577-583, here p. 578, traces Ivan's origin to the son of Mamai, Mansur Kiyat, citing Józef Wolff Kniasiowie, *Litewsko-ruscy od końca czternastego wieku*. Warszawa 1895, pp. 77-86, but Wolff merely regurgitates the same Muscovite genealogy (pp. 77-78), not a text from Poland-Lithuania-Ukraine. Vadim V. Trepavlov, "Eastern Influence: The Turkic Nobility in Medieval Russia," in: *Coexistence* 32 (1995) 1, pp. 9-16, accepts the validity of

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Chinggisid descent was exclusively male, and could not pass through the female line.[8] While a non-Chinggisid could acquire some charisma by marrying a Chinggisid princess, such a dynastic union did not convey membership in the Golden Kin (*Altan uruk*) to the fortunate groom. The case of Timur (Tamerlane) well illustrates this phenomenon.[9]

Secondly, Ivan IV knew very well that he was not an heir of Chinggis Khan. The Muscovites had hardly forgotten who Chinggis Khan was.[10] To be sure, the Nikon Chronicle account of the Battle on the Kalka in 1223, the first East Slavic encounter with the Tatars, did not contain the Hypatian Chronicle's observation that afterward Chinggis Khan ("Chanogiz kan'") died fighting in the land of the Tanguts (1227).[11] Authentic *iarlyki* to Russian Orthodox Church metropolitans by the khans of the Golden Horde (and their wives), which were

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this genealogy. Anna L. Khoroshkevich, *Rus' i Krym. Ot soiuza k protivostoiianiu. Konets XV - nachalo XVI v.* Moskva 2001, pp. 97-98, 296, appears to accept the historicity of Mansur Kiyat Mamaevich, but more cautiously describes him as "supposedly" the founder of the Lithuanian Glinskii line. Edward L. Keenan, "Royal Russian Behavior, Style and Self-image," in: Edward Allworth (ed.), *Ethnic Russia in the USSR. The Dilemma of Dominance*. New York 1980, pp. 3-16, here p. 15, describes Ivan IV's maternal grandfather as a Ukrainian of Tatar antecedents. The genealogy traces the Glinskii clan to the Kiyats, actually Chinggis Khan's clan, and a clan among the Crimean and Nogai Tatars; on the Nogai Kiyats, see Trepavlov, *Istoriia Nogaiskoi ordy*, chart on p. 502. There is no evidence the Crimean Nogai Kiyats perceived the Glinskiis as relatives.

[8] See Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, p. 183. Also Vadim V. Trepavlov, "Status "Belogo Tsaria": Moskva i tatarskie khanstva v XV-XVI vv.," in: Sergei A. Panarin (ed.), *Rossiia i vostok: Problemy vzaimodeistviia*. Chast' 2. Moskva 1993, pp. 302-311, here p. 308 n. 34. Note that the most inflated Glinskii genealogy described the Glinskiis as an "imperial clan" ("tsarskii rod") because of marriage to a daughter of Chinggis.

[9] Timur, a member of the Mongol Barlas tribe, never went beyond claiming the title of "güregen" (royal son-in-law) for marrying a Chinggisid princess, scrupulously employed puppet Chinggisids, and never appropriated the title "khan." Contemporary and even subsequent Timurid ideologues treated differently a reputed common (male) ancestor of Timur and Chinggis; Timur's legendary genealogy played other Chinggisid themes instead (e.g. service of a Barulas ancestor to the Chagataid khans; Timur sometimes claimed in narrative sources that his mother was a Chinggisid princess!). See John E. Woods, "Timur's Genealogy," in: Michel M. Mazzaoui, Vera B. Moreen (eds.), *Intellectual Studies on Islam. Essays written in honor of Martin B. Dickson*. Salt Lake City 1990, pp. 85-125; Beatrice Forbes Manz, "Tamerlane and the Symbolism of Sovereignty," in: *Iranian Studies* 21 (1988) 1-2, pp. 105-122, here 105, 107, 110-111, 116, 120; idem, *The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane*. Cambridge 1989, pp. 14, 57; idem, "Temür and the problem of a conqueror's legacy," in: *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (3rd series) 8 (April 1998) 1, pp. 21-41, here pp. 36-38; John E. Woods, *The Timurid Dynasty*. Bloomington, IN 1990, p. 8. My thanks to Professor Manz for bibliographic assistance and consultation. Charles J. Halperin, "The Russian Land and the Russian Tsar: The Emergence of Muscovite Ideology, 1380-1408," in: *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 23 (1976) pp. 7-103, here p. 51 n. 165; idem, *The Tatar Yoke*. Columbus, OH 1985, p. 127, and David Morgan, "The Empire of Tamerlane: An Unsuccessful Re-Rerun of the Mongol Empire?," in: J. R. Maddicott, D. M. Palliser (eds.), *The Medieval State. Essays Presented to James Campbell*. London, Rio Grande 2000, pp. 233-241, here pp. 235-236, make the same mistake of asserting that a Timurid genealogy claimed Timur was a descendent of Chinggis.

[10] See Kennedy, *The Juchids of Muscovy*, p. 162.

[11] See Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 29-34.

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actively propagated during the 1540s and 1550s and survive in 1560s manuscripts, mentioned Chinggis Khan by name. Even if a 1540s (in Zimin's dating) forged *iarlyk* omitted that passage from its model, so Sokolov argued, from ignorance of its significance, the "expanded collection" of *iarlyki* to which it was attached retained invocations to Chinggis Khan in its genuine documents.[12] More importantly, Muscovite genealogies (*rodoslovnye knigi*) included paragraphs on the khans of the Great Horde, Kazan', Astrakhan' and Crimea, even preserving an accurate enumeration of the four sons of Chinggis Khan.[13] The Muscovites could hardly have dealt with the Khanates of Kazan', Astrakhan', and the Crimea, let alone decided whom to install as puppet khan of the serving Khanate of Kasimov, without scrupulous attention to Chinggisid genealogy.[14]

Third, the Muscovite rulers in general and Ivan IV in particular claimed an entirely different descent, from Pros, the brother of Augustus Caesar, via the Varangian Riurik. This fictive genealogy was propagated directly by the Court and the official Muscovite foreign policy establishment.[15] Unless Chinggis

[12] See Mikhail D. Priselkov, *Khanskie iarlyki russkim mitropolitam*. Petrograd 1916, *Appendices*, pp. 56, 58, 92, 96, 107, 110 et passim (invocations to Chinggis Khan); *Pamiatniki russkogo prava. Vypusk III: Pamiatniki prava perioda obrazovaniia russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva*. Moskva 1955, pp. 463-491 ("expanded collection" of *iarlyki*), 465, 467, 469 (invocations to Chinggis Khan); P. P. Sokolov, "Podlozhnyi iarlyk Uzbeka mitropolitu Petru," in: *Russkii istoricheskii zhurnal 1918*, kniga 5 (Reprint: The Hague, Paris 1971), pp. 70-85, here pp. 76-77, 78; V. V. Grigor'ev, *Rossiia i Aziia*. S.-Peterburg 1876, pp. 245-258 (entire "expanded collection" of *iarlyki*), 245-250 (forged grant from Uzbek to metropolitan Petr), 250, 254, 255 (invocations to Chinggis Khan); A. A. Zimin, "Kratkoe i prostrannoe sobraniia khanskikh iarlykov, vydannykh russkim mitropolitam," in: *Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 1961 god (1962)*, pp. 28-40, esp. pp. 36-39 (on the forged *iarlyk*). Zimin did not comment on Sokolov's explanation of the omission of the name of Chinggis in the forged *iarlyk*.

[13] *Rodoslovnye knigi po trem spiskam*, pp. 126-130 (Chinggis is listed among the Great Horde khans, with his sons Iuchi, Chagadai, Ugedei, and Tulei, a remarkable factum in a text of Muscovite provenance), 221-222. See also *Redkie istochniki po istorii Rossii*. Moskva 1977, pp. 67-68. Note that the same text contained both the Glinskii and Chinggis genealogies.

[14] A 1602 Kasimov chronicle by Qadir Ali Bek Jalayiri, the "Jami at-Tawarikh," derived its information about Chinggis from Rashid al-Din, translated into Turkish (see M. A. Usmanov, *Tatarskie istoricheskie istochniki XVII-XVIII vv*. Kazan' 1972, pp. 33-96), who also influenced later Volga Tatar works. On the other hand, the seventeenth-century Siberian chronicles reflect the decidedly anti-Chinggisid folkloric ideology of the Taybughids, who treated Chinggis as a commoner and brigand. See Allen J. Frank, *The Siberian Chronicles and the Taybughid Biys of Siberia*. Bloomington, IN 1994, pp. 8-11, 20.

[15] *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskago gosudarstva s Pol'sko-litovskim gosudarstvom*. Tom II *(1533-1560)*. Izd. pod red. G. F. Karpova. S.-Peterburg 1887 (= *Sbornik Imperatorskago Russkago Istoricheskago Obshchestva* [hereafter *SRIO*]. Tom 59), p. 519 (Ivan to Sigismund Augustus, King of Poland and Grand Prince of Lithuania, 1556); Iu. N. Shcherbatov (ed.), *Akty Kopengagenskago arkhiva, otnosiashchiesia k russkoi istorii. Vypusk pervyi: 1326-1569*, in: *Chteniia v imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete* [hereafter: *Chteniia*] 1915, kniga 4, tom 255, pp. 1-320, here p. 118 (Danish envoys account of negotiations with Viskovatyi, 1559, from "Rome"); Vypusk vtoroi: 1570-1576, in:

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Khan could somehow be wedged in as a lineal descendent of Riurik, there was simply no way Muscovite ideology could have accommodated Belek Bulat Mirza's version of Ivan's ancestry. Bennigsen misstates the Muscovite response to the Nogai version of his ancestry.

The five historians who have analyzed Belek Bulat Mirza's epistle interpret its significance differently.

Bennigsen cites the epistle as evidence that to the Nogais Ivan IV was "their man," not only the "belyi kniaz'"or, in Bennigsen's opinion, more rarely "belyi tsar'," the ruler of the western *ulus* of the empire of Chinggis Khan in the traditional color scheme, white = west, but also the true heir of Batu's *ulus,* and therefore had to be of steppe origin, not merely noble but of Chinggisid origin. Bennigsen adds that it is interesting to note that in his reply Ivan did not renounce such origin,[16] but this misstates the case: Ivan did not renounce it because he did not deign to acknowledge it in the first place.

Kennedy argues that Ivan had been acquiring the functional status of a khan long before he took the title "tsar'"in 1547. Kennedy describes the sources about that coronation as elusive, speculating, in effect, that Ivan meant to acquire the title of khan, not basileus, that Ivan was "wittingly or unwittingly" challenging Chinggisid legitimacy. The Nogais, wishing neither to challenge Chinggisid legitimacy nor insult their Muscovite patrons, resorted to a contrived kinship to convert Ivan into a Chinggisid who had the right to install khans in Kasimov and Astrakhan'. To Kennedy, the Muscovite rulers had already been "wrapping themselves in the Chinggisid mantle," and Belek Bulat's "modest, credible denial of reality" to make Ivan a Chinggisid may have been more than a "pure contrivance bora of political necessity." Still, Kennedy concedes, "we have no direct evidence that Ivan himself made claims of Chinggisid descent."[17]

Ostrowski confines himself to the comment that the letter "makes it clear that, after the adoption of the title tsar', the ruler of Muscovy could be referred to as a Chingizid," arguing that if Ivan was a "tsar'," and only Chinggisids could be "tsari," then Ivan must have been a Chinggisid; Ostrowski labels Belek Bulat Mirza's claim that a Daniilovich was a Chinggisid a "deception." [18]

Khodarkovsky sees in this depiction of Ivan's ancestry Muscovite pretensions to make Moscow the New Sarai, to compete with the Crimea to be the sole heir of the Golden Horde. However, Khodarkovsky expresses some caution at whether this flattery represents Nogai or Muscovite sensibilities. After all, the Turkic originals of the *gramoty* in the *nogaiskie dela* are not

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ibidem, 1916, kniga 2, tom 257, pp. 1-224, here p. 181 (Eisenberg's 1575 account to King Frederick II of Denmark of his embassy to Moscow, "Keyser Augusto"). Such references could of course be multiplied in diplomatic papers and foreign travelers' accounts.

[16] Ivanov, *Why is Ivan 'White'*? p. 4, follows Bennigsen, writing that Ivan "had nothing against the unexpected extension of his pedigree."

[17] Kennedy, *The Juchids of Muscovy,* pp. 11, 121-126, 128, 150.

[18] Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols,* pp. 182-183.

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always extant. Belek Bulat Mirza could have been buttressing Ivan's claims to legitimate sovereignty over Kazan' at Moscow's initiative or with Moscow's connivance. Similarly, even the title "White Tsar'" might be the product of Muscovite translators, a major point to which we will return.[19]

Trepavlov categorizes the epistle as Nogai flattery necessitated by the Muscovite advance down the Volga and does not explore its meaning to the Muscovites.[20]

Turning to the *gramota* itself, Khodarkovsky obviously is right on the mark in observing that flattery is hardly conducive to consistency. Belek Bulat Mirza's exaltation of Ivan might charitably be described as eclectic. Belek Bulat Mirza addressed "the Christian sovereign, the White Tsar'." Kennedy translates "belyi tsar'" as "western khan." In his land[21] Ivan "skazyvaettsia Chingisovym priamym synom i priamym Gosudarem Tsarem nazyvaetsia." In Khodarkovsky's literary translation, "In your land you claim to be the legitimate heir to Chinggis [Khan] and call yourself the legitimate Sovereign and Tsar'." Or in Kennedy's version: "In that land he is said to be a true son of Chinggis, and he is called a true sovereign khan." Belek Bulat Mirza described himself as the son of Edige, the Edigei of the Slavic chronicles, the non-Chinggisid emir, perhaps *beylerbei*, who was considered the founder of the Nogai (Mangyt) Horde and its ruling family.[22] Belek Bulat Mirza also referred to Ivan as "the son of Chinggis ("Chingishovu synu"), the White Prince, and the Orthodox Christian Sovereign."

Ostrowski made two critical errors in citing this text. First, he dates it 1554. Novikov did not publish, and quite possibly could not have published, the *nogaiskie dela* in strictly chronological sequence, and the chronology of the documents surrounding our epistle is definitely muddled; a letter by Ivan preceding Belek Bulat Mirza's *gramota* is dated 1552. Moreover, there were

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[19] Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, pp. 35, 40 (New Sarai), 44, 103, 106-107, 114. Khodarkovsky does not cite Kennedy's dissertation in his bibliography. Kennedy expresses caution at whether another passage, in which the Nogais purportedly recognized that the "era" of the Russian khan had arrived, actually reflected Nogai sentiments (Kennedy, *The Juchids of Muscovy*, p. 151). Bennigsen dismisses as nonsense a *gramota* to Ivan in 1551 from the Muscovite envoy to the Nogais Petr Turgenev, according to which the Ottoman sultan had written the Nogais that according to "Muslim books," the hand of the Russian "tsar" Ivan was now high over the Muslims. Bennigsen concludes that probably this assertion was fabricated in the Muscovite chancelleries to justify the conquest of Kazan'; in other words, that the Muscovites forged a letter from Suleiman the Magnificent! (Bennigsen, "Ekumenizm tsaria Ivana Vasil'evicha Groznogo," pp. 268-269) On Muscovite translators and interpreters from Nogai "Tatar" = Turkic, see Trepavlov, *Istoriia Nogaiskoi ordy*, p. 605.

[20] Trepavlov, *Istoriia Nogaiskoi ordy*, p. 630.

[21] Kennedy translates "v toi zemli" as "in this land" (Kennedy, *The Juchids of Muscovy*, p. 113, chapter epigram) and "in that land" (ibidem p. 124); cf. the confusing footnote ibidem, p. 124 n. 43.

[22] Vadim V. Trepavlov, *The Formation and Early History of the Manghit Yurt*. Bloomington, IN 2001.

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scribal errors in recording dates and misprints in Novikov's publication.[23] Nevertheless, Belek Bulat Mirza's letter should be dated to October 1551, before Ivan's conquest of Kazan', as Kennedy, Khodarkovsky and Trepavlov all agree.[24]

Secondly, Ostrowski misidentifies its author, Belek Bulat Mirza, with Bek Bulat Khan, grandson of Akhmad Khan, and father of Simeon Bekbulatovich.[25] Unfortunately these were two separate individuals, as Ostrowski should have learned from Kennedy. Bek Bulat Khan, also known as "Bek Bulat sultan" or "tsarevich Bek Bulat," was a Chinggisid, did spend some time among the Nogais, was invited to join Ivan's service in 1558, seems to have arrived in 1562, and campaigned for Ivan until his death in 1566. He was the father of Ivan the Terrible's favorite Chinggisid.[26] But no Chinggisid could possibly have written this epistle, abjuring his Chinggisid ancestry to describe himself as the son of Edigei. Belek Bulat Mirza, son of Koshum (variously Koshul or Kuchum), first appeared in the *nogaiskie dela* in 1545, and played a prominent role in Nogai affairs, although he never rose above the second-in-command rank of *nurredin*,[27] and in Muscovite-Nogai relations until his death in 1558.[28] No Nogai, no Tatar, and certainly no mid-sixteenth-century Muscovite would have confused two men of such different statuses.[29]

Since Ivan did not claim Chinggisid descent but "Roman" or "German," it is very unlikely that Belek Bulat Mirza's assertion was Muscovite-inspired.

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[23] I am deeply indebted to Michael Khodarkovsky for this critical commentary on the flaws of the *nogaiskie dela* and Novikov's publication. Cf. V. D. Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo pod verkhovenstvom Ottomanskoi porty. Tom I (do nachala XVIII veka)*. S.-Peterburg 1887, pp. xxvi-xxix. Khoroshkevich, *Rus' i Krym,* p. 20, notes omissions, later editing, and inaccuracies in the *posol'skie knigi.* Trepavlov *Istoriia Nogaiskoi ordy* pp. 29, 202 n. 4, 258 n. 18, 519 n. 6, notes omissions and typographical errors in PDRV.

[24] Trepavlov, *Istoriia Nogaiskoi ordy,* p. 630; Khodarkovsky, e-mail, May 3, 2002 (the date of the letter is not explicitly given in Khodarkovsky Russia's Steppe Frontier).

[25] Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols,* p. 182 n. 87.

[26] On his biography and career see Janet Martin, "Tatars in the Muscovite Army during the Livonian War," in: Eric Lohr, Marshall Poe (eds.), *The Military and Society in Russia, 1450-1917*. Leiden 2002, pp. 365-387, here pp. 368, 369-370 (my thanks to Professor Martin for pre-publication access to this article); Vladimir V. Vel'iaminov-Zernov, *Izsledovaniia o Kasimovskikh tsariakh i tsarevichakh.* Chast' I. S.-Peterburg 1863, pp. 456, 459, 460, 533; chast' 2. S.-Peterburg 1863, pp. 4-11; V. I. Buganov (ed.), *Razriadnaia kniga 1475-1598*. Moskva 1966, pp. 196, 197, 198, 200; *PDRV*. Chast' 10. S.-Peterburg 1795, pp. 24, 30; N. G. Savich (ed.), *Razriadnaia kniga 1475-1605 gg*. Tom II, chast' 1. Moskva 1981, pp. 110, 113, 137.

[27] The highest Nogai status was *beg* (in Russian *kniaz'*); the title *nurredin* derived from the personal name of the historical Nogai's eldest son; the third status, below *nurredin*, was *keikuvat*, from the name of the historical Nogai's younger son. (See Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, p. 10.)

[28] *PDRV*. chast' 8. S.-Peterburg 1793, pp. 78-80, 189-190, 196, 219-223, 229-233, 242-245, 316-317, 320-321, 336; chast' 9. S.-Peterburg 1793, pp. 16-22, 45, 76, 95, 105-108, 140-141, 179, 157-159, 248-251, 252-255, 276-277, 295-296; chast' 10. S.-Peterburg 1795, pp. 6-8, 14-16.

[29] Dr. Ostrowski informed me (e-mail, May 16, 2002) that he now accepts the dating and authorship of the epistle presented here.

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Moscow's ruler neither needed nor wanted such kudos. Indeed, when in 1537 Nogai Mirza Sheidiak (Said-Akhmed) claimed to have achieved the status of khan ("I nyne vo tsarevo mesto"),[30] the Muscovite court was hardly fooled and severely rebuked him.[31] Not surprisingly, Muscovite genealogies record the descent of the Nogai *mirzas* from "Edigei kniaz'."[32]

II

Belek Bulat Mirza, as we have seen, addressed Ivan as "White Tsar"'and "White Prince."[33] It is necessary to reconsider this titulature in order to put his restatement of Ivan's ancestry into context.[34]

Before 1537, Nogai documents call Ivan simply "Ivan," "prince," "Muscovite prince" or "grand prince." The title "White Prince" first appeared in 1537, in an epistle from Urak Mirza.[35] A preview of this title may be seen in an earlier epistle from 1536, also from Urak Mirza, which called Ivan "volnoi chelovek beloi" ("free and noble man" in Khodarkovsky's translation), although the garbled syntax makes it equally possible that Urak Mirza was referring to himself.[36] "White Tsar'" first occurred in 1548, after Ivan's coronation and

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[30] *PDRV*. Chast' 8. S.-Peterburg 1793, p. 24.

[31] Kennedy, *The Juchids of Muscovy*, pp. 160 n. 17, 190-191, 198; Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, pp. 102-103; Trepavlov, *Istoriia Nogaiskoi ordy*, pp. 190-194, 555.

[32] *Rodoslovnaia kniga po trem spiskam*, p. 130.

[33] Chebokaev does not even comment on this titulature. Kennedy translates it without comment. Novikov's publications were available to nineteenth-century Imperial Russian historians, but they apparently did very little with it Sergei M. Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*. Kniga III, tom 6. Moskva 1963, p. 480, cites the phrase as the usual designation for the ruler of Moscow by the descendants of Edigei. In Sergei M. Soloviev, *History of Russia from earliest times*. Ed. by Peter von Wahlde. Volume 10: *The Reign of Ivan the Terrible. Kazan, Astrakhan, Livonia, the Oprichnina and the Polotsk Campaign.* Gulf Breeze, FL 1995, p. 35, the translater Anthony L. H. Rhinelander glosses it as "meaning Western" but without further explication.

[34] I am very grateful for bibliographic references to "belyi tsar" to Brian Boeck, Edward L. Keenan, Jr., Chester Dunning, Boris Uspenskii, Sergei Bogatyrev, Norman Ingham, John Dunn, Frank Kämpfer, Dittmar Schorkowitz, Marina Kravets, and Leonid Chekin, who responded to my open inquiry to the H-Early Slavic listserv, and to Petko Ivanov. Unfortunately it has been impossible to pursue all bibliography and opinions on this topic within the confines of a single article.

[35] *PDRV*. Chast' 8. S.-Peterburg 1793, p. 32; Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, p. 44 n. 124. Was this the first Nogai appearance of the adjective "white" to describe the Muscovite prince? Either the first Nogai usage represents some invisible milestone in the projection of Muscovite power onto the steppe which motivated the Nogais to escalate their rhetoric, or it is an accident of manuscript preservation. The Nogai documents from 1523-1534 were lost to fire, but preserved documents earlier than 1537 did not use the title "White Prince."

[36] *PDRV*. Chast' 8. S.-Peterburg 1793, p. 11. Khodarkovsky, e-mail, May 3, 2002. Cf. definitely apropos of Ivan, "volnoi chelovek Belyi Kniaz'," *PDRV*. Chast' 9. S.-Peterburg 1793, pp. 19, 41. Note that the early seventeenth-century apocryphal correspondence of the Ottoman sultan to Ivan IV, putatively in 1564, addressed Ivan as "belyi Ivan," literally "white Ivan," and "russkii belyi

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before his conquest of Kazan'.[37] Despite Bennigsen, the title "White Tsar"is ubiquitous in subsequent Nogai correspondence, even if it did not efface "White Prince." Khodarkovsky attributes the epithet "white" to the traditional steppe color scheme, meaning west, or "right wing" (if one is facing south),[38] as the ruler in charge of the western territories of the former Golden Horde.[39] Kennedy, as we have seen, translates it as "west"; Bennigsen agrees with this interpretation. Ostrowski emphasizes the "wide distribution" of the title.[40] But the chronological and geographical patterns of that distribution have never been fully analyzed; the conclusions to be drawn from such an analysis require substantial revision of many accepted opinions about the title.

The only texts by a Muscovite author which contained the title "belyi tsar'"are dated approximately in 1460; they are two works about the Council of Florence by Simeon of Suzdal', the "Tale of Isidore's Council" and the "Tale of the Eighth (Florentine) Council,"[41]although Vasilii II is mentioned much more frequently without the epithet "white."

"Belyi tsar'"can be attested from a document in the Milan archive dated to approximately the same time, the end of the reign of Vasilii II and the beginning of that of Ivan III. Francesco Sforza referred to Ivan III as "Albus Imperator" ("Albi Imperatoris," "Album Imperatorem") in a letter to an Italian in Muscovite service.[42] However, Sforza did not use that title in letters to the

vozderzhatel" ("Russian white teetotaler"), probably a pun of some sort on "samoderzhets"; my thanks to David Goldfrank for consultation on this satirical term. M. D. Kagan, "Legendarnaia perepiska Ivana IV s turetskim sultanom kak literaturnyi pamiatnik pervoi chetverti XVII v.," in: *Trudy otdela drevnerusskoi literatury* 13 (1957) pp. 247-272, here pp. 266, 268.

[37] The Nogais continued to describe the ruler of Russia as "belyi tsar'" through the seventeenth century. In 1696 a Nogai could not decide whether to serve the "belyi tsar'" or the Turk (Glavnyi arkhiv Voronezhskoi oblasti, fond 5, opis' 2, delo 20, list 10). Brian Boeck kindly supplied this archival citation (e-mail, December 4, 2002).

[38] There is a considerable literature on color/cardinal directions systems. See Aleksandr Vasil'evich Podosinov, *Ex oriente lux! Orientatsiia po stranam sveta v arkhaicheskikh kul'turakh Evrazii*. Moskva 1999, pp. 429-433 (on the Turco-Mongol system, in which "white" meant "west" [in other systems, other colors could mean "west" and "white" could mean "east"]), 423-426 (on whether it derived from the Chinese).

[39] Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, p. 44 n. 124.

[40] Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, p. 181.

[41] V. Malinin, *Starets Eleazarova Monastyria Filofei i ego poslaniia. Istoriko-literaturnoe izsledovanie*. Kiev 1901 (Reprint: Westmead 1971), pp. 98 ("Skazanie Simeona suzdal'tsa 'Isidorov sobor i khozhenie ego'"), 111 ("Povest' Simeona suzdal'tsa o VIII (Florentiiskom) sobore"). Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, p. 181, cites the first but not the second text. See Gustave Alef, "The Origins of Muscovite Autocracy. The Age of Ivan III," in: *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 39 (1986) pp. 7-362, here p. 48 n. 157; Marc Szeftel, "The Title of the Muscovite Monarch up to the End of the Seventeenth Century," in: *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 13 (1979) 1-2, pp. 59-71, here p. 72 n. 41.

[42] Gino Barbieri, *Milano e Mosca nella Politica del Rinascimento: Storia della relazioni diplomatiche tra la Russia e il Ducato di Milano nell'epoca sforzesca*. Bari 1957, pp. 82-84; the editor translated the title as "Bianco imperatore." Gustave Alef, "Was Grand Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich Ivan III's 'King of the Romans'?," in: Daniel Clarke Waugh (ed.), *Essays in Honor of A.*

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Pope, a cardinal or his own Papal emissary.[43] Gustave Alef noted the identity of "Albus Imperator" to "belyi tsar'," which he called a "peculiarly Muscovite" title "hitherto known only from Russian sources" which Sforza could only have learned about from Vasilii II's envoy to Milan, the Greek Nicolo Ralli. Alef was concerned only with Vasilii II's search for recognition of his imperial title, and paid no attention to the adjective "white," despite citing an article by Spasskii which observed that "White Emperor" was "similar" to titles from the "Tatar east," and must have been "picked up" by Jacopo on the Black Sea littoral.[44] The Italians did not utilize this title again.[45] Croskey also places the title in the context of Italian, for example Contarini's, usage of "White Russia" to refer to Muscovy, but the too concludes that the Italian sources may reflect Crimean Tatar usage. However, Croskey emphasizes that Ivan III never used the title "belyi tsar'."[46]

The evidence of Sigismund von Herberstein is inconclusive. In a discourse on why the ruler of Muscovy was not an emperor, Herberstein observed that "some call the prince of Moscow Albus or White." Vasilii III was the first ruler of Muscovy to be so designated, but none of Vasilii III's councillors could explain its derivation, so Herberstein proposed his own theory based upon the ruler"s white cap.[47] Szeftel, referring to the Sforza letter,

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A. Zimin. Columbus, OH 1985, pp. 89-101, here p. 93, more fully in Alef, *The Origins of Muscovite Autocracy*, pp. 47-50. Alef cited V. I. Rutenberg, "Ital'ianskie istochniki o sviaziakh Rossii i Italii v XV v.," in: *Issledovaniia po otechestvennomu istochnikovedeniiu. Sbornik statei posviashchennykh 75-letiiu professora S. N. Valka*. Moskva, Leningrad 1964, pp. 455-462, here pp. 458-459, without noting the discrepancies between his and Rutenberg's readings of Barbieri: Alef wrote that Giovanni da Cernusco, who pretended to be Sforza's envoy to Vasilii II, conned 30 gold ducats out of Ivan III's Italian minter Jacobo, but Rutenberg wrote 300; similarly, Alef counted 30 pearls as Ivan III's gift to Sforza's wife, Rutenberg approximately 300. (I believe Alef was correct: Italian "trenta," Latin "trigenta.") Alef recorded Ivan III's gift of three newly-minted Muscovite gold coins – probably commemorative medals – to Sforza, Rutenberg conveyed the information that only two were actually given to Sforza, the third being lost en route. Rutenberg did not analyze the term "White Emperor." Also in Szeftel, *The Title of the Muscovite Monarch*, p. 72, n. 41; Ostrowski cites Szeftel without discussing the letter. Trepavlov does not refer to Sforza.

[43] Barbieri, *Milano e Mosca*, pp. 79, 80, 81. Barbieri, *Milano e Mosca*, pp. 19-26, did not mention this omission. He also did not comment on the title "White Emperor" per se.

[44] I. G. Spasskii, "Gold Coins and Coin-Like Gold in the Muscovite State, and the First Gold Pieces of Ivan III." Transl. by H. Bartlett Wells, in: *Numismatic Chronicle* (7th series) 19 (1979) pp. 165-184, here p. 173.

[45] Barbieri, *Milano e Mosca*, p. 24 n. 20.

[46] Robert M. Croskey, *Muscovite Diplomatic Practice in the Reign of Ivan III*. New York 1987, pp. 234-236.

[47] Sigismund Von Herberstein, *Notes upon Russia*. Transl. by R. H. Major. Volume 1. London 1851, pp. 32-38 (on title "emperor"), esp. p. 34 (on "white"); Szeftel, "The Title of the Muscovite Monarch," p. 72, n. 41; Trepavlov, "Status "Belogo Tsaria"," p. 306; V. V. Trepavlov, "Rossiia i kochevye stepy: Problema vostochnykh zaimstvovanii v rossiiskoi gosudarstvennosti," in: *Vostok* (1994) 2, pp. 44-62, here p. 56. My heartfelt thanks to Helen Sullivan of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Slavic Reference Service for locating this journal.

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observed that Herberstein erred in thinking the title originated under Vasilii III or that Vasilii III used it himself, but Szeftel may have erred in interpreting this title as "belyi tsar'." Herberstein did not mention an "Albus Imperator," but, as Szeftel quotes, a "Weisse Konige" or "Albus Rex."[48] However, the Muscovites might have used that term and Herberstein might be speaking in his own voice here; his aversion to Muscovite imperial status might explain the absence of the imperial title. Certainly Herberstein used the epithet "white," but this might have been an echo of "belyi kniaz'." Finally, if we take Herberstein at his word, then we must explain the unwillingness of the Muscovites to explain the epithet, despite their obvious enthusiasm for defending Vasilii III's imperial aspirations.

The title "belyi tsar'" was employed by Ottoman officials in Azov in 1519, addressing Vasilii III,[49] obviously well before Ivan IV's 1547 coronation.

In the 1550s the monks of the Hilandar Monastery on Mt. Athos wrote letters to Ivan IV which sometimes, but not always, addressed him by the title "belyi tsar'," and once used the title in an epistle to his brother Iurii Vasil'evich.[50]

In 1555 Muscovite diplomats quoted to incredulous Polish-Lithuanian envoys three epistles addressed to Ivan by the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman which employed the title "tsar'" as evidence that Ivan merited that title. One - and only one - of the three referred to Ivan as "belyi tsar'."[51]

Also in 1555, as part of the same diplomatic campaign, Metropolitan Makarii wrote to lay and ecclesiastical lords in Lithuania inquiring why

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[48] Ivanov, *Why is Ivan 'White'*? p. 2, similarly quotes Herberstein's terminology but translates his terms as "white tsar'."

[49] This might seem to corroborate Herberstein, but does not provide a transmission belt for the Milanese, since in the 1460s the Ottomans were not yet in control of Azov or the Crimea. See *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoiu i Nogaiskoiu Ordami i s Turtsiei.* Tom II (*1508-1521*). Izd. pod red. G. F. Karpova. S.-Peterburg 1895 (= *SRIO*. Tom 95), pp. 671-672, two *gramoty* which redundantly also employed the title "belyi tsar' vostochnoi." The first is dated 7028, the second in October; I presume therefore both may be dated 1519, the former from Dezder-burgan aga Azovskii, the latter from Kadyi (qadi) Azovskii. I was lead to these epistles by Khoroshkevich *Rus' i Krym* p. 188, who attributes them to "Crimeans" despite her other observations on Crimean titulature of Muscovite rulers (Khoroshkevich, *Rus' i Krym*, pp. 24, 185-186, 187 n. 348, 197). Khoroshkevich does not comment on the meaning of "White Tsar'." Trepavlov, *Istoriia Nogaiskoi Ordy*, p. 158, attributes one letter to the Azov *namestnik*, dated close to November 1519. Khodarkovsky makes the plausible suggestion that usage of "White Tsar" here might be a local initiative dictated by immediate circumstances (e-mail, August 24, 2002).

[50] M. Dimitrijevič (ed.), "Dokumenti koji se tichu odnosa između srpske tsrkve i Rusije u XVI veku," in: *Spomenik. Srpska Kralievska Akademiia* 39 (1903) pp. 16-42, here pp. 22 (no. 14), 27, 28, 31 (no. 21; an extract from the epistle's intitulatio written on the back of the manuscript), 31 (no. 22); Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, p. 181. (Ostrowski cites only no. 14 [p. 22] and no. 21 [p. 28].) Not utilized by Szeftel, Alef or Trepavlov. Ivanov, *Why is Ivan 'White'?* p. 5, quotes the 1550 epistle of Paisii, abbot of the Hilandar monastery, to Ivan, from A. N. Murav'ev, *Snosheniia Rossii s Vostokom po delam tserkovnym*. Chast' 1. S.-Peterburg 1858, pp. 62-63. (This text is identical to Dimitrijevič *Dokumenti* p.22)

[51] *SRIO*. Tom 59, p. 477. Not in Ostrowski or anyone else.

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Sigismund Augustus did not recognize Ivan IV as "tsar'." According to Makarii, all (other) neighboring Christian and Muslim states entitled him "belyi russkii tsar'" ("White Russian Tsar'"), including the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian, the head of the Roman faith (*zakon*), and the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman, the head of the Muslim faith (*zakon*).[52] Only Boris Uspenskii quotes this passage as a reference to "belyi tsar'," [53]but that is unclear: "belyi russkii tsar'" is not identical to "belyi tsar'." If Makarii meant "belyi tsar'," then his observation is simply false, since in no extant documentation did Maximilian or any of Ivan IV's western neighbors (England, Denmark, Sweden, Livonia, or even Moldavia) address him as "belyi tsar'," and, as we have seen, Ottoman usage of "belyi tsar'" ("ak-padishah"), was sporadic, through the seventeenth century.[54]

In 1562 the ambassador of the Crimean Khan Ian-Boldui addressed Ivan IV as "belyi tsar'"in his message asking for money and patronage, a unique usage of that title in the Crimean diplomatic documents during the 1560s and 1570s.[55]

Post-Ivan IV references can be summarized briefly. In 1590 a Kabardinian Cherkassian prince in Muscovite service, fighting the Swedes, addressed Tsar Fedor Ivanovich as "belyi tsar'."[56]The Muscovite envoy to Persia 1595-1599, Vasilii Tiufiakin, reported that the Persian shah referred to the ruler of Muscovy as the "belyi tsar'" in a letter when threatening the Turkish ambassador with retribution for Ottoman aggression.[57] During the Time of Troubles (*smutnoe vremia*), Prokopii Liapunov, fighting Tsar Vasilii Shuiskii and the "Thief of Tushino" (Second False Dmitrii), in 1609 "called himself the White Tsar and wished to fight, he said, for the Muscovite Christian faith," at least according to the German mercenary Conrad Bussow.[58]

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[52] *SRIO*. Tom 59, pp. 470-476.

[53] Boris A. Uspenskii, "Dualisticheskii kharakter russkoi rednevekovoi kul'tury (na materiale "Khozhenie zatri moria" Afanasiia Nikitina," in: idem, *Izbrannye trudy*. Tom I: *Semiotika istorii. Semiotika kul'tury*. Moskva 1994, pp. 254-297, here p. 260 n. 29.

[54] Spasskii, *Gold Coins*, p. 173 n. 40, added that in the eventeenth century Paul of Aleppo recorded that the Turks called the Russian monarch or "ak-padishah," i.e. "White Padishah."

[55] *Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov*, fond 123, delo 10, list 10. I am enormously grateful to Aleksandr I. Filiushkin for supplying this citation (e-mail, December 10, 2002).

[56] S. A. Belokurov (ed.), *Snosheniia Rossii s Kavkazom. Materialy izvlechennye iz Moskovskago Glavnago Arkhiva Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del*. Vypusk I (*1578-1613 gg.*). Moskva 1889, p. 72. (Previously published in: *Chteniia* 1888, kniga 3, tom 1, same pagination. My thanks to Helen Sullivan of the University of Illinois Slavic Reference Service for locating this prior publication.)

[57] N. I. Veselovskii, *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh i torgovykh snoshenii Moskovskoi Rusi s Persiei*, Tom 1: *Tsarstvovanie Fedora Ivanovicha*. S.-Peterburg 1890, p. 448, as quoted in Ivanov, *Why is Ivan 'White'?* p. 3.

[58] *The Disturbed State of the Russian Realm*. Conrad Bussow. Transl. and ed. by G. Edward Orchard. Montreal [et al.] 1994, p. 120.

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Dukhovnye stikhi (spiritual verses), whose dating is problematic, often refer to the "belyi tsar'," and also apply to him the title "tsar' nad tsariami," an epithet of Jesus Christ appropriately translated as "King of Kings."[59]

Similarly, "White Tsar'"appears in "historical songs," of equally indistinct dating, about Ivan IV and events in Russian history through the nineteenth century.[60]

More reliably dated are seventeenth-century documents from the Kalmyks addressed to Muscovite rulers as "belyi tsar'."[61]In the middle of the seventeenth century Grigorii Kotoshikhin, after defecting to Sweden, informed the Swedes that the Kalmyks employed this title.[62] During the seventeenth century various tribes in Siberia addressed the Muscovite ruler as "belyi tsar'."[63]

A 1696 letter from the Safavid Shah of Persia Hussein to Peter I called him "belyi khan."[64]

In the eighteenth century the Manchu Ch'ing Emperor K'ang-hsi and the Li-fan yuan, the Mongolian Superintendency (Court of Colonial Affairs, Barbarian Control Commission), habitually addressed Russian rulers as "Ch'a-han nan," a direct translation of the Mongol "chakhan khan," meaning "White Khan." [65]

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[59] G. P. Fedotov, *Stikhi dukhovnye (Russkaia narodnaia vera po dukhovnym stikham)*. Paris 1953, pp. 18, 20, 106, 107, 143. See George Majeska, "Tsar'grad: The Image of Byzantium in the Popular Lore of Medieval Russia," in: Maria Cieśla-Korytowskia (ed.), *The Slavs in the Eyes of the Occident. The Occident in the Eyes of the Slavs*. Krakow, Boulder, CO 1992, pp. 9-19, here p. 18 (published in Russian translation as Dzh. Mazheska, *Tsar'grad: obraz Vizantii v russkom fol'klore*, in: B. N. Floria (ed.), *Gennadios. K 70-letiiu akademika G. G. Litavrina*. Moskva 1999, pp. 118-128, here pp. 125-126).

[60] Norman Ingham, "The Groza of Ivan Groznyi in Russian Folklore," in: *Russian History/Histoire russe* 14 (1987) 1-4, pp. 225-245, here p. 225, epigraph; V. I. Ignatov, *Russkie istoricheskie pesni. Khrestomatiia*. Moskva 1970, pp. 76 (Ivan IV), 96 (Ivan IV and also siege of Pskov by Stephan Batory), 191 (eighteenth-century capture of a Russian noble during Seven Years War), 210-211, 217 (both 1812).

[61] I. IA. Zlatkin, N. V. Ustiugov (eds.), *Russko-mongol'skie otnoshennia 1606-1636. Sbornik dokumentov*. Moskva 1959, pp. 67, 79, 80, 91, 243, 245-246; V. S. Miasnikov, N. F. Demidova, S. L. Tichvinskij (eds.), *Russko-kitaiskie otnosheniia v XVII v*. Tom 1 (*1608-1683*). Moskva 1969, pp. 72, 76, 78 (duplicating an entry in the previous citation), 108, 113-114, 115, 121, 262, 470-471. See Michael Khodarkovsky, *When Two Worlds Met. The Russian State and the Kalmyk Nomads*, 1600-1771. Ithaca, NY 1992, pp. 66, 97; idem, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, p. 134.

[62] Grigorii Kotoshikhin, *O Rossii v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha*. 4th ed. S.-Peterburg 1906 (Reprint: The Hague, Paris 1969), pp. 36-40.

[63] David N. Collins, *Subjugation and settlement in seventeenth and eighteenth-century Siberia*, in: Alan Wood (ed.). *The History of Siberia from Russian Conquest to Revolution*. London 1991, pp. 37-56, here p. 42. Collins cites secondary literature inaccessible to me. Further research is required to identify primary sources, dates, identity of tribes, etc.

[64] K. A. Antonov, N. M. Gol'dbert, T. D. Lavrentsova (eds.), *Russko-indiiskie otnosheniia v XVII v. Sbornik dokumentov*. Moskva 1958, pp. 365-366, 368-369, 392-392 (originals and contemporary translations).

[65] V. S. Miasnikov, N. F. Demidova, S. L. Tichvinskij (eds.), *Russko-kitaiskie otnosheniia v XVIII v*. Tom 1 (*1700-1725*). Moskva 1978, pp. 105-106, 175-175, 382. Cf. Mark Mancall, *Russia and China. Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728*. Cambridge, MA 1971, pp. 4-5 (translation of office of Li-fan yuan), 54 esp. n. 47 (Chinese and Mongol terms).

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It is hardly surprising, therefore, that eighteenth-century historians and visitors to Russia should mention the title. Tatishchev wrote, with some legerdemain, that Tatars, Persians, Turks and other eastern peoples called the Russian Emperor the "ak-padishah," "belyi gosudar'," "belyi imperator." Somewhat incoherently he tried to link the title to *Belaia Rus'* (White Rus').[66] In a comparable vein, von Strahlenberg wrote that all the Tatars, Kalmyks, and Chinese called the Russian monarch "tzagan zaar," "White Czar," with an equally confused derivation of the term based upon "white" as meaning free or noble.[67] Scattered usages continued throughout the nineteenth and even early twentieth centuries.[68]

Trepavlov[69] identifies three explanations of "belyi tsar':"

1) The Slavic, from *Belaia Rus'* as independent, great, ruling, noble, in contrast to *Chernaia Rus'* or *Chervornnaia Rus'*. Trepavlov cites Alexandra Soloviev, who demonstrated that the term "White Russia" was well known in the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries in Eastern Europe, "white" being a synonym of "great."[70] A text about the Council of Florence in the Russian chronicles, the "Slovo izbranno," contains a passage in which the Byzantine Emperor John VIII Palaeologus allegedly declared to Pope Eugenicus (Eugene IV) that Vasilii II, the ruler of *Belaia Rus'* (White Rus'), was so pious that he declined the title "tsar'."[71] This assertion contradicts Simeon of Suzdal' since a "belyi tsar'" is still all in all a "tsar'," but suggests a connection between *Belaia Rus'* (White Rus') and "belyi tsar'" ("White Tsar'"), appropriated in 1578 by

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[66] V. N. Tatishchev, *Istoriia Rossiiskaia*. Tom I. Moskva, Leningrad 1962, pp. 355, 438 n. 9, 439 n. 10.

[67] Philip Johan von Strahlenberg, *An Historico-Geographical Description of the North and Eastern Parts of Europe and Asia, But more particularly of Russia, Siberia and Great Tartary...*, London 1738, p. 188 n. 25.

[68] K. K. Pahlen, *Mission to Turkestan. Being the Memoirs of Count K. K. Pahlen 1908-1909*. Ed. and introd. by Richard A. Pierce. London 1963, pp. 17, 30, 32, 41, 56, 83-84,144, 191: in *Turkestan the Emperor of Russia was called the "White Tsar'," ("ak-padishah")*; Edward L. Keenan Jr., "Remarques sur l'histoire du mouvement revolutionnaire a Baku," in: *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 3 (1962) pp. 225-260, here p. 234 n. 17: a Muslim worker quoted about the revolution of 1905 in Baku by an article in 1925 referred to the "great White Tsar'."

[69] Trepavlov, *Status "Belogo Tsaria"*, pp. 306-307; idem, *Rossia i kochevye stepi*, pp. 56-57.

[70] Alexandre V. Soloviev, "Weiß-, Schwarz- und Rotreußen," in: *JBfGOE* 7 (1959) 1, pp. 1-31, here pp. 10-21 (reprinted in: idem, *Byzance et la formation de l'Etat russe*. London 1979, Essay XII); idem (Aleksandr Solov'ev), "Velikaia, Malaia i Belaia Rus'," in: *Voprosy istorii* (1947) 7, pp. 24-38, here pp. 33-35. For an example from the reign of Ivan IV, see Richard Chancellor, in Lloyd E. Berry, Robert O. Crummey (eds.), *Rude & Barbarous Kingdom. Russia in the Accounts of Sixteenth-Century English Voyagers*. Madison, WI 1967, p. 21.

[71] *Polnoe Sobranie Russkikh Letopisei*. Tom VI, p. 153; Tom VIII, p. 101 (variant "Belyia Rus'"); Tom XII, p. 26 (Despite the Emperor's insistence that Vasilii II declined the title "tsar'," the Pope addresses him as "tsar'," and the Nikon Chronicle itself also accords him that title [pp. 40, 43]; see Alef, *The Origins of Muscovite Autocracy*, p. 48 n. 157 [without referencing Nikon Chronicle]).

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Guagnini,[72] by which time it might have been little more than learned speculation. This theory is supported by Uspenskii, who lists as sources Sforza, Herberstein ("Weisser Khünig" and "Albus Rex"), Metropolitan Makarii, Bussow about Liapunov, Kotoshikhin, Strahlenberg, and Tatishchev, and A. V. Soloviev from secondary works. Uspenskii sees a confessional significance to the term, linked to the defense of Orthodox Christianity. He connects the term *Belaia Rus'* to that of *Sviataia Rus'* (Holy Rus') in the spiritual verses as sacred nomenclature.[73]

2) The Hungarian theory follows sixteenth-century English sources such as Fletcher, which derived the name from King Bela of Hungary.[74]

3) The Turco-Mongol, that "white" meant "west" and derived from the *Belaia orda/Ak orda*/White Horde of the Golden Horde, to which Trepavlov gives precedence. As we have seen, this theory is endorsed by Kennedy, Ostrowski and Khodarkovsky. It is also shared by Vernadsky,[75] Keenan,[76] and Bačić.[77] "White" had a variety of meanings among the Mongols and the Muscovites.[78]

None of these theories satisfactorily explains all the data on the usage of "belyi tsar'," even allowing for the expected vagueness and inconsistency of Muscovite texts.[79]

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[72] Guagnini explained "alba Caesar" by "Russia Alba"; quoted from Alexandri Guagnini Veronensis, *Omnium regionum Moscoviae descriptio*, in: Adalbertus De Starczewski (ed.), *Historiae ruthenicae scriptores exteri saeculi XVI*. Tomus I. Berolini, Petropoli 1841, chapter VII, pp. 1-48, here p. 27, by Soloviev, "Weiß-, Schwarz- und Rotreußen," p. 19.

[73] Uspenskii, *Dualisticheskii kharakter*, pp. 260-261. In an e-mail, December 6, 2002, Professor Uspenskii kindly informed that although the first edition of the "Selected Works," which I cite here, contains typographical errors, such as "confidential" for "confessional" in this passage, corrected in the second edition, its references and quotations are identical. Petko Ivanov presents "White Tsar'" as a steppe concept which was "Russianized" and Christianized, and pursues its religious meaning in Russia further than anyone else, linking "White Tsar'" to Third Rome, Russian messianism, the White Cowl, eschatology, the "white kingdom," Holy Rus', and the "Russian God," including in modern Russian literature and theology Dostoevsky and Father Sergei Bulgakov (Ivanov, *Why is Ivan 'White'?* pp. 2, 5-7).

[74] Berry, Crummey (eds.), *Rude & Barbarous Kingdom*, p. 126.

[75] Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia*, pp. 138-139, 388; idem, *The Tsardom of Moscow 1547-1682*. Part 1. New Haven 1969, p. 5.

[76] Keenan, *Muscovy and Kazan'* (dissertation), pp. 385-386, citing Sforza and the Nogai documents; Edward L. Keenan, "Muscovy and Kazan. Some Introductory Remarks on the Pattern of Steppe Politics," in: *Slavic Review* 26 (1967) 4, pp. 548-558, here p. 558; idem, "Royal Russian Behavior, Style, and Self-Image," p. 7.

[77] Jacques Bačić, *Red Sea-Black Russia. Prolegomena to the History of North Central Eurasia in Antiquity and the Middle Ages*. Denver, CO 1995, pp. 167-168.

[78] Among the Mongols, white was also considered the "mother" color, since all colors derived from it; "white" meant luck, welfare, goodness, honestly, honor and high social status ("white bone"). See Antti Ruotsala, *Europeans and Mongols in the Middle of the Thirteenth Century: Encountering the Other*. Helsinki 2001, p. 115 n. 265. In Muscovy, "white" could mean tax-exempt. However, among the Mongols "black" could also mean "great," as in Karakorum (the "black city" and capital of the Mongol Empire) or the four *karachi begs* of the Golden Horde.

[79] A useful reminder by David Goldfrank in Pittsburgh.

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The Slavic theory suffers from two weaknesses. First, it neither includes nor explains the Nogai or other steppe usages of the term, in which "belyi tsar'"as "western khan" makes obvious sense. However there are passages in which even the Nogai usage takes on a confessional coloration. The conflation of ethnic and religious identities is reflected in Aidar Mirza's observation that Ivan was a Christian, but he was a Mangyt.[80] If Christian = Russian, then the phrase "of all Christians" included in Ivan's titles by the Nogais might be their translation of "vsea Rusi," since the Nogais surely knew that Ivan was not sovereign of all Christians.[81]

The second obstacle to the Slavic theory is the absence of an adequate history of the geographic term *Belaia Rus'*, which Western Europeans – and the "Slovo izbranno" – applied to Muscovy but which in the long run permanently attached itself to what is now Belarus.[82]

The Hungarian theory can simply be dismissed as fantasy.

The Turco-Mongol theory poses its own problems. Ostrowski wrote that "the term 'belyi tsar'' ('White Tsar'') was used by Tatar khans in addressing the grand prince,"[83] but the secondary works he cited mistakenly generalized from Nogai documents to the Tatars in general.[84] It would appear that no Chinggisid – of the Golden Horde or any of its successor states – ever addressed the ruler of Moscow as "White Tsar'," and I strongly suspect none could have without impugning the legitimacy of the Golden Kin. The sole possible exception to this previously unnoticed and critically important pattern is the "Crimean envoy" of 1562. Khodarkovsky[85] proposes several possible interpretations – an overzealous translator; an envoy so desperate to get what he wanted from Ivan IV that he exceeded diplomatic protocol; or, most likely, an envoy who did not represent the Crimean khan, but rather the Nogais in the Crimea, who, in their

80. *PDRV*. Chast' 8. S.-Peterburg 1793, p. 195.

81 For example, *PDRV*. S.-Peterburg 1793, pp. 153, 189, 196. See Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier* pp. 35, 44.

82 Nicholas Vakar, "The Name "White Russia"," in: American Slavic and East European Review 8 (1949), pp. 201-213; idem, *Belorussia. The Making of a Nation. A Case Study. Cambridge*, MA 1956, pp. 1-4. On Vakar's theory – which links "white" to freedom from foreign taxation – see Herbert Ludat, "Farbenbezeichnungen in Völkernamen. Ein Beitrag zu asiatisch-osteuropäischen Kulturbeziehungen," in: *Saeculum* 4 (1953), pp. 138-155, here pp. 141-142. Cf. *The Russian Empire and Grand Duchy of Muscovy. A Seventeenth-Century French* Account by Jacques Margaret. Ed. and transl. by Chester S. L. Dunning. Pittsburgh, PA 1983, p. 7, esp. nn. 5, 6. Note that Solov'ev, "Velikaia, Malaia i Belaia Rus'," p. 26, invoked the analogy of White and Black Wallachia in Turkic, *Ak-Iflak* and *Kara-Iflak*, to argue that "White" and "Black" meant "Great" and "Little," not "west" and "north."

83 Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, p. 181

84. Ostrowski's references are to Keenan, *Muscovy and Kazan'* (dissertation), p. 385, who asserts (p. 385 n. 54) that the title was used in diplomatic correspondence with other former parts of the Golden Horde; Szeftel, "The Title of the Muscovite Monarch," pp. 70-71; and Croskey, *Muscovite Diplomatic Practice*, pp.235-236. Neither Keenan nor Szeftel cite any Tatar material other than Nogai.

85 E-mail to H-EarlySlavic, December 15, 2002, posted December 16, 2002.

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independent relations with Muscovy, might have borrowed the titulature of their non-Crimean Nogai brethren. Indeed, a group of Volga Nogais migrated to Crimea in 1558, and by 1562 were seeking to return to their previous pastures; the "ambassador" might have been from them. No other case of "steppe usage" – Ottoman, Kalmyk, and especially Nogai – comes from Chinggisid khans.

This phenomenon complicates the Turco-Mongol interpretation of the Sforza reference. In the 1460s who on the steppe could have supplied the title to the Italians? Surely not the Crimeans, with their Chinggisid arrogance, nor the Nogais, whose "hordes" did not yet exist, nor, least of all, the nomadic successor of the Golden Horde, the *Bol'shaia orda* (Big Horde), which maintained pretensions to sovereignty over Muscovy for decades thereafter.

Alef suggests that the title "White Tsar'"in the Sforza documents came from Muscovy, from the Muscovite chancelleries. Keenan concurs but goes two steps further, arguing that the title meant "western khan," and that it was Muscovite grand-princely usage at the time. The Muscovite Church, opposed to steppe influence in Moscow, successfully "censored" the title by the reign of Ivan III, especially after his marriage to Sofia Paleologina opened up alternative ideological possibilities, reducing "belyi tsar'"to just plain "tsar'." [86]

This scenario is completely unconvincing. There are no fifteenth-century documents from the Muscovite court which employ the title. Keenan does not mention Simeon of Suzdal', a cleric whose usage of the term was not "censored" by the Church. It is more credible that when traveling to Italy Simeon picked up the term from the same foreign milieu that applied the designation "White Russia" to Muscovy at the time, than that he intended to describe Vasilii II as the "western khan" when the Great Horde could still threaten Moscow. Even if Metropolitan Makarii's phrase "belyi russkii tsar'" was not an invocation of the title "belyi tsar'," it is scarcely conceivable that the militantly anti-Muslim, anti-Tatar Makarii would have used the epithet "white" to mean "western" rather than the "free" or "great" of the Slavic theory.

That states and peoples which had not been part of the Golden Horde addressed the ruler of Moscow as the "belyi tsar'"may be far less significant that it appears. Ottoman usage was inconsistent, and certainly the Ottomans did not intend to express subservience to Moscow.[87] As for the Kalmyks, the Lubsan Tayiji in 1662-1663 addressed the Muscovite tsar as "White Khan" but himself as "khagan," Emperor, reducing Alexei Mikhailovich to a local ruler.

[86] Keenan expounds this theory in his dissertation (Keenan *Muscovy and Kazan'* pp. 384-386); it has never surfaced in print, even in his articles which comment on the title.

[87] On Turkic-language Crimean and Ottoman titulature for each other and Muscovy, see Halil Inalcik, "Power Relationships between Russia, the Crimea and the Ottoman Empire as reflected in titulature," in: *Passé Turco-Tatar, Présent Soviétique. Études offertes á Alexandre Bennigsen.* Louvain, Paris 1986, pp. 175-211. Selim II addressed Ivan IV as "moskov kral sar," in which Inalcik doubts "sar" meant Caesar or Emperor; Inalcik quotes no equivalent of "belyi tsar'," nor did he utilize the Muscovite translations which the Muscovites presented to the Poles and Lithuanians.

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An early eighteenth-century Russian translator complained that the Manchus omitted a dot after the term when referring to Peter the Great, which meant "khan who is a subject," versus with a dot, meaning "autocratic khan," berating the stupidity and ignorance of the Russian frontier translators. The Ch'ing Emperor in theory recognized no one as his equal.[88] Isolated occurrences, such as by Persian shahs, are mere curiosities.

It would be too easy if the Nogais called Ivan IV "White Prince" before 1547 and only "White Tsar'"thereafter. If Ivan's title "White Emperor" was a reflection of his 1547 coronation, then the Nogais' continuing use of "White Prince," as in Belek Bulat Mirza's epistle, would seem to be inconsistent, as Khodarkovsky observes.[89] If genuine Turkic phrases underlie each variant, then it would follow that the Nogais were guilty of an inability to distinguish between "Ak beg" and "Ak qan,"[90]an incredible chronic and pervasive insensitivity to Chinggisid genealogy. Rather, the continued use of both "White Prince" and "White Tsar'"in Nogai address to Ivan IV after 1547 may reflect different segments of Ivan's actual title, which was, after all, "Tsar' i velikii kniaz'," bifurcated and adulterated with the adjective "white." Therefore the Nogai contribution to Ivan's title would have been the interpolated color adjective.

The Muscovite chancelleries of the sixteenth century, as Ostrowski noticed, did not entitle the Muscovite ruler as "belyi tsar'."[91]The title never occurs in documents from Ivan, only in "Muscovite sources" which are epistles TO Ivan.[92] In his own communications to the Nogai *mirzas* or those written in his name, Ivan of course adheres to Muscovite titulature; he never called himself "White Emperor,"[93] which creates a somewhat schizophrenic impression in the Nogai diplomatic documents, as if the Muscovites and the Nogais were talking past each other. Since no sixteenth-century text emanating from Muscovite speech employed the title, it would be quite odd if the Nogais acquired the term from the Muscovites rather than inventing it themselves or acquiring it somehow from someone else.

Therefore, claims that Nogai usage reflected Muscovite pretensions to the throne of Sarai are unconvincing. The flaw in Kennedy's analysis is that except

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[88] The Kalmyk and Chinese situations are both discussed in Khodarkovsky, *When Two Worlds Met*, pp. 64-65.

[89] Keenan, *Muscovy and Kazan'* (dissertation) p. 385 n. 54, describes them as alternatives.

[90] Benningsen, "Ekumenizm tsaria Ivana Vasil'evicha Groznogo," p. 272 n. 8, considers "belyi kniaz'" the translation of "Aq Khan," and "belyi tsar'"the equivalent of "ak-padishah."

[91] Ostrowki, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, pp. 181-182.

[92] Still less would we look for "belyi tsar'"in Muscovite narrative sources, of whatever provenance, about the conquest of Kazan' – the Nikon Chronicle, prince Andrei Kurbskii's "History," or the "Kazanskaia istoriia."

[93] There is no corroboration that Muscovite couriers or envoys ever invoked the title orally – their instructions included the speeches they were to deliver verbatim – so there is no analogy to United States cavalry officers or Bureau of Indian Affairs officials speaking to Native American chiefs on behalf of "the Great White Father."

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for the "Epistle to the Ugra river" of Vassian Rylo, bishop of Riazan', in 1480, Muscovites did not challenge Chinggisid legitimacy, and, as Kennedy's own data demonstrate, regardless of Ivan's coronation or Muscovite annexation of Kazan' and Astrakhan', Muscovy continued to respect Chinggisid descent. Moreover, as even Ostrowski conceded,[94] Ivan IV was not crowned as a khan in 1547, but a basileus.[95] Khodarkovsky's arresting metaphor of Moscow as the "New Sarai" is the boldest presentation of the notion of Muscovy as a successor state of the Golden Horde, which fails to take into account the striking Muscovite restraint in expressing – or even acknowledging – anything even vaguely comparable.

The Slavic and Turco-Mongol theories, therefore, each explain different incidents of the usage of "belyi tsar'." The Slavic theory fits Simeon of Suzdal',[96] Sforza, the possible "belyi kniaz'" in Herberstein, Hilandar, one way or the other Makarii, the otherwise mysterious Bussow,[97] and the historical songs and spiritual verses. The Turco-Mongol theory fits, in different ways, the Ottoman, Nogai, Kalmyk, and Chinese cases. The non-Muscovite version of "White Tsar'" was available to the Muscovites from Simeon of Suzdal' and the adjectival use of "white" by the time of Metropolitan Makarii.[98] The obviously Christian world-view of the historical songs and spiritual verses makes any steppe origin highly unlikely.[99] Ever since the Mongol conquest of the East Slavs, the term "tsar'" translated both "basileus" and "khan," as Michael Cherniavsky so brilliantly elucidated. It does not strike me as extravagant to argue that this same duality, somewhat transmuted, applied to "belyi tsar'" as well.[100] Trepavlov suggested that only one of the three theories could be

[94] Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols,* p. 186

[95]. David B. Miller, "The Coronation of Ivan IV of Moscow," in: *JBfGOE* 15 (1967) pp. 559-574.

[96] Ludat, "Farbenbezeichnungen in Völkernamen", pp. 138-155; Viacheslav V. Ivanov, "Tsvetovaia simvolika v geograficheskikh nazvaniiakh v svete dannykh topologii (k nazvaniiu Belorusii)," in: *Baltoslavianskie issledovaniia 1980.* Moskva 1981, pp. 163-177; and Podosinov, *Ex oriente lux!* pp. 41, 377-379, 531, fail to explain *Belaia Rus'* in a steppe context. They argue that the terms *Belaia Rus'*, *Chervonnaia Rus'* and *Chernaia Rus'* embodied the Turco-Mongol direction system from the thirteenth century (when they are not attested), but by the fourteenth century had been distorted, thus the *translatio* of "White Rus'"to Muscovy.

[97] Chester S. L. Dunning, *Russia's First Civil War: The Time of Troubles and the Founding of the Romanov Dynasty.* University Park, PA 2001, pp. 401-402, tries to explain thr term.

[98] To repeat, however, the Muscovites *never* identified Muscovy as *Belaia Rus'* and the Muscovite court *never* entitled its ruler "belyi tsar'."

[99] Bačić, "Red Sea-Black Russia", p. 169, suggests that the "white" in "belyi tsar'"and in the folkloric and spiritual-verse description of Moscow as "belokamennaia" ("white-walled") is coincidence, purely descriptive. Perhaps this connection should be pursued, since it might provide the link between foreign and domestic usages. Since, following Cherniavsky, I would date the concept of Holy Rus' to the seventeenth century, it cannot connect the sixteenth-century dots intellectually.

[100] Cherniavsky did not discuss "belyi tsar'." Despite my having read Vernadsky when I was studying Russo-Tatar relations, neither did I.

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"correct"; I am proposing that two could, that there were two distinct "White Emperors."[101] We are, after all, talking about "white," not puce; the possibility of coincidence should not be excluded. But for our analysis of Belek Bulat Mirza's epistle, this lengthy digression on the title "belyi kniaz'" suggests that he was not borrowing Muscovite usage, but following Nogai conceptions.

III

As Trepavlov alone eventually realized, Belek Bulat Mirza was not the only Nogai to project Chinggisid ancestry onto Ivan IV.[102] In April 1552 Arslan Mirza addressed Ivan as "White Tsar'," and described him as "Chinnikov syn." [103] Since he paralleled that phrase with his own paternal lineage – "I am the son of Kuchum, Belek Bulat Mirza's brother," in which "son" means "son" and not "heir" – "Chinnikov" should be a variant of "Vasilii," but it appears to be a distorted invocation of Chinggis.[104]

No less intriguing is an epistle from Urus Mirza, son of Ismail, to Ivan from 1564,[105] in which he complained that Ivan, the "belyi tsar'," had promised to honor him greatly, but had not kept his word. The following words are printed as a separate sentence, although grammatically they lack a verb: "Velikago Tsingiz – Tsarev priamoi rod – schastlivoi." This referred to Ivan.[106] As a stand-alone sentence, it might mean: "May the true heir of the great Chinggis Khan be happy!" As a phrase in apposition somehow to Ivan's name, Khodarkovsky suggests "the direct descendent of Chinggis' felicitous lineage."[107]Regardless of how this expression was integrated into the letter, it does associate Ivan yet again with Chinggis.

What then are we to make of these multiple attributions to Ivan of Chinggisid charisma? Trepavlov acutely observes that the Nogais who advanced them all belonged to the "right wing" of the Nogai Horde, which, because it

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[101] Podosinov, *Ex oriente lux!* pp. 539-541 et passim, concludes that is was extremely rare for one ancient or medieval people to use only a single color-directional scheme consistently and withoutalteration in all cultural spheres.

[102] Kennedy, Ostrowski and Khodarkovsky do not refer to either of the two additional texts which portray Ivan IV as a Chinggisid.

[103] *PDRV*. Chast' 9. S. -Peterburg 1793, pp. 20-22, quote on p. 21.

[104] Trepavlov, *Istoriia Nogaiskoi ordy*, p. 630, not cited in his earlier articles.

[105] *PDRV*. Chast' 11. S. -Peterburg 1801, pp. 30-33, quote on p. 31.

[106] "Schastlivoi" in the meaning "fortunate" was applied to Ivan IV and Nogai *mirzar* (*PDRV*. Chast' 9. S. -Peterburg 1793, pp. 92, 115, 189) and to the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman (Kochekaev, *Nogaisko-russkie otnosheniia*, p. 76). See Kennedy, *The Juchids of Muscovy*, p. 165.

[107] Khodarkovsky, e-mail, May 3, 2002; Trepavlov, "Status "Belogo Tsaria"," p. 308, cites this phrase and re-punctuates it to stand in apposition to "sovereign," clearly Ivan. Regrettably, Trepavlov's obscure article escaped the bibliographies of Ostrowski and Khodarkovsky. Only in Trepavlov, *Istoriia Nogaiskoi ordy*, p. 630, does the author bring together the three passages discussed here, which I had found independently before reading either his article or his monograph.

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traded with Astrakhan', was usually pro-Russian, as opposed to the "left wing," which traded with Bukhara and often was anti-Russian.[108] Overall, however, such Nogai claims were erratic, occasional, sporadic, temporary, and unsystematic. Even as flattery, such a fictive genealogy found no resonance in Muscovite sources, which, as we have seen, propagated an entirely different – if equally legendary – ancestry for Ivan. Therefore, Belek Bulat Mirza's ideological innovation represented Nogai, not Muscovite, liberties with genealogy, to which the Muscovites paid no heed, neither affirming nor denying the insinuation. Muscovy not only did not promote the notion, the Muscovites avoided even acknowledging it.

Contrasting the rarity with which the Nogais attributed Chinggisid descent to Ivan with the ubiquity with which the Nogais addressed Ivan as "White Tsar'," one might speculate that the Muscovite court was more tolerant of the latter than the former, although it might equally well be true that the Nogais themselves were more reluctant to attribute Chinggisid ancestry to Ivan than to laud him as "belyi tsar'." And even at that, Herberstein may illustrate Muscovite sensitivity to the title "White Emperor."

In conclusion, Belek Bulat Mirza's epistle attributing Chinggisid ancestry to Ivan IV, and the two additional epistles making similar claims, represent more than Nogai sycophancy toward the new power on the middle and lower Volga River. The Nogai response to Muscovite expansion symbolizes both how intimately tied Muscovy was to the steppe world of the former Golden Horde, and the cultural, political and ideological limits of Muscovy's involvement. The Muscovite court might be willing to take advantage of Nogai willingness to honor Ivan with Chinggisid blood, just as the Nogais entitled the Muscovite ruler the "western khan," but it was not willing to assimilate such assertions into its own titulature, imperial genealogy, or, more broadly, political self-consciousness. Muscovy preferred to enjoy its Mongol inheritance without recognizing it.

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108 Trepavlov, *Istoriia Nogaiskoi ordy*, p. 630; but cf. *ibidem*, pp. 532-533 for evidence that even "left wing" Nogais could also trade with Muscovite towns.

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ВЫМЫШЛЕННОЕ РОДСТВО. МОСКОВИЯ НЕ БЫТ НАСЛЕДНИЦЕЙ ЗОЛОТОЙ ОРДЫ[1]

Бляха-навершие. Золотая Орда. Крым. XIV в. ГИМ.

Входе молниеносных кампаний 1237-1238 и 1239-1240 годов монгольские армии Батыя разбили войска княжеств и городов-государств Древней Руси. Господство монголов над этими землями, вошедшими в улус Джучи, который традиционно называется Золотой Ордой, продолжалось приблизительно 240 лет. Заметим при этом, что принятая в российской науке дата освобождения от татарского ига – 1480 год – больше порождена историческими доктринами середины XVI века, нежели соответствует исторической действительности[2]. Так или иначе, в XV столетии Русь стала независимой, а Золотая Орда распалась. Вокруг его кочевого ядра, Большой Орды, возникло несколько татарских государств с оседлым населением – Казанское, Астраханское, Сибирское, Крымское и Касимовское ханства. Кроме того, выделилась кочевая Ногайская Орда.

Место Золотой Орды как хозяина Восточной Европы пытались занять сразу несколько государств. После гибели Большой Орды в 1502 году крымский хан заявил, что именно он является законным преемником золотоордынской власти над Восточной Европой и его полномочия должны признать бывшие вассалы улуса Джучи. И тот факт, что Крым был подчинен Османской империи, никак не умалял его претензии на господство над Восточной Европой. В XIV веке на исторической арене появилась Московия. Она выступила одним из главных соперников Орды в борьбе за объединение восточнославянских земель под единой верховной властью. К началу XVI века весь северо-восток и северо-запад Руси оказались под рукой московитов.

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[1] Считаю своим долгом выразить благодарность Джанет Мартин за помощь в написании данной статьи.

[2] Halperin Ch. *The Tatar Yoke*. Columbus. 1986. P. 149-166.

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Комета, предвещающая нашествие татар. Миниатюра Лицевого летописного свода XVI в.

Являлась ли московская держава Ивана III политическим наследником Золотой Орды? Рассматривала ли она себя так? Эти вопросы необычайно важны для изучения более широкой и сложной проблемы – о степени воздействия Золотой Орды на русскую государственность, о «монгольском наследии» в российской державности.

Среди историков-медиевистов широко распространена концепция трактовки московской государственности как исторического преемника Золотой Орды[3]. Тезис о генетическом родстве этих держав часто декларируется, а вот научных обоснований данной теории немного. Наиболее серьезные разработки этой проблематики принадлежат американским историкам Эдварду Кинану[4] и Дональду Островскому[5], выводы которых приняли другие историки. Результаты их научных поисков можно обобщить следующим образом.

Московия была составной частью степной державы монголов. Русские дипломаты и политические деятели хорошо знали политическую систему Золотой Орды и ощущали свою принадлежность к ней. Московия заимствовала у Золотой Орды многие торговые, политические, административные, финансовые, военные и дипломатические учреждения.

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[3] Hughes L. *The Courts of Moscow and St Petersburg c. 1547-1725* // The Princely Courts of Europe: Ritual Politics and Culture under the Ancien Regime 1500-1750 / Ed. by J. Adamson. London. 1999. P. 295; Fragner B. G. *The Concept of Regionalism in Historical Research on Central Asia and Iran*: (*A Macro-Historical Interpretation*) // Studies on Central Asian History in Honor of Yuri Bregel. Bloomington. 2001. P. 348; Fletcher J. *Integrative History: Parallels and Interconnections in the Early Modern Period, 1500-1800* // Fletcher J. *Studies in Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia.* / Ed. by Beatrice Forbes Manz Aldershot. Hampshire. 1995. P. 33; *To Siberia and Russian American: Three Centuries of Russian Eastern Expansion, 1558-1700: A Documentary Record. Volume One. Russia's Conquest of Siberia.* Portland. 1985. P. XXXVI-XXXIX; Vasary I. *Why was Muscovite Russia Considered «Barbarian» by Contemporary Europe?* // Mesto Rossii v Evrope / The Place of Russia in Europe. Budapest. 1999. P. 99

[4] Keenan E. L. *Muscovy and Kazan, 1445-1552: A Study in Steppe Politics*: PhD dissertation. Harvard University, 1965.

[5] Ostrowski D. *The Mongol Origins of Muscovite Political Institutions* // Slavic Review. 1990. Vol. 49. No. 4. P. 525-542; Idem. *The Military Land Grant along the Muslim-Christian Frontier* // Russian History. 1992. Vol. 19. No. 1-4. P. 327-359; Idem. *Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier, 1304-1589.* Cambridge. 1998; Idem. *The Tamma and the Dual-administrative Structure of the Mongol Empire* // Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies. 1988. Vol. 61. No. 2. P. 262-277; Idem. *Muscovite Adoption of Mongol-Tatar Political Institutions: A Reply to Halperin's Objections* // Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History. 2000. Vol. 1. No. 2. P. 267-304.

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Кочевники-одиночки, жившие в степи, занимаясь охотой, рыболовством и грабежом, породили особую модель образа жизни, позже известную как казачество. В области политической практики московиты, как доказал Майкл Чернявский, перевели «хан» как «царь» и восприняли ордынские представления об облике монарха[6]. Московские князья употребляли в своих отношениях с Чингисидами юридическую терминологию татарского государства[7].

Важнейшим этапом становления московской государственности стало покорение в 1550-х годах Иваном IV Казани и Астрахани, исторических наследников Золотой Орды. Великий князь отныне приобрел имперский статус, став господином татарских «царств». Московские государи привлекли многих представителей татарской знати, в том числе Чингисидов, к себе на службу[8]. С этого момента Грозный называл себя «белым царем», или каганом, Белым или Западным ханом, правителем северо-западной области Монгольской империи, Белой (Золотой) Орды. Иван IV даже хвастался, что связан своим происхождением непосредственно с Чингисханом. Александр Беннигсен считал эти события свидетельством «экуменизма» московской власти, а Крэйг Кеннеди видел в них кульминацию процесса узурпации Калитовичами прерогатив Чингисидов, начатого с установления протектората над «чингисидским троном», Казанью, в 1487 году[9].

Осознание себя преемниками монгольской государственности придавало уверенность русским правителям. Татарские символы верховной власти, следы Орды в памятниках бытовой культуры, Чингисиды в составе русской знати, обилие тюркизмов в русском языке – во всем этом отчетливо проглядывает «стиль Степи». Эти выводы наиболее точно выражены метафорой Майкла Ходарковского: Москва – это «Новый Сарай», конкурент Крымского ханства за право быть главным наследником Золотой Орды[10].

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6 Cherniavsky M. *Khan or Basileus: An Aspect of Russian Medieval Political Theory* // Journal of the History of Ideas. 1959. Vol. 20. P. 459-476.

7 Halperin Ch. *The Russian Land and the Russian Tsar: The Emergence of Muscovite Ideology, 1380-1408* // Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte. 1976. Bd. 23. P. 7-103; Горский А. А. *Москва и Орда*. М. 2000.

8 Martin J. *Tatars in the Muscovite Army during the Livonian War* // The Military and Society in Russia: 1450-1917 / Ed. by Eric Lohr and Marshall Poe. Leiden. 2002. P. 365-387.

9 Беннигсен А. *Экуменизм царя Ивана Васильевича Грозного: Москва, Казань и Оттоманская Порта в 1552 году* // Русский альманах. Париж. 1981. С. 272-273; Kennedy C. *The Juchids of Muscovy: A Study in Personal Ties Between Emigre Tatar Dynasts and the Muscovite Grand Princes in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries*: PhD Dissertation. Harvard University. 1994. P. 11, 117, 126, 128, 150.

10 Khodarkovsky M. *Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800*. Bloomington. 2002. P. 40, 44-45.

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Подобная трактовка происхождения московской державности кажется весьма убедительной, но это только на первый взгляд. Она не учитывает многих аспектов отношений Руси и Степи и особенностей процесса становления средневековой русской государственности. Степень заимствования Московией у монголов политических институтов сильно преувеличена. Многочисленные аналоги государственной символики и институтов сами по себе еще не могут свидетельствовать о прямой политической преемственности Руси и Орды. Каждое государство, побежденное Монгольской империей, сохранило имперские учреждения после свержения ее власти. Если бы был верен тезис о решающем влиянии государства Чингисидов на развитие бывших колоний, то каждое постмонгольское государство, возникшее на обломках империи, либо воспроизводило бы ее облик, либо являлось «антимонгольским» государством, подобно династии Мингов. Наследование монгольских властных полномочий над территорией и тождественность государственных институтов империи и бывших колоний – не одно и то же[11].

Московия проявляла немалую компетентность при осуществлении «восточной» дипломатии, умела подстроиться под татарскую модель политических отношений. При чтении посольских книг о переговорах Москвы с Ногайской Ордой возникает ощущение, что русские посольские дьяки мастерски воспроизводили «язык Степи». Но русские контакты с христианскими европейскими странами строились по иной модели, вовсе не татарской[12]. Дипломатические памятники сношений с западноевропейскими странами переполнены неискренними и часто повторяющимися апелляциями к христианскому единству и недопущению пролития христианской крови. Это, казалось бы, однозначно свидетельствует, что московиты считали себя полноправными членами христианского мира, враждебного к неверным мусульманам. Но достаточно вспомнить, что и Московия, и Польша, и ВКЛ нанимали на службу в свои армии татар-мусульман, везли деньги и подарки в Крым, чтобы натравить татар на соседние государства - и в то же время русские и литовские дипломаты обвиняли друг друга в наведении проклятых неверных на христианский народ.

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[11] Halperin Ch. *Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History*. Bloomington, 1985; Idem. *The Ideology of Silence: Prejudice and Pragmatism on the Medieval Religious Frontier* // Comparative Studies in Society and History. 1984. July. Vol. 26. No. 3. P. 442-466; Idem. *The East Slavic Response to the Mongol Conquest* // Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi. 1998-1999. Vol. 10. P. 98-117; Halperin Ch. *Muscovite Political Institutions in the 14th Century* // Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History. 2000. Vol. 1. No. 2. P. 237 - 257.

[12] Croskey R. M. *The Diplomatic Forms of Ivan III's Relationship with the Crimean Khan* // Slavic Review. 1984. Vol. 42. No. 2. P. 257-269; Idem. *Muscovite Diplomatic Practice in the Reign of Ivan III*. New York. 1987; Keenan E. *Muscovy and Kazan: Some Introductory Remarks on the Pattern of Steppe Politics* // Slavic Review. 1967. Vol. 26. No. 4. December. P. 557.

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

Г. Незнайкин. Князь и хан 1991 г.

Территориальный рост Московии и протяженность ее границы также не подтверждают идею, будто бы она хотела стать преемницей Золотой Орды. Московия никогда не выдвигала лозунг собрать под своей властью земли Золотой Орды, тем более что эта задача была нереальной из-за неустойчивости границ Орды в XIII-XV веках[13]. Вплоть до конца XVII столетия Россия не ставила перед собой задачи победить Крым, который являлся главным наследником ордынской государственности, да и в XVII веке наступление на южное ханство было обусловлено участием России в европейском антимусульманском союзе, «Священной лиге».

Поскольку географические границы Московии и Орды не совпадали, русские не могли иметь ту же самую геополитическую ориентацию, что и Золотая Орда. Например, Россия имела сферу интересов в Поволжье (прежде всего торговлю и рыболовство). Но она едва ли нуждалась в азербайджанских кочевых пастбищах, за которые Золотая Орда постоянно спорила с Ильханатом. Стремление Ивана IV к балтийским портам в Ливонской войне не имело исторического прецедента в политике Орды. Конечно, Россия при случае выражала претензии на территории Восточной Европы, которые когда-то подчинялись Орде, а в XVI веке принадлежали Польше и Литве, – например, на Киев и Украину. Но посольские дьяки поднимали этот вопрос не потому, что данные территории когда-то являлись частью Золотой Орды, а потому что рассматривали их как собственность.

Очень показательна здесь идеология завоевания Казани в XV-XVI веках. Русская дипломатия обосновывала свои права на эту территорию тем, что Казань якобы была преемницей Великой Булгарии. А Булгарию в древности победили предки великих князей московских – князья владимирские и киевские. Чтобы предотвратить прямую аннексию Казани, татары предложили Ивану Грозному следующую модель отношений: они признают власть московского наместника, при этом им гарантируются все старые льготы и права. Иван получает «царские доходы», то есть доходы хана, и его полномочия. После присоединения Казани Иван IV отправил послания ко всем черным людям и в отдаленные улусы с известием, что они

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[13] Егоров В. Л. *Историческая география Золотой Орды в XIII-XIV вв.* М. 1985.

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обязаны платить ему ясак (дань) так же, как когда-то платили казанскому царю. После завоевания Астрахани в 1556 году Иван IV дал наказ казачьим атаманам Ивану Черемисинову и Михаилу Колупаеву взять с астраханцев присягу на верность и приказать всем черным людям оплачивать ясак согласно традиции («по старине»), поскольку они были должны платить его прежнему царю[14]. Исходя из этих фактов, было бы более правильно говорить, что Московия осознавала себя преемницей власти казанских и астраханских ханов, а не правителей Золотой Орды. Но даже эта система являлась формальной, лишенной идеологического значения.



Нашествие Батыя. Гибель древнерусского города (Зарево пожарища).

Ногаи называли Ивана IV «Белым царем», что означало «хан Западной Орды». Это подразумевало трактовку статуса правителя Москвы как наследника ханской власти Золотой Орды. Однако, как показал Д. Островский, это обращение присутствует в посланиях, *адресованных Ивану IV*, но его нет в документах, *исходящих от Ивана IV*[15]. Во всех русских текстах титул царя писался согласно московскому протоколу: «царь и великий князь всея Руси». Московиты перевели ногайские послания и оставили в них титул «Белый царь». Это показыв ет, что Московия позволяла ногаям и другим кочевникам, например калмыкам, в XVII веке называть своего государя титулом правителя Монгольской империи, но не более того. Причем именно позволяла – Москва была крайне чувствительна к любым неточностям в титуле монарха. Русские дипломаты не отрицали обращения «Белый хан», но и не подтверждали его уместность. Иначе Московия реагировала на попытку в некоторых ногайских посланиях, например от Белек Булат мурзы в 1551 году, объединить родословия Чингисидов и Рюриковичей. Ногайская «генеалогическая лесть» не была оценена Россией. Для нее было значимо только возведение рода русских царей от Августа кесаря.

Содержащиеся в посольских книгах переводные тексты, подобные вышеупомянутому ногайскому посланию, нельзя считать памятниками русской политической культуры или идеологии[16]. Кроме того, московско-

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[14] Pelenski J. *Muscovite Imperial Claims to the Kazan Khanate* // Slavic Review. 1967. Vol 26. No. 4. P. 559-576; Idem. *Russia and Kazan: Conquest and Imperial Ideology (1438-1560s)*. The Hague-Paris. 1973.

[15] Ostrowski D. *Muscovy and the Mongols*. P. 181-182.

[16] Три ногайских послания, в которых происхождение царя Ивана возводится к

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ногайские отношения были вообще нетипичными по сравнению с контактами Руси с другими ордами и ханствами, так как ногаи не имели собственных правителей-Чингисидов. Кровавая история продвижения Московии в Сибирь говорит о том, что местные татары вовсе не приветствовали появление нового «хана» и не считали его наследником золотоордынской власти[17]. Это доказывает, что Московия не нуждалась в декларации своей преемственности от Золотой Орды ни на словах, ни на практике. Перед нами однозначные свидетельства невосприимчивости Московии к восточной политической идеологии.

Однако есть один исторический эпизод, казалось бы, свидетельствующий об обратном. М. Чернявский утверждал, что в течение XVI столетия образ хана был более широко представлен в московской политической культуре, чем образ византийского василевса. Ученый считает временную передачу Иваном IV престола Чингисиду Симеону Бекбулатовичу в 1575-1576 году ярким примером, подтверждающим данный тезис. Но Симеон никогда не был царем Московии. Он носил титулы касимовского хана, позже великого князя тверского. Назначение Симеона следует рассматривать как политический театр и не стоит расценивать как возвеличивание чингисидской родословной и унижение национально-религиозных чувств русских, что было неизбежно при возведении татарина, пусть и крещеного, на царский трон.


Строительство церкви Покрова Богоматери «на Рву» (Храм Василия Блаженного) в 1555 г., заложенной в честь взятия Казани. Миниатюра Лицевого летописного свода. XVI в.

Более интригующий материал для решения изучаемой проблемы дает нумизматика. Возможно, после 1480 года (датировка спорная) Иван III выпустил монеты, где его имя на арабском языке размещалось там, где обычно писалось имя хана. Это конкретное свидетельство того, что Даниловичи хотели выступать законными правителями земель, входивших в Золотую Орду, и для этого

Чингисидам (он назван «прямым сыном» Чингиса), опубликованы: *Продолжение Древней Российской Вивлиофики*. СПб. 1793. Ч. 8 и переизданы: *Slavistic Printings and Reprintings*, 251/8. The Hague-Paris. 1970. P. 316-317, V. 9 (1793, 251/9). P. 22-23. V. 11 (1801, 251/11). P. 30-33.

[17] Collins D. N. *Russia's Conquest of Siberia: Evolving Russian and Soviet historical interpretations* // European Studies Review. 1982. Vol. 12. No. 1. P. 18-43; Idem. *Subjugation and Settlement in 17th and 18th century Siberia* // The History of Siberia from Russian Conquest to Revolution / Ed. by Alan Wood. London. 1991. P. 37-56.

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прежде всего сохраняли символику монетной системы. К сожалению, мы можем только гадать, что символизировала эта чеканка. Например, монеты тверского князя Михаила Борисовича (1461-1486) также содержат имя правителя на арабском языке. Великие князья московские были не одиноки в попытке использовать элементы татарской монетной системы в своих политических целях.

Таким образом, легковесные декларации, будто московская государственность являлась преемницей Золотой Орды, не выдерживают научной критики и должны быть пересмотрены. Московия была прежде всего православным христианским царством, наследником Киева и Владимира, а вовсе не Сарая. Московия заимствовала ряд учреждений и институтов Монгольской империи, участвовала в политической жизни татарских государств, ей был знаком бытовавший в политической практике татарских послов тезис о связи Чингисидов и Рюриковичей, но не более того. Можно уверенно утверждать, что Московия не была политическим наследником государственности Золотой Орды и ее правитель никогда не считал себя «новым татарским ханом».

Перевод *Александра Филюшкина*

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OMISSIONS OF NATIONAL MEMORY: RUSSIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY ON THE GOLDEN HORDE AS POLITICS OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION

Professional historians both create and reflect "popular" historical memory. In doing so, they participate in the elaboration and maintenance of visions and interpretations of the past that are closely connected to national identity and nationalism. These visions, through their omissions and "forgotten" episodes, reflect the politics of national identity and construct the boundaries of the national community. In this sense, historians' omissions are as important as their discoveries: as this article purports to demonstrate, in Russia specialists in Russian history during the period of the "Tatar Yoke" continue at worst to disregard or at best to utilize only very selectively the research of specialists in Russia on the Golden Horde, which would qualify their sometimes one-sided depictions of the Tatars informed by nationalist fervor or pan-European arrogance with respect to "savage" or "backward" peoples. The research of scholars of oriental studies on the Golden Horde's economy (international trade, coinage, urbanization), government (administration, bureaucracy, foreign policy, diplomatics), and culture (material, Islamic), needs to be fully integrated into the analysis of Russianists in order to present a balanced and comprehensive view of Rus'-Tatar relations, which has been for the most part prevented by distortions of a nationalist historiography.

Since the eighteenth century Russian historiography has devoted considerable attention to the Golden Horde[1] and Rus'-Tatar relations.[2] However, the nature of that attention has certain peculiarities which require analysis. The first Russian historians adopted the conceptual framework of the Rus' chroniclers, which shaped their attitudes toward the "Tatars," as these sources called the Mongols. The subsequent development of studies of the Golden Horde by orientalists (*vostokovedy*) influenced this stance only partially. It is only fairly recently that specialists in Russian history under the Golden Horde have begun to broaden their approach, but they have yet to integrate, what

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[1] The term "Golden Horde" is an anachronism, dating to no earlier than the second half of the sixteenth century, and was never used by the Tatars. However, since it was and is still used in Russian historiography and there is no acceptable alternative, it will be employed here.

[2] Only selective bibliography can be cited here. Comparisons to Western scholarship lie outside the scope of this article.

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orientalists know about the Golden Horde into their narrative of Rus'-Tatar relations. Finally, the definition of Rus'-Tatar interaction remains constrained by tradition and needs to be considerably expanded.

The formative narratives of "Russian" history – Tatishchev,[3] Karamzin,[4] Solov'ev[5] – dealt extensively with the Tatar conquest and the relationship between the Rus' and their new Tatar overlords. While differing considerably in historical philosophy, sensibility, style, and format, these three historians all relied directly and heavily upon the Rus' chronicles for their narratives. These chronicles treated the Tatars from an explicitly religious perspective as "infidels," alien outsiders motivated by Devil who sought only to harm Orthodox Christians. There was no need to seek any other motivation on the part of the Tatars. Nor was there any interest in anything about the Tatars other than their aggressive, violent actions against Rus'. The chroniclers had applied to the Tatars the standard vocabulary of steppe relations of the Kievan period. Rus'-Tatar relations were reduced in large measure to a bloody narrative of Tatar "raids," and the issue of Tatar conquest, sovereignty, was avoided as much as possible. Evidence of more complex interaction between the East Slavs and the Tatars was de-emphasized.

By paraphrasing or quoting the chronicles, Tatishchev, Karamzin and Solov'ev not only projected this hostile attitude into their historical narratives, but also infused the confessional animosity of the chroniclers toward "pagan" or later Muslim Tatars – which they shared – with more modem national and cultural prejudices against pastoral nomads and "Asiatics." In fact these Imperial Russian historians were embarrassed, ashamed, that their ancestors, civilized European Christians, had been conquered by such an "inferior" people as the Mongols. For this reason, these historians denied Golden Horde rule any legitimacy. Trips by Riurikid princes to the Horde or to Karakorum to secure approval for their thrones were considered degrading. By and large these historians confined Rus'-Tatar relations to political narrative; the economic consequences of the Tatar invasion and Tatar exploitation were limited to destruction; there was no possibility of cultural influence; social history ignored the Tatars; even borrowing of political institutions was not discussed, since implicitly the Golden Horde had no government or administrative apparatus worth mentioning. The Tatars were little more than an admittedly dangerous band of bandits and robbers. The only arguments made for Tatar influence concerned the supposedly baneful moral consequences for the Russian "people" (*narod*) of subjugation to the immoral Tatars, namely the acquisition of stereotyped "Asiatic" vices such as servility and duplicity. Such evaluations of

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[3] V. N. Tatishchev. *Istoriia Rossiiskaia*. Vols. V-VI. Moscow-Leningrad, 1962.

[4] N. M. Karamzin. *Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo* / Ed. by P. N. Polevoi. Vols. 3-6. St. Petersburg, 1892. Rpt. The Hague-Paris, 1969.

[5] S. M. Solov'ev. *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*. Book II. Vols. 3-4; Book III. Vol. 5. Moscow, 1963.

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Russian national morals were intrinsically connected to the on-going highly politicized and ideological debates on the nature of Russian national character and Russian national identity.

Beginning in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, "Oriental Studies" (*vostokovedenie*) in the Russian Empire very rapidly made significant contributions to historical understanding of the Golden Horde. Frän (Fren), Sablukov and Savel'ev studied Golden Horde coins,[6] Sablukov and Berezin the Horde's internal structure,[7] Grigor'ev the *iarlyki* granted to the Russian Orthodox Church by the khans,[8] Tereshchenko the archeology of the Volga region.[9] Tiesenhausen's translation of excerpts from Arabic and Persian sources about the Golden Horde was of capital importance to Russian historians who did not read oriental languages.[10] Studies of the successor states of the Golden Horde, Vel'iaminov-Zernov on the Kasimov khanate,[11] Smirnov on the Crimean khanate, also translated and incorporated Turkic sources.[12]

Therefore, Russian historians of Rus'-Tatar relations of the late Imperial period had the opportunity to enrich their analysis with the fruits of Oriental studies which showed that the Golden Horde minted coins when the Rus' principalities and city-states did not, that the Horde had an administrative apparatus and tax structure, that there were cities in the steppe. An Orientalist, N. I. Veselovskii, even suggested that the Tatars had influenced Muscovite diplomatic ceremonial and Russian social customs,[13] although his arguments for the former were much stronger than for the latter.

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[6] Kh. M. Fren. *Monety khanov ulusa Dzhuchieva ili Zolotoi Ordy s monetami raznykh inykh mukhamedanskikh dinastii*. St. Petersburg, 1832; P. S. Savel'ev. *Monety Dzhuchidov, Dzhagataidov, Dzhelairidov i drugikh, obrashchavshiesia v Zolotoi Orde v epokhu Tokhtamysha*. Vols. I-II. St. Petersburg, 1858; G. S. Sablukov. *Monety Zolotoi Ordy (1843) // Izvestiia Obshchestva Arkheologii, Istorii i Etnografii pri Kazanskom universitete*. 1896. Vol. XIII.

[7] G. S. Sablukov. *Ocherk vnutrennego sostoianiia Kipchakskogo tsarstva // Pribavlenie. Saratovskie gubernskie vedomosti*. 1844. Pp. 26-30, 32-36. Reprinted Kazan', 1895; I. N. Berezin. *Ocherk vnutrennogo ustroistva ulusa Dzhuchieva // Trudy Vostochnogo otdeleniia Russkago arkheologicheskogo obshchestva*. 1864. Vol. 8. Pp. 387-494.

[8] V. V. Grigor'ev. *O dostovernosti iarlykov dannykh khanami Zolotoi Ordy russkomu dukhovenstvu*. Moscow, 1842.

[9] A. V. Tereshchenko. *Arkheologicheskie poiski v razvalinakh Saraia // Zapiski Sanktpeterburgskago Arkheologicheskago-numizmaticheskago obshchestva*. 1850. Vol. II. Pp. 364-410; Idem. *Okonchatel'noe issledovanie mestnosti Saraia s ocherkom sledov Desht-Kipchakskogo tsarstva // Uchenye zapiski Akademii Nauk*. St. Petersburg, 1854.

[10] V. G. Tizengauzen. *Sbornik materialov otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Zolotoi Ordy*. Vols. 1-2. St. Petersburg, 1884; Moscow-Leningrad, 1941.

[11] V. V. Vel'iaminov-Zernov. *Issledovaniia o Kasimovskikh tsariakh i tsarevichakh*. Vols. 1-4. St. Petersburg, 1863-1887.

[12] V. D. Smirnov. *Krymskoe khanstvo pod verkhovenstvom Ottomanskoi porty*. St. Petersburg, 1887.

[13] N. I. Veselovskii. *Tatarskoe vliianie na posol'skii tseremonial v moskovskii period russkoi istorii*. St. Petersburg, 1911; Idem. *Perezhitki nekotorykh tatarskikh obychaev u russkikh // Zhivaia starina*. 1912. Vol. 21. Pp. 27-38.

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This did not happen. Kliuchevskii, the most significant Russian historian of the time, chose to ignore this scholarship entirely. In his thematic "Course of Russian History" he denied any and all Tatar influence on Russian history, and did everything he could to minimize or avoid his own evidence to the contrary.[14] Presniakov's detailed narrative of the period partially refuted Kliuchevskii's position. Even though Presniakov's focus was on the development of Russian political structures, namely the appanage system, he showed the influence of the Tatars on that process. Presniakov was the first to offer a scholarly evaluation of Horde political strategies and tactics devoid of the pejorative vocabulary of earlier Russian historiography. Nevertheless, to Presniakov, the Golden Horde was still an "alien and strange authority" (*chuzhaia i chuzhdaia vlast'*), an external factor in Rus' history despite Tatar sovereignty.[15] The role assigned to the Tatars in Russian history was not changed even when specialists in Russian history began working with "Tatar" sources, as shown by Priselkov's classic study of the *iarlyki* given to the Church by the khans.[16]

If Kliuchevskii represented the apex of Imperial Russian historiography, it is no wonder that the Tatars were blamed for anything and everything any Russian historian thought wrong with Russian history or contemporary life, from "isolation" from Western Europe, "missing" the Renaissance and Reformation, economic and cultural backwardness, to the seclusion of women.

Guided by the hand of the great Orientalist Bartol'd (Barthold), Russian Oriental studies survived the transition to the Soviet period. Bartol'd's influence on the study of the Golden Horde consisted less in his publications than in his scholarly attitude toward the worlds of Islam and the steppe, even if he was prone to idealize the Mongol Empire. Vladimirtsov studied Mongol politics and society, formulating the controversial concept of "nomadic feudalism" which was later applied to the Golden Horde.[17] Especially after World War II and without interruption since 1991, orientalists have significantly enriched historical knowledge of the Golden Horde. The starting point was the synthesis co-authored by Iakubovskii and B. D. Grekov, in which the former wrote the sections on the rise and fall of the Horde, the latter on the Horde and Rus'.[18] Subsequent studies include the decline of the Golden Horde by Safargaliev,[19]

[14] V. O. Kliuchevskii. *Kurs russkoi istorii*. Vol. II. // V. O. Kliuchevskii. *Sochineniia*. Vol. II. Moscow, 1957. Especially pp. 5-27, 42-44. See also Charles J. Halperin. *Kliuchevskii and the Tatar Yoke // Canadian-American Slavic Studies*. 2000. Vol. 34. No. 4. Pp. 385-408.

[15] A. E. Presniakov. *Obrazovanie velikorusskogo gosudarstva. Ocherki po istorii XIII-XV stoletiia*. Petrograd, 1918. P. 50.

[16] M. D. Priselkov. *Khanskie iarlyki russkim mitropolitam // Zapiski istoriko-filologicheskogo fakul'teta Imp. Petrogradskago Universiteta*. 1916. No. 133.

[17] B. Ia. Vladimirtsov. *Obshchestvennyi stroi mongolov: Mongol'skii kochevoi feodalizm*. Leningrad, 1934.

[18] B. D. Grekov, A. Iu. Iakubovskii. *Zolotaia Orda i ee padenie*. Moscow-Leningrad, 1950. Pp. 17-176, 179-258, 261-428.

[19] M. G. Safargaliev. *Raspad Zolotoi Ordy*. Saransk, 1960.

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Horde ethnic and social composition, and cities by Fedorov-Davydov,[20] Russians who resided in or visited the Horde by Poluboiarinova,[21] diplomatic relations between the Golden Horde and Egypt by Zakirov,[22] Mongol administrative practices as embodied in imperial charters by A. P. Grigor'ev and Usmanov,[23] and the Horde's historical geography by Egorov, who also produced a popular brochure on the Horde.[24] Mukhamadiev continued the numismatic researches of Fedorov-Davydov, S. A. Ianina, and others by examining coins from the Volga region.[25] Eleven of thirteen articles in an anthology on the history of the Golden Horde were authored by scholars from Russia or Tatarstan. Their focus was the Golden Horde as a period in the history of the Tatar "people" (*narod*), with interesting articles on the term 'Tatar," the multi-ethnic origins of the "Tatar people" and their evolving national consciousness, along with archeological and artistic studies.[26] Khalikov turned to a regional analysis of Volga Bulgaria.[27] In a more recent anthology on sources for the study of the Golden Horde and its successor states, ten of the twenty contributors were from Russia, Tatarstan or Mari-el; their articles explored written, archeological, folkloric and ethnographic evidence.[28] Orientalists continued to study the successor states of the Golden Horde, from the early study of Kazan' by Khudiakov,[29] to the latest monumental depiction of the Nogai Horde by the post-Soviet Trepavlov.[30] Kul'pin has added an ecological perspective on the Horde's history, although his work is marred by an uncritical reading of Muscovite narrative sources to justify a fanciful interpretation of Mamai's motives in 1380.[31] Khafizov's study of the break-up of the Mongol Empire and the formation of the Golden Horde is largely

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[20] G. A. Fedorov-Davydov. *Kochevniki Vostochnoi Evropy pod vlast'iu zolotoordynskikh khanov: Arkheologicheskie pamiatniki*. Moscow, 1966; Idem. *Obshchestvennyi stroi Zolotoi Ordy*. Moscow, 1973; Idem. *Zolotoordynskie goroda Povolzh'ia*. Moscow, 1994.

[21] M. D. Poluboiarinova. *Russkie liudi v Zolotoi Orde*. Moscow, 1978.

[22] S. Zakirov. *Diplomaticheskie otnosheniia Zolotoi Ordy s Egiptom (13-14 veka)*. Moscow, 1966.

[23] A. P. Grigor'ev. *Mongol'skaia diplomatika XIII-XV vv. (Chingizidskie zhalovannye gramoty)*. Leningrad, 1978; M. A. Usmanov. *Zhalovannye akty Dzhuchieva ulusa, XIV- XV vekov*. Kazan', 1979.

[24] V. L. Egorov. *Istoricheskaia geografiia Zolotoi Ordy v XIII-XIV vv*. Moscow, 1985; Idem. *Zolotaia orda: mify i real'nost'*. Moscow, 1990.

[25] A. G. Mukhamadiev. *Bulgaro-tatarskaia monetnaia sistema XII-XV vv*. Moscow, 1983.

[26] G. F. Valeeva-Suieimanova et al (Eds.). *Iz istorii Zolotoi Ordy*. Kazan', 1993.

[27] A. Kh. Khalikov. *Mongoly, Tatary, Zolotaia Orda i Bulgariia*. Kazan', 1994.

[28] M. A. Usmanov et al (Eds.). *Istochnikovedenie istorii ulusa Dzhuchi (Zolotoi Ordy): ot Kalki do Astrakhani, 1223-1556*. Kazan', 2002.

[29] M. Khudiakov. *Ocherki po istorii kazanskogo khanstva*. Kazan', 1923. Reprinted Kazan', 1990.

[30] V. V. Trepavlov. *Istoriia nogaiskoi ordy*. Moscow, 2001.

[31] E. S. Kul'pin. *Zolotaia Orda. Problemy genezisa Rossiiskogo gosudarstva*. Moscow, 1998.

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derivative and rather poorly annotated, but it is still curious for its point-of-view.[32] From this impressive scholarship specialists in Russian history during the Mongol period would have learned that the Golden Horde was a major state, which conducted sophisticated international relations with Egypt and Iran, which possessed cities, a distinctive, syncretistic material culture, a Muslim religious establishment and high culture. Nevertheless, Egorov complained, Russian historians of Russia have always emphasized only the negative side of Rus'-Tatar relations. Following in the tradition of N. I. Veselovskii, specialists in the Horde sometimes offered suggestions as to Tatar influence on Russia. Khudiakov had advanced some observations about possible institutional borrowing by Muscovy from Kazan'. The Turcologist Baskakov investigated how many Russian families derived from Turkic progenitors;[33] although his uncritical reliance on legendary genealogies and late coats-of-arms weakens his arguments, it remains striking how many Russian elite families at least *claimed* steppe origin, and how expertly they fashioned convincing Turkic names for their "ancestor." Trepavlov, not surprisingly after 1991, has gone farthest of all, not only drawing conclusions about the contribution of the Nogais to Russia's upper class,[34] but also claiming that the Muscovites copied the "dual kingship" of the Mongols,[35] Mongol notions of "statehood" (*gosudarstvennost'*)[36] and the title of "White Khan" (*Belyi tsar'*).[37] Kul'pin traces the Muscovite notion that the ruler was owner of all landed property in the state to the Tatars as part of the "heritage" of the Golden Horde. Unfortunately, some of these assertions rest on one-sided interpretations of the nature of Mongol and Golden Horde authority. In a world of their own, Gumilev's fantastic theories receive far more respectful treatment as scholarship than they deserve.[38]

By and large, however, Soviet specialists in Russian history during the Tatar period did not, as Egorov observed, progress much further than the hostile and limited perspective of Imperial Russian historiography.[39] While Soviet

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[32] G. G. Khafizov. *Raspad Mongol'skoi imperii i obrazovanie ulusa Dzhuchi*. Kazan', 2000.

[33] N. A. Baskakov. *Russkie familii tiurkskogo proiskhozhdeniia*. Moscow, 1979.

[34] V. V. Trepavlov. *Tiurkskaia znat' v Rossii (Nogai na tatarskoi sluzhbe) // Vestnik Evrazii*. 1998. Nos. 1-2 (4-5). Pp. 101-114.

[35] V. V. Trepavlov. *Vostochnye elementy rossiiskoi gosudarstvennosti (k postanovke problemy) //* S. A. Panarin (Ed.). *Rossiia i vostok: Problemy vzaimodeistviia*. Chast' 1. Moscow, 1993. Pp. 40-52.

[36] V. V. Trepavlov. *Rossiia i kochevye stepi. Problemy vostochnogo zaimstvovaniia v rossiiskoi gosudarstvennosti // Vostok*. 1994. No. 2. Pp. 49-62.

[37] V. V. Trepavlov. *Status "Belogo Tsaria": Moskva i tatarskie khanstva v XV-XVI vv. //* S. A. Panarin (Ed.). *Rossiia i vostok: Problemy vzaimodeistviia*. Chast' 2. Moscow, 1993. Pp. 302-311.

[38] L. N. Gumilev. *Poiski vymyshlennogo tsarstva. Legenda o "Gosudarstve presvitera Ioanna"*. Moscow, 1970; Idem. *Drevniaia Rus' i velikaia step'*. Moscow, 1992.

[39] Charles J. Halperin. *Soviet Historiography on Russia and the Mongols // Russian Review*. 1982. Vol. 41. No. 3. Pp. 306-322; Idem. *The Six-Hundredth Anniversary of the Battle of*

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historians no longer called the Tatars "barbarians" or "infidels," their own vocabulary was just as prejudicial; the Tatars were "predators" (*zakhvatchiki*) and "plunderers" (*khishchniki*); only a legitimate state could expect tribute, taxes and recruits from its conquered subjects. To be sure, there was significant progress within these narrow confines. Nasonov's ground-breaking analysis was the first to fully incorporate Horde political narrative into the framework of Rus'-Tatar relations, paying special attention to political divisions in the Horde under Nogai and Mamai, as well as innovatively using toponymic evidence.[40] Cherepnin continued Presniakov.[41] Kargalov made use of new archeological data.[42] I. B. Grekov projected extremely sophisticated political strategies, probably too sophisticated, onto the Horde's actions at the cost of neglecting the often decentralized nature of the Horde, which made coordinating central policy problematic,[43] although most Soviet historians acknowledged that some Tatar raids were independent, not state-sponsored, endeavors. A later popular synthetic work by I. B. Grekov and Shakhmagonov does not advance matters much because of its unsubstantiated conclusions and occasional confusion on Horde matters.[44] A popular pamphlet by Kuchkin, while rejecting some ignorant mass press articles on the Tatar role as devoid of value, is itself professional and informed, but very selective and hence woefully incomplete even as a overview.[45] Outside of political narrative, Kobrin and Iurganov attributed to the Tatars the model for the transition from free princely servitors to unfree, servile *ministeriales*. Since the ruler possessed the entire land, there was no concept of private property, so another Tatar political concept also contributed to the development of despotism in Muscovy.[46]

Post-Soviet scholarship did not rush to revise previous positions.[47] Kniaz'kii, despite a balanced presentation of the relations between Kievan Rus'

Kulikovo Field, 1380-1980 // Canadian-American Slavic Studies. 1984. Vol. 18. No. 3. Pp. 298-310.

[40] A. N. Nasonov. *Mongoly i Rus'. Istoriia tatarskoi politiki na Rusi*. Moscow-Leningrad, 1940.

[41] L. V. Cherepnin. *Obrazovanie russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva v XIV-XV vv.: Ocherki sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi i politicheskoi istorii Rusi*. Moscow, 1960.

[42] V. V. Kargalov. *Vneshnepoliticheskie faktory razvitiia feodal'noi Rusi. Feodal'naia Rus' i kochevniki*. Moscow, 1967.

[43] I. B. Grekov. *Vostochnaia Evropa i upadok Zolotoi Ordy (na rubezhe XIV-XV vv.)*. Moscow, 1975.

[44] I. B. Grekov, F. F. Shakhmagonov. *Mir istorii. Russkie zemli v XIII-XV vekov*. Moscow, 1986.

[45] V. A. Kuchkin. *Rus' pod igom: kak eto bylo?* Moscow, 1991.

[46] V. B. Kobrin, A. L. Iurganov. *Stanovlenie despoticheskogo samoderzhaviia v srednevekovoi Rossii (k postanovke problemy) // Istoriia SSSR*. 1991. No. 4. Pp. 54-64; A. L. Iurganov. *Kategorii russkoi srednevekovoi kul'tury*. Moscow, 1998. Pp. 216-305.

[47] Space, time and access have necessitated overlooking other works of recent Russian scholarship on both the Horde and Russo-Tatar relations, for which I sincerely apologize to their authors.

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and the steppe, retreated to old and non-Soviet verities concerning the Mongols, concluding that the worst aspect of Tatar rule was not the raids or tribute, but the transformation of the political structure. He quotes Berdiaev and Fedotov to the effect that the Muscovites borrowed Horde administrative institutions (which Kniaz'kii otherwise does not discuss) and accepted Horde immigrants into Muscovite service, that Horde rule altered Russian national psychology, that Ivan IV imitated Chinggis Khan, not Vladimir Monomakh. Although Kniaz'kii devotes much space to refuting Gumilev's contention that there was a Horde-Rus' symbiosis, he endorses Gumilev's conclusions that the Kievan Rus' and the Muscovites were different "peoples" (*narody*), and that the Mongols were responsible for the division of the East Slavs (a very old notion Kniaz'kii erroneously thinks insufficiently studied). Thus Kniaz'kii fuses Imperial Russian and emigre scholarship on the Horde.[48]

Krivosheev's monograph is thematic, not chronological in structure, and self-consciously revisionist in conclusion. He attempts a bi-cultural analysis of Rus'-Mongol relations, paying close attention to Mongol religion, ritual, and notions of honor, which is sometimes productive, for example in analyzing the symbolic nature of tribute or diplomatic ceremonial, but as often flounders since Krivosheev repeatedly insists that the Rus' failed to understand Mongol ways, as if Polovtsy literally and figuratively could not have "interpreted" for them. Krivosheev acknowledges that Rus' became a tributary of the Golden Horde, but insists it was not part of the *ulus*, actually an unresolved question, that the Mongols did not change the Rus' social and political structure of city-states (lands). Urbanization in fourteenth-century northeast Rus' proves that the Mongols did not permanently distort the economy, although Horde international trade is not mentioned in this connection. The Mongols were not, in Krivosheev's opinion, responsible for the development of autocracy in Muscovy, which arose after the overthrow of the Horde's yoke; the Horde had been only one factor among many influencing Russian politics. Krivosheev's stimulating monograph is more convincing in approach than in details.[49]

Chukaeva's study of the Russian principalities and the Golden Horde has some admirable points. She incorporates Ukrainian-language Imperial, Soviet and post-1991 scholarship into the discussion, recognizes that the terms "Tatar Yoke" and "Golden Horde" are anachronisms, and makes the acute observation that studies of the Golden Horde often turn out to be studies of Horde influence on Russia. She is refreshingly cynical about the motives of princes such as Alexander Nevskii, whom Chukaeva sees as looking only for the best deal for himself, not choosing between "East" and "West." However, on the whole this

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[48] V. O. Kniaz'kii. *Rus' i step'*. Moscow, 1996. See on the pre-Mongol period pp. 9-65, 66-116, and on Tatars especially pp. 119-122.

[49] Iu. V. Krivosheev. *Rus' i Mongoly: issledovaniia po istorii Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi XII-XIV vv.* St. Petersburg, 1999. For a different analysis of Russian historiography on the Horde, see pp. 93-123.

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slim book is mostly derivative, contrasting the vassalage of the northeastern princes and northwestern city-states with the lesser Mongol influence over Galicia-Volynia, which replaces one national myth with another, deploring the baneful Mongol influence on Russian morals, and attributing Muscovite autocracy to imitation of "eastern despotism."[50]

A stimulating anthology from a recent conference of archeologists sheds considerable new light on the question of Rus' in the thirteenth century. While not rejecting the destructive role of Tatar conquest and raids, its articles find more continuity than previously thought, and less evidence connecting changes in material culture, such as in settlement landscape, to the Tatars. Archeological research is sometimes more balanced than that of many historians on the issue of the Horde because it sticks closer to evidence.[51]

A. A. Gorskii has departed most from previous Russian scholarship, not so much in his analysis of the influence of the Tatars on the political realignment of the Rus' territories after the Mongol conquest,[52] but in his depiction of Muscovite attitudes towards Golden Horde authority.[53] From Tatishchev on, Russian historiography rejected the legitimacy of Tatar rule and projected that rejection onto the medieval East Slavs. Gorskii argues that the Rus' recognized Tatar rule as legitimate and assimilated the principles of Chingissid legitimacy according to which only direct male heirs of Chinggis khan could assume the title of "khan." This is significant, since even recent Russian scholarship sometimes confuses the status of Horde political figures, making Mamai or Edigei "khans" when they were not. Gorskii goes so far as to define a Russian "Chingissid complex" which made opposition to Horde rule psychologically difficult, which may confuse Muscovite propaganda with reality.

On the other hand, Kargalov's old-fashioned post-Soviet book remains focused exclusively on the "heroic struggle" of the "Russian people (*narod*)" against the Tatars, although it does provide a superb geographical context for the stand on the Ugra.[54] The continuing gap between orientalist and Russianist concepts of the Horde is epitomized by the contrast between the contributions of Grekov and Iakubovskii to "Zolotaia orda i ee padenie"; Grekov seems not to have read, let alone appreciated, anything Iakubovskii wrote about the nature of the Horde.

Russian historiography as a whole about Rus'-Tatar relations has yet to fully integrate the results of Russian-language Oriental studies of the Golden Horde. The Golden Horde was a symbiosis of nomadic and sedentary political,

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[50] V. A. Chukaeva. *Russkie kniazhestva i Zolotaia Orda*. Dnepropetrovsk, 1998.

[51] N. A. Makarov, A. V. Chernetsov (Eds.). *Rus' v XIII v.: drevnosti temnogo vremeni*. Moscow, 2003.

[52] A. A. Gorskii. *Russkie zemli v XIII-XIV vekakh: puti politicheskoi razvitiia*. Moscow, 1996.

[53] A. A. Gorskii. *Moscow i Orda*. Moscow, 2000.

[54] V. V. Kargalov. *"Na stanitsakh stoiat' krepko!" – Velikaia Rus' i Dikoe Pole. Protivostoianie XIII-XVIII vv*. Moscow, 1998. Pp. 7-162 cover 1223 through the reign of Ivan III.

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social and economic elements, not just a band of greedy, conniving bandits. A bureaucratic administrative apparatus copied from the Muslim world was superimposed on top of a clan-tribal social base. It contained cities engaged in the a"silk road" trade from the Far to the Middle East as well as nomads who lived by their herds. This complexity should give Russian historians pause when analyzing Horde political actions before they accept at face value the motives and intentions ascribed to the Horde by partisan medieval chroniclers.

There is, certainly, common ground for reconciling the views of "Russianists" and orientalists. Fedorov-Davydov, for example, fully recognizes that the Mongol conquest was devastating, that the Volga Horde cities were built by slave labor from conquered peoples. He even describes the khan's power as despotic.[55] However, "Russianists" by and large continue to revere Pushkin's observation that the Russians saved Europe from Mongol conquest by inflicting heavy losses on Batu's forces, whereas most orientalists believe that the death of Kagan Ugedei explains Batu's return to the steppe.[56]

At the same time, the problematics of Horde influence on the East Slavs must be expanded to include institutional borrowing, especially of fiscal, administrative, military and even bureaucratic procedures and processes. The nature of the social interaction between the Rus' and the Tatars can be explored by fresh reading of Slavonic literary works, which suggest a range of intimate familiarity with the steppe, bilingualism, and shared aristocratic ethos that also constitute elements of Rus'-Tatar relations. After Russia had recovered from the catastrophic devastation of the conquest itself, the "Pax Mongolica" definitely benefited new and reviving Volga river cities by fostering eastern trade in the fourteenth century. The degree to which Tatar concepts shaped later Muscovite autocracy, especially in the sixteenth century with the annexation of the Kazan' and Astrakhan' khanates, requires considerable additional study and has probably been exaggerated. Ivan IV did not call himself "White Khan," he only let the Nogais flatter him with that designation. Recent studies emphasize the consensual nature of power in the Mongol Empire and its successor states, including the Golden Horde. If the khan of the Horde did not have absolute, unlimited power, then no ruler could become an arbitrary autocrat by imitating him.

The degree of interest aroused by the topic of Rus'-steppe relations is reflected in a massive, lavishly illustrated double-issue of the journal *Rodina* from 1997, "Forest and steppe IX-XVI centuries. Unknown pages."[57] It contains (approximately) fourteen original articles, all by scholars in Russia and Tatarstan, one translation of a medieval source (Juvaini), two excerpts from previous scholarship (the Imperial Russian church historian Golubinskii and the émigré Eurasianist George Vernadsky), an interview of Usmanov by Trepavlov,

[55] Fedorov-Davydov. *Zolotoordynskie goroda Povolzh'ia*. Pp. 5-19.

[56] Cf. Kniaz'kii. *Op Cit.* Pp. 77, 80 with Fedorov-Davydov. *Zolotoordynskie goroda Povozh'ia*. P. 7.

[57] *Les i step' XI-XVI vv. Neizvestnye stranitsy // Rodina*. 1997. No. 3-4.

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a map, an Imperial Russian painting, publication of the 1944 Communist Party decree criticizing the Tatar *Nauchno-issledovatel'skii institute iazyka, literatury i istorii* for ideological errors and nationalism in idealizing the Golden Horde, and a "round table" of seven Russia and Tatarstan scholars, whose tenor is encapsulated by its title: *Polemic.* Two scholars (including the Orientalist-specialist on Mongolia Gol'man) repeated the traditional view that the Mongol impact on Russia was entirely negative, one insisted it was not negative on the Tatars, and the remaining four (including the "Russianist" A. A. Gorskii) dismissed the question as to whether the Mongol influence was entirely positive or negative as simplistic. The perspectives of the articles were as diverse as the exchange of opinion in the "round table." The disciplinary reversal of positions of Gol'man and Gorskii is noteworthy but the exception.[58]

A more recent "virtual round table" on the pages of *Ab Imperio* suggests the disciplinary divide.[59] Orientalists criticize the views of specialists in Russian history about the Golden Horde and the Tatars. Usmanov complains that Mongolophobia remains evident in Russian scholarship and dismisses as stupid attempts to reduce the Tatar role in Russian history to all negative or all positive;[60] Rykin invokes Edward Said on Eurocentrism and cultural imperialism; Kradin notes that although Russian historians admit the Mongols conquered Russia, in textbooks their maps show Russia somehow outside the boundaries of the Mongol Empire, and he describes the polemic over the Tatar Yoke as an "unhealthy hullabaloo" (*nezdorovyi azhiotazh*). Kradin also invokes the conclusions of the Eurasianists and George Vernadsky on institutional borrowing and derides "Oriental Despotism" as a false model.[61]

Russian historiography would benefit from a less insular, more multi-disciplinary approach which integrates the orientalists' understanding of the Golden Horde, its political, social, economic and cultural structures and institutions, into analysis of Horde policies toward its Rus' subjects.[62] The obstacles such a reorientation of Russian historiography will encounter may be

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[58] *Ibid. Round table.* Pp. 85-92. The "round table" included A. Kurkchi, D. Iskhakov, I. Izmailov, V. Trepavlov, M. Gol'man, V. Darkevich, and A. A. Gorskii. It was moderated by D. Oleinikov.

[59] *Zaochnyi kruglyi stol: Ot Ordy k Rossii / Virtual Round Table: From the Golden Horde to Russia // Ab Imperio.* 2002. Vol. III. No. 1. Pp. 205-238.

[60] For additional sharp comments on the biases of Russian historical studies on the Golden Horde, see M. A. Usmanov. *Sostoianie i perspektivy istochnikovedeniia istorii Ulusa Dzhuchi // Istochnikovedenie istorii ulusa Dzhuchi (Zolotoi Ordy): ot Kalki do Astrakhani. 1223-1556.* Pp. 3-14.

[61] *Zaochnyi kruglyi stol: Ot Ordy k Rossii.* Pp. 206, 207-208, 219, 228-229, 229-230. Andrei Amel'kin cites fifteenth-century Russo-Tatar dictionaries and the influence of Tatar coinage on Russian. *Ibid.* P. 224.

[62] It is perhaps indicative of this disciplinary divide that no Russian specialist in Russian history during the Tatar period contributed an article to "Istochnikovedenie istorii Ulusa Dzhuchi (*Zolotoi Ordy*): ot Kalki do Astrakhani. 1223-1556" on the Russian narrative sources, including chronicles, saints' lives, tales and epics, about the Golden Horde or Rus'-Tatar relations.

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indicated by Kargalov's derisive remarks about "apologists" of the Mongol conquest who seek some "benefit" (*blago*) to the Rus' from their subordination in the "world empire" of the "chosen genius" Chinggis Khan; the quotation marks are Kargalov's sarcastic commentary.[63] The exchange of opinions on the pages of journals and "round tables," on the other hand, provides some grounds for optimism.

SUMMARY

В статье Чарльза Гальперина обсуждается проблема создания национального исторического нарратива посредством исключения из доминантного исторического дискурса прошлого национального меньшинства, сыгравшего важную роль в формировании российского государства и культуры. Гальперин прослеживает динамику эволюции воззрений российских историков на наследие Золотой Орды и ее влияния на российскую историю. Проследив эту динамику от Н. М. Карамзина до современных исследователей, Гальперин приходит к выводу, что предрассудки историков помешали им использовать в полной мере значительное количество знаний, накопленных востоковедами, археологами, и нумизматами. На многочисленных примерах Гальперин доказывает необходимость выхода российской исторической науки из дисциплинарной изоляции, что поможет созданию более инклюзивного исторического нарратива.

[63] Kargalov. "Na stanitsakh stoiat' krepko!" P. 9.

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THE PLACE OF RUS' IN THE GOLDEN HORDE[1]

In order to understand fully the interaction between Rus', that is the East Slavic principalities and city-states, and the "Golden Horde,"[2] the "Tatar" (as the Rus' called it) successor state of the Mongol Empire which ruled Rus' from 1237-1240 until 1480,[3] it is first of all necessary to understand each separately. Unfortunately, studies of Rus'-Tatar relations often fail to take sufficiently into account scholarship on the Golden Horde.[4] This essay draws a conclusion about the role of Rus' in the Golden Horde on the basis of a new, or at least differently phrased, synthesis of the nature of the Golden Horde. It then seeks to explain

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[1] This article was inspired by my participation in the Second International Conference on the Golden Horde and Its Successors in Istanbul, April 22-24, 2005. I wish to thank the Ayza-Tahir Turkistan Idil-Ural Foundation for its generous financial support in underwriting the Conference. I also wish to express my sincerest appreciation to Mustafa Tuna for his curiosity and patience during several long conversations in which I clarified my ideas.

[2] The anachronistic term *Zlataia/Zolotaia orda* originated no earlier than the 1560s; the contemporary Rus' sources usually referred only to the *Orda* (the Horde). Since the late origin of the term "Golden Horde" is generally acknowledged, I have no problem using it, and will not place it in quotation marks hereafter. However, such usage is a matter of taste. Donald Ostrowski has strong objections to the term, and in its stead proffers "Kipchak Khanate." In Donald Ostrowski, "The Mongol Origins of Muscovite Political Institutions," *Slavic Review* 49:4 (Winter, 1990), p. 525 n. 1, he erroneously calls this term "contemporary," a claim not repeated in his *Muscovy and the Mongols. Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier, 1304-1589* (Cambridge, England, 1998), p. xiii, where he states that the Horde called itself the "Jochid ulus." Here he translates *orda* as "court." I do not find the term "Kipchak Khanate" convenient: Many historians, erroneously in my opinion since the Kipchaks (Polovtsy) were stateless, describe the rulers of the pre-Mongol Kipchaks as khans, so the "Kipchak Khanate" might confusingly refer to pre-Mongol Kipchak chieftainships. The ruling elite of the Horde called itself "Mongol" and retained a separate social identity from its subject Kipchaks perhaps as late as the fifteenth century. The Horde occupied the "Kipchak steppe", but "Kipchak" is a social, not geographic term, so "Kipchak Khanate" does not match "Crimean Khanate"; the equivalent term might be the awkward "Kipchak Steppe Khanate" or the "Volga Khanate" (a term which was occasionally used by the Rus' sources). On the analogy of the Chagatayid Khanate, the Horde might be called the Jochid (or Juchid) Khanate [starting with Tokhtamysh, the khans were not Batuids but Ordoids]. Thus there are several potential replacements for the term "Golden Horde" to which I have no objections, but "Kipchak Khanate" is not among them.

[3] The date "1480" is arbitrary, and acquired its somewhat inaccurate significance as the end of Mongol rule only in the mid sixteenth century. Charles J. Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke* (Columbus, OH, 1985), pp. 150-166.

[4] Charles J. Halperin, "Omissions of National Memory: Russian Historiography on the Golden Horde as Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion," *Ab Imperio* 2004:3, pp. 131-144.

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why the contemporary Rus' sources did not manifest this conception of the Horde as well as the consequences of that omission for modern Russian historiography.

The Golden Horde existed simultaneously in a number of overlapping universes.[5]

First, it was heir to the traditions of the "world" Mongol Empire, of which it was a segment without autonomy until approximately 1259. Batu's authorization to conquer the Rus' and Eastern Europe came from a quriltais in 1234[6] or 1235[7] under Great Kha'an Ugedei, whose death caused Batu to return to the steppes from Hungary. Batu refused to attend Guyuk's accession on the Orkhon river near Karakorum in 1246, which was still expected of him.[8] Batu sent his son Sartak and brother Berke to the Kerulen river in Mongolia to the quriltai which elected Mongke in 1251. The census in Rus' in 1257 was ordered in Karakorum. On Batu's death, Sartak, still a vassal of the Mongol Empire, traveled to Karakorum for confirmation of his accession to the Golden Horde. Even after the de facto independence of the Golden Horde had been established, Juchids, like the Hulagids in the Ilkhanate, recognized Kubilai as sovereign, even though they were at war with each other, and both sent contingents of troops to aid Kubilai's conquest of the Sung starting in 1267.[9] Indeed, Juchid troops had participated in Hulagu's conquest of Iran. Some were stranded in the Ilkhanate when hostilities broke out between the Golden Horde and the Ilkhanate, and under instructions from Berke defected to the Egyptian Mamluks.[10] In 1304 Golden Horde khan Tokhta adhered to an all-Mongol truce resolving the civil war between the Yuan Timur and rebellious Chingissids from rival lines which had been led by Kaidu, to which the Ilkhanate and Chagatayids also subscribed, at least symbolically embodying the continued relevance of the world Mongol confederation.[11] In the first quarter of the fourteenth century, all the successors of the Mongol Empire considered each other "brother states".[12]

The Golden Horde was a successor state of the world Mongol Empire in more than name. Its rulers came exclusively from the Chingissid dynasty; a principle so revered that non-Chingissid powerbrokers such as Mamai and

[5] For an earlier overview, see Charles J. Halperin, *Russia and the Golden Horde. The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History* (Bloomington, IN, 1985), pp. 25-32.

[6] Donald Ostrowski, "The Assembly of the Land (*Zemskii sobor*) as a Representative Institution," in Jarmo Kotilaine and Marshal Poe, eds., *Modernizing Muscovy. Reform and social change in seventeenth-century Russia* (London, 2004), pp. 132-133, n. 46.

[7] George Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia* (New Haven, 1953), p. 48.

[8] On Guyug now see Hodong Kim, "A Reappraisal of Güyüg Khan," in Reuven Amitai and Michal Biran, eds., *Mongols, Turks and Others: Eurasian Nomads and the Sedentary World* (Boston, 2005), pp. 309-338.

[9] Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia*, pp. 57, 61, 65, 66-67, 71, 73, 150.

[10] Charles J. Halperin, "The Kipchak Connection: the Ilkhans, the Mamluks, and Ayn Jalut," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 63:2 (2000), p. 244.

[11] Vernadsky, p. 82.

[12] Liu Yingsheng, "War and Peace between the Yuan Dynasty and the Chaghadaid Khanate (1312-1323)," in Amitai and Biran, eds., p. 354.

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Edigei functioned through Chingissid puppets. The Golden Horde maintained the traditions of the Mongol Empire in its administrative culture, issuing documents (*iarlyki*) which followed earlier models,[13] and in propagating the myth of the "Great Yasa" of Chinggis Khan.[14] The Golden Horde followed the Mongol Empire example in fostering trade, adapting to new possibilities from the Baltic to connect to the caravan Silk Route.[15] The Golden Horde always retained the religious policies of the Mongol Empire, tolerating any faith whose clergy would pray for the health of the khan and his family.[16] Although the Golden Horde evolved in its own way, its policies and institutions still owed a great deal to the Mongol inheritance.

Golden Horde consciousness and historical memory of the Mongol Empire must therefore have been considerable. As long as the Golden Horde fought fellow Mongols in the Ilkhanate or had contacts with even renegade Chagatayids, as in 1316,[17] let alone looked at its own rulers' genealogies, avoiding the Mongol factor would have been impossible. The Mongol legacy might have been very material at times. As a reward for contributing troops to all-Mongol military campaigns in China or Iran, the Juchids expected to receive a share of the revenues from the newly-conquered provinces or at least some private domains (appanages) there. Batu had possessions in Iran and Shansi province in China, and in the fourteenth century Khans Uzbek, Tok-Temur and Janibek still collected revenues from China from 1339 to 1357. All four ulus received a share of the Crimea ports customs income.[18] Not surprisingly, the Yuan could portray themselves as "rulers" over the Golden Horde on a 1331 map, and fourteenth-century Muslim visitors to the Golden Horde could still

[13] A. P. Grigor'ev, *Mongol'skaia diplomatika XIII-XV vv. (Chingizidskie zhalovannye gramoty)* (Leningrad, 1978); M. A. Usmanov, *Zhalovannye gramoty Dzhuchieva ulusa, XIV-XVI vekov* (Kazan', 1979).

[14] David Morgan, "The "*Great Jasa* of Chinggis Khan" Revisited," in Amitai and Biran, eds., pp. 291-308.

[15] S. N. Valk, ed., *Gramoty Velikogo Novgoroda i Pskova* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1949), #30, p. 57.

[16] On the religious "toleration" of the Mongol Empire see James D. Ryan, "Christian Wives of Mongol Khans: Tartar [sic] Queens and Missionary Expectations in Asia," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 3rd series, 8 (1998), pp. 411-21 (pp. 418-20 on the Golden Horde), and Peter Jackson, "The Mongols and the Faith of the Conquered," in Amitai and Biran, eds., pp. 245-290.

[17] Vernadsky, p. 84; Yingsheng, p. 346.

[18] Vernadsky, p. 133, citing Iakinf (Bichurin), tr., *Istoriia pervykh chetyrekh khanov iz doma chingisova* (St. Petersburg, 1829), p. 260. On Juchid appanages in China, see Louis Hambis, tr., *Le Chapitre CVIII du Yuan Che. Les fief attribués aux membres de la famille impériale et aux ministres de la cour mongole d'àpres l'histoire chinoise officielle de la dynastie mongole.* Tom I (Leiden, 1954), pp. 52 Konchak (Uzbek's sister, baptized as Agatha and married to Muscovite prince Iurii Daniilovich?), 114-115 in Kansu, Toqto (khan Tokhta, client and opponent of Nogai, faithful Yuan "servitor" in 1304?). On Golden Horde-Yuan contacts see Mark Grigor'evich Kramarovskii, *Zoloto Chingisidov: kul'turnoe nasledie Zolotoi Ordy* (St. Petersburg, 2001), p. 58 n. 3.

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find Chinese silks and other goods in Sarai bazaars.[19] The overthrow of the Yuan and the Ilkhanate in the fourteenth century cannot have erased this Mongol sense of history completely in the Golden Horde, since Chagatayids, even as Timurid puppets, continued to flourish through the fifteenth century in former Chagatayid territory.

Second, the Golden Horde was heir to the largely Turkic nomadic traditions of the Pontic and Caspian steppe, most of all to the Kipchaks (Polovtsy, Cumans),[20] perhaps the largest indigenous social element to be incorporated into the new "Tatar" society. For this reason the Golden Horde became turkicized. The Golden Horde followed Kipchak practice in retaining oral history, rather than adopting written historiographic traditions as the Yuan, the Ilkhanate, the Timurid, polities and eventually the Mongols in Mongolia did.[21] Geographically Golden Horde activities pertaining to Georgia, Khwarizm, Hungary, Bulgaria, Byzantium, and elsewhere continued the pre-Mongol pattern of broad Kipchak dispersion over Eastern Europe and Western Eurasia. The Tatars took over the Kipchak pastures and ruled the "Kipchak Steppe."

Third, the Golden Horde, especially after the official state adoption of Islam under Khan Uzbek, belonged to the "world of Islam," Dar al-Islam, not the "Abode of War," the Dar al-Harb, with far-reaching cultural consequences. Islam brought with it cultural traditions from Mamluk Egypt and Central Asia – not just the ulema and Sufi orders, but Arabic and Persian theology, jurisprudence, and "high culture." Translations of poetry from Persian to Turkic,[22] books on mathematics and the sciences,[23] students from the Volga and Crimea attending Mamluk universities in Egypt and Syria in the fourteenth centuries, manuscripts of works on Muslim law, logic and philosophy by Golden Horde scholars of Grand Bolgar origin in Turkish repositories[24] – all attest to the Golden Horde's participation in the intellectual pursuits of a flourishing Islamic civilization. The visit of a Berber Moroccan scholar, ibn Batuta, to the Golden Horde signifies the recognition of the Golden Horde's inclusion in the Muslim world on the part of other Muslims,[25] and would have

[19] Vernadsky, pp. 86-87.

[20] Charles J. Halperin, "The Kipchak Connection," pp. 229-245.

[21] Charles J. Halperin, "The Missing Golden Horde Chronicles and Historiography in the Mongol Empire," *Mongolian Studies* 23 (2000), pp. 1-15.

[22] For example, Numuhammet Hisamov, "The Verse Culture of the Golden Horde" and Ebulfez Amanoglu, "The Golden Horde Poet Kutb's Work and its Comparison with that of Nizami" (both in Turkish), papers, Second International Conference on the Golden Horde and Its Successors in Istanbul, April 22-24, 2005, to be published in Timur Kacaoglu and Uli Schamiloglu, eds., *Studies on the Golden Horde and Its Successors* (Istanbul, 2006, forthcoming).

[23] Ihsan Fazlioglu, "The First Mathematics Book in the Golden Horde State. The Masterpiece of Science: et-Tuhfe fi ihmi'l-hisab" (in Turkish), paper. Second International Conference on the Golden Horde and Its Successors, to be published in Kacaoglu and Schamiloglu, eds.

[24] Kramarovskii, *Zoloto Chingisidov*, p. 4.

[25] Ross E. Dunn, The Adventures of Ibn Batuta. A Muslim Traveler of the Fourteenth Century, 2nd ed. (Berkeley, CA, 2004).

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validated to the Horde their religious identification with that world. Tatars from the Golden Horde made the Hajj, including Edigei's wife in 1416 accompanied by 300 horsemen,[26] and architectural monuments in Jerusalem still testify to its Golden Horde Tatar visitors.[27] Islam became perhaps the most lasting and profound contribution of the Horde to the future Tatar peoples.

Fourth, the Golden Horde belonged to the world of the Mediterranean. Despite the Horde's separation from the Mediterranean by the Black Sea, the Horde played Mediterranean politics and became familiar with its diplomatic and geopolitical exigencies. In order to wage war against the Ilkhanate in Iran, the Golden Horde allied with the Mamluks in Egypt; in order to communicate with the Mamluks in Egypt, the Golden Horde compelled the Byzantine Empire to permit transit through the Bosporus. Via Kaffa and Azov, the Horde entered into the vicious commercial rivalries of the Italian city-states.[28] And, of course, contacts from Crimea brought the Golden Horde into greater proximity with Anatolia and Asia Minor.[29] In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, before the Black Death, civil war, and Timur ravaged its economy and polity, the Golden Horde was a major power in the known Afro-Eurasian world, and for that reason the object of missionary and diplomatic solicitude from the far-off Roman Popes.

Fifth, the Golden Horde continued and developed the urban, commercial cultures and societies of Grand Bolgar and Khwarizm, importing not only architectural styles to New and Old Sarai and other new urban foundations,[30] but also, perhaps from the rival Ilkhanate, the Persian bureaucratic diwan system for administration.

Sixth, even after the watershed of the second half of the fourteenth century, the Golden Horde still remained a "minor" power within a narrower region, Central and Eastern Europe.[31] In the thirteenth century Horde military excursions reached into Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Lithuania. Through the fifteenth century the Horde was involved with Poland and Lithuania in their relations with the Rus' principalities. In a sense, the Crimean Khanate continued this role even after the destruction of the Great Horde (the nomadic core of the

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[26] V. G. Tizengausen (Tisenhausen), *Sbornik materialov otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Zolotoi Ordy*, v. I (St. Petersburg, 1884), p. 442, cited in Vernadsky, p. 288.

[27] Mehmet Tütüncü, "The Architectural Monuments & Their Epitaphs Concerning the Golden Horde State in Jerusalem" (in Turkish), paper, Second International Conference on the Golden Horde and Its Successors, to be published in Kacaoglu and Schamiloglu, eds.

[28] Nicola Di Cosmo, "Mongols and Merchants on the Black Sea Frontier in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries: Convergences and Conflicts," in Amitai and Biran, eds., pp. 391-424.

[29] Kramarovskii, *Zoloto Chingisidov*, *passim*, also illustrates Italian (Genoese and Venetian) influence on decorative art with precious metals in the Golden Horde, along with contacts with the Delhi sultanate, Yemen, Armenian Cilicia, and North Africa.

[30] G. A. Fedorov-Davydov, *Zolotoordynskie goroda Povolzh'ia* (Moscow, 1994).

[31] Berthold Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde. Die Mongolen in Russland*, 2nd exp. ed.. (Wiesbaden, 1965), emphasized this point in describing the Horde's role in international affairs.

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Golden Horde after its dissolution into its component parts), and legitimately so, since the Crimea insisted that it and it alone was heir to the Golden Horde legacy. Sometimes ambivalently under Ottoman suzerainty Crimean cavalry could be dispatched far and wide, from eastern Asia Minor or the Caucasus to fight Safavid Persia in the east to the gates of Vienna to the west.

These variegated orientations, perspectives and traditions made the Golden Horde a very complex society, culture, and polity. The challenge to specialists in Rus' history is to identify the significance of the Golden Horde's multi-valent nature for Tatar policy toward the East Slavic forest zone.

The Golden Horde's vision of its past and present extended far beyond the confines of the Rus' territories. The Golden Horde's economy depended upon international commerce, its major foreign policy goal was annexing the pastures of Azerbaijan from the Ilkhanate, its cultural mentors were Khwarizm and Cairo and indirectly the entire Muslim Middle East. The list of visitors, voluntary or coerced, to the Golden Horde and Sarai attests to the cosmopolitanism of the Horde's outlook. From their nomadic or urban centers, the khans of the Golden Horde could only have viewed Rus' as peripheral to their interests.

At first glance this conclusion seems fatally counter-intuitive in light of the Rus' sources.[32] To the Rus', Rus'-Tatar relations were central to the Golden Horde, indeed, virtually a dominant, all-encompassing obsession. The Rus' chronicles overflow with descriptions of "raids" and campaigns by Horde forces into the forest, Horde interference in princely succession and politics, massive economic loss via Horde tribute, taxes, bribes, gifts, and extortion by resident or visiting Horde officials. On the other hand, some sources, such as the Life of Aleksandr Nevskii or more ambivalently a passage in the Galician-Volhynian chronicle about grand prince Daniil, virtually exult in the reflected glory of Golden Horde khan's respect for the dignity of leading Riurikid princes.[33]

This depiction of the dominance of Rus' in Horde political and economic concerns is a half-truth. The military incursions and fiscal exactions depicted in the Rus' chronicles did take place. The Rus' sources may be problematic but they were at least rooted in reality, not fantasy. However, Rus' obligations to the Horde did not have the same significance to the Horde as they had for the Rus'. The quantity of Tatar "raids" is deceptive, since many of them were extremely small-scale slave-raiding expeditions, probably not even close to the scale of the Crimean attack on Moscow in 1571. To be sure, there was a large-scale military engagement, Kulikovo Pole in 1380,[34] but this was atypical. The scale of

[32] Charles J. Halperin, "The Russian Sources for the History of the Golden Horde and Its Successor States," paper, Second International Conference on the Golden Horde and Its Successors, to be published in Kacaoglu and Schamiloglu, eds.

[33] Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 53-61.

[34] Statistics for medieval Rus' armies are notoriously suspect, but relative scale is easier to determine. The size of the battle of Kulikovo is attested by the emphasis of the literary works of the Kulikovo Cycle on the dimensions of Russian losses and by Dmitrii Donskoi's inability two

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Golden Horde invasions of Ilkhanid territory probably dwarfed that of Rus' campaigns significantly. The forces which even Mamai in 1380 or Tokhtamysh in 1382 moved against grand prince Dmitrii Donskoi of Moscow could hardly match the massive armies Tokhtamysh and later khans or emirs mobilized against Timur. Similarly, while the economic burden of Golden Horde rule was exceptionally onerous on Rus', compounding the losses of life and property of military activities, surely the income to the Horde, even in silver, from the East Slavic forest zone could not match the revenue from the transcontinental Silk Route or the Italian-dominated Black Sea/Mediterranean route.[35] It was Timur's relocation of the Silk Route south of the Caspian which spelled economic doom to the Golden Horde, which, after the demographic catastrophe of the Black Death, could not rebuild its lower Volga urban base, at least, not to its former level. The evidence of Rus'-Tatar relations leads to the conclusion that the Golden Horde was more important to Rus' than vice versa.

It is necessary to ask whether the Rus' were aware of the multiple universes to which the Golden Horde belonged. Although there is no evidence of Rus' familiarity with Horde original works or manuscripts of outside provenance belonging to Muslim intellectual high culture of theology, poetry, or jurisprudence, nevertheless the overall answer has to be affirmative. Grand Prince Iaroslav and his son Aleksandr Nevskii traveled to Karakorum. Rus' princes fought under Golden Horde banners in a campaign against the Alans in the Caucasus.[36] Princes Fedor Rostislavovich of Smolensk, Gleb Vasil'kovich of Rostov, and others made careers and sometimes marriages in the Horde.[37] "Russians" constituted various military units in Yuan China[38] and "Russians" continued to be given as "gifts" to Yuan emperors in the 1330s.[39] Moscow in 1376 attempted to impose its rule, and more importantly its tax officials (*doroga and tamozhnia*), on Grand Bolgar.[40] Later, Muscovite merchants traded with the

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years later to raise sufficient troops to oppose what became Tokhtamysh's sack of Moscow. On the available source and secondary estimates, see Donald Ostrowski, "Troop Mobilization by the Muscovite Grand Princes (1315-1533)," in Eric Lohr and Marshall Poe, eds., *The Military and Society in Russia 1450-1917* (Leiden, 2002), pp. 21-22.

[35] The importation of silver from the Black Sea trade is emphasized in Leonard Nedashkovsky and Uli Schamiloglu, "Coins Tell Their Own Story: Numismatic Evidence for the History of the Golden Horde and Later Golden Horde," paper, Second International Conference on the Golden Horde and Its Successors, to be published in Kacaoglu and Schamiloglu, eds.

[36] *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei*, XV, 2nd ed., *Rogozhskii letopisets* (Petrograd, 1922, rpt 1965), p. 405.

[37] Halperin, *Russia and the Golden Horde*, pp. 110-111; Gail Lenhoff, *Early Russian Hagiography: The Lives of Prince Fedor the Black* (Berlin, 1997).

[38] E. Bretschneider, *Medieval researches from eastern Asiatic sources. Fragments toward the knowledge of the geography and history of central and western Asia from the 13th to the 17th centuries* (London, 1910), v. I, pp. 73-81.

[39] Vernadsky, p. 88.

[40] Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, p. 45.

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city of Solkhat in the Crimea.[41] Artistic influence and borrowing even crossed the confessional divide. Not only is the famous "Cap of Monomakh" of Horde origin, but gold and silver decorations of manuscripts of the Gospels, icons, ecclesiastical vestments and accouterments, bracelets and other jewelry, illustrate not only the degree to which the "Tatar gold" of the *Zadonshchina* was fashionable in Rus' but also a creative inspiration. Kramarovskii even proposes that after Timur ravaged Sarai and other Horde urban sites Horde artisans sought refuge in Moscow, including in the atelier of metropolitan Photius.[42] Rus' lived in and visited the Horde and Sarai in significant numbers; they would have had no choice but to become aware of the range of international contacts which the Golden Horde maintained. Indeed, Rus' imports of foreign goods, including silk and pearls, from the Horde suggests a very material appreciation of the Golden Horde's diverse and far-flung economic connections.[43] In the thirteenth century the Rus' were hardly likely not to notice a Franciscan friar talking to the khan! In short, the Rus' would have had to be deaf, dumb and blind to remain ignorant of the Golden Horde's nature, as if Rus' passed through Sarai without seeing its aqueducts, caravansaries, mosques, and medresses.

It is certain that the Rus' were not totally immune to such observations. The Rus' chronicles do provide a very small number of references conducive to explicating the true nature of the Horde, to which we have already referred, such as princely trips to Karakorum and princely participation in a Caucasus campaign. Genealogies which traced Golden Horde khans back to Chinggis Khan were copied even in sixteenth-century Muscovy.[44] However, such allusions are few and far between, and what is omitted is much greater than what is included - no mention of Muslim high culture, of bureaucratic structures, of urban civilization, of Horde contacts with Egypt. There is not even any Rus' evidence of Byzantine-Golden Horde contacts, although Nogai married an illegitimate Byzantine princess. Superficial reading of the Rus' narrative sources creates the distinct impression that the Golden Horde was no more than a band of nomad, barbarian, "infidel" bandits, whose sole purpose in life was to wreck havoc on the Orthodox Christian Rus'. The larger universes of Golden Horde identity escaped articulation.

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[41] Mark Kramarovsky, "Solkhat-Crimea in the 13th and 14th centuries: People, Culture and Craft Traditions," paper, Second International Conference on the Golden Horde and Its Successors, to be published in Kacaoglu and Schamiloglu, eds.

[42] Kramarovskii, *Zoloto Chingisidov*, pp. 176-177, 181-183, 204-209, 212-213, 267. Horde artistic influence on Russian Orthodox objects obviously requires modification of my earlier views of the impermeability of Russian Christian culture to the Horde. It would be interesting to know the ethnic identity and religion of refugee Horde artisans in Moscow.

[43] Thomas S. Noonan, "Russia's Eastern Trade, 1150-1350: The Archeological Evidence," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi III* (1983), pp. 201-264.

[44] "Rodoslovnye knigi po trem spiskam," *Vremennik Obshchestva Istorii i Drevnostei Rossiiskikh* X (1851), pp. 126-130, 221-222; *Redkie istochniki po istorii Rossii* (Moscow, 1977), pp. 67-68.

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Why? The most common explanation, which I have shared and propagated,[45] is that religious prejudice drove the distorted Rus' image of the Tatars. Religious prejudice there was, and in abundance; Christianity constituted the world-view of the Rus', and not just of the clergy and monks, professional believers.[46] But I would now propose that there was another factor, hitherto overlooked, which motivated the Rus' myopia about the place of Rus' in the Golden Horde. That factor was, without over-dramatizing, the instinct for survival.

Simply put, for the Rus' princes the Horde was a matter of life-and-death, for themselves personally and politically, and for their principalities economically. In the thirteenth and early fourteenth century, a political misstep in dealing with the Golden Horde could result in summary execution, as Mikhail of Chernigov and Mikhail of Tver', among others, learned to their martyrdom. Failure to comply with Horde demands could produce devastating punitive expeditions from the Horde, with or without rival Rus' princely connivance or contribution. For the Rus' Orthodox Church, maintaining its fiscal immunities from Horde taxation was crucial to generating the financial resources necessary to support its sacral functions. The bishop of Sarai was there not only to tend to the spiritual needs of Rus' in the Horde, but also to keep an eye out for Church interests. Allocation of the Tatar tribute was of paramount importance, which is why the northeastern princes of Tver' and Moscow fought so hard for the right to control who paid how much. Prosperity or depression depended upon the quantity and frequency of Horde payments, not to mention trying to remain below the Horde's radar in raids and campaigns. Politically and economically, literally and metaphorically, the Rus', like their princes and Church hierarchs, could not afford the luxury of devoting any intellectual or cultural energy into articulating, or even acknowledging, the Golden Horde's heterogenous, creative high culture. Rus' knowledge of Horde contributions to Islamic theology or astronomy or even the Chinese appanages of Horde khans could not possible contribute to Rus' ability to satisfy Horde demands for taxes and conscripts. The Golden Horde paid as much attention to the Rus' as was required to collect tribute, taxes, and military recruits, in order to pursue really important matters elsewhere. The Rus' were – and had no choice but to be – fixated on Tatar actions toward and in the East Slavic forest zone.

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[45] Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke.*

[46] Following John L. I. Fennell, Ostrowski postulates a sharp divide between pre-1448 "pro-Tatar" and post-1448 "anti-Tatar" Rus' sources; following Edward L. Keenan, Jr., Ostrowski distinguishes between "Court" and "Church" attitudes toward the Tatars, especially after 1448. See Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, especially pp. 135-163. Even accepting for the sake of argument the arbitrary and hypothetical 1448 divide, I find both conclusions unconvincing; the former misinterprets the content of pre-1448 sources, which are, like post-1448, anti-Tatar but pro-Chingissid, and the latter distorts the cultural homogeneity of Rus' society by stripping the "Court" of its religion.

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The result of the synergy of Orthodox Christian bigotry and Rus' pragmatic necessity was the depiction of Rus'-Tatar relations in the chronicles and other narrative sources which highlighted military confrontation to the almost total exclusion of institutional borrowing, trade, bilingualism, social intercourse, or cultural appreciation. Understanding this Rus' narrow-mindedness as a matter of exigency might not mitigate the religious intolerance on which it was based or minimize the intellectual impoverishment which resulted from such insularity. However, the seeming contradiction between the portrayal of the Tatars in Rus' sources and the results of generations of scholarly study of the Golden Horde by orientalists, Turcologists, and Islamicists at least makes historical sense within this new context.

Finally, the analysis presented in this essay makes it all the more regrettable and unjustifiable that some specialists in Russian history have taken the Rus' sources at face value as "objective," and perpetuated, sometimes with translation from religious to modern nationalist vocabulary, the mind-set of the medieval Rus' into scholarship, as if studies of the Golden Horde had not abundantly illustrated the distortion they embody. Dismissing the Golden Horde as barbaric and avaricious nomads will not help elucidate the nature of Rus'-Tatar relations. The history of Rus'-Tatar relations and of the Golden Horde itself cannot be written without reference to the Rus' sources, but it cannot be written exclusively from them, or objectively or comprehensively unless the limitations of those sources are fully taken into account.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

INSTITUTIONS:

CGADA = Tsental'nii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov, Moscow (now Rossisskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov = RGADA)
GBL = Gosudarstvennaia biblioteka imeni V. I. Lenina, Moscow (now Rossiiskaia Gosudarstvennaia Biblioteka)
GIM = Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Muzei, Moscow
GPB = Gosudarstvennaia Publichnaia Biblioteka imeni M. E. Saltykova-Shchedrina, St. Petersburg (now Rossiiskaia Natsional'naia biblioteka)
Izd. LGU = Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta
Izd. Sotsekolit = Izdatel'stvo Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, Moscow
Sibirskoe otdelenie AN SSSR = Sibirskoe otdelenie Akademii Nauk Soiuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskh Respublik (USSR)
Otd. rus. iazyka slov. Akad.Nauk = Otdelenie russkogo iazyka i slovestnosti Akademii Nauk, St. Petersburg

JOURNALS:

AM = Asia Major
CAJ = Central Asiatic Journal
FEQ = Far Eastern Quarterly
FOG = Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte
HJAS = Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies.
Izvestiia AN SSSR = Izvestiia Akademii Nauk Soiuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskh Respublik (USSR)
JBfGOE = Jarhbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas
MS = Monumenta Serica
OE = Oriens Extremis
SRIO = Sbornik russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva
Učenye zapiski LGU = Učenye zapiski Leningradskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta

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